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 Interest in the various institutions and comparisons of them did not wane 
after the collapse of the socialist system; in fact, institutional analysis has 
recently attracted renewed attention. Interestingly, in the literature, two 
particular trends can be distinguished in the analyses of institutions. On 
the one hand, the trend known as the varieties of capitalism (VoC) studies 
the institutional system of developed countries from a political- economic 
point of view, searching for alternatives to the neoliberal system of the 
USA. On the other hand, another group of researchers analyses the tran-
sition of socialist countries, searching for analogies in order to be able to 
classify the VoC literature or to refuse this possibility. 
 Th is book makes an attempt to empirically identify the models of capi-
talism found in the member states of the European Union (EU) and to 
elaborate a common theoretical framework suitable for all member states. 
Th us, not only the customary duality of the liberal versus coordinated 
market economy featured in the VoC literature and its fi ne-tuned ver-
sions but also those aspects in which the company is placed in focus 
are surpassed. If not only the most developed countries but also the 
Mediterranean and post-socialist countries are included in our investi-
gation, the institutional systems of their economies or their operation 
cannot be understood without taking the role of the state into account. 
Th is approach is a political-economic one, and this comparison aims to 
interpret the diff erences existing primarily in economic performance and 
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competitiveness; however, the social impacts of the functioning of these 
models must also be considered. 
 Th e fi rst part of the book establishes the methodological background 
of other studies. It provides an overview of the literature dedicated to 
the comparison of institutions to ascertain a place for this study in the 
literature. 
 At the beginning of this research, at the end of 2009, it was impos-
sible to foresee the depth of the fi nancial and economic crisis, and the 
subsequent developments rewrote the plan for the book. On the one 
hand, the classifi cation of the models of capitalism had to be built on 
pre-crisis data because the indicators used to identify the institutions are 
modifi ed by the temporary eff ects of the crisis and therefore may lead 
to false conclusions pertaining to the institutions. On the other hand, 
more than a half a decade has passed since the crisis began, and this 
period has been long enough to pose the question of whether the crisis 
triggered any changes in the models of capitalism. Th erefore, the second 
part of the book describes the models of capitalism characteristic to the 
EU member states. Th e framework of the study has been created in a way 
that the results should be comparable with those of an earlier empirical 
study performed by Bruno Amable ( 2003 ) that included only the old 
member states (OMS) of the EU. Th e next part provides an overview of 
the changes that occurred during the crisis. Particular attention has been 
given to the course of the crisis and the regulatory responses to it; on the 
basis of these responses, I have tried to deduce the changes that may have 
a permanent impact on the institutions. 
 Studies pertaining to the period before the crisis and the period of 
the crisis have confi rmed that a paradigm shift is necessary in the insti-
tutional analysis of the EU member states. A quarter of a century has 
passed since the system change in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In 
the meantime, countries that became member states of the EU detached 
from the other post-communist countries; as a result, a stable institu-
tional system of the market economy, which has specifi c distinguishing 
features compared to the other European models of capitalism, evolved. 
Th us, we can speak about the CEE model of capitalism—nevertheless, a 
common theoretical framework can be applied to all EU member states. 
It is also reasonable because VoC literature has never questioned that 
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
 Preface vii
Mediterranean countries can be included in their research as well, under 
the name “mixed market economy”. Nevertheless, the quantitative statis-
tical analyses applied in this book, as well as the qualitative case studies, 
confi rm that the institutional system of the Mediterranean countries is 
not more similar to that of the Nordic, North-Western countries than it is 
to that of the CEE countries. It further follows that the categories of the 
old and the new member states (NMS) no longer express the signifi cant 
diff erences within the European integration. At the same time, there are 
still profound diff erences between the models of capitalism represented 
by the Nordic and North-Western countries and the models of capital-
ism characteristic of the Mediterranean countries and the CEE countries. 
Moreover, these diff erences can be seen in those areas that have a key role 
in long-term growth, in the innovation system and in the transparent 
and professional operation of the state and public administration. An 
important feature of the European social market economy is successful 
cooperation between employers and employees. Th ere are essential diff er-
ences between the two regions in this respect as well. 
 Th is divide is remarkably striking because in the Nordic and North- 
Western countries, increasing solutions serving the purpose of liberali-
sation were built in the Nordic and continental models of the 1960s 
and 1970s, while attempting to maintain the balance between ensur-
ing competitiveness and providing the services of the welfare state. Th is 
part of the EU witnessed a certain degree of institutional convergence. 
Th e operation of the internal market and the EU regulations also had 
the same eff ect, explaining why the Anglo-Saxon model does not appear 
markedly in the EU. Th e process of hybridisation did not come to a halt 
even during the years of the crisis. 
 In addition, the crisis made it obvious to the Mediterranean countries 
that the precondition for their long-term development is precisely to step 
out of the framework of the Mediterranean model. Naturally, the eff ects 
of the reform measures taken as a response to the recession and auster-
ity measures cannot be felt yet, but the in-depth analyses in the third 
part of this book reveal that the road to realisable, eff ective institutional 
solutions built on their own development path is still very long. Th e 
CEE countries’ adaptation during the crisis came by way of maintaining 
and deepening the characteristic features of the model (liberalisation on 
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
viii Preface
the product and the labour market, integration in the global value chain 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) and maintaining competitive-
ness through keeping the social protection expenditures at a low level). 
 Th is institutional analysis sends a grave message to the theory of 
European integration, which is elaborated in the last chapter of this book. 
Economic integration, as well as the monetary union, assumes the con-
vergence of real and nominal processes among the countries. Decision 
makers within the EU have long been aware of the need to take action at 
community level in order to achieve this goal. Th ese reforms have long 
been based on the conception that the institutions designed at the com-
munity level will be able to change the behaviour of the actors by com-
bining sanctions and incentives. Th e diffi  culties that emerged due to the 
crisis in 2008 show that the eff ectiveness of such interventions is limited. 
Th e institutional analyses clearly revealed that we have to face such sig-
nifi cant, durably sustaining diff erences that the question—which is never 
asked in the economics of the European integration—cannot be evaded: 
how large are those diff erences that allow for a still-functional internal 
market and monetary union? If it were possible to model this situation, 
we would be able to identify the minimal conditions for functionality 
and to estimate the related cost. When all the above factors are taken into 
account, we may begin talking about how these minimum conditions 
can be achieved and about what kind of reforms are possible and needed. 
 In case of the CEE countries, the European integration successfully 
stimulated this transition. Th e application of conditionality, however, 
was truly eff ective only until their intention to join the Western bloc 
impelled these countries and the non-recurrent, productivity-increasing 
eff ect of the transition from a planned economy to a market economy 
in the favourable global economic environment resulted in perceptible 
convergence. However, in this region, reforms have slowed down or even 
come to a stop in recent years. Th e eff ectiveness of the conditions and 
regulations imposed by the external EU level decreases, and the signifi -
cance of the commitment of the given state or society increases, if pro-
ductivity growth must be ensured from a higher income level and with a 
more complex adaptation process. 
 Ultimately, the EU must fi nd a balance between two adverse aspects. 
On the one hand, the EU cannot fail to support, at the level of the 
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 community, convergences that allow for a functioning internal market 
and a functioning monetary union. On the other hand, what can be 
realistically expected from the community-level institutions and regula-
tions in this heterogeneous integration must be reassessed, and increased 
value must be given to the responsibility of the member states. We have 
to accept the situation in which the European integration is an open-
ended system, not a process with a well-defi ned fi nal state, implying “a 
safe haven”. I argue that the diff erentiated integration is not a transitory 
deviation from the ideal situation to be achieved, but rather a method for 
handling the diff erences. 
 Th e European integration is a great asset that is threatened by sev-
eral internal and external challenges. At the time this manuscript was 
completed, the outcome of the next act of the Greek drama was still 
unknown, and in Ukraine, because there is no immediate hope to settle 
the situation, we must regard the ceasefi re agreement as a success. Th e 
crisis of the euro area and the tension caused by the free movement of 
labour within the Union have indicated that maintaining and developing 
this integration require new conceptual frameworks. Th is book makes an 
attempt to fi nd these frameworks. 
 Finally, I express my thanks to Professor László Csaba and Professor 
Péter Gedeon for their valuable comments and advice on the manuscript. 
  Beáta   Farkas 
  Szeged, Hungary 
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 1 
1.1  Historical Precursors 
 Th e thought that “institutions matter” is currently widely accepted in 
mainstream economics. However, a range of various ideas and approaches 
existed until this thought gained recognition. In order to understand the 
current situation, a brief historical overview is needed. Among the clas-
sical economists, Adam Smith was receptive to the historical approach, 
which inherently involved describing the changing institutional system. 
Analysing the operation mechanism of the market was only an instrument 
for Adam Smith to create a normative argument—based on the effi  ciency 
of the market—for a given institutional system. Screpanti and Zamagni 
( 2005 ) reference the interpretation of James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, 
and Friedrich von Hayek and go as far as to claim that Smith dealt with 
the comparison of various institutional structures. David Ricardo vigor-
ously moved towards an abstract, deductive model, which was void of 
almost any historical or institutional content. John Stuart Mill, belong-
ing to the classical school of economics, and Alfred Marshall, who gave 
a summary of the neoclassical trend, both returned to the methodology 
of Smith and combined deductive reasoning with historical description 
 Institutions in the Economic Thought 
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(Landreth and Colander  2002 ). However, Marshall’s approach concern-
ing the institutions did not become generally accepted in neoclassical eco-
nomics, but rather the thought—which had already been present in the 
works of the “founding fathers” (William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, 1 
and Léon Walras)—that economics studies the universally applicable 
laws concerning the allocation of scarce resources among alternative uses. 
It is well known that this brief defi nition of the subject of economics was 
polished to perfection by Lionel Robbins in his book titled  An Essay on 
the Nature and Signifi cance of Economic Science in 1932. 2 In this system of 
thought, the aim and motivation of human action are exogenous features 
built on the  a priori axiom of rational thinking and profi t maximisation. 
Th e legal and institutional environment in which decisions are made is 
also considered exogenous. For Marshall, it was important that his theory 
provide answers to the questions of economic reality that are relevant in 
economic policy. Th e impact of his approach has faded in this respect, 
however. In neoclassical orthodox economics, Walras’ legacy—which was 
preoccupied with the internal logic of the equilibrium models—proved 
to be more powerful. Positivism, the main philosophical, epistemologi-
cal theory of the era, also fostered the view that theory enjoys certain 
autonomy as opposed to reality. Pursuant to this approach, the validity 
of the assumptions of a model is less important than the model’s ability 
to forecast. Th is view did not leave much room to take institutions into 
account (Henley and Tsakalotos  1993 ). 
 Neoclassical economics gained ground in Britain and France, but not 
in Germany, and it was met with resistance in the USA. Schools both in 
Germany and the USA placed importance on the study of institutions. 
 In Germany, even the classical Anglo-Saxon political economy failed 
to win acceptance. Th e main characters of the old German historical 
school (Wilhelm Roscher, Bruno Hildebrand, and Karl Knies), which 
existed in the less developed, fundamentally agrarian German economy, 
refused that an economic theory that was valid for the industrialising 
British economy would be equally valid independent of time and space. 
According to them, economics, as a social science, must be historically 
well-founded. It was exactly for this reason that they rejected the attempt 
of the classical school, especially Ricardo and his followers, to adapt the 
methodology of physics. Th e second generation of the German historical 
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school, with its outstanding leader, Gustav von Schmoller, also denied 
that economics possessed universal laws that would be independent of 
all historical, social, or institutional contexts. Th us, it is not surprising 
that the models of Menger, Jevons, and Walras built on marginal analysis 
and abstract deduction could not take eff ect in the 1870s (Landreth and 
Colander  2002 ; Spiegel  2004 ). 
 Th e German historical school did not develop an alternative economic 
theory with long-lasting eff ects; nevertheless, it had a direct infl uence on 
American economic thought. At the turn of the nineteenth century, it was 
not unusual for American students to go to Germany to obtain doctor-
ate degree in economics; thus, several American university professors had 
gathered experience in Germany. Th is eff ect was added to other infl uences 
and eff ects within the USA; consequently, the old institutional school 
was born. Th ere are essential diff erences between the views of Th orstein 
Veblen, Wesley Clair Mitchell, and John Rogers Commons—just to men-
tion the three most frequently featured authors in the history of economic 
thought—but they share some common ideas, which have relevance to 
my study. Pragmatism—more precisely, the views of John Dewey—exer-
cised profound infl uence on American social science and on the institu-
tionalists. Th is philosophical tradition rejected natural law, the existence 
of universal social laws and the abstract, deductive argument in social sci-
ences. Instead, it turned towards experience and evolutionary change. In 
addition to Darwin’s evolution theory, the profound, dynamic economic 
growth and structural changes that were so characteristic of the USA at the 
end of the nineteenth century made scholars open to these views. 
 Th e institutionalists did not attempt to fi nd an equilibrium deriv-
ing from a static comparison—as the neoclassical economists did—but 
rather wanted to explain the dependence of the economic setting and 
behaviour on other circumstances. In contrast with the German histori-
cal school, these scholars were not so much interested in the historical 
dimension of this dependence, but rather in the interaction of the eco-
nomic setting and the wider social environment and institutional frame-
work, that is, its social embeddedness. German institutionalists also dealt 
with the latter in a national framework, while American institutionalists 
concentrated on the local communities, which is only natural if we con-
sider their historical backgrounds. Empirical data collection was deemed 
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important by the Americans as well, but besides this, several representa-
tives could not abandon the idea of theory building. Moreover, the lack of 
theory building caused them to criticise German historism (Djelic  2010 ; 
Spiegel  2004 ; Ekelund and Hébert  1997 ; Screpanti and Zamagni  2005 ). 
American institutionalists had considerable infl uence between the two 
World Wars, but Clarence Ayres—who was member of the next genera-
tion—declared in 1944 that neoclassicism gained complete victory over 
the institutionalist approach (Landreth and Colander  2002 : 477). Th e 
above-referenced interpretations of economic thought univocally distin-
guish John Kenneth Galbraith and Gunnar Myrdal as scholars who dealt 
with institutional analysis after the Second World War (WWII), but this 
approach was entirely abandoned until the 1970s. 
 Th e above-referenced books on the history of economic thought regard 
the old and the new German historical schools as part of economic think-
ing and univocally speak about old or American institutional economics 
when the approach of Veblen and his followers is discussed; others men-
tion the impact of other social sciences as well. However, when histori-
cal precursors are reviewed, it immediately stands out that the study of 
the institutional dimensions has always been interdisciplinary from the 
beginning. In compliance with this, the handbook of comparative insti-
tutional analysis, which was created as an interdisciplinary undertaking, 
explores German historism and old institutionalism as the joint legacy 
of economics and political science. Based on the arguments put forward, 
this thought is not without reason (Djelic  2010 ). 
1.2  Institutions in Contemporary Economics 
 After WWII, economic thought was no longer interested in the study of 
institutions, and the Keynesian economic policy based on state interven-
tion became dominant. It seems that short-term stimulation of demand 
and the acceptance that market failures are handled by the state could not 
shake the belief in the existence of a long-term neoclassical equilibrium. 
Th is thought is expressed rather well by the neoclassical synthesis begin-
ning with John R. Hicks, the aim of which was to fi t the Keynesian system 
of thought into the neoclassical theory. Th anks to Paul A. Samuelson, its 
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formalised version found its way to education, thereby determining the 
way of thinking for generations (Beaud and Dostaler  1995 ). 
 In the decades after WWII, there were changes in the interrelations 
among the social sciences, which obviously aff ected institutional analyses 
as well. Until the 1960s, the various fi elds of social sciences—economics, 
political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and so on—shared 
experiences and learned from each other. Originating from the econom-
ics departments in the USA, several fi elds of social sciences began to pull 
away from each other. Economics became mathematised, and psychol-
ogy became closer to biochemistry. Economic sociology practically dis-
appeared in the 1950s and 1960s. In the post-war “Golden Age”, it may 
have seemed that the Keynesian welfare state would be able to solve the 
social problems of developed countries (Crouch  2005 ). 
 Th e explosion in oil prices in the 1970s and the subsequent economic 
crisis resulted in a structural rearrangement in scientifi c scrutiny as well. 
Th ose schools based on neoclassical thought, such as monetarism and 
the new classical macroeconomics, basically criticised the institutional 
system when fi nding fault with the Keynesian interventionist policy. 
Th e microeconomics-based demand-side policies called for substantial 
institutional changes, which carried the implicit acknowledgement that 
“institutions matter” (Amable  2003 ; Pedersen  2010 ). 
 Two paradigms developed parallel to each other. On the one hand, 
in political sciences, one paradigm was historical institutionalism, also 
known as comparative political economy, which dealt with expressly eco-
nomic institutional issues. On the other hand, economists and economic 
historians began to use the denomination of new institutional econom-
ics, new political economy, which basically meant an analytical institu-
tionalism. In the mid-1980s, economic sociology appeared again, and 
according to its representatives, it immediately had fruitful interaction 
with new institutional economics (Nee and Swedberg  2005 ). 
 Nevertheless, if we aim to place institutionalism in contemporary eco-
nomics or in social sciences, we have a diffi  cult task. It is only natural 
that there is no generally accepted classifi cation of the contemporary 
trends in the history of economic thought because we do not have the 
temporal perspective that would be necessary for such a classifi cation. 
Th e thought that attention must be devoted to institutions appeared in a 
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series of contemporary approaches from the French school of “ régulation ” 
and from Marxists through Post-Keynesians to evolutionists (Hodgson 
 2007a ). Th erefore, it is hardly surprising that various groupings can be 
found in the literature or—at the other end of the spectrum—the books 
on economic thought often fail to address contemporary schools at all. 
Screpanti and Zamagni ( 2005 ) examine the contemporary trends in an 
even greater volume, compared to similar works, which provided an over-
view of economic theories, and they have collected a series of contem-
porary schools under the heading of institutional analysis. For instance, 
they include new political economy, the contractarian, the utilitarian and 
the evolutionary neo-institutionalism, the new “old” institutionalism, 
Hayek and the neo-Austrian schools. It can be seen from the above cat-
egorisation that the widespread rediscovery of institutions in economics 
makes the application of the institutional analysis as a group-generating, 
scientifi c-taxonomical category more or less meaningless. 
 We can therefore conclude—in agreement with Hodgson ( 2007b : 1)—
that the discussion of the role of institutions in economics is commonplace 
today. 3 Paying attention to the institutional issues has become so general 
that it is no longer suitable as the basis of a scientifi c-taxonomic classifi -
cation. It is worth making a distinction between the institutional analy-
ses—which are also frequently performed by other social sciences (see Fig. 
 1.1 )—and another, better defi ned fi eld, institutional economics, which 
can easily fi t into the family tree of economics as an individual approach 
(at the same time, naturally, it is an important area of institutional analy-
sis, and the interdisciplinary methods are used in this as well). When we 
say that institutional economics is “better defi ned”, it is only relatively true 
because institutional economics is a highly complex scientifi c branch of 
economics, full of contradictory and overlapping tendencies.
1.3  The New “Old” Institutionalism 
and the New Institutionalism 
 If the authors of large, comprehensive books on the history of economic 
theory place new institutional economics somewhere in the history of 
economic thought, this school—which is complementary to neoclassical 
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economics and basically part of the mainstream—is usually contrasted 
with the heterodox old institutional economics pursued in the fi rst third 
of the twentieth century (for example, Landreth and Colander  2002 ; 
Roncaglia  2007 ). However, old institutionalism has current represen-
tatives as well; they gained strength in the 1990s, and at present, they 
invariably debate with new institutionalism. Nevertheless, it is not the 
aim of this work to give a detailed theoretical reconstruction of these 
two schools. By comparing what the two schools consider the subject 
and method of scientifi c investigation, I provide an overview of those 
dilemmas they have to face in institutional analysis. Behind the diff erent 
methodological standpoints, there are diff erent ontological views about 
human beings and society. 
 Th e main forum for the representatives of old institutional econom-
ics is currently the  Journal of Economic Issues , which was established in 
1967 by the Association for Evolutionary Economics, an organisation for 
those institutionalists who were gradually crowded out from mainstream 
American economic thinking. Warren J. Samuels, Marc R. Tool, Allen 
G. Gruchy, Geoff rey Hodgson, and others have built on the American 
institutionalists of the beginning of the twentieth century. However, 
 Fig. 1.1  The relationship between economics and other social sciences (soci-
ology and political science) in institutional analysis.  Source : Author’s 
construction 
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this approach is not uniform, either; fundamentally, two research pro-
grammes are included. One of them is based on the Veblen-Ayres tra-
dition and deals primarily with the industrial and business, fi nancial 
dichotomy of the economy, which is also expressed in the diff erentia-
tion between institutional and technological ways of thinking. Th is pro-
gramme investigates the eff ect of new technologies on institutions and 
how social habits, conventions, and interests resist these changes. Th e 
other programme—deriving from Commons—concentrates on law, 
property rights, and organisations, and their development, and examines 
their impact on legal-economic power and the distribution of income. 
Institutions are considered the fi nal outcome resulting from the formal 
and informal processes of confl ict solving (Rutherford  1996 ). 
 Th e new institutional economics—the name of which derives from 
Oliver Williamson ( 1975 )—involves an even more wide-ranging pro-
gramme. According to the categorisation applied in the handbook writ-
ten on this school, the examination of the institutions covers the state, 
the legal order and those macro-institutions that infl uence markets and 
companies. Other fi elds involve the micro-institutions that govern the 
companies, the contracts they conclude and the relationship between the 
companies and the state. Recently, in new institutional economics, there 
has been growing interest in the emergence, evolvement, and disappear-
ance of institutions. According to their self-defi nition, new institutional 
economics—as opposed to neoclassical thinkers—provides the assump-
tion of perfect information and unbounded rationality. Individuals with 
limited mental capacity and those exposed to uncertainties establish 
institutions in order to decrease risks and transaction costs. At the same 
time, they accept the concept of scarcity of resources and competition, 
but new institutional economics has its own identity, which is separate 
from that of neoclassical thought (Ménard and Shirley  2005 ). 
 Many researchers have joined the school of new institutional econom-
ics. If we want to name the most emblematic fi gures in connection with 
the above topics, Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson are undoubtedly 
pioneers in the study of transaction costs, Harold Demsetz in property 
rights, and Richard A.  Posner in the legal system. As far as collective 
action, the name of Mancur Olson must be mentioned. Th e economic 
historian Douglass North applies the instruments of new institutional 
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economics to provide an explanation for the diff erent performance of 
the economies and their temporal changes. In new institutional econom-
ics, several authors—including Andrew Schotter—have used the game 
theory to explain the evolvement of institutions and their functioning. 
As far as the interpretation of the institutional changes is concerned, the 
legacy of Hayek, the new Austrian school, and Schumpeter have been 
mentioned in literature; moreover, other authors categorise Hayek as a 
new institutionalist (Hodgson et al.  1994a ; Rutherford  1996 ). 
 Contemporary old institutionalists—as opposed to the self-defi nition 
of new institutionalists—emphasise the community neoclassicists share 
with the new institutional economics, and they are keen on markedly 
distinguishing themselves from new institutionalists. Th e contemporary 
pillars of old institutionalism, Hodgson, Samuels, and Tool, edited  Th e 
Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics , in which 
the entry comparing old and the new institutionalism was written by 
Hodgson (Hodgson et al.  1994a ). He sees sharp diff erences between the 
two institutionalist schools in terms of “methodology” and “ontology”. 
Th e diff erences lie in the fact that new institutionalists—similar to neo-
classical thinkers—handle the preferences of the economic actors and 
technology as external factors, while old institutionalists consider them 
endogenous factors, and it is their task to explain the evolution of these 
factors. New institutionalists regard the individual as an atomic entity 
and apply methodological individualism. Old institutionalists consider 
society an organic phenomenon, where there is no “state of nature” in 
which individuals may exist without social and cultural norms; that is, 
they cannot be defi ned without institutions, thus, their methodology is 
institutionalist (some authors apply the term “holistic” 4 ). New institu-
tional economics—in conformity with its neoclassical roots—is inter-
ested in the optimised equilibrium conditions that derive from physical, 
more precisely, mechanical analogies. By contrast, old institutionalists 
create biologically inspired evolution theories, with the help of which 
they wish to provide an explanation for the continuous change of the 
institutions, with special regard to the role of technological changes. 
 New institutionalists assess the importance of the diff erence similar to 
old institutionalists, but it is only natural that what they consider a virtue 
is seen by the old institutionalists as a defect or a fl aw. New institution-
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alists hold it against the old institutionalists that they apply a holistic 
approach instead of individualism and behaviourism instead of the ratio-
nal choice theory and that they do not attach as much importance to the 
spontaneous evolutionary processes in institutional development as they 
should but instead emphasise the collective decision-making processes 
and institutional design. Nevertheless, such a stark contrast between the 
two schools cannot be maintained after the detailed study of the authors 
belonging to the two approaches. In one of his later works, Hodgson 
( 2007b : 7) himself admits that the boundaries between old and new 
institutionalism have become less distinct. Rutherford ( 1996 ) wrote a 
whole book on this topic, which is immensely informative, and below, 
where the key issues are introduced, we will note powerful synthesising 
attempts as well. 
1.4  Methodological Dilemmas 
of Institutional Analysis 
 Th e representatives of old institutional economics rejected the orthodox, 
neoclassical form of theory, and model construction, declaring its pro-
gramme too formal, abstract, and limited in its scope. Th is rejection does 
not mean that they refused the necessity of the theory—of which they 
were often accused. Th e methodological debate has always been about 
the necessary level of abstraction needed in the analysis of a complex, 
variable system. Th e complexity of the history of institutions implies 
a less formalised, abstract approach that comes into confl ict with the 
expected severity of theory. Th e strictly formalised models lead to a sim-
pler, idealised outcome, which may lack important elements of reality. 
Neither new nor old institutional economics was able to fi nd a defi nite 
solution to this dilemma. Opinion is divided among new institutionalists 
in this respect: Coase, Williamson, and North do not apply formalisa-
tion, the followers of the Austrian school’s traditions expressly refuse it, 
while those applying the game theory use it (Rutherford  1996 ). 
 A central and long-standing debate concerning the methodology of 
social sciences is the choice between a holistic approach and method-
12 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
ological individualism, which has been discussed extensively in old and 
new institutional economics. 
 According to the holistic approach, society is more than simply a sum 
of its parts, and social structures and institutions infl uence the behaviour 
of individuals, who are the functioning of society’s parts. If this train of 
thought is pursued further, all social phenomena and attitudes of indi-
viduals may be derived entirely from or explained by social structures, 
institutions, or culture. Th e holistic approach is characteristic of old insti-
tutionalists, but usually they do not reach that extreme, reductionist level 
at which the action of the individual is considered merely the product of 
the social and cultural environment. However, they emphasise the impact 
of the institutional environment, norms and customs on individual 
behaviour. Another problem, which is even more diffi  cult to avoid—and 
comes up frequently in the works of several old institutionalist authors, 
such as Veblen, Ayres, and Galbraith—is that the formation of norms 
and institutions is explained in a functionalist manner; however, these 
works do not describe the mechanism that actually created these norms 
and institutions, that is, the individual aims and incentives that led to the 
formation and maintenance of norms and institutions. Th e functional-
ist explanation usually postulates a purpose without a purposive actor 
(Rutherford  1996 ). 
 Th e starting point of methodological individualism is the notion that 
only individuals have aims and interests. Institutions, the social system, 
and its changes are the results of individuals’ actions. Th erefore, social 
structures and their changes can be traced back entirely to individuals’ 
actions, goals, and beliefs. Unilateral reasoning will not hold in this case, 
either. Critics are correct in saying that if they want to derive the for-
mation of institutions and norms from individual decisions—as some 
new institutionalist authors who apply the game theory do—it cannot be 
avoided that at the beginning of the game, one should assume elemen-
tary rules that would still require explanation, that is, we have to face 
the problem of “ regressus ad infi nitum ”. Th us, the reductionist solution 
cannot be accepted here, either (Hodgson  2007b ). However, the new 
institutionalists who deal with transaction costs, property rights, and the 
legal system often make the above mistake of functionalist argumenta-
tion (Whitley  1999 ). Th e change began with North, who fi rst explained 
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the institutional changes in a functionalist manner in his economic his-
tory, saying that these changes are shaped by the maximising behaviour of 
economic organisations. Th e controversies he found led him to introduce 
the term “path dependence”, that is, historically developed institutions 
restrain the possibilities of institutional change; furthermore, he says that 
ideology has its own motivating role (North  1990 ,  2005 ). 
 Due to these evident diffi  culties, those who currently deal with insti-
tutional analysis, regardless of whether they are from the economic or 
the sociological side, avoid the extremes of the holistic approach and of 
methodological individualism. It may vary where emphasis is placed, 
but the starting position is the same: the individuals and the institutions 
mutually depend on each other and refl exively interlink. Th is thought 
has its forerunners in sociology and appears quite markedly in contempo-
rary sociological institutionalism. Contemporary game theory also shares 
the view that the rules and the players create a mutually interdependent 
context for each other. Th is approach is represented rather pronouncedly 
by Masahiko Aoki and Avner Greif, who argue that institutions are pro-
duced and reproduced by the strategic behaviour of actors, even while 
actors are constrained. At the same time, institutions not only constrain 
actors in pursuing their material interests but also shape their cognitive 
capabilities and mind-set. Historical institutionalism, which has its roots 
in political science, also considers actors and institutions interdependent 
and co-generative (Hall and Taylor  1996 ; Jackson  2010 ). Representing 
old institutionalists, Hodgson draws attention to the “middle-way solu-
tion” in his entry about methodological individualism (Hodgson et al. 
 1994b : 63–67). 
 Th e issues of rational choice and rule-following are closely related 
to the above-detailed problems. In neoclassical economics, method-
ological individualism is interlinked with the assumption of rational, 
 profi t- maximising decision-making, which was thought to be universally 
applicable (Coates  2005 ). Th is individualism was exposed to a crossfi re 
of attacks by old institutional economics, which holds the view that hab-
its, norms, and institutions play an important role in directing human 
behaviour. Th is does not mean that rationality would be excluded from 
the interpretation of behaviour. It is not diffi  cult to prove that maxi-
mising rationality from case to case is not realised in human decisions. 
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Th erefore, the old institutionalists assume adaptive rationality, and cus-
toms, social conventions, and norms gradually change according to the 
changing conditions and circumstances. Th e new institutional school is 
more divided in this respect. Some advocates of the agency theory and 
the game theory represent the traditional rational maximisation, which 
extends over each and every case. Others are of the opinion that follow-
ing customs and norms can itself be a rational decision. Th is decision 
may be justifi ed by the costs of information and decision-making, cogni-
tive and informational constrains, risks related to decision-making, and 
advantages derived from rule-following. Th e use of adaptive rationality 
is approved in this school for solving the problems of maximising ratio-
nality. Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded rationality also had an eff ect 
on some of the authors (for example, on Williamson). Th e authors who 
use the evolutionary perspective (for example, Richard R. Nelson and 
Sidney G. Winter) expressly refuse the concept of maximising rationality 
(Nelson  1995 ; Rutherford  1996 ; Whitley  1999 ). 
 Schotter ( 1986 ) describes another type of intertwining between the 
game theory and evolutionary thought. According to Schotter, there are 
two trends in terms of the institutional conception within the new insti-
tutional school. One of them regards the social and economic institutions 
as rules, which can be designed, restrain the behaviour of the individu-
als and, thus, lead to a pre-determined equilibrium. Others—as well as 
Schotter—see the rules as unintended regularities of social behaviour 
emerging spontaneously in the course of repeated confrontation with the 
same types of social problems; in this process, Schotter assumes profi t- 
maximising actors. Table  1.1 gives an overview of the methodological 
dilemmas.
 In the following, I will examine the principal theoretical questions in 
connection with the institutions that must be clarifi ed from the  viewpoint 
of comparative institutional analysis. For instance, a key issue is the con-
cept of “institution”, the institutional changes, and the complementarity 
of the institutions. In the diff erent views, the confl icting ideas of the old 
and the new schools appear, but I will place more emphasis on the trends 
within comparative institutional analysis. In institutional analysis, soci-
ologists and political scientists also apply the term “new institutionalist” 
to themselves, that is, to those who do not use the economics perspec-
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tive when trying to fi nd an explanation for the mechanism and eff ects of 
institutions. Th ese scholars call themselves historical new institutionalists 
(avoiding the term, “new institutional economics”), and their view of 
institutions is closer to the old view. 
1.5  Concept of Institution 
 Th e same perceptions as those in the methodological debates can be seen 
in connection with the concept of “institution”. A widespread defi nition 
for institutions derives from North: “institutions are the rules of the game 
in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (North  1990 : 3). Th e scholars who favour the 
version of new institutionalism based on rational choice are inclined to 
accept the above defi nition and regard institutions as rules that are effi  -
cient and in which rationality prevails. 
 Table 1.1  The most important methodological dilemmas of institutional 
analyses 
 Old institutionalism  New institutionalism 
 Methodological 
approach and 
concept of society 
 Holistic approach and 
institutions are the 




institutions are optimised 
states of equilibrium 
 Taken as an exclusive 
approach 
 The individual is a social 
product: reductionism 
 Social system is the product 
of the individuals’ actions: 
“ regressus ad infi nitum ” 
 Synthesis  The individuals and the institutions are 
interdependent and refl exively interlink 
 Concept of human 
behaviour 
 Rule-following: habits, 
norms, and institutions 
direct human behaviour 
 Rational, profi t-maximising 
decision-making 
 Taken as an exclusive 
approach 
 The role of rationality is 
uncertain 
 Rational, profi t-maximising 
behaviour cannot be 
applied as a general rule 
 Synthesis  Assumption of adaptive bounded rationality and the 
explanation of rule-following in rational terms 
 Source : Author’s construction 
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 For old institutionalists, institutions rather meant widely accepted 
habits, cultural and symbolic patterns, and rationalised and impersonal 
prescriptions. Historical new institutionalists look upon institutions as 
structural frames, organisational solutions, and formal rules or systems. 
Th ey attach great importance to the states and the national boundar-
ies and frontiers in the structuration, stabilisation, and reproduction 
of institutional frames. Similar to the above-described methodological 
debates, in this case, we can see that there is an attempt to synthetise 
the historical and the rationalist approaches. It has been accepted that 
institutions became identifi ed with the rules of the game, which provide 
stability and meaning to social life; nevertheless, the nature of these rules 
are interpreted in more dimensions. Th ese rules can be formal and infor-
mal, normative and cognitive, and organisational and cultural, and the 
combinations of the dimensions vary through space and time. It has also 
gained acceptance that institutions do not necessarily embody effi  cient 
and rational solutions (Djelic  2010 ). 
 Th is comprehensive approach can be traced in the  Handbook of New 
Institutional Economics as well. Ménard and Shirley defi ne institutions in 
the Introduction on the basis of North and Williamson. New institu-
tional economics studies institutions and how they interact with organ-
isational arrangements [as North ( 2005 : 22) puts it, “the institutions are 
the rules of the game and the organisations are the players”]. Institutions 
are the written and unwritten rules, norms, and constraints that humans 
devise in order to reduce uncertainty and control their environment. 
Th ese include all written rules and agreements that govern contractual 
relations and companies; constitutions, laws, and rules that govern poli-
tics, the government, fi nance, and society in a broader sense; and unwrit-
ten codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, and beliefs. Organisational 
arrangements are the various modes of governance that are implemented 
by agents in order to support production and exchange. Th ese include 
markets, companies, and their various combinations developed by the 
economic actors in order to facilitate transactions, contractual agreements 
that provide a framework for organising activities, and behavioural traits 
that underlie the chosen arrangements. Recently, representatives of new 
institutional economics have become increasingly concerned with men-
tal models and cognitive processes that determine how people interpret 
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reality, which, in turn, shape the institutional environment (Ménard and 
Shirley  2005 : 1). 
 An essential feature of the functioning of institutions is that non- 
compliance with the rules must be sanctioned somehow, and the method 
for it can vary depending on the type of the rule (for example, a sanction 
can be legal enforcement, social discrimination, or reprobation depend-
ing on whether the rule in question is formal or informal). In the case of 
the rules-of-the-game theory, the argument can be brought up in rela-
tion to those who apply the sanctions that rules also pertain to them; 
thus, the question arises of who enforces the enforcer. Consequently, 
the problem of “ regressus ad  infi nitum ” arises again. Aoki interprets all 
institutions as an equilibrium strategy in a game theoretical framework. 
Enforcers behave in the expected way not because of other enforcers but 
rather because of the strategic interactions performed by the players of 
the game. According to Aoki, “the institutions are self-sustaining systems 
of shared beliefs about a salient way in which the game is repeatedly 
played” (Aoki  2001 : 10). 
1.6  The Changes and Complementarities 
of Institutions 
 As noted above, biological evolution theories infl uenced the old institu-
tional school, especially Veblen. Th erefore, it is logical that the interpreta-
tion of institutional changes has an important place in theory. According 
to Veblen, innovations in the industrial sector demand changes in hab-
its of thought and behaviour in the industrial and fi nancial (“pecuni-
ary”) sectors, and this usually meets resistance. Nevertheless, institutional 
changes come about in the form of selective adaptation to technological 
innovations. Veblen places emphasis on the non-intentional, spontane-
ous features of the adaption process, allowing for instances of deliberate 
design. Institutional change is a continuous process in which institu-
tional structures are composed of the habits of thought and behaviour 
that emerged from the adaptation of the community to the objective 
circumstances in a previous period. Th is process was coined “cumulative 
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causation” by Veblen. In contrast with the neoclassical equilibrium theo-
ries, adaptation is not necessary, social evolution is an open, not teleologi-
cal, process, and its outcome is uncertain and not necessarily a state of 
equilibrium (Bush  1994 ). Th e views of the old institutional school can be 
traced in the representatives of the current, new “old” institutionalism, as 
well as in historical new institutional analyses. 
 Because the old institutional school became insignifi cant after WWII, 
interest in changes in institutions was lost as well. Th e modernisation 
theories of the 1950s and 1960s were concerned with the democratic 
and capitalist institutions gaining international ground. Th ey expected 
“pluralist industrialism”, which evolves under rational, technocratic gov-
ernance as a result of the global convergence between the American and 
the Soviet structures. During the 1960s and 1970s, neo-Marxists wrote 
about how capitalist institutions would eventually be transformed into 
socialism. However, the 1970s brought new challenges for institutional 
systems to face. Th e Fordist model—based on mass production and con-
sumption—began to change, the Keynesian welfare state shrunk a bit, 
and the economy became less regulated. Various countries could meet 
the structural changes diff erently, which aroused scientifi c interest in 
 institutional reproduction, change, and comparison (Campbell  2010 ; 
Streeck  2010b ). 
 Within new institutional economics, changes are usually explained by 
aspects of effi  ciency; due to the deliberate activity of the economic actors, 
institutional change is considered an effi  cient answer to the changes in 
environment and circumstances. Approaches to dealing with property 
rights, economic organisations and collective action, are typically in tan-
dem with the assumption of rational choice. Authors applying the game 
theory—similar to the Austrian school—explain institutions as outcomes 
of interactions between self-interested players. Th is approach relates to 
the evolutionary and the Austrian tradition, and Hayek regards the insti-
tutional changes as evolution, which does not necessarily lead to a state 
of equilibrium. In particular, Hayek emphasises that changes are unin-
tended results of individual actions and that institutions are not the result 
of design. Th e formation of social norms is not motivated by the desire 
to produce a social institution; only legislative processes are not sponta-
neous. In the functional-evolutionary explanation (based on the legacy 
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of Hayek), institutions are already selected at the time of their forma-
tion—following the analogy taken from biological evolution—according 
to whether they have a social function (Rutherford  1996 ). 
 New institutionalists from the fi elds of political sciences and sociology 
criticise economic theories, showing great propensity for coining these 
theories of rational choice institutionalism. In their opinion, the state 
and politics and values and ideologies have not been taken into account. 
However, as mentioned in connection with North ( 2005 ), new institu-
tional economics has opened up to these issues as well. 
 New institutional analyses with no basis in economics have been cat-
egorised into several trends as well, 5 but a detailed description of these 
trends is not within the scope of this work. Hereinafter, the term “histori-
cal new institutionalism” will be used exclusively because it is the most 
frequently mentioned approach in connection with comparative analy-
ses. Institutionalists with backgrounds in sociology and political science 
trace the changes in institutions to several factors. A direction of research 
is concerned with the diff usion of the western institutional practice, 
which may manifest in three diff erent ways. Organisations may adopt 
normatively appropriate solutions or mime and copy the best-performing 
 institutional practice, or it may be that international organisations coer-
cively impose such practices on countries (Campbell  2010 ). However, 
confl icts and power struggles are considered even more important for 
the explanation of changes of institutions, and several economists have 
included this signifi cance in their theories (for example, Amable  2003 ; 
North  2005 ). 
 In addition to the reasons why institutions change, the mechanisms of 
these changes and transformations are investigated as well, with special 
regard to the incremental changes that lead to the transformation, that is, 
the changes in institutions in time. Historical new institutionalists seem 
particularly enthusiastic about this topic. I will draw attention to those 
approaches that—according to the leading scholars of the school in ques-
tion—are the most widespread. Streeck and Th elen, based on their obser-
vations, distinguish four types of transformations. By displacement, they 
mean that a new institutional model appears to replace the old one. When 
new institutions—which may have a transformative eff ect—are inserted 
into old ones, they speak about layering. Conversion occurs when an old 
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institution is redirected to serve new aims and functions. In the case of a 
drift, an old institution is neglected purposefully (Streeck  2010b ; Th elen 
 2010 ). Campbell ( 2010 ) notes that the transformation of institutions 
often means that institutional principles and practices rearrange and 
recombine in a new and creative way, which has been termed “bricolage”. 
If new elements are added to the existing institutional arrangement, it is 
termed Campbell “translation” because new elements often have to be 
modifi ed in order to blend properly with the old institution. Th e former 
is similar to layering, as seen in the above categorisation, and the latter 
to conversion. 
 In order to be able to understand institutions, it is essential to have an 
explanation of their transformation and for their continuity. As shown 
above, Veblen was interested in this problem. Currently, the greatest infl u-
ence is attributed to the path dependence theory of North, according to 
which past events and decisions appearing in institutions may persist for 
a long time and may restrain actors’ potential decisions for the future. 
As in other cases, when institutional constraints are taken into account, 
the path dependence theory also involves the risk that actions and deci-
sions of actors are considered predetermined. North avoids this trap; 
however, the change can occur in an incremental, evolutionary manner, 
and adaptation can begin only at the margin of the institution (North 
 1990 ,  2005 ). Path dependence is interpretable for evolutionist authors as 
well (Nelson  1995 ). A version of path dependence theory has developed 
within historical institutionalism, in which arguments taken from politi-
cal science and sociology are applied to underline why institutions are 
resistant to change (for example, political institutions have high start-up 
costs, politicians deliberately introduce processes that would be diffi  cult 
to change, knowledge is accumulated with the given institutionalised 
policy style or decision-making approach, given practices are taken for 
granted by the actors, and so on). Institutional complementarity and the 
presence of social-political coalitions are among the important explana-
tory factors. Some authors try to explain the changes that may emerge 
despite path dependence, such as situations where exogenous shocks and 
crises disrupt the status quo (Campbell  2010 ). 
 Th e study of the relations between institutions is especially important 
in comparing institutions. Institutionalists seem to agree that economies 
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are functioning in a complex institutional environment and, as a result, 
economic actors, if they want to make any changes, may choose from dif-
ferent institutional principles or practices. Nevertheless, opinion seems 
to be divided regarding the question of whether institutional diversity 
makes hybrid solutions possible, stimulates institutional innovation, or 
complementarity restricts the sphere of solutions, at least the effi  cient 
ones. 
 Th e second standpoint—that certain institutions complement each 
other and therefore occur together—is a widely accepted idea in com-
parative institutional analyses. Complementarity has been explained in 
several ways. Co-existing institutions may complement each other’s defi -
ciencies and handicaps. Others interpret complementarity as a kind of 
similarity. Complementary institutions encourage economic actors to 
show similar behaviour and reinforce each other’s eff ects. Another conse-
quence is that hybrid institutions show worse performance. Economists 
explain complementarity—by applying the game theory—in such a 
way that the co-existence of certain institutions creates stable models 
by mutually reinforcing each other. Crouch ( 2010 ) points out that the 
concept of complementarity has several errors. One of them is that the 
 complementarity of institutions is often linked with economic success, 
but in reality, it is exactly their stability (that derives from the comple-
mentarity) that may worsen their ability to change. Another—and more 
severe—problem is that the number of market economies that can be 
compared is too small to be able to make a defi nite statement about the 
strength of interconnectedness between the institutions, and their co-
existence in itself is not informative: their causal relationship and the 
direction of it are unknown. 
1.7  The Theoretical Framework 
of Comparative Institutional Economics 
 Above, an overview has been given regarding the most important theo-
retical and methodological issues necessary for defi ning the framework 
in which the market economies of the European Union will be analysed 
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below. Because the macro-level comparison of the economic performance 
of national economies is the subject of the following analysis, North’s 
( 2005 ) approach seems the most convincing and the most productive, 
providing a synthesis that can be defended content-wise and that may 
answer methodological dilemmas as well. Let us accept that institutions 
are rules that are needed because human interactions occur in an uncer-
tain world, which may reduce uncertainty in organisations’ functioning. 
Th e rules for the actors are on the one hand constraints and on the other 
hand possibilities. North’s argument is that survival is the aim of actors 
and organisations, which manifests in profi t maximising amid competi-
tion for scarce resources. I would not go so far as to attribute universal 
validity to this statement—accepted as a kind of ontological condition—
but in this analysis, regarding its time horizon and examining the per-
spectives of national economies for economic growth, I will accept this 
assumption as my starting point, especially because North’s assumptions 
do not say that the decisions of the actors necessarily lead to an optimal 
state of equilibrium. 
 Th e knowledge and skills obtained by individuals and organisa-
tions shape how they comprehend and interpret their possibilities. Th e 
 individuals who have diff erent cultural backgrounds and diff erent expe-
riences may assess the same facts diff erently and may decide diff erently. 
Th is means that, consequently, bounded rationality and path dependence 
are assumed; it may be that development does not lead to a state of equi-
librium, or it may lead to more than one possible state of equilibrium. 
Th e acceptance of path dependence does not mean determination, but 
rather limited choice and that changes are evolutionary and incremen-
tal. Th e change in the political systems in Eastern and Central Europe 
confi rms North’s ( 1990 ) observation that it takes time, even for radical 
changes to deepen because deeply rooted cultural legacy and the infor-
mal constraints deriving from it can adjust to the radical, rapid formal 
changes only slowly. 
 It is possible to fi t this approach with the above-referenced view, 
according to which—in the description of the social and economic pro-
cesses—the relation between the individual and the institution is grasped 
as interdependence, and we cannot disregard the confl icts or the power 
relationships. 
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 In relation to complementarity, I could not fi nd any correlations 
on the basis of which it would be possible to determine in advance 
whether a group of institutions will function effi  ciently or not. It is 
presumable that institutions cannot be combined at will, but we can 
fi nd successful hybrid solutions described in case studies (Crouch 
 2010 ), which means that only empirical investigations may help us in 
fi nding out what the outcome of the interaction between the institu-
tions will be. 
 Notes 
 1.  Th e Austrian school of economics founded by Carl Menger, and especially 
the representatives of the second generation new school, showed interest 
towards the institutional issues, as will be detailed in connection with 
Friedrich August von Hayek. 
 2.  “Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship 
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins 
 1932 : 15). 
 3.  In the last several decades, the approach of the mainstream economics has 
changed as well. Due to the problems related to the general equilibrium 
theory, since the 1980s, the game theory has come to the forefront of the 
explanation of economic interactions, which presumes the structured world 
of binding rules. Th is—as well as experimental economics—has made main-
stream economics more open to institutional issues. Experimental econom-
ics no longer handles the markets as an abstract and universal forum for 
human interactions, but rather as a designed system of rules (Hodgson 
 2007b ). 
 4.  Th e terms “holistic” and “institutional” are not synonyms. Th e institutional 
analysis is not necessarily holistic, but the holistic explanation inevitably cov-
ers institutional factors. 
 5.  Th ey speak about historical institutionalism in political sciences and socio-
logical institutionalism in sociology (Coates  2005 ), but historical institu-
tionalism itself has several branches (Martin  2005 ). Hall and Taylor ( 1996 ) 
make a distinction between historical institutionalism and rational choice 
institutionalism within political science and touch upon sociological institu-
tionalism as a third trend. 
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 Given this overview of the most general theoretical and methodological 
issues related to the institutions, I will narrow down my investigation 
to comparative institutional analyses. Institutional research was largely 
neglected after World War II (WWII), but institutions started to attract 
attention later. Th e problems of the era are always refl ected in compara-
tive analyses, but their common feature is that they attempt to answer 
how diff erent institutional systems promote and facilitate development, 
economic performance, and growth, which have been closely linked to 
competitiveness since the 1990s. 
 Similar to Chap.  1 , I do not attempt to provide a comprehensive his-
torical reconstruction of theories. My undertaking is merely to give an 
account of the theoretical background of those analyses focusing on the 
time of interest. Th ose works that have had an outstanding eff ect or infl u-
ence on the development of comparative analysis will be introduced, and 
a detailed introduction to the current situation will follow. 
 The Models of Capitalism: Comparative 
Institutional Analyses 
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2.1  From Post-World War II Golden Age 
to the Crisis of the 1970s 
 In the 1960s, the perception became widespread—as mentioned above—
that due to the generally applied technologies and the division of labour, 
there would be a convergence of institutional systems, namely, that mod-
els in Europe and Japan would more closely resemble the US model. 
Even the Eastern European socialist countries were considered part of the 
global process, presuming that a hybrid economy based on market mech-
anisms and state intervention would develop (Hollingsworth and Boyer 
 1997a ). Researchers were also interested in how the pre-war practices of 
economic management changed, in what made it possible for France and 
the Federal Republic of Germany to catch up rapidly with the productiv-
ity level of the USA, and in the factors behind the rapid growth of the 
Western European countries. It seems that there is agreement in litera-
ture concerning the turning point in comparative institutional analysis, 
namely, Shonfi eld’s work, which was published in 1965 (Amable  2003 ; 
Crouch  2005 ; Hall and Soskice  2001 ). 
 Shonfi eld’s ( 1965 ) starting point was that the 1950s and the early 1960s 
saw an unprecedented economic boom in the Western European world. 
Th e persistence and the rate of growth, the wide-reaching welfare eff ects 
in Western European countries were even more favourable than those 
in the USA. According to Shonfi eld, Keynesianism does not provide an 
explanation because its views were accepted fi rst in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the USA, and after WWII, these countries were the least suc-
cessful among the Western European countries. Shonfi eld fi nds expla-
nations for the Western European countries’ institutional changes. Th e 
most important institutional changes—according to Shonfi eld—include 
larger-scale state intervention, specifi cally, supervising the bank sector, 
establishing state-owned companies, building the welfare state, “taming” 
competition in the private sector (that is, by powerful regulation), devel-
oping research and development (R&D) from state resources and long- 
term national economic planning. He was especially interested in the 
latter, and in addition to information for the obvious example of France, 
he collected information on the various elements of planning in other 
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Western European countries. It is diffi  cult to fi t the Federal Republic of 
Germany into his theory because the country—or, personally, Ludwig 
Erhard—was committed to the model of social market economy, that is, 
the competing private economy. Shonfi eld notes that although the free 
market was propagated fi rmly, the cooperation between industrial com-
panies survived, the banks’ coordinating role and long-term planning 
appeared in concentrated, large industrial enterprises, and these features 
are markedly diff erent from those of the Anglo-Saxon economies. 
 In the 1970s, as a result of the crisis following the oil price explosion, 
the question arose of what caused the post-war Golden Age and stable 
economic growth. Th e French “regulation” school sought an institutional 
explanation. 1 Th ey focused their attention on fi ve “institutional forms” 
of capitalism: wage and labour relations (which is the most important), 
forms of competition, international relations, money, and state authori-
ties. Th e general form of regulation is characterised by the relationship 
between these forms. Post-war Fordist mass production and consumption 
placed wage and labour relations at the centre of attention because divid-
ing the profi t of productivity between capital and labour ensured stable 
employment and the social protection of the welfare state. Th e benefi cial 
eff ect of the Fordist production system implied that the most prominent 
country and the regulation that prevailed in this country should be con-
sidered as an example. However, empirical studies show that the Fordist 
system itself changed and transformed in the various countries, and when 
the Fordist system of mass production came to a crisis in the developed 
countries; the North European countries, for instance, were more suc-
cessful in introducing fl exible systems while simultaneously maintaining 
cooperative wages and labour relations (Amable  2003 ; Hollingsworth 
and Boyer  1997a ). As we will see, a prominent fi gure of the “regulation” 
school, Boyer, contributed to the debate on the social system of produc-
tion in the 1990s. 
 In the 1970s, increasing infl ation diverted researchers’ attention to 
neo- corporatist institutions. Th ese researchers saw the power in the 
agreement of the centralised corporative bodies, which were able to 
stop increasing prices. Peter J. Katzenstein ( 1985 ) and John Zysman 
( 1983 ) continued Shonfi eld’s historical institutionalist approach. 
Th ough they proceeded on diff erent tracks, both of them created a 
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threesome  typology: they distinguished the liberal economy, the state-
led economy, and the neo-corporatist or negotiation-based economy. 
Katzenstein provided a detailed description of the latter in his infl uen-
tial book, in which he investigated the outstanding economic perfor-
mance of the small, developed countries. His starting point was that 
by 1982, the per capita GDP in fi ve European countries, including 
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, had exceeded that of the 
USA. 2 Th is spectacular result prompted Katzenstein to analyse how 
the small European countries, such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland, adapted themselves to 
the rapid changes of the 1970s. He found that these countries counter-
balanced the liberalism they pursued in their international economic 
relations—which they were not willing to give up, although there were 
protectionist approaches in large states at that time—by internal poli-
cies. In the name of national income policy, they limited the increase in 
wages and prices. R&D expenditures increased in the 1960s and 1970s, 
even when these expenditures generally decreased on average in large 
industrial countries. Industrial policy was applied more actively for 
structural changes than in the USA or West Germany. Small countries 
usually have less diversifi ed economic structures, are more open, and 
are in great need of import and foreign capital. Managing this external 
vulnerability is helped immensely by corporatist traditions. In these 
countries, feudal traditions are relatively weak; therefore, the weaker 
right wing was willing to reach an agreement with the trade unions and 
with the left wing. Th is legacy promoted the development of demo-
cratic corporatism after WWII.  Only Austria is an exception, where 
social partnership after WWII became established as the result of the 
radical break with the past after the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the 
civil war in 1934 and the fall of fascism. Katzenstein’s ( 1985 ) book is 
interesting on the one hand because he explains economic performance 
by the interaction of the elements of the economic-political group of 
institutions and, on the other hand, because comparing these elements 
allows him to demonstrate the comparative advantages of the national 
economies, which leads us to the question of competitiveness, which is 
the core issue of the 1990s. 
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2.2  Classifi cation of the Varieties 
of Capitalism in the 1990s 
 In the 1990s, comparative institutional analyses reinterpreted the insti-
tutional systems of market economies in an environment that changed 
considerably in at least two aspects. 
 Beginning at the micro level, the Fordist production system in the 
economies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan was converted 
into fl exible production systems. While the former was based on the pro-
duction of highly standardised goods exploiting economies of scale, for 
which specialised machines and semi-skilled labour were used mainly, in 
the latter, various types of fl exible production systems off er a wide range 
of products adapted to various consumer needs, and skilled workers can 
be moved between various jobs within the company. Th e Fordist system 
and the fl exible production system are two ideal types—their appearance 
in reality was not so defi nite—but their comparison makes it understand-
able that several authors focus on the company and its functioning and 
that other elements of the institutional system are attached to it. 
 At the macro level, the spread of globalisation and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union made the question of whether countries were headed 
towards one single model of capitalism due to the international competi-
tion, that is, whether the market economies would converge towards the 
liberal market economy model of the USA after the neoliberal, neocon-
servative wave of the 1980s, especially topical. 
2.2.1  Comparison of Business Systems 
 When Fordist production systems were described, there were attempts 
to distinguish the diff erent forms of capitalist development in the twen-
tieth century on the basis of diff erent methods of corporate governance. 
Chandler ( 1990 ) discusses competitive managerial capitalism in relation 
to the USA. In the twentieth century, competitive managerial capitalism 
meant that the extended bureaucratic management of large corporations 
coordinated a wide sphere of activities and transactions, and owners were 
segregated from the managers, invested in R&D, retained incomes and 
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dividends for the sake of new investments, and expanded their activi-
ties abroad as well. In Great Britain, personal capitalism survived, where 
family-owned companies were dominant, less was invested in R&D, 
management, and marketing, and risk was reduced by corporate alliances 
through contractual cooperation. In the model of cooperative managerial 
capitalism, large German corporations were able to exploit the advan-
tages of economies of scale and were able to expand the same way as in 
the USA. Th e production chain was integrated by the large bureaucratic 
management, but—unlike in the USA—supervision by the family and 
strong cooperation between the companies survived. Th e latter was facili-
tated by corporate fi nancing through banks, which was not characteristic 
of the Anglo-Saxon practice, either. Th e production systems were fl ex-
ible and relied on skilled labour. Germany, even though it functions dif-
ferently, overtook Great Britain and became Europe’s leading industrial 
state even before WWII as a result of its developed organisational capaci-
ties similar to those of the USA. 
 According to Lazonick ( 1993 ), it is characteristic of the success-
ful capitalist economies that there is a shift from market coordina-
tion towards planned coordination within the business organisations. 
In the USA, those managerial structures that were able to plan and 
coordinate the technologies and production processes of the second 
industrial revolution began to develop in the 1920s. Th e US manage-
rial capitalism kept its advantage until the 1960s, but Japan’s collec-
tive capitalism presented an increasing challenge during the following 
two decades. In Great Britain, in the framework of proprietary capi-
talism, where economic coordination was performed mainly through 
market contracts, the innovation strategies were followed to a lesser 
extent, and they were not able to run the Fordist production system 
competitively. 
 Th ese were the preliminaries upon which Whitley ( 1999 ) built his 
own sophisticated system. First, Whitley determined ideal types on the 
basis of the main characteristics of the business system, and he distin-
guished six types of them, defi ning their characteristics in the context of 
the institutional environment (state control, fi nancial institutions, trust, 
and authority). 
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2.2.2  From the Competition of Enterprises 
to the Competition of National Economies 
 In the theories described above, business or entire economic systems were 
compared at a given time, the main aim or one of the aims of which was 
to provide an explanation for their diff erent economic performance. In 
the background, we can fi nd the intention to provide evidence for the 
viability of one market economy model or another, and in most cases, the 
rejection of the Anglo-Saxon or the American hegemony. Later, Michael 
Porter’s book  Th e Competitive Advantage of Nations , fi rst published in 
1990, had a signifi cant eff ect on these types of research. Porter remains 
indiff erent to the various models of capitalism and focuses on competi-
tiveness. At certain points in his investigation, he attaches the various 
levels of competitiveness to various groups of institutions (Porter  1998 ); 
thus, paradoxically, his work became integrated into the sources of com-
parative institutional research. 
 Porter led a four-year-long international research project, during 
which case studies were completed about the ten major industrial coun-
tries; in these case studies, the causes of their competitive advantages were 
revealed from a historical perspective. On the basis of this work, Porter 
summarises the most important elements of national advantages, factor 
conditions (including the entire system of infrastructure, even healthcare 
and cultural institutions), domestic demand conditions, the availability 
and the quality of related and supporting industries and the association 
between fi rm strategy, structure and rivalry. From this list, it can be seen 
that Porter—contrary to the authors of the previous theories—does not 
examine the production systems directly, but rather expands the tradi-
tional growth factors in economics by adding the institutional dimen-
sion; additionally, he does not apply econometric modelling. 
 On the basis of his investigations, he does not categorise the ten coun-
tries into capitalist models but distinguishes the four stages of competi-
tive development: factor-driven, investment-driven, innovation-driven, 
and wealth-driven stages. 
 In the factor-driven stage, the competitive advantage of a country 
comes from natural resources or from cheap and semi-skilled labour. 
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Technology comes from other countries; domestic fi rms only imitate 
them. Few domestic fi rms come into contact with end users. Th e econ-
omy is sensitive to the cycles of the global economy. All states go through 
this stage, but few surpass it. Th ere are some states that, due to their 
ample natural resources, are able to reach high living standards in this 
development stage (Canada and Australia). 
 Large-scale industry develops in the investment-driven stage, and 
industry is equipped with the “latest but one” technology available in the 
market (latest-generation technologies are not sold). An important diff er-
ence from the previous stage is that purchased technologies are developed 
further and that universities and research institutes are integrated into this 
development. Th e companies in this stage still compete with standardised 
price-sensitive products, but they appear abroad as well. Th ose indus-
tries are suitable for providing the economy with access to the advantages 
of the investment-driven stage in which the economies of scale can be 
exploited, but its labour cost component is also large, and the technol-
ogy can be taken over in a ready state. In this stage, the economy is not 
as sensitive to global economic shocks, but it is still vulnerable. Porter 
says that few countries reached this stage: in the period after WWII, only 
Japan and, later, Korea. Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Spain, and, 
to a certain extent, Brazil show signs of having reached this stage. Th e 
investment- driven stage calls for a national consensus that favours invest-
ments and long-term growth over current consumption and redistribu-
tion of income. Th e government is pursuing selective industrial policy, 
which carries the risk that the protection of the industry does not remain 
temporary due to the pressure of the groups concerned; thus, industry 
cannot surpass the factor-driven stage. 
 In the innovation-driven phase, domestic fi rms are able to create new 
technologies and methods themselves, and they are globally competitive 
at an international level. Cost competition occurs; however, it is not built 
on factor costs, but rather on effi  ciency deriving from a high level of skills 
and developed technology. Th e manufacturing of price-sensitive products 
is given over to other national economies. International competitiveness 
extends over services as well. Th e economy is less sensitive to external 
shocks than in previous stages. Th e government develops the business 
environment in an indirect way instead of through direct intervention. 
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 In the wealth-driven economy, the willingness of fi rms to bear risk is 
decreasing, and instead, greater eff ort is made to infl uence governmental 
policy in a way that is more benefi cial for them. Innovations slow, and 
investments in industry are chronically insuffi  cient. Domestic companies 
are purchased by foreign fi rms and integrated into their global strategy. 
Decreasing wages and increasing unemployment worsen the incentive to 
improve productivity, which causes a further loss of market shares. 
 Th e individual stages do not necessarily follow each other. Italy (more 
precisely, the Northern Italian regions) advanced directly from the factor- 
driven stage to the innovation-driven state. According to Porter, Great 
Britain reached the wealth-driven stage by the 1980s, and Th atcher’s gov-
ernment turned the country back. 
 In Porter’s theory, the advantages of the national economy are created 
by the home-based company. Th e home basis is the place (in most cases, 
also the headquarters) where the fi rm’s strategy is set and where the key 
products, the technological processes—in a wider sense—are ultimately 
created. Th e most productive workplaces, the core technologies, and the 
most developed skills can be found in the home basis. Th e property of 
the fi rm is often concentrated in the domestic base, but the nationality 
of the shares is secondary. If the company remains home-based, that is, 
it keeps its actual strategic, creative, and technical control, the national 
economy gains the most profi t, even if the company is the property of 
foreign investors or owned by a foreign company. 
 Porter’s theory appeared among the basic sources of literature belonging 
to the “VoC” (Varieties of Capitalism) school (discussed below) in rela-
tion to the institutional competitive advantages (Soskice  1999 ; Hall and 
Soskice  2001 ) and in  Th e Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional 
Analysis (Pedersen  2010 ). Although it has been criticised that competi-
tiveness was elevated from the micro level to the macro level, these voices 
have subdued, and a wide- ranging agreement has been reached on the 
competitiveness of national economies (Aiginger  2006 ). As shown in the 
institutional comparative analyses providing an explanation for institu-
tional changes, transition from one state to another is quite a method-
ological challenge. A great asset of Porter’s theory is that the development 
perspective of the various economic models can be traced. He does not 
apply the variables of the continuous neoclassical functions, but rather 
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discrete,  well- distinguishable stages to describe development, which fi ts in 
with the assumption of the institutional analyses, namely, that an effi  cient 
institutional arrangement requires a certain level of complementarity. 
2.2.3  The “Neo-American” and “Rhine” Capitalism 
 Michel Albert’s work—which was published in 1991 in French and in 
1993 in English—had a great eff ect on the classifi cation of the models 
of capitalism. Th e author was President-CEO of the  Assurances Générales 
de France for more than a decade, including at the time of publishing his 
book. It is important to be aware of the fact that he was not a researcher 
by profession. His work does not contain references (with the excep-
tion of the fi gures), although he uses a great deal of statistical data, his 
work is rather a readable—and simultaneously perspicuous—essay than 
a standard scientifi c paper. His aim was not the creation of a model, but 
rather the criticism of Reagan’s neoconservative, neoliberal economic and 
social policy. In his work, he contrasts the “neo-American” model with 
the “Rhine” model, the latter including Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, while the Scandinavian countries and Japan show signs 
of similarity. Th e “neo-American” model is characterised by individual-
ism, the importance of short-term, fi nancial profi tmaking and the fact 
that the greatest variety of goods is available in the market (including 
education, healthcare services, public transport, and so on). Th e “Rhine” 
model is characterised by long-term vision, publicly organised welfare 
provisions, a greater extent of social equality, and consensus seeking. 
He considers Germany and, generally, the Rhine model—with its strict 
fi nancial policy, strong currency, and large export surpluses in foreign 
trade—socially and economically superior to the USA, where indebted-
ness grew alarmingly (one must not forget that the book was published 
in 1991!). Notwithstanding the above, he saw that Americanism was 
jeopardising the Rhine model, that the concept of social market econ-
omy was unknown even in the spheres of the trained economists and 
that the Eastern and Central European new democracies were bedazzled 
by the glamour of American capitalism. Changing habits and demand, 
strengthening of individualism, and demographic decline all undermine 
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the basis of the Rhine model. Albert aimed to end this process in Europe. 
He does not even bother with categorising the other Western and South 
European countries with the help of a theoretically elaborated classifi ca-
tion system. At the same time, his work contrasting the American and 
the Rhine models has had a considerable eff ect, and it is considered the 
forerunner of dual classifi cation, and his term “Rhine model” has become 
widely used. 
2.3  The Dichotomy of the Liberal 
and the Coordinated Market Economies 
 Peter A. Hall, political scientist, and David Soskice, economist, published 
their volume of studies titled  Varieties of Capitalism. Th e Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage in 2001. In its introduction, they 
elaborated a new theoretical framework for the survey of developed 
national economies. Th eir undertaking was successful, their approach has 
become one of the most popular in the literature, and the school of VoC 
is frequently cited in connection with them. As demonstrated above, as 
Fordist mass production declined, the examination of the social system 
of production—to a large extent due to the infl uence of sociologists—
assumed a very important role in the works of institutional comparison, 
with special regard to the behaviour of the companies and the coordi-
nation of their activities. Hall and Soskice place their approach in this 
trend as well. Th ey point out that, in addition to Albert ( 1993 ), the work 
of Hollingsworth and Boyer ( 1997b ), Crouch and Streeck ( 1997 ), and 
Whitley ( 1999 ) had great infl uence on them. 
 Th ese authors examine the most important spheres in which fi rms 
must develop relationships, such as corporate governance (including 
funding), industrial relations, the system of vocational training and edu-
cation, inter- fi rm relations (including relations with the suppliers and 
customers), and coordination vis-à-vis employees. Th ese are the same as 
the elements in the study of Hollingsworth and Boyer ( 1997a ); the only 
diff erence is that the latter also list the conception of fairness and jus-
tice held by capital and labour, the structure of the state and its policies, 
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and a society’s  idiosyncratic customs and traditions, as well as norms, 
rules, and laws. Th is diff erence can be attributed to the fact that Hall 
and Soskice follow the tenets of new institutional economics (in which 
institutional analyses are built on rational choice) in their theoreti-
cal framework related to institutions. Th is approach manifests in their 
starting point, which is built on individual and rational choice, which 
is complemented by taking culture, values, and historical features into 
account. Th e defi nition of institutions is expressly taken from North, 
economic actors are at the centre of these authors’ political economy, 
and the authors presume that these economic actors follow their interests 
rationally through their strategic interactions with others. According to 
this view, the major economic actors are companies, and their ability to 
adapt over the course of technological changes in international compe-
tition is of crucial importance. Hall and Soskice focused their investi-
gations on companies’ above-mentioned system of relations, while also 
noting that, in addition to formal institutions, culture, informal rules, 
and historical experiences also have a very important role. Th ese authors 
apply the micro-level interpretation of organisations’ behaviour to under-
stand macroeconomic problems; that is, they integrate the analysis of 
corporate behaviour with that of political economy. Th ey suggest that the 
diff erences in the socio-economic institutional system cause systematic 
diff erences in corporate strategies and in the two ideal types of market 
economy: liberal and coordinated market economies. It is not declared 
expressly, but their study implies that in the relation between the indi-
vidual and the structure, the authors aim to avoid reductionism in both 
directions, thus assuming a dynamic interaction. 
 Th ese authors fi nd that there is a close relationship between the coor-
dination type of companies’ activities and institutions. Based on the 
coordination of economic activities, they describe the two ideal types 
of modern capitalism: the liberal market economy and the coordinated 
market economy. Th e diff erence between the two types is reinforced by 
the presence of institutional complementarity. Th ese authors follow Aoki 
by considering two institutions complementary if the presence (or effi  -
ciency) of one increases the returns from (or the effi  ciency of ) the other. 
When the two ideal types are introduced through the cases of Germany 
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and the USA, the authors give a detailed account of how the institutional 
solutions of certain individual areas may assist each other. 
 In coordinated market economies, access to the fi nancing is not 
entirely dependent on current returns. Because fi rms have access to 
“patient capital”, they are able to retain a skilled workforce even at times 
of economic downturns and to invest in projects that generate returns 
only in the long run. Investors obtain information for the assessment of a 
fi rm by virtue of professional relationships, from the extensive networks 
of cross shareholding and through active industry associations (chambers 
and so on), which means that the fi rms are under “network reputational 
monitoring”. Because fi rms often fund their activities from retained earn-
ings, they are not as sensitive to external fi nancial conditions; on the 
other hand, they are sensitive to hostile acquisitions, against which the 
relevant provisions of law off er protection. Top managers of these fi rms 
have to negotiate with many actors (major shareholders, employee rep-
resentatives, major suppliers and customers, and so on), and manage-
rial incentives also stimulate them to reinforce the operation of business 
networks. Th e rights of the trade unions and works councils present a 
further need for agreement in labour relations. In vocational training, 
employer organisations and trade unions supervise the publicly subsi-
dised system of vocational training and apply pressure on fi rms to take on 
apprentices in the framework of apprenticeship schemes. Th ese actions 
are benefi cial for the fi rms because employer associations prevent skilled 
workers having received industry-related and corporate-specifi c knowl-
edge from being poached by competitor fi rms. In addition to long-term 
employment contracts, the main source of technological transfer is not 
the movement of scientifi c and engineering personnel, but rather fi rms’ 
network of relationships supported by business associations. To maintain 
the latter, formal contracts are not enough; informal standards and cus-
toms are necessary as well. 
 In the liberal market economy, fi nancing resources are dependent on 
current earnings and the price of shares on equity markets. Regulatory 
regimes are tolerant of hostile acquisitions, and no close-knit corpo-
rate networks develop. In industrial relations, there are market relations 
between the individual employee and the employer, it is not a require-
ment to set up work councils, and the role of trade unions is more 
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 limited than in the former case. Limiting the attempts to increase wages, 
thus, depends more on economic policies and market competition than 
on wage bargaining pursued with trade unions. Th e decision-making 
authority of fi rm managers is concentrated on the top management; 
therefore, the dismissal of employees in order to take advantage of new 
opportunities is easy. Vocational training is performed within the frame-
work of a formal education system where general knowledge and skills 
are developed. Firms are reluctant to invest in apprenticeship schemes 
because trained, skilled workers are easily poached. Th e fl exible labour 
market also encourages employees to obtain skills that can be generally 
used. Inter-company relations are based on enforceable formal contracts. 
Technology transfer is secured through the movement of scientifi c per-
sonnel from one company to another. Licensing and the sale of innova-
tions provide another important channel for technology transfer. 
 Hall and Soskice also describe in detail why the above systems of insti-
tutions make liberal market economies more suitable for radical innova-
tions, while coordinated market economies for incremental innovations. 
Nevertheless, they do not claim that any of the systems is superior to 
the others. Rather, institutional diff erences determine those areas and 
fi elds—in an international spectrum—in which the given system can 
achieve a comparative institutional advantage because certain fi elds are 
characterised by incremental innovations (for example, machinery), 
while others by radical innovations (for example, biotechnology and soft-
ware development). 
 Th e authors’ investigations are centred on developed countries; how-
ever, they say that this dual system can be applied to study developing 
countries as well. Among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) nations, the positions of six countries—
France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey—are not so evident. 
Th e authors fi nd it possible that these countries constitute another type 
of capitalism, the “Mediterranean” type, with a large agrarian sector and 
extensive state intervention enabling them to have specifi c capacities for 
non-market coordination in the sphere of corporate fi nance and more 
liberal labour relations. Th ey also point out that not all economies cor-
respond to the two ideal types. 
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 In their opinion, globalisation exerts huge pressure on national econo-
mies, which may adversely aff ect the institutional system of the coordi-
nated market economies; nevertheless, this does not necessarily lead to 
institutional convergence, either. 
 Th eir conception has sparked intense debate, but before going into 
this topic, let us take a quick look at the study by Peter A.  Hall and 
Daniel W. Gingerich ( 2004 ). Th e approach of Hall and Soskice almost 
entirely lacks aggregate and empirically founded investigations. Hall and 
Gingerich implicitly intend to remedy these shortcomings and comple-
ment the argumentation based on comparative case studies with an 
empirical test. Because they consider coordination to be a central cat-
egory, they collect those statistically accessible variables that are suitable 
for identifying the type of coordination. Th ey construct a coordination 
index and apply it to national economies with the help of factor analysis, 
proving that there is a fundamental diff erence between market coordi-
nation and strategic coordination. Th e complementarity of the institu-
tional areas is another central tenet that should be tested empirically. Hall 
and Gingerich assume that the reason why complementarities occur is 
because they have proved to be effi  cient. Th ey fi nd seven spheres, among 
which they identify several complementarities. Based on these spheres, 
they confi rm by various econometric methods that complementarity has 
a positive eff ect on economic growth in the case of three relations—for 
example, between corporate governance and industrial relations. It fol-
lows from the foregoing that purely market coordination and purely stra-
tegic coordination both have more benefi cial eff ects on economic growth 
than mixed solutions. Th e relation between the rate of economic growth 
per capita in the OECD nations between 1971 and 1997 and the type 
of coordination confi rms this assumption. Finally, these authors also 
explore whether institutional changes are heading towards convergence 
and whether coordinated market economies begin to adjust to liberal 
market economies. Th ey compare indicators from the period between 
1980 and 1990 that are characteristic of certain institutional areas. Th e 
Mediterranean countries and France are handled as mixed market econo-
mies in a separate group. In sum, coordinated market economies have 
taken moderate steps towards liberalism, and there have been changes in 
2 The Models of Capitalism: Comparative Institutional Analyses 43
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
the fi eld of strategic coordination, but we cannot talk about large-scale 
convergence. 
2.4  Dual or Plural Classifi cation? 
 Th e theory of Hall and Soskice has attracted immense attention, as noted 
by the researchers of this topic (for example, Nölke and Vliegenhart 
 2009 ; Streeck  2010a ). Hall and Soskice’s interpretation had its follow-
ers; however, it generated considerable debate as well. In the following, I 
will examine the important nodes of this debate—without the exhaustive 
review of the related literature—to clarify the theoretical framework of 
my research topic. 
 Without question, the most univocally debated and criticised issue 
has been the dual classifi cation of market economies into liberal and 
coordinated market economies. Although Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ) 
point out that the Mediterranean countries may constitute another 
type of capitalism, this notion did not gain signifi cance in their study. 
Th e authors’ terms are not entirely logical, and several authors have 
drawn attention to this. Th e liberal market economy is coordinated as 
well, but typically through market interactions, and the coordinated 
market economy is coordinated not through market interactions but—
as Hall and Gingerich ( 2004 ) subsequently describe—through strategic 
coordination. 
 According to Hay ( 2005 ), the foundation of the dual classifi cation is 
not clear. In conformity with Hall and Soskice’s institutionalist approach 
based on rational choice, two models of capitalism are built on the 
dichotomy of market—non-market coordination by applying deduc-
tive reasoning. However, Hall and Gingerich ( 2004 ) use an inductive 
approach, and empirical evidence does not support duality. Th ere is no 
reason why we should not distinguish, for example, the continental coun-
tries, the Nordic countries, and so on. When the archetypes (Germany 
and the USA) are compared, the liberal market economy seems to be 
an “institution-light” system—it is like a residual category. However, in 
their case, it is not about the lack of coordination—they are coordinated 
in another way. 
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 Pontusson ( 2005 ) points out not only that the “hybrid countries” indi-
cate the cumbersomeness of the dual classifi cation but also that Japan 
does not fi t into the category of the Germany-based coordinated market 
economy. Moreover, Great Britain, with its developed welfare provision, 
does not fi t into the US-based liberal market economy. 
 While Hay ( 2005 ) believes that there is a micro-economy-based insti-
tutionalism behind Hall’s dual system, Crouch ( 2005 ) sees the economic 
version of the neoliberal-social democratic political philosophical theo-
ries in the two models. Crouch criticises the dual classifi cation because 
he fi nds that the models and empirical data are not compatible—France 
and Great Britain, for example, do not fi t into this duality. Crouch goes 
even further, saying that the USA does not appropriately represent the 
characteristics of the liberal market economy and that Germany is not 
suitable for representing the coordinated market economy. In the Unites 
States, the scientifi c and technological innovations deriving from the mil-
itary sector have great importance for the economic performance of the 
country. Another factor is that in the 1990s, the countries that entered 
the information technology market fi rst gained a huge advantage, which 
was coupled with the advantages resulting from the size and the inter-
national position of the country. However, all these refl ect the results of 
the intra-company and state coordination, not those of market coordina-
tion. Lazonick ( 2007 ) argues that the advantages of the USA originated 
from corporate hierarchy and not from market coordination in the “old” 
business model of the decades after WWII and in the business model 
adjusted to the new economy (propelled by information technological 
innovation) of the 1990s. 
 Regarding Germany, Crouch ( 2005 ) notes that considering that 
Germany is a federal state, state coordination and the network relations 
of the actors are looser than in the small states; thus, Germany should 
be considered rather an outlier case of a coordinated market economy 
than a paradigmatic example of it. Th is is in sync with the assessment 
of Katzenstein ( 1985 ), who suggests that Germany is the closest to the 
democratic corporatism of the small states but that Germany has much 
stronger market elements. 
 Amable ( 2003 ) argues against the dual classifi cation by saying that clas-
sifi cation according to one dimension only (coordination) does not reveal 
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much about why one country is put into the same category as another 
country. If the number of intermediate, “imperfect” cases is high, a clas-
sifi cation more complex than the dual classifi cation has been disregarded. 
 It can be seen that irrefutable counter-arguments have been put for-
ward against the dual classifi cation. As a matter of fact, it is diffi  cult to 
understand why Hall and Soskice insisted on this classifi cation because 
the problems of dual classifi cation had come to the surface even before 
their paper was published in 2001. Soskice introduced this duality in 
several of his papers at the beginning of the 1990s (Hall  1999 ); in 1999, 
he wrote about uncoordinated or liberal and business-coordinated mar-
ket economies (Soskice  1999 ). Th e volume in which this paper was 
published (Kitschelt et  al.  1999b ) has also attracted much attention. 
Although in the fi nal study (Kitschelt et al.  1999a ), the editors commit-
ted themselves to the classifi cation made by Soskice, they described four 
types of capitalism, connecting them to various political arrangements. 
In addition to uncoordinated liberal market capitalism, they distinguish 
the national coordinated market economies (the Nordic countries), the 
countries with sector-coordinated market economies, that is, countries 
of “Rhine” capitalism, and group-coordinated market economies in the 
Pacifi c basin (Japan, Far East). 
 Th e book edited by Hancké et  al. ( 2007b ) aims to apply the VoC 
approach to the current issues of the EU (functioning of the EMU, the 
Eastern European nations’ accession to the EU). In the introduction to 
this volume (Hancké et al.  2007a ), on the one hand, the authors expressly 
reject those critical comments and observations made in connection with 
the conceptual framework of Hall and Soskice. On the other hand, based 
on these critics, they wish to develop it further. One such accepted modi-
fi cation was the review of the dual classifi cation. 
 Authors criticise dual classifi cation, believing that more models are nec-
essary for the interpretation of contemporary capitalism. Furthermore, 
others who question whether states enjoy enough independence in 
today’s global economy such that models can be built on national econo-
mies. Crouch ( 2005 : 42) expressly declares, “theorists of the diversity of 
capitalism are eager to play down the implications of globalisation, and 
argue intelligently and forcefully against the naive assumptions of much 
other literature that globalisation somehow abolishes the signifi cance of 
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national diff erences”. Streeck ( 2010a ) draws attention to studies accord-
ing to which there is institutional arbitrage, that is, due to the free inter-
national movement of capital, fi rms are able to choose the institutional 
environment that best fi ts their needs. Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ), though 
recognising this notion, conclude that diversity between countries can 
be retained because the diff erences in national institutional frameworks 
may present various competitive advantages. According to the studies to 
which Streeck ( 2010a ) makes reference, institutional arbitrage redounds 
on the practice pursued in the country of origin and, as a consequence, it 
may increase institutional diversity within the country while decreasing 
diversity between countries. It is worth noting the diff erences in coordi-
nation at the national, regional, and sectoral levels. 
 Regarding state, this issue is not the only problem with Hall and 
Soskice’s interpretation. Although Hall and Soskice connect their models 
to various states, the role of the state is missing. In other classifi cations 
(see below), the state-led market economy itself is one of the models. 
Th is defi ciency is recognised by Hancké et al. ( 2007a ), and in the same 
volume, Soskice ( 2007 ) investigates how production regimes are comple-
mentary to welfare state regimes and political systems, maintaining the 
dual classifi cation of the market economies into liberal and coordinated 
market economies. 
 Regarding the question of institutional changes and complementar-
ity, the debate in connection with the work of Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ) 
(which has been mentioned above on a general, theoretical level) fl ares up 
again. Undoubtedly, these authors rely on the thought of complementar-
ity quite strongly and conclude—partly based on this complementar-
ity—that in spite of globalisation, national characteristics are retained 
because the changes in the institutions disturb the effi  cient cooperation 
with the complementary institutions. Th e changes, therefore, should be 
accomplished in the form of gradual adjustment. 
 It is worth considering a counter-argument concerning complemen-
tarity represented strongly by Crouch ( 2005 ) and confi rmed empirically 
by Streeck ( 2010a ), namely, that hybrid institutions can be viable as well. 
Th is argument also demonstrates the limitations of empirical evidence 
because Hall and Gingerich ( 2004 ) empirically confi rm the effi  ciency- 
increasing power of complementarity and the weaker performance of 
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hybrid solutions. However, according to Crouch ( 2005 ), the heterogene-
ity of institutions is downright preferable because if a development path 
is blocked, those actors who are able to fi nd a way out with the help of 
their alternative strategies are present. 
 In the background of the issue of complementarity and change are the 
questions of whether globalisation facilitates institutional convergence or 
divergence and of whether coordinated market economy remains a viable 
alternative for Anglo-Saxon, or, rather, American, capitalism. Pontusson 
( 2005 ) accuses Hall and Soskice of tackling this question rather briefl y 
and obscurely. In his criticism, it is quite illuminating when he demon-
strates that revealing convergence or divergence between the two models 
depends largely on the indicators chosen. For instance, in coordinated 
market economies during the 1990s, there is no decrease in the index—
applied by the OECD—measuring the protection of the employ-
ees, which means that the diff erences between the models remained. 
However, if we add the increase in the number of employees with open- 
ended contracts—who are not covered by this protection—the picture 
is somewhat diff erent: the labour market of the coordinated market 
economies converges towards the liberal one. In a similar period, wage 
inequalities increased to a greater extent in the liberal market economies 
than in the coordinated market economies—as expected on the basis of 
theory—but if the change in the household income of the working age 
population is measured by the Gini coeffi  cient, we cannot fi nd a clear 
correlation between the type of economic coordination and the increase 
in inequality. 
 Political scientists and sociologists criticise Hall and Soskice, argu-
ing that economic coordination as a single dimension is not enough 
to explore the variations of capitalism, and they object that power rela-
tions, class interests, and confl icts have not been taken into account. 
For example, Pontusson ( 2005 ) suggests that coordination should be 
complemented with a second dimension, namely, whether class compro-
mise has been institutionalised or not. Th us, for instance, the diff erences 
between pre-Th atcher Great Britain and the USA would be manageable, 
while the common characteristics of liberal economic coordination are 
maintained. Streeck ( 2010a ) completely refutes their theory; according 
to him, Hall and Soskice, as well as the entire approach, show the types 
48 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
of  neoliberal capitalism at the end of the twentieth century under the 
term VoC, although their common features and their interdependency 
are more important than the diff erences between them. 
 Boyer ( 2005a ) sheds light on the weaknesses of VoC from the view-
point of the “ régulation ” school. He does not accept the dual classifi ca-
tion; moreover, he does not fi nd the economic coordination approach 
satisfactory, either. According to Boyer ( 2005a ), there are four polar prin-
ciples in terms of coordination (market, fi rm, state, and community), 
and the entire VoC literature covers only some of these principles. He 
underlines the importance of labour market institutions and welfare sys-
tems, claiming that their inclusion is not enough—they must be the cen-
tre of attention. Th ese critical views originate from the principle tenets 
of the “ régulation ” school and can just as well be subjected to criticism 
as the statements of VoC. It is interesting how Boyer sees the diff erence 
between the two schools concerning the interpretation of change. VoC 
interprets the changes as adaptation to external shocks, with the help of 
which the essence of the institutional infrastructure can be maintained. 
Th e “ régulation ” school often considers crises to be the consequences of 
prior success and emphasises the internal, endogenous development of 
the economic system. Nevertheless, Boyer ( 2005a ) fi nds it important that 
the two schools cooperate closely because, despite the above diff erences, 
there are similarities between them. 
 Mjøset and Clausen ( 2007 ) raise methodological problems in connec-
tion with the work of Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ), which aff ect the com-
parative institutional analyses in general. Th ere are two possible forms of 
theory building: a model can be created either empirically through the 
analysis of large-scale datasets or via thought experimental modelling, 
which is formulated in mathematical language. According to Mjøset and 
Clausen, Hall and Soskice are torn between the two methods. Th e fact 
that they apply the terminology of the game theory, with which micro-
economics is related to macroeconomics, implies that the model was cre-
ated by the second method. Nevertheless, abstract models should not 
directly connect with empirical cases. In contrast, in the case of Hall and 
Soskice, the models for the liberal and the coordinated market economies 
are the USA and Germany, which have been founded empirically and 
serve as master cases. Nevertheless, as indicated above, other empirical 
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cases do not confi rm this dual classifi cation. However, the small num-
ber of cases—as Hall ( 1999 ), as well as Hall and Gingerich ( 2004 ) have 
pointed out—do not make possible empirical testing that meets statisti-
cal requirements. It seems that Hall does not particularly force model 
creation built on thought experiments because, in his opinion, “Th e very 
emphasis of these models on interaction eff ects has made it diffi  cult to 
isolate the impact of each independent variable given the limited devel-
opment of equation systems modelling their full eff ects and the small 
sample (of OECD nations) against which they can usually be tested … 
As a result there is still an implicit emphasis in this literature on a few 
ideal-typical countries …” (Hall  1999 : 145). However, Crouch ( 2005 ) 
rightly protests and claims that an ideal type should be developed by 
emphasising logically well-founded characteristics, and in individual 
cases, these characteristics may be present only partially. Th erefore, the 
ideal type cannot be identifi ed with one single case. 
 In connection with Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ), Mjøset and Clausen 
( 2007 ) raise another problem, which causes diffi  culties in the compara-
tive analyses. Namely, there are no established criteria for dividing an 
economy into institutional areas. Neither the number of institutional 
domains is fi xed, nor are the most important institutional mechanisms 
determined. In comparative studies, the investigated institutional areas 
are similar, but there are diff erences in this and in the analysed institu-
tional mechanisms, which are not theoretically founded, and their selec-
tion in itself leads to diff erent typologies. 
 Th ere is a strengthening view that as a result of critiques, the VoC 
approach has eroded in recent years, while this perspective is still inspir-
ing. However, in comparative capitalism research, a new, “post-VoC” 
stage has evolved (Ebenau et al.  2015 ). 
2.5  The Diversity of Market Economies 
 Many authors were not satisfi ed with the fi ne-tuning of the dual clas-
sifi cation and opted for more than two models. Th ese authors largely 
neglected (and only made references to) or did not deal at all with models 
other than those of Europe and the USA. Th us, fi rst, we focus on two 
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works—the books by Coates ( 2000 ) and Amable ( 2003 )—which have a 
defi nitely more global approach. 3 
 David Coates published a study in 1999 and an entire book in 2000 on 
the models of capitalism. He reviewed all the attempts at typology made 
in the 1990s as found in the literature, and many of these attempts have 
been forgotten since. In his opinion, dual classifi cation is an unacceptable 
simplifi cation, and he opts for three ideal types: market-led capitalism 
(the USA, Great Britain after 1979), negotiated/consensual capitalism 
(Germany, Sweden), and state-led capitalism (Japan, Far East). 
 Coates ( 2000 ) presents these models and their historical evolution 
in his book, while making reference to the decades after WWII. In the 
course of this overview, it can be seen clearly that these models had diff er-
ent performance in terms of their competitiveness over diff erent periods 
of time. His reasoning aims mainly to prove that strengthening competi-
tiveness does not necessarily require forcing back trade unions, corpo-
ratist structures and wages, which was the central element of neoliberal 
thinking in the 1980s. 
 Amable ( 2003 ) uses the framework of new institutional economics, 
but at the same time he attempts to synthesise the remarks made over 
the course of the debates in the 1990s. He accepts North’s institution 
defi nition as a starting point; furthermore, he sees institutions not only as 
constraints but also as an opportunity for coordination, cooperation, and 
information sharing. With reference to Aoki, he says that the application 
of the game theory does not presume perfect rationality or perfect infor-
mation. He bridges the theoretical dilemma of the relationship between 
the individual and the institution by describing the behaviour of the 
actors with a two-tier game structure. Th e lower tier defi nes the agents’ 
strategy in a given institutional framework. Th e upper tier is the level of 
the metagame, where the framework of the lower tier evolves as the result 
of self-sustaining equilibrium strategies. Amable himself acknowledges 
that this two-tier game theory needs further elaboration. He claims that 
the role of institutions is to settle confl icts of interest, and he describes 
institutional complementarity with the help of the game theory. At the 
same time, in his view, institutions are not merely the result of equilib-
rium deriving from games that can originate from individuals’ pursuit 
of self-interest, but rather, actors gather into social groups, their confl ict 
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of interest crosses over to the political sphere, and institutions embody a 
political-economic balance. 
 In examining the current variations of capitalism, Amable’s method is 
diff erent from that based on ideal types. In one of his earlier papers, he 
termed the various types of capitalism “the social system of innovation 
and production”. He does not provide the theoretical background or the 
reason why he chose to investigate the particular institutional areas he 
actually analysed, but it is clear that he follows the “ régulation ” school. 
Th e institutional areas under scrutiny are the following: the product mar-
ket, the labour market, the fi nancial sector, the social protection system, 
and the education system. Based on the literature, Amable presumes that 
there are diff erent complementarities between institutions and that there 
are fi ve types of capitalism: market-based economies, social-democratic 
economies, continental European capitalism, Mediterranean capitalism, 
and Asian capitalism. Th en, he examines the individual institutional areas 
in twenty-one OECD countries by using an empirical analysis (principal 
components analysis and cluster analysis). Th e indicators take account 
of the average data for the 1990s or data for the end of the decade. 
Th e OECD has already constructed composite indicators that are able 
to characterise a given institutional area (for example, product markets 
and the labour market), but others have also elaborated similar indica-
tors for other areas. Amable accomplishes an empirical analysis by using 
these indicators, fi rst for the individual subsystems; then, he performs an 
aggregate analysis that confi rms the existence of these models. 
 One group is clearly distinct and homogenous: the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, Australia, Canada, the UK, and the USA, which represent the lib-
eral, market-based version of capitalism. Deregulated product markets 
are combined with the deregulated labour market and the market-based 
fi nancial system, and the education system is also organised in a competi-
tive manner. Th e welfare state may have a diff erent size according to the 
country concerned, with the USA and Canada on one side and the UK 
and Australia on the other. 
 Th e Mediterranean countries, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, con-
stitute another group with a rigid labour market, regulated product mar-
kets, non-developed fi nancial markets, a bank-based fi nancial system, a 
low level of social protection, and a weak education system. 
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 Using the OECD countries as a sample, only two countries—Japan 
and South Korea—represent the Asian economies with “governed” 
production- market competition, a bank-based fi nancial system, a low 
level of social public expenditures, and private higher education. 
 Denmark, Finland, and Sweden constitute the social-democratic 
group. Th eir product markets and labour markets are regulated, their 
fi nancial systems are bank-based, social protection is based on the univer-
salist model, and their education systems are publicly funded. 
 Th e group of the continental countries is large and the most heteroge-
neous group, containing Switzerland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, 
Norway, Germany, France, and Austria. Th eir product markets range 
from competitive to mildly regulated, their labour markets are coordi-
nated, their fi nancial systems are based on fi nancial institutions (banks 
and insurance companies), social protection is corporatist, and their edu-
cation system is publicly funded. Switzerland and the Netherlands are 
closer to the liberal group, while others are between the Mediterranean 
and the social-democratic clusters. 
 Although Amable speaks about the social system of innovation and pro-
duction, he does not include innovation in the fi ve subsystems but rather 
separately analyses the patterns of scientifi c, technological, and industrial 
specialisation (that is, sectoral structure). He does not build a comprehen-
sive indicator system, as he did in case of the previous fi ve subsystems, 
and the outcome is rather fragmented. Th en, he tries to fi nd relationships 
between the various institutional features and economic performance by 
applying regression analysis. Th e results can be summed up by saying that 
there are at least two ways of reaching high-level innovation. One is a liberal 
way, by deregulating the product markets combined with a fl exible labour 
market. Th e other way is the regulated product markets combined with a 
centralised fi nancial system, which ensures long-term fi nancing and com-
plies with the social-democratic and partly with the continental European 
models. Coordinated and uncoordinated labour relations both may lead 
to a large growth in productivity, but only if coupled with the appropriate 
groups of institutions. Th e same can be said about the relationship between 
a high degree of employment and a fl exible and regulated labour market. 
Th ese conclusions and reasoning leading to these conclusions are rather 
limited to Europe; therefore, the Asian model is neglected. 
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 Although Amable’s book has received little substantive criticism, it 
has been frequently referenced. According to Crouch ( 2005 : 38), “By far 
the best and most sophisticated approach to a ‘post-dualist’ typology of 
capitalism to date is that established by Amable ( 2003 )”, as Amable man-
aged to avoid those instances of methodological unilateralism detailed 
in Chap.  1 . He made his methodological individualism and his starting 
point—game theory—more elaborate, including bounded rationality, 
social confl icts, and the political-economic interpretation of equilibrium. 
At the same time, he has conducted more meticulous empirical analyses 
than his predecessors. 
 Amable’s analysis may have one defi ciency only: according to the 
author, the fi rst and foremost aim of the typology is to compare the 
economic performance of the various models of capitalism; namely, the 
author does not examine how the individual social-economic subsystems 
contribute to economic performance, which justifi es their inclusion in 
the analysis. He handles this topic as sociological evidence that these sub-
systems serve as the basis for distinguishing between the various types 
of capitalism. Nevertheless, innovation—critical from the point of view 
of growth—could have been regarded as a subsystem, and it could have 
been built in the models of capitalism, for instance. 
2.6  Varieties of Capitalism in the European 
Union 
2.6.1  The Models of the Old Member States 
 Undoubtedly, the book written by Esping-Andersen ( 1990 ) has had an 
impact on classifying the market economies of the EU. Th e book cov-
ered welfare state regimes only, not all economic systems. According to 
his defi nition, he uses a political-economic framework with an institu-
tional approach. Th e result of his research is well known—the diff eren-
tiation between the three welfare state regimes—therefore, this is only a 
reminder: the liberal system covers the Anglo-Saxon countries, the cor-
poratist system includes mainly continental European countries (Austria, 
France, Germany, and Italy) and the Scandinavian, Nordic countries con-
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stitute the social-democratic system. Th is is the fi rst analysis (compared 
to all analyses discussed above) in which the Nordic countries appear as 
an individual group. 
 Boyer ( 1997 ) investigates the specifi c features and the future prospect 
of the French development path, that is, how France is positioned among 
the types of capitalism. In his classifi cation, he considers the features 
of the labour market especially important. Market-oriented economies 
are the Anglo-Saxon countries (USA, Canada, and Great Britain), and 
with Albert’s generosity, he includes Japan along with Germany among 
the Rhine or corporatist economies. In the social-democratic model, he 
presents not only Sweden but also Austria. France and Italy embody the 
type of statist capitalism. Boyer does not build his models on statisti-
cal analysis—as in his above-cited paper he wrote with Hollingsworth 
( 1997a )—but he develops further and complements the known types of 
Anglo-Saxon and Rhine capitalism by using case studies and qualitative 
investigation. 
 Schmidt ( 2002 ) was inspired by the French institutional arrangement 
in her introduction of the term “state capitalism” (France, Italy) as a third 
ideal type in addition to market capitalism (the USA and Great Britain) 
and managed capitalism (Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden). In 
this defi nition, she follows the triple typology of Katzenstein and Zysman 
and that of Coates. For the future, she prognosticates that institutional 
diff erences will not cease in spite of globalisation or Europeanisation. 
 Th e papers cited so far are all concerned with the question of whether 
competition drives developed European economies towards the Anglo- 
Saxon liberal model. Ebbinghaus ( 1999 ) adds a new dimension in his 
discussion of the issue of the European social model. Th e European social 
model has always been frequently referenced in the documents of the 
EU as the model that distinguishes Europe from North America or Asia- 
Pacifi c. Ebbinghaus ( 1999 ) puts the question of whether the European 
social model exists, and if the answer is in the affi  rmative, of whether it 
can survive. He illustrates with the help of indicators that we can make a 
distinction between the Anglo-Saxon, the Nordic, the European Central, 
the Southern European countries, and Japan. He fi nds that there are 
fundamental diff erences between the USA, Europe, and Japan in terms 
of economic performance, labour relations, the labour market, and the 
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 welfare state. In spite of the pressure of globalisation, various institutional 
solutions have survived, and diff erences remained not only between these 
geographical locations but also within Europe. He fi nds Albert’s ( 1993 ) 
dual categorisation, which places Europe under the umbrella of Rhine 
capitalism, expressly unsatisfactory. In more detailed model-making, 
Ebbinghaus deals with European countries only. He extends the term 
“social model” to “socio-economic model”, which includes economic 
governance, industrial relations, employment regimes, and the welfare 
state, 4 and he distinguishes the Anglo-Saxon, the Nordic, the European 
Central, and the Southern European models. Although the empirical 
foundation in Ebbinghaus’ ( 1999 ) work is narrow and casual (it func-
tions as an illustration of his literature-based conception), its impact 
is important—authors rejecting the dual typology frequently cite him 
among their sources. 
 Th e European social model has become accepted in research on 
Europe, as well as in EU documents. At the beginning of the 2000s, 
in the research workshops working for—among others—the European 
Commission, increasing attention was devoted to the various develop-
ment paths that became visible within the Community. According to 
Boeri ( 2002 ), it is customary to divide Europe into four social policy 
models. In his paper “Globalisation and the Reform of European Social 
Model”, Sapir ( 2006 ) makes reference to Boeri when performing an 
empirically founded comparison of the performance of the four diff erent 
European social models (the Anglo-Saxon, the Nordic, the continental, 
and the Mediterranean). Sapir’s starting point is that, due to the single 
market and the monetary union within Europe, diff erences appear in 
social policy and in the regulation of the labour market because there is 
enough room for manoeuvring at a national level. Similar to Ebbinghaus, 
Sapir regards the welfare state and the labour market as the main sources 
of diff erences; in contrast, however, Sapir examines only the social model, 
not the socio-economic model. His conclusion is that among the four 
models, the Anglo-Saxon model and the Nordic model are effi  cient and 
the latter combines this effi  ciency with a high degree of equality. Th e 
continental model and the Mediterranean model are in need of reform 
due to their effi  ciency problems. 
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 Attention must be devoted to Sapir’s paper because, on the one hand, 
it is referenced very frequently in the literature and, on the other hand, 
before it was published in a journal, it was a background document for 
presentation at an informal meeting of the Economic and Financial 
Aff airs Council in September 2005. Th is informal meeting was fol-
lowed by another one in October (where heads of state and government 
met, but not within the framework of the European Council), and the 
Commission published communication for this meeting under the title, 
“European values in the globalised world” (CEC  2005 ). Th is paper 
refl ects the views and thoughts mentioned above in connection with 
Ebbinghaus and Sapir. Th is report declares that there are common values 
that—on the one hand—serve as a foundation for a unique European 
approach to economic and social policies; on the other hand, these note 
the diff erences as well. Th erefore, the authors of this report say that one 
cannot determine a single European model; however, they attempt to 
describe those specifi c features that constitute the characteristics of the 
European models. 5 
 Given an overview of the most important sources in the literature, it is 
clear that by the beginning of the 2000s, in spite of the various content- 
based and methodological approaches, it has been largely accepted in the 
non-dual typologies that the old EU member states are classifi ed into 
four models (Table  2.1 ). It is conspicuous that not a single source deals 
with the NMS even though 10–15 years have passed since the change in 
the political systems. Asian countries, expressly Japan, have been men-
tioned by certain authors, but no detailed model has been constructed. 
Naturally, the typologies represented in Table  2.1 do not cover all sources 
in the literature. Th ere are always newer and newer papers and studies, 
but these usually fi ne-tune existing trends and develop them further 
(for example, Schröder’s book ( 2013 ) combines the VoC typology with 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime classifi cation, ultimately reaching a 
triple categorisation).
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2.6.2  Classifi cations of the New Member States 
 Th e above authors use many indicators in their empirical analyses taken 
mainly from the OECD database or from other studies (but most of 
these studies obtained their data from the OECD database as well). 
Presumably, this is the reason why these publications do notdiscuss the 
Eastern and Central European countries; there are studies that present 
these countries separately from the developed countries and compare 
them to each other (for example, Hancké et al.  2007b ; Lane and Myant 
 2007 ; Estrin et  al.  2007 ). As part of a research project led by Amable 
and completed in 2008, Berrou and Carrincazeaux ( 2005 ) integrate the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (that is, those Eastern and Central 
European countries for which the data are accessible in the OECD data-
base) into their classifi cation. 
 In the last two decades, several attempts have been made to compare 
the Eastern and Central European countries with the existing models, 
but these cover only few countries, or the scope of the applied data and 
viewpoint is not as wide as in the case of the old capitalist countries. 
 Berrou and Carrincazeaux ( 2005 ), after performing a cluster analysis, 
conclude that the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are similar to 
the Mediterranean countries. 
 Cernat ( 2006 ), using very few indicators, conclude that Estonia belongs 
to the Anglo-Saxon group, while Bulgaria, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, and Slovakia to the continental category. Surprisingly, Cernat 
places the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia in the category of 
developmental capitalism, which is characteristic of the Asian countries. 
He gives a detailed study of his own country, Romania. In this case study 
of Romania, he says that compared to the other countries, Romania only 
partly fi ts the continental model, so he uses the term “cocktail capitalism” 
for the country. In the course of capitalist transformation,globalisation 
(and the World Bank) transferred the Anglo-Saxon model, while the 
European Union transferred the Anglo-Saxon and the continental mod-
els, and the domestic circumstances moved the country towards the direc-
tion of state-centred, clientist capitalism. As a result of these impacts, the 
outcome has become inconsistent and ineffi  cient. 
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 Lane ( 2007 ) gives a review of the model creation of the market econo-
mies, dealing with the books by Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ) and Amable 
( 2003 ) in more detail. Nevertheless, this is not the basis on which he 
classifi es the countries that underwent capitalist transformation. His 
starting point is that the Western advisors suggested the application of 
the Anglo-Saxon model with full liberalisation, free trade, and privati-
sation as the key elements. Th erefore, he compares the extent of priva-
tisation and stock market capitalisation, the size of the private sector’s 
share of domestic credit as a percentage of GDP, the size of FDI as a 
percentage of GDP, and the transnationality index (elaborated by the UN 
expressing the ratio of FDI in output, exports, and employment) in the 
post- socialist countries. In the case of all indices, there are fundamental 
diff erences between the CEE countries (including the Baltic countries) 
and the former Soviet member states. Only stock market capitalisation 
and the share of domestic credit exhibit low levels everywhere. Lane 
compares the CEE countries to the continental countries, and he creates 
a subgroup in which privatisation is less extensive and state interven-
tion remains more intensive (Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Romania). Th e other, economically poorer group, in which the transi-
tion was unsuccessful, contains the following countries: Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Moldova. Th e situation in these 
countries has become chaotic; to describe it, the author uses the term 
“hybrid state/market uncoordinated capitalism”. 
 In the same volume, Knell and Srholec ( 2007 ) use Hall and Soskice’s 
dual classifi cation and Hall and Gingerich’s empirical analysis method as 
a starting point. Built on data from 2001 to 2004 and using 13 indica-
tors, they construct the indices for social cohesion, labour market regu-
lation, and business regulation and explore in detail certain aspects of 
labour relations. Th ey examine the Eastern and Central European post- 
socialist countries, including the Western Balkans, the Soviet successor 
states, Vietnam, and China, together with the developed OECD mem-
ber states. Regarding social cohesion (the size of the public sector and 
income inequalities), the majority of the post-socialist countries are more 
similar to liberal coordination than the USA; at the same time, business 
regulation more closely resembles coordinated market economy. On the 
other hand, if labour market regulation is taken into consideration, these 
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 countries are entirely divided between the models of the liberal and the 
coordinated market economies. Th is study may serve as a warning exam-
ple of the uncontrolled application of statistical data because, according 
to the cumulative index, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Mongolia are 
at a level of market coordination similar to that of, for instance, Hungary, 
Estonia, Slovakia, or Lithuania, which is an obviously absurd result. 
 King ( 2007 ) applies the VoC framework for the transition countries. 
He describes their development path with the help of six characteristic 
features: average per capita GDP growth between 1991 and 2000, change 
in male life expectancy between 1989 and 2000, percentage of the popu-
lation below poverty, net FDI infl ow, an EBRD Governance Indicator, 
and the security of property rights index. He contrasts the liberal depen-
dent states (the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary) with the patri-
monial states (Russia, Romania, Ukraine, and Milosevic’s Serbia). His 
description of the latter group is very similar to Lane’s ( 2007 ) defi nition 
of uncoordinated capitalism. King ( 2007 ) adds that the liberal depen-
dent states show elements of proto-coordination and proto-liberalism. 
Th e explanation for this lies in the fact that there are two essential diff er-
ences that separate them from the Western European countries, namely, 
that their dependence on foreign capital, foreign technology, and foreign 
customers is huge and that workers are defenceless. 
 Bohle and Greskovits ( 2007 ) argue that after the fall of the socialist 
system, three versions of capitalism emerged in Central-Eastern Europe: 
a purely neoliberal type in the Baltic states, an “embedded” neoliberal 
type in the Visegrád countries, and a neo-corporatist system in Slovenia. 
When creating these types, the authors address new aspects, not those 
described so far. In addition to the usually examined fi elds of the welfare 
state and labour relations, industrial structural change, macroeconomic 
stability, and even the dynamism of the political systems were subject to 
scrutiny. Th e other novelty of these authors is also—compared to the 
studies above—that they take the specifi c features of the socialist lega-
cies into account and, starting from here, they present the evolution of 
the models from a historical perspective. In addition, they integrate the 
impacts of the EU and the transnational companies in their explana-
tion. Th eir paper in 2007 was followed by a book (Bohle and Greskovits 
 2012 ), which I return to later. 
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 Mykhnenko ( 2007 ) compares Ukraine and Poland, and despite 
their diff erences, he regards these countries as the weakened versions 
of the continental model or—by using the terminology of Hall and 
Gingerich ( 2004 )—as mixed market economies (which complies with 
the Mediterranean model). 
 Estonia and Slovenia led Feldmann ( 2007 ) and Buchen ( 2007 ) to 
present the CEE manifestation of the liberal and coordinated market 
economy. 
 Blanke and Hoff mann ( 2008 ) assume that the Baltic countries fol-
low the liberal model, while the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and 
Slovenia follow the model of a coordinated market economy. 
 Similarly, Csaba ( 2009b ) emphasises the diff erences between the trans-
formed countries. On the basis of the degree of state redistribution, three 
Visegrád countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, can be dif-
ferentiated from Slovakia and the Baltic countries (their level is similar to 
the Anglo-Saxon one). Romania and Bulgaria are not included in the lat-
ter group because in these two countries, the contribution of agriculture 
to GDP and to employment exceeds by far the level of the other CEE EU 
member states. Furthermore, the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) is sharply diff erent from the NMS of the EU; in the former states, 
the state-led economic model seems to have settled. 
 Schweickert et al. ( 2013 ) make a distinction between liberal and coor-
dinated market economies within the CEE EU member states by apply-
ing the dual classifi cation of VoC. 
 Th e CEE countries are regarded by the report prepared by the European 
Commission on Industrial Relations in Europe (European Commission 
 2009c ) as a distinct model of capitalism, which is presented in Table 3.6. 
At the same time, the report leaves some institutional areas open, which 
will be the fi nal solution from among the controversial tendencies. 
Rodrigues ( 2009 ) explores the variations of capitalism within the EU in 
connection with the Lisbon strategy, and she notes that the Eastern type 
should be elaborated as well. In the same volume, Török ( 2009 ) confi rms 
with the help of a few other aspects that the CEE countries constitute a 
distinct model. Schweiger ( 2014 ) classifi es that the CEE countries have 
a “transition model” with some common challenges but with noticeably 
diff erences in their culture and the development of their economies and 
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welfare states. However, he considers that it is justifi ed to speak of an 
emerging new variety of capitalism in this region. 
 Nölke and Vliegenhart ( 2009 ) prepare a thorough inventory of the 
attempts made so far in the framework of VoC to classify the market 
economies that have emerged in the transition countries. Th ey note the 
discrepancy in these attempts because some studies have argued that the 
East Central European countries converge towards the liberal model, 
while others claim that convergence towards the coordinated market 
economy occurred. A third group regards these countries as the hybrid 
variation of the two models. Nölke and Vliegenhart ( 2009 ) argue that 
the contradictory results can be attributed to the premature, mechanis-
tic application of quantitative approaches. In their study, they prove the 
existence of a new capitalism model, which they termed a “dependent 
market economy”, but their investigation covers the Visegrád countries 
only. Th e comparative advantage of the dependent market economies 
is due to the institutional complementarity characterised by skilled but 
cheap labour, technological innovations received through transnational 
companies and capital provided by FDI. Th e authors derive all features of 
the dependent market economy model from the essential role of foreign 
capital, which has a huge impact on the system of corporate governance, 
industrial relations, education, and training, as well as the innovation sys-
tem. As a result, it is easy to show complementarity between the elements 
of the model that have been derived from a single factor. A merit of the 
study is that in several defi nite areas (for example, industrial relations and 
corporate governance), it demonstrates that very diff erent institutional 
correlations may exist behind the quantitatively very similar data. Th is 
illustrates rather well the methodological challenge needed to interpret 
the statistical analyses together with case studies. It is also without doubt 
that the role of FDI has its special features compared to the developed, 
old market economies, and it has an explanatory power concerning the 
evolution and operation of the institutional system. However, in their 
study, the authors apply FDI unilaterally as a single, universal explana-
tory factor. For instance, in comparison with the study by Bohle and 
Greskovits ( 2007 ), it is striking how important elements are left out 
from the attempt to understand the institutional systems of the countries 
concerned. 
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 From the above overview, it can be clearly seen that no common 
standpoint has evolved in the literature regarding the assessment of the 
institutional system of the transformed post-socialist countries. On the 
contrary, opinions are divided and expressly opposing. Agreement has 
been reached in only one question—which is outside the scope of this 
study—namely, that the diff erence is huge and qualitative between the 
post-socialist EU member states and the CIS. 
2.7  Theoretical and Methodological 
Considerations 
 In Sect. 1.7, the methodological starting position that will be followed in 
the course of my institutional analysis is defi ned. In Chap.  2 , the com-
parative economic analyses were covered, and the development of the 
classifi cations concerning market economies was explored. Let me sum-
marise the main points of Chap.  2 by following the principle defi ned in 
Sect. 1.7. 
 In spite of the fact that in the literature, the dual classifi cation of Hall 
and Soskice is considered the starting point in most cases, in my opinion, 
Amable’s empirically based model construction is more convincing, that 
is, it describes the models of market economies with the help of various 
social-economic subsystems. Because his results concerning Europe have 
been confi rmed by other authors, I will use this model as a reference 
point, and the CEE countries will be placed into this framework. 
 At the same time, we must be aware of the fact that the application of 
quantitative methods has its limitations. Th e most important of these lim-
itations is that it is impossible to satisfactorily explore the causal relation-
ships and the eff ect mechanisms in the background of the phenomena by 
statistical means (regardless of whether it is a cluster analysis or regression 
analysis). 6 Th e investigations are naturally infl uenced by the scope of the 
available statistical data. Furthermore, when countries are compared, the 
number of the elements is so small that it weakens the statistical power. 
However, as the number of countries with diff erent features and with 
diff erent degrees of development involved in the investigation increases, 
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the possibility that the conclusions will be superfi cial or biased increases. 
Given an overview of literature, it seems that the researchers agree that 
the quantitative investigations must be complemented with qualitative 
analyses in order to overcome this diffi  culty or to at least mitigate the 
related problems, for example, with the help of historically oriented case 
studies (Shalev  2007 ; Pontusson  2007 ; Esping-Andersen  2007 ). 
 In order to provide a well-established foundation for the results of this 
research, the quantitative and qualitative methods are applied together. 
In addition, in the course of this investigation, I have kept track of and 
will apply the results of neoclassical research. On the one hand, in this 
work, the subsystems involved in the investigation in order to construct 
the market economy models are not considered evidential, but it will be 
examined whether macroeconomics justifi es their signifi cance from the 
viewpoint of the given economic system’s performance. On the other 
hand, the neoclassically founded analyses are also useful, as the operation 
of the market economies during the crisis will be presented below. 
 Th e current crisis gives us an opportunity to perform an unusual 
methodological experiment: we are able to observe the operation of an 
institutional system modelled at the threshold of the crisis within the cir-
cumstances of a global crisis. Th is means that the mainstream economic 
analyses must inevitably be applied alongside the institutional compari-
son and that institutional changes, that is, the methodologically critical 
element of the comparative studies, must be presented as well. 
 In spite of methodological open-mindedness, I am aware that it is 
impossible to eliminate all uncertainties from the conclusions I may draw 
and that future investigations may impel me to review the results. 
 Notes 
 1.  In his entry in  Th e Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary 
Economics , Jessop ( 1994 ) says that the French “ régulation ” school and its 
three branches have their roots in Marxism. According to Jessop, the repre-
sentatives of this school consider the institutions of capitalism the results of 
historical development in which the relatively stable capitalist expansion—
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which took place during a long historical period—was due to non-economic, 
institutional factors. Furthermore, they emphasise the transformation poten-
tial of social actions. Boyer indicates the Parisian branch’s Marxist roots from 
the 1970s (Boyer  2005a ); however, in Boyer’s analyses written in the 1990s 
or later, all statements would easily be part of a standard sociological 
analysis. 
 2.  According to a footnote in the book, GDP data were calculated at the 
exchange rate and price level in 1975. 
 3.  Becker ( 2009 ) rejects dual classifi cation, regarding capitalism as an open 
social system, and he introduces an empirically founded typology in his 
book, which involves Japan; however, this book is less elaborate than Amable’s 
book ( 2003 ). Th erefore, I do not discuss it in detail. 
 4.  Not only Ebbinghaus can be characterised by dual interpretation. In the lit-
erature, the term “European social model” sometimes refers to the system of 
social protection only, but in the case of others, it is used in a broader sense, 
referring to an economic-social model, which also appears in the name itself 
in the case of certain authors. O’Hagan ( 2002 ) follows the content-wise 
changes in the concept of the “European social model” from the Paris 
Summit held in 1972 to the beginning of 2000s. 
 5.  Common features of the European model include the following:
•  Common values of economic and social policies: solidarity and cohesion, 
equal opportunities and the fi ght against all forms of discrimination, ade-
quate health and safety in the workplace, universal access to education 
and healthcare, quality of life and quality of work, sustainable develop-
ment and the involvement of civil society. Th ese values represent a choice 
in favour of a social market economy. 
•  In the member states of the EU, the public sector plays a bigger role than 
in Asia or in the USA, and public spending on social protection is higher 
than in the USA or in Japan. 
•  Compared to other regions in the world, national systems are reinforced 
by European-level policies. 
•  Th ere is a strong tradition of social dialogue and partnership (CEC  2005 ). 
 6.  Th e well-known methodological problems (endogeneity, multicollinearity, 
and so on) are beyond the scope of this study. 
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 Based on the theoretical grounding in Part I, I accept the method of 
empirical model construction. As we have seen, in generating models 
for the market economies of the EU as they pertain to the older member 
states, a relative consensus exists in the literature in terms of distinguish-
ing among the four accepted models; namely, the Nordic, continental, 
Anglo-Saxon, and Mediterranean models. For this reason, it might be 
reasonable to conduct an empirical institutional analysis exclusively of 
the NMS. However, two factors prompt opting for a full investigation 
once again. On the one hand, data from Amable—who carried out the 
most thorough empirical investigation so far—date from the 1990s; 
therefore, it is interesting to repeat the process with data from a decade 
later. On the other hand, the same set of indicators could not be gener-
ated because some of the NMS are not featured in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database used by 
Amable. 
 An Empirical Analysis of the 
Economic System 
 Th is chapter is derived in part from the empirical investigation published in the author’s article, 
“Th e Central and Eastern European model of capitalism” (Post-Communist Economies 23(1) 
pp. 15–34, copyright Taylor & Francis), available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/ Article 
DOI 10.1080/14631377.2011.546972. 
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 In the case of the post-communist member states, after reviewing the 
literature on the subject and the contradictory results produced therein, 
it is reasonable to ask how the new, former communist member states 
of the EU fi t into models elaborated for the OMS when attempting to 
provide an answer based on a comprehensive, empirical investigation. 
Two decades after the change in the political system, we can assume that 
a stable framework of economic and social order is in place, which lends 
itself to analysis. We might put it another way by asking whether these 
member states approach any existing model or whether, based on their 
common distinctive features, they represent a new model of their own or 
even contain several models among themselves. 
 One important criticism levelled at comparative investigations and 
the modelling of market economies is that the selection of the examined 
institutional elements leaves too much to chance. If an institutional com-
parison is carried out from the point of view of suitability for economic 
growth—as in the present case—theoretically, limits to the sphere of rele-
vant institutions are set. Mainstream growth theories can help us because 
they also allude to institutional components of growth. Th e endogenous 
growth theory of Barro and Sala-i-Martin ( 2004 ) takes into account data 
pertaining to the education system, healthcare provision, the quality of 
public administration, government expenditures, and political democ-
racy among institutional type variables explaining growth, with innova-
tion seen as the central growth factor. According to Barro ( 1997 ), the 
long-term growth rate also depends on government functions such as tax-
ation, maintenance of the rule of law and public order, provision of infra-
structural services, protection of intellectual property, and the regulation 
of international trade, fi nancial markets, and other areas of the economy. 
At the same time, these investigations do not defi ne why these—and 
only these—institutional variables are included in regression analyses in 
this way. In other words, regardless of whether Amable’s sociologically 
rooted approach or the mainstream economic growth theory is taken into 
account, the uncertainty cannot be eliminated in the selection of institu-
tions in market economic modelling. Nevertheless, some reinforcement 
may be gained in two aspects. On the one hand, the elements listed in 
endogenous growth theory allude to the subsystems featured in Amable’s 
approach (the regulation of product markets, innovation, the fi nancial 
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system, the education system, and welfare provision). Th at the role of 
human capital as a growth factor is beyond question indirectly justifi es 
the inclusion of the labour market. On the other hand,  numerous mac-
roeconomic research studies prove the connection between individual 
subsystems and economic growth. Th at is, while the inclusion of certain 
subsystems can be satisfactorily justifi ed in building the models, it cannot 
be guaranteed that institutions relevant from the point of view of growth 
performance will not be omitted. Th ere is scarcely room for doubt that 
the structure of the state and the political system, combined with the 
customs, traditions, and norms of society, infl uence the functioning of 
a market economy. However, the incorporation of these factors into 
market economic models extends beyond the scope of my economically 
based investigation. 
 In selecting the range of subsystems, I therefore accept Amable’s work 
( 2003 ), with the diff erence that while he did not analyse research and 
development and innovation (R&D&I) as an independent subsystem, 
this approach is nevertheless justifi ed from the perspective of growth 
theory. Prior to each individual statistical analysis, I review whether the 
signifi cance of the investigation criteria applied to the performance of the 
economic system and economic growth by Amable—and in the compar-
ative economics in general—can be defended within the given subsystem 
based on current macroeconomic research. Th ese macroeconomic results 
are summarised in the introductory sections. 
 Among the socioeconomic sectors, I examine product markets, 
R&D&I, the fi nancial system, the labour market, the system of social 
protection, and education. Th e database I have established uses data from 
Eurostat, the European Central Bank (ECB), the World Bank, and the 
Fraser Institute. Due to insuffi  cient data, I must omit the two member 
states, Cyprus and Malta, and I cannot include Croatia—which became a 
member state from 2013—for similar reasons. I select the information to 
include only “hard” data, thus giving preference to measurable data over 
indices formed on the basis of the opinions of economic actors. 
 In order to render international institutional comparisons measur-
able, it has become widespread practice among both international organ-
isations, such as the OECD, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), and authors of VoC studies, to map the existence 
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of institutional diff erences using some form of indicator. For individ-
ual subsystems, I have gathered all those indicators currently in use in 
the literature. However, indicators measuring input or output do not in 
themselves necessarily off er a precise picture of institutions, and for this 
reason, I always compare the results of the cluster analysis with conclu-
sions uncovered in the literature and qualitative studies. In this way, I 
believe the problem whereby similar indicator values in statistical group-
ings do not necessarily conceal an actual institutional similarity can be 
avoided. 
 Th e indicators show the average of three years taken from the mid- 
2000s; I intend to refl ect the situation that existed prior to the crisis, 
that is, to “take a snapshot” that fi lters out possible fl uctuations. It is 
not yet possible to determine whether the changes that the current 
global economic crisis has brought signify lasting institutional trans-
formations or if they are transitory changes that might lead us to draw 
only markedly distorted conclusions regarding the institutional frame-
work. 1 After the crisis and once an ensuing period of stabilisation has 
elapsed, it will be worth repeating these measurements. Th en, it will be 
possible to make an empirical comparison of the way individual coun-
tries have reacted to the crisis through institutional changes. Given 
that my primary goal is to classify countries according to their type 
within the individual subsystems, as well as to represent them in some 
form of—preferably—two-dimensional diagram, the principle meth-
ods of my examination are cluster analysis and multidimensional scal-
ing (MDS). 
 In applying cluster analysis—which produced interpretable results 
despite the small number of elements—I tried out several possible num-
bers of clusters, fi nally taking two aspects into account in deciding on the 
number of clusters:
•  Th e individual clusters should be economically interpretable. I have 
provided an interpretation of the clusters based on cluster centres. 
•  Th e individual clusters should be comparatively homogeneous, mean-
ing that the standard deviation of variables that form the clusters 
should be lower within the clusters compared to the whole. 
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 In multivariate analyses, point confi gurations can be represented 
within several diff erent frames of reference. MDS served as the basis for 
the graphic representation of countries and clusters applied. Th e result 
of MDS can be regarded as interpretable provided that the S-stress value 
obtained in the given dimension is below 0.2 and that the artifi cial 
dimensions are interpretable. Ideally, the value of this indicator should be 
below 0.1. With the exception of product markets, this stricter condition 
was successfully met in all areas. 
 For the interpretation of artifi cial dimensions, the relationship 
between the standardised variables and the primarily received dimen-
sions was examined, and when the dimensions could not be apprehended 
unequivocally, a clarifi cation was carried out. In other words, I projected 
the group of variables shaping the individual dimensions on a dimen-
sion, taking the S-stress value into consideration. Th e indicators, their 
mean values, and standard deviations within the individual clusters, as 
well as descriptions of the cluster centres characterising the clusters, are 
contained in Tables A.1–A.6 of the Appendix. Th e exercises were run in 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software (version 15.0) 
using K-means clustering. 
3.1  Product Markets 
3.1.1  The Relationship Between Competition, 
Productivity, and Innovation 
 In describing individual models of capitalism, one of the most important 
aspects in classifying these models by type is the strength of competi-
tion on respective markets and how much the state restricts this com-
petition. In economics, there is a generally accepted correlation among 
mainstream authors whereby the strengthening of competition and 
deregulation increases economic performance, while curbing state inter-
vention has a benefi cial eff ect on economic growth. On the one hand, 
competition boosts economic growth by encouraging innovation, which, 
in turn, increases productivity. On the other hand, it forces managers to 
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make better use of their resources by allocating them more effi  ciently. It 
is not the object of this book to analyse the macroeconomic debates that 
revolve around this nor to discuss what other preconditions related to 
economic policy or institutions, for example, are required in order for 
the desirable eff ects of free competition to be genuinely felt. I aim only 
to provide a short summary of the insights attained in the literature of 
the past decade. In most studies, questions of competition and growth 
go hand in hand with the discussion of research and development and 
innovation (R&D&I); therefore, it will become evident in the following 
why R&D&I are treated as an independent subsystem. 
 Ahn in 2002 and Sharpe and Currie in 2008 completed wide-ranging 
reviews of the relevant literature. Although several studies discussing the 
connection between competition, innovation, and increasing productiv-
ity are of a theoretical nature, for the most part, these studies do not stop 
at creating models, but submit them to empirical testing. Th e remaining 
studies endeavour to compare international experiences. Work carried 
out within the OECD framework is the most infl uential, as material pre-
pared here culminates in proposals for the reform of economic policy. 
Th e third type of approach is the case study. Based on the aforemen-
tioned reviews of the literature, it can be stated that empirical evidence 
confi rms the positive infl uence that intensity of competition exerts on 
innovation and productivity. 
 Høj et al. ( 2007 ), in investigating the relationship between profi t mar-
gins and market regulation, fi nd evidence that liberalisation increases 
the strength of competition in the OECD countries. On this basis, 
they make competition policy recommendations for the strengthening 
of competition in the service sphere. Dutz and Hayri ( 2000 ), carrying 
out their investigations in various regions of the world economy, fi nd an 
overall close correlation between long-term growth and effi  cient competi-
tion policy. Data from the Far East region, however, indicate a far weaker 
connection, prompting the authors to caution against oversimplifi cation. 
With regard to the OECD countries, Clougherty ( 2010 ) confi rms the 
positive relationship between committed competition policy and eco-
nomic growth. Blanchard and Giavazzi ( 2003 ) make similar arguments 
supporting the benefi ts of market deregulation and formulate conditions 
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with respect to both the product and labour markets, which they deem 
necessary in order for deregulation to generate growth. 
 One independent line of debate takes as its starting point Schumpeter’s 
theory, which—contrary to the above—posits that competition weakens 
the incentive to innovate because the prospects of rent from innovation 
deteriorate with keen competition. Th e National Bureau of Economic 
Research has produced a series of studies that combine the Schumpeter 
eff ect with the eventuality in which competition stimulates innovation. 
Acemoglu et al. ( 2002 ) diff erentiate an investment-based growth strategy 
from one based on innovation. Th e former has been applied successfully 
by emerging economies, where it may allow room for state intervention, 
direct subsidies and restricted competition. In the case of innovation- 
based growth in proximity to advanced technologies, competition and 
the selection of successful companies and managers play an increased 
role. Th ere is a danger that following successful convergence, an economy 
will not shift over to the innovation-based path necessary to ensure con-
tinued growth. In addition, interested groups that have gained strength 
during the period of investment-based growth may acquire political 
infl uence, potentially obstructing the transition to innovation-based 
growth. Aghion et al. ( 2005 ) portray the link between competition and 
innovation using an inverted U-shaped curve. In this model, innovation 
occurs step by step. Here, innovation is principally motivated not by the 
innovation rent in itself, but rather by the diff erence between the pre- 
innovation and post-innovation rents. If the initial level of competition 
is low and the technological standard even in most sectors, then strength-
ening competition will stimulate innovation because companies can thus 
“escape” competition. If competition is already intense and the techno-
logical standard of most sectors is uneven, there is no motivation for 
underdeveloped companies to innovate, as the achievable innovation rent 
is modest, such that the Schumpeter eff ect comes into play. In industries 
in which companies are close to the technology frontier, strong competi-
tion encourages innovation (and thus the aforementioned “escape eff ect” 
dominates). With the help of British data, the authors see their model as 
empirically justifi ed. Based on data from 40 developing and transitional 
countries, Alder ( 2010 ) fi nds that here, too, companies behave diff er-
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ently amid competition according to their distance from the technologi-
cal frontier. 
 In summary, both theoretically and empirically, competition increases 
the performance of the economy. Th erefore, the customary standpoints 
of the VoC literature in the analysis of product markets can be accepted, 
namely, the power of competition and the presence of the state. At the 
same time, the change in the framework of ownership was of central 
importance in the transformation of the economic system in the post- 
socialist countries. Th is fi nding justifi es introducing indicators relating to 
the ownership structure as well, which is missing from the methodology 
developed for mature market economies. Nevertheless, in the absence of 
comparable data available for all countries, it was not possible to do this. 
International collection of data exists only with regard to FDI, and only 
this have I been able to utilise. 
3.1.2  Product Markets of the Member States 
 In the EU, integration unquestionably materialised earliest and most pro-
foundly in the commodities market, with the regulation of competition 
limiting the opportunities for state intervention within narrow bounds. 
Competition can also force states to break down bureaucratic obstacles 
in the way of businesses in the interest of improving the given member 
state’s competitiveness, leading to the creation of a level playing fi eld in 
the regulations pertaining to enterprise. However, product markets and 
competition within them are impacted not only by state regulation but 
also by individual economies’ openness to foreign trade (including the 
movement of goods and capital), which is simultaneously an important 
feature of an economy’s structure as a whole. 
 For this reason, I examine the product markets of member states in 
two dimensions. One is the level of integration of markets in foreign 
trade, in which not only the ratio of foreign trade and of the stock of 
outward and inward FDI to GDP was measured but also the equilibrium 
in the balance of trade. In the other dimension, I aimed to grasp the level 
of market liberalisation by measuring the extent of price regulation and 
state investments, the scale of taxation, and the burden of bureaucratic 
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procedures connected to the operation of companies, the latter expressed 
in terms of both time and cost. 
 Based on the cluster analysis, the great majority of OMS (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, the UK, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Germany, Portugal, and Sweden) were assigned to the fi rst cluster. Th is 
cluster, in addition to few bureaucratic obstacles and little direct state 
presence, is characterised by higher tax levels and a moderate degree of 
openness to foreign trade, as well as by a stock of outward and inward 
FDI above the EU average. Th ere are signifi cant diff erences in the level 
of international integration among the countries concerned, principally 
due to disparities in size. 
 Th e NMS can be classifi ed into two quite distinct groups. Th e second 
cluster, comprising Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia, lies fur-
ther from the cluster of OMS. Th ese economies’ moderate openness to 
foreign trade is accompanied, in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, by a 
severe struggle with imbalances. Except for Bulgaria, the ratio of inward 
FDI to GDP is below the EU average, while outward FDI is all but neg-
ligible for all these countries. Although their tax levels are lower than in 
the cluster of OMS, bureaucratic obstacles are greater. 
 Th e other group (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, and Slovakia) lies closer to the cluster of OMS. Th is group has 
a greater openness to foreign trade and a ratio of inward FDI to GDP 
that is slightly above the EU average, while outward FDI is very mod-
est in scale, albeit greater than in the preceding cluster. Bureaucratic 
obstacles are greater than in the fi rst cluster. Substantial diff erences exist 
within the group, due mainly to the severe imbalance in foreign trade 
in the Baltic states. Th e level of taxation is lower than in the cluster of 
OMS and, in terms of tax brackets that lend themselves to comparison, 
even Hungary does not show values conspicuously diff erent from other 
members of the cluster (although the level of state deductions from 
income is higher than in other countries in the cluster). Th e Czech 
Republic borders on the second cluster in this regard, while Estonia 
borders on the fi rst cluster. 
 Th e three Mediterranean countries, Greece, Italy, and Spain, make up 
the fourth cluster. Th ese are comparatively closed economies, refl ected 
in a stock of outward and inward FDI below the average, with a more 
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powerful state presence and greater bureaucratic obstacles. Spain borders 
on the third cluster. 
 Luxembourg, by virtue of its conspicuous openness due to its peculiar 
situation and size, stands apart from the OMS, forming a separate cluster 
(Table  3.1 ).
 I have represented product markets in two dimensions (Fig.  3.1 ), with 
market liberalisation expressed on the horizontal axis (S-stress: 0.19) 
and the economy’s level of international integration on the vertical axis 
(S-stress: 0.05). Th e fi gure clearly demonstrates what we have already 
seen in the cluster analysis: that unequivocal boundaries cannot be drawn 
 Table 3.1  Product market clusters 
 Clusters 
 1.  Moderately open, with balance in foreign 
trade 
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 




 Above-average stock of outward and inward 
FDI 
 Little direct state presence 
 Higher tax levels 
 Few bureaucratic obstacles 
 2.  Moderately open, with signifi cant imbalance 
in some countries 
 Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia 
 Stock of inward FDI below average, outward 
FDI negligible 
 Stronger state presence, but lower taxes 
 Signifi cant bureaucratic obstacles 
 3.  Highly open, with signifi cant imbalance in 
some countries 
 Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Slovakia  Stock of inward FDI above average, outward 
FDI meagre 
 Low-level state presence 
 Moderate bureaucratic obstacles 
 4.  Comparatively closed economies, with 
foreign trade imbalances 
 Greece, Italy, Spain 
 Below-average stock of outward and inward 
FDI 
 Comparatively powerful state presence 
 Signifi cant bureaucratic obstacles 
 5.  Conspicuously open, strikingly large stock of 
outward FDI 
 Luxembourg 
 Moderate state presence 
 Few bureaucratic obstacles 
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between the clusters in the way we will later be able to do for the other 
subsystems.
 Th e results obtained diff er somewhat from the conclusions reached 
by other studies with respect to the OMS. On the one hand, Amable 
( 2003 ) examined product markets based on indicators formed from data 
generated at the OECD at the end of the 1990s (Nicoletti et al.  2000 ). 
On the other hand, the OECD’s research team repeated the analysis in 
2003, expanding it to include the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary 
(Conway et al.  2005 ). A conspicuous diff erence is that my study could 
 Fig. 3.1  Two-dimensional MDS-based representation of product markets 
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not reveal the unequivocal separation of the English-speaking coun-
tries (the UK and Ireland), which is so strikingly apparent in the above- 
mentioned analyses. Th ere may be several reasons for this. For the sake of 
the available data pertaining to the NMS, it was necessary to thoroughly 
revise the range of indicators. State supervision and regulation could be 
assessed by using signifi cantly fewer indicators due to a lack of data. At 
the same time, bureaucratic obstacles were characterised by using data 
measurable only in time and cost based on World Bank sources (“Doing 
Business”). In the OECD material, however, no small proportion of the 
indicators were created by re-coding the prescriptions of legal regulation; 
therefore, it is conceivable that the diff erences in implementing looser or 
more rigid regulations, in terms of their time and cost eff ects, are not as 
signifi cant as the legal regulations might suggest. 
 Th e 2005 OECD study clearly showed that between 1998 and 2003, 
diff erences among the EU countries in the functioning of product mar-
kets signifi cantly decreased (Conway et al.  2005 ). If this continued in 
the 2004–2006 period examined here, it might explain why the English- 
speaking countries do not form a separate cluster. In any case, not only 
did convergence occur among the member countries in the regulation 
of market competition between 1998 and 2003, but it is also generally 
typical of all EU member states that regulation stimulates competition, 
which is to say that the unifi ed internal market has proven to be a success-
ful framework. Griffi  th et al. ( 2006 ,  2010 ) reaches similar conclusions. 
3.2  R&D and Innovation 
3.2.1  Technological Progress and Growth 
 With respect to the analysis of product markets, the correlation between 
competition, productivity, and innovation was taken as a starting point. 
In addition, treating the system of innovation as a separate subsystem is 
justifi ed by the clear importance assigned to technological progress in 
current growth theories. In the neoclassical growth models of the 1950s 
and 1960s, technological development featured as an exogenous factor, 
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and by taking this factor into account, it was possible to presuppose a 
positive rate of growth in the long term. Th e fact that the source of long- 
term growth was an element outside the model ultimately left long-term 
growth itself without an explanation. Attempts were made to remedy this 
defi ciency with endogenous growth theory, but this brought its own set 
of problems. Th e fruits of technological progress are embodied partly in 
elements of the economy, which are non-competitive and possess certain 
properties of public goods. If the non-rivalrous new ideas are included 
among factors of production, increasing returns to scale may arise, 
incompatible with perfect competition. R&D theories and the concept 
of imperfect competition were incorporated into growth theory begin-
ning at the end of the 1980s. In these models, technological advance-
ment is the result of conscious research and development, the reward 
for which—to follow Schumpeter—is some form of ex-post monopoly. 
Barro ( 1997 ) presents the evolution of growth theory, a now classic, 
detailed exposition of which is provided by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
( 2004 ). Subsequent research has also demonstrated, based on a sample 
containing 71 developed and emerging countries, that innovation-driven 
growth is advantageous not only because it increases productivity but 
also because it creates more jobs; moreover, innovative companies employ 
proportionately more unskilled labour, so that their growth is inclusive 
from a social point of view (Dutz et al.  2011 ). Inasmuch as proponents of 
growth theories agree on the determining role of technological develop-
ment, this theme requires no further discussion here. 
3.2.2  R&D&I in the Member Countries 
 In analysing R&D&I, not only expenditures and available human 
resources have been taken into account but also employment in high- 
technological industries and knowledge-intensive services, exports of 
high-technological products and licensed patents. In this way, we can 
measure the strength of presence of advanced technologies in the econ-
omy alongside R&D activity. In cluster analysis, the Nordic and con-
tinental countries are markedly separate from the Mediterranean and 
post-socialist countries. 
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 Th e vanguard countries are unquestionably Finland, Sweden, and 
Germany. Here, the business sector accounts for two-thirds of high-level 
R&D expenditures. Particularly in Germany, these expenditures are 
paired with a high level of employment in advanced technological indus-
tries. Sweden and Finland tend to excel more in knowledge-intensive 
services. Th ese countries also fi gure prominently in terms of patents per 
number of inhabitants compared to the other clusters. 
 Due to its unique circumstances, Luxembourg again carves itself a 
separate position. Corporate fi nancing plays a strikingly large role in 
moderate R&D expenditures. Th e proportion of exports of advanced 
technological products is high and that of knowledge-intensive services 
also above average. 
 A moderate level of R&D expenditures characterises the cluster com-
prising the other continental countries, Ireland and the UK, in which the 
share of the business sector exceeds 50 per cent, but is still lower than the 
aforementioned groups. In keeping with this, there are signifi cantly fewer 
patents per number of inhabitants than in the vanguard countries. Th e 
proportion of exports of advanced technological products is high, as is 
the proportion of those working in knowledge-intensive services. 
 Th e cluster comprising post-socialist and Mediterranean countries 
is characterised by a low level of R&D expenditures. Th e government 
share of fi nancing reaches 50 per cent, while that of the business sector 
is accordingly low. Th e ratio of patents to the population is dramatically 
lower, even lower than the preceding cluster. Th e presence of multina-
tional fi rms may explain the smaller-than-expected gap in employment 
and exports compared to the other three clusters (Table  3.2 ).
 Th e horizontal axis in Fig.  3.2 shows the degree of development of 
countries’ R&D systems, while the vertical axis indicates the weight of 
high-technological products in exports, as well as the proportion of those 
employed in knowledge-intensive fi elds (S-stress: 0.02)
 Several attempts have been made in the literature to draw up an empir-
ically grounded ranking or grouping of EU or OECD countries. 
 Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ) argued that of the two basic types of mod-
ern capitalism, the liberal market economy promotes radical innovation, 
while the coordinated market economy encourages incremental inno-
vation. From the observation of the innovative activities of the world’s 
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developed economies, Taylor ( 2004 ) concluded that the aforementioned 
division is unsustainable. According to Akkermans et al. ( 2009 ), Hall 
and Soskice’s conclusion, though invalid as a principal rule, still applies 
to many branches of industry. 
 A comprehensive picture is provided by the European Innovation 
Scoreboard (EIS), issued annually within the framework of the Lisbon 
Strategy. Th e EIS report for 2008 employed a total of 29 indicators, 
including those applied in my study. An index made up of these indica-
tors produced a ranking of the member states. Taking a fi ve-year period 
as its basis, the report also created clusters based on the indicators used. 
Sweden, Finland, and Germany are joined as innovation leaders by 
Denmark and the UK. Th e group of innovation followers coincides with 
our third cluster (naturally without the promoted Danes and Brits). Th e 
Mediterranean and NMS are split among the groups of moderate inno-
vators and catching-up countries (Table  3.3 ) in somewhat diff erent posi-
tions than those suggested in the MDS diagram (Fig.  3.2 ). It is worth 
 Table 3.2  R&D&I clusters 
 Clusters 
 1.  High R&D expenditures, high contribution 
by the business sector 
 Finland, Germany, Sweden 
 High level of employment in advanced 
technologies 
 High ratio of patents to the population 
 2.  Moderate R&D expenditures, high 
contribution by the business sector 
 Luxembourg 
 High level of exports of advanced 
technological products 
 High ratio of US-registered patents to the 
population 
 3.  Moderate R&D expenditures, moderate 
contribution by the business sector 
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
UK, France, Netherlands, 
Ireland  High level of employment and exports in 
advanced technologies 
 Moderate ratio of patents to the population 
 4.  Low R&D expenditures, low contribution by 
the business sector 
 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Greece, Poland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Italy, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 
 Below-average exports and employment in 
advanced technologies 
 Low ratio of patents to population 
3 An Empirical Analysis of the Economic System 89
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
noting that Estonia precedes even Slovenia in the EIS ranking of innova-
tive performance (UNU-MERIT  2009 ).
 In the cluster analysis, I document a given situation, while the EIS 
report also measures growth in the examined fi ve-year period based on 
changes in indicators in several other European countries, as well as in the 
EU-28 member states. 
 Due to the time horizon for the cluster analysis, the results need to be 
compared to the 2008 EIS report. In later EIS reports, the grouping of 
countries altered somewhat, as did the range of indicators, but the sepa-
 Fig. 3.2  Two-dimensional MDS-based representation of R&D&I 
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ration of the old, non-Mediterranean from other member states did not. 
More recent reports will be discussed later. 
 In examining the literature on innovation (for example, Altuzarra 
et al.  2007 ; Bilbao-Osorio and Rodríguez-Pose  2004 ; Crescenzi  2005 ), 
it is noticeable that no matter the basis for the analysis, from a very 
narrow database to a thoroughly extensive one, the group of old, non- 
Mediterranean member states is separate from the Mediterranean and 
NMS. Despite the convergence documented in the EIS report, the sec-
ond group will long remain far from the innovation-driven, knowledge- 
based economy that is theoretically the EU’s common goal. 
 In the new, post-socialist member states, FDI plays an undeniably 
important role in technological development. European research by 
Srholec ( 2009 ), which reaches beyond the boundaries of the EU, reveals 
that foreign subsidiaries are more likely to be inclined to engage in inno-
vative cooperation with both domestic and foreign partners. With respect 
to the NMS, Chinkov ( 2006 ) came to the conclusion, based on empirical 
data, that the imported results of foreign R&D play a substantial role in 
the growth of productivity as a whole, and the growth in domestic R&D 
is insignifi cant. 
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 Source : European Innovation Scoreboard 2008 (UNU-MERIT  2009 :11) 
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 Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has become widespread practice 
to approach innovation as a system (Asheim and Coenen  2006 ). Th e 
aforementioned research studies also underline what this cluster analysis 
has shown: not only do the new and Mediterranean member states lag 
behind the old, non-Mediterranean member states in quantitative terms, 
but the institutional structure of their innovation systems is diff erent. 
Rather than the distinction made by Hall-Soskice between incremental 
and radical innovation, the main source of this diff erence lies in whether 
the system of domestic research and development is properly advanced or 
if innovations enter the economy primarily through foreign companies. 
3.3  The Financial System 
3.3.1  The Impact of the Financial System on Economic 
Growth 
 When analysing the fi nancial system, the main question in the VoC lit-
erature is whether fi nancing occurs primarily through the banking system 
or via fi nancial markets. Of the two defi nitive works we have highlighted, 
Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ) clearly emphasise this question; Amable ( 2003 ), 
meanwhile, suggests that fi nancial systems tend to use a combination of 
the two in the wake of the changes that occurred in the 1990s. 
 At the same time, another question that arises in the literature relates to 
the degree of infl uence that the maturity of the fi nancial system exercises 
over economic growth. In the case of product markets, we observe a fairly 
broad consensus—subtle diff erences and fi ner points aside—regarding the 
relationship between competition and growth. Th ere is far from common 
agreement regarding how the maturity of the fi nancial system impacts 
long-term growth. Here, the lessons to be learned are summarised only in 
as far as they appear to provide a necessary foundation for my study. 
 Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine ( 2008 ) provide a thorough review of the 
theoretical debates currently under way. From this, it is evident that some 
studies (for example, important books on the study of economic develop-
ment) do not deal with the fi nancial system, while others hold that the 
fi nancial system’s importance from the point of view of growth is beyond 
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dispute. Th ose authors who ascribe a positive role to the fi nancial system 
argue that its effi  cient operation reduces information-related and trans-
action costs. Such systems not only aid the effi  cient allocation of capital 
but also exercise a controlling function in the implementation of invest-
ments. Th e diversifi cation of risks, the mobilisation and accumulation 
of savings, and the facilitation of transactions have a similarly benefi cial 
eff ect on economic growth. According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
( 2008 ), empirical research—which they also summarise—carries a still 
more explicit message. In these studies, just as much eff ort is made to 
measure the correlation between the maturity of the fi nancial system and 
economic growth via comparisons between countries as it is on the level 
of specifi c industries and companies. Many studies—with no small por-
tion of them emerging from the World Bank and the National Bureau of 
Economic Research—prove that the depth of the fi nancial system bears 
a close relation to long-term growth per capita, accumulation of capital, 
and increasing productivity. During their investigations, authors have 
also endeavoured to prove that this correlation exists not merely in terms 
of simultaneity but also on a causal level, at the exclusion of other poten-
tial infl uencing factors (for example, per capita income, education, politi-
cal stability, and so forth). Examining the Eastern and Central European 
and CIS countries, Cojocaru et al. ( 2011 ) fi nd an empirical justifi cation 
in the relationship of fi nancial development to economic growth. Taking 
into account all methodological restrictions and counter-arguments, 2 we 
accept, for the sake of this analysis, that the maturity of the fi nancial sys-
tem is an important criterion of an economic model and simultaneously 
a foreshadower of its development opportunities. 
3.3.2  Financial Systems of the Member States 
 Based on the above, the inclusion of the new, post-socialist member states 
in the analysis provides justifi cation—beyond examination of the cus-
tomary, bank, or fi nancial market-based fi nancing—for us to pose the 
question of how the maturity of these countries’ fi nancial systems relates 
to that of the OMS. Th e selection of data was determined—and also 
limited—by which data were fully available with respect to the examined 
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member states. Th e maturity of the banking system is revealed in the 
stock of credits and deposits, as well as in the proportion of bank assets to 
GDP, while the degree of concentration in the banking sector is also an 
important attribute. Th e maturity of the fi nancial market could be mea-
sured through the size of the insurance market, investments and pension 
funds, as well as by taking stock exchange turnover into account. 
 Belgium, Finland, and Sweden are included in the fi rst cluster, with 
their moderately developed and fairly concentrated banking systems. 
Th e stock market is well developed in these countries, with signifi cant 
turnover, revealing a signifi cant diff erence compared to the fi fth cluster, 
containing most of the OMS. Of institutional investors, insurance com-
panies hold average assets, while the assets of investment and pension 
funds are somewhat below average. 
 As before, Luxembourg is in a special situation, forming a separate 
cluster of its own. Unsurprisingly, a large amount of foreign savings is 
deposited in the bank system, while the stock of credits and deposits is 
very high. Th e same is true of the size of investment funds. At the same 
time, stock exchange turnover is very low. 
 Th e third, large cluster is made up of the NMS, which does not appear 
in such unifi ed isolation from the OMS even in other subsystems exam-
ined. Every element of these countries’ banking systems and fi nancial 
markets is far less developed than those of the OMS. Th is lack of devel-
opment is relatively less pronounced in the case of the banking system 
and greater in terms of the assets of institutional investors, stock market 
capitalisation, and, particularly, stock market turnover. Th e concentra-
tion of credit institutions (according to the Herfi ndahl index) is higher, 
particularly in comparison to the fi fth cluster, which contains the major-
ity of the OMS. 
 Th e fourth cluster comprising the UK and the Netherlands shows 
the same specifi c attributes usually ascribed to the Anglo-Saxon model; 
namely, a developed fi nancial market and high-turnover stock exchange. 
At the same time, it is worth noting that bank systems here also appear 
to be more developed than those of the other OMS. Th e latter’s underde-
velopment in the area of fi nancial markets is even greater, however. Th e 
concentration of the banking system is average among the 25 member 
states examined. Th e amount of assets of insurance companies in propor-
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tion to GDP is average, while investment and pension funds are larger 
compared to all the other clusters (with the exception of Luxembourg). 
 Nine OMS compose the fi fth cluster: Austria, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Interestingly, 
although these countries’ banking systems are well developed, their stock 
of credits and deposits in proportion to GDP is less than that of the 
fourth cluster. Th e banking systems are less concentrated. Assets of insur-
ance companies in proportion to GDP are average, while investment and 
pension funds are below average. Th e development of the stock market is 
somewhat above average in these countries but falls signifi cantly short of 
the fourth cluster (Table  3.4 ).
 In the two-dimensional MDS diagram (Fig.  3.3 ), the development 
of the banking system is represented on the horizontal axis and that of 
fi nancial markets on the vertical axis (S-stress: 0.036).
 Conclusions similar to those revealed by this cluster analysis can be 
found in the literature in descriptions of the fi nancial system of the 
EU. Allen et al. ( 2005 ) completed a study of the fi nancial system of the 
then EU-25, determining that it is bank-based, in contrast to the con-
siderably smaller fi nancing role played by banks in the USA, where stock 
market fi nancing plays a signifi cantly greater role. Th anks to the merg-
ers and acquisitions that have taken place since the turn of the millen-
nium, the European banking system has become highly concentrated. 
Fundamental diff erences exist among the EU member states, however. 
While the UK is traditionally an exception, the Netherlands, Finland, 3 
and Sweden have lately shifted towards a market-based fi nancial system. 
Owing to monetary integration, there has been a movement towards the 
Anglo-Saxon model in the EU monetary system as a whole, albeit accom-
panied by the dominance of bank-based fi nancing. In addition to being 
noted in the studies cited by Allen et al. ( 2005 ), this shift is confi rmed 
by Murinde et al. ( 2004 ). In implementing directives serving to liber-
alise EU fi nancial markets during the 1990s, the German government 
adopted a series of economic policy measures to increase the role of the 
fi nancial market. Vitols ( 2004 ) fi nds that, due to the conservative, risk- 
averse behaviour of households and investors, the role of the banking 
system nonetheless remains signifi cant. Studies discussing the new, post- 
socialist countries devote much space to an aspect that is also striking in 
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this cluster analysis, namely, the insuffi  cient development of these coun-
tries’ fi nancial systems. Th e other major theme is the privatisation of the 
banking system in this region, as a result of which foreign-owned banks 
assumed a decisive role. 
 Allen et al. ( 2005 ) compare the total assets of the fi nancial sectors of 
the eight NMS (which did not include Bulgaria or Romania at that time) 
with that of the OMS, fi nding that the former amounted to 170 per 
cent of GDP in 2002, compared to 558 for the latter. Every approach 
 Table 3.4  Financial system clusters 
 Clusters 
 1.  Moderately developed banking system  Belgium, Finland, 
Sweden  Above-average bank concentration 
 Insurance companies with average 
assets,investment and pension funds somewhat 
below average 
 Well-developed, high-turnover stock market 
 2.  Developed banking system, particularly high 
stock of deposits 
 Luxembourg 
 Well below-average bank concentration 
 Huge investment funds, insurance companies 
 High level of stock exchange capitalisation 
alongside low turnover 
 3.  Underdeveloped banking system compared to 
average, with modest stock of credits and 
deposits 






 Somewhat above-average bank concentration 
 Signifi cantly below-average assets of 
institutional investors and insurers 
 Underdeveloped stock market with low turnover 
 4.  Developed banking system with extensive 
lending 
 UK, Netherlands 
 Average bank concentration 
 Well-developed investment and pension funds, 
average assets of insurance companies 
 Developed stock market with high turnover 
 5.  Below-average bank concentration  Austria, Denmark, 
France, Greece, 
Ireland, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain 
 Insurance companies with average assets and 
below-average pension and investment funds 
 Development of stock market somewhat above 
average 
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to the subject highlights the immaturity of the banking sector in terms 
of the stock of domestic credit compared to GDP, whether weighing the 
fi rst decade of fi nancial transformation in the three Central European 
countries of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary (Reininger et al. 
 2002 ), reviewing the banking system of the Baltic countries (Köhler et al. 
 2006 ), or presenting the status of the ten post-socialist member states’ 
banking systems prior to accession to the EU (Pissarides  2004 ). In the 
fi rst decade following the change in the political regime, these states did 
 Fig. 3.3  Two-dimensional MDS-based representation of the fi nancial 
system 
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not approach the international average of medium-income countries (De 
Haan and Naarborg  2004 ), but in 2002, an energetic process of conver-
gence began (Marton and McCarthy  2008 ). At the same time, Pissarides 
( 2004 ) calls attention to the fact that, even in the NMS, the role of banks 
is greater than in the USA. 
 Th e above authors also unanimously observe that stock exchanges are 
modest in proportion to those of the OMS (one-third their size, on aver-
age), while insurance companies, 4 investment funds, and pension funds 
are of marginal signifi cance. 
 Th e venture capital sector underwent dynamic growth in the Central 
and East European region until 2007, but even so, its proportion to GDP 
lagged signifi cantly behind the EU average, at approximately 60 per cent. 
Risk capital arrived in the region almost exclusively from foreign sources 
(Karsai  2010 ). 
 Descriptions of the foreign acquisition of ownership in the banking 
systems of the post-socialist countries have received great emphasis not 
only in the history of individual groups of countries prior to EU acces-
sion (Reininger et al.  2002 ; Köhler et al.  2006 ) but also in the 2008 
report of the ECB (European Central Bank  2008 ), which devotes a sepa-
rate  chapter to the internationalisation of the EU banking system. Th e 
authors of this report ascertain that the degree of internationalisation 
diff ers substantially between the EU-15 and the NMS, as in the former, 
some 27.8 per cent of total bank assets are in foreign hands, while the cor-
responding fi gure in the NMS is 70.3 per cent [with only Slovenia retain-
ing two-thirds of domestic ownership (Marton and McCarthy  2008 )]. 
In the NMS, the high ratio of foreign ownership is paired with a very 
low level of diversifi cation (Schoenmaker and Wagner  2011 ). Because 
of a dearth of capital and shortage of management and technical skills, 
the privatisation of the banking sector was unavoidable in the 1990s. 
Freed of the bad loans inherited from the old regime, the banking system 
became profi table after the turn of the millennium: for example, at that 
time, 30–70 per cent of the pre-tax profi ts of Austrian banks, but only 
5 per cent of their total assets, derived from Central and East Europe 
(Mihaljek  2004 ). Based on 2002 data, Mucci et al. ( 2004 ) prove that for-
eign ownership has a benefi cial impact on the profi tability of the banking 
system and supports cost effi  ciency. 5 
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3.4  The Labour Market and Industrial 
Relations 
3.4.1  Labour Market Institutions and the Performance 
of the Labour Market 
 As a criterion for distinguishing between a liberal and coordinated mar-
ket economy, Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ) choose the method of organising 
employment, which, in the former, is based on individual, market-based 
contracts and, in the latter, on bargaining between employer and employee 
bodies and the resultant collective contracts. Amable ( 2003 ) isolates three 
aspects of labour market institutions. He measures the fl exibility of the 
labour market through employment protection legislation (EPL), while 
analysing both the institutional framework of industrial relations and the 
set of tools utilised in employment policy. 
 It is well known that from the mid-1970s, the member states of 
European integration were stricken with severe levels of unemployment. 6 
It became a generally held conviction that increased fl exibility in the 
labour market was indispensable in order to promote job creation. Th e 
focus of empirically grounded investigations since the turn of the millen-
nium is no longer on verifi cation of this correlation, but rather on the 
relationship between the labour market and the deregulation of product 
markets. In this thematic area—just as in the theme of product markets—
the intellectual infl uence of the research unit operating under the aegis 
of the OECD is defi nitive. It is here that the indicators generally applied 
in the literature were elaborated and measured. Nicoletti and Scarpetta 
( 2005 ) analyse the relationship between product market reforms and 
employment in the OECD countries, building partly on the theoretical 
model of Blanchard and Giavazzi ( 2003 ), already mentioned in the above, 
and expanding partly on their earlier empirical investigations carried out 
together with Boeri (Boeri et al.  2000 ). Th ey provide a comprehensive 
picture of the results achieved in the literature thus far; accordingly, based 
on theoretical models that deal with product market regulation, it can be 
presumed that regulations limiting competition result in employment 
losses. Empirical analyses have strengthened this assumption. Many 
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studies demonstrate that a high tax wedge and high, long-lasting unem-
ployment benefi ts have a negative eff ect on employment. Th e situation 
with regard to EPL is not entirely unambiguous. Job security and an 
enduring working relationship can enhance an employee’s inclination 
to cooperate and increase productivity. Very rigid regulation, however, 
may actually lead to a lower level of employment. Opinions are divided 
regarding the nature of the relationship between employment regulations 
and the institutional system and the degree of centralisation of collec-
tive wage bargaining. Nicoletti and Scarpetta ( 2005 ) base their analy-
sis of the experiences of OECD countries on data from the 1980–2002 
period, reaching the conclusion that the evolution of the employment 
rate is attributable partly to the variety in labour and product market 
regulations. Restricting competition signifi cantly reduced the employ-
ment rate in the OECD countries. Anti-competitive regulation proved 
the most costly from the point of view of employment wherever labour 
market policies and institutions protected those inside the labour market 
and increased their bargaining power. Th e benefi cial eff ect of deregula-
tion on long-term employment derives from the observation that, on the 
one hand, labour market activity and entries increase, while on the other 
hand the gap between wages and productivity decreases and insiders lose 
their opportunity for rent-seeking. (In the short term, as Blanchard and 
Giavazzi ( 2003 ) show, the strengthening of competition may lead to a 
decline in employment at incumbent companies.) An interesting partial 
fi nding is that employment gains only slightly decreased if the tax wedge 
was reduced, and the EPL was relaxed while generous unemployment 
benefi ts were left unchanged (the Danish “fl exicurity” system). It has also 
been established that deregulation of rigid markets brings greater ben-
efi ts. Berger and Danninger ( 2006 ) determine that market deregulation 
leads to signifi cant employment growth, and they also hold that product 
market deregulation is more effi  cient in conjunction with less restrictive 
labour market policies. Fiori et al. ( 2008 ) reconfi rm the 2005 analysis of 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta on the issue under discussion. 
 Th e research team of Amable and Lung ( 2008 ) reach a diff erent conclu-
sion using the same OECD data. Th ey fi nd that competitive restrictions 
on product markets and highly organised trade unions have a detrimental 
eff ect on employment, but that EPL does not. Th eir explanation for this 
100 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
fi nding was that on deregulated labour markets, the uncertain situation 
of employees can be off set with higher wages in order to maintain moti-
vation, which reduces employment. 
 Th e study by Boeri ( 2005 ) sheds light on why we fi nd more com-
plex institutional solutions and less clear-cut results in examining labour 
markets than in the case of product markets. From the appraisal of two 
decades of European structural reforms, it emerged that labour market 
reforms were more frequent than those of product markets, but that the 
latter were more coherent. In the case of the labour market, reforms can 
be more readily accomplished politically when introduced gradually and 
initially applied only to new entrants. Th is staggered approach cannot be 
implemented on the product market, as it would put incumbent compa-
nies in a more advantageous position from which they might drive out 
new entrants. 
 In addition to the deregulation of the labour market, active employ-
ment policy is used at both the EU and the national levels to counter 
stubbornly high unemployment in Europe. One research study cover-
ing fi ve European countries examined the impact of active employment 
policy. Both the summary study and case studies pertaining to individual 
countries show that an active employment policy helps reduce unem-
ployment, including long-term joblessness, but in a comparatively inef-
fi cient manner (De Koning and Mosley  2001 ), which indicates that the 
mode of implementation of such schemes is in need of improvement. 
 Storm and Naastepad ( 2009 ) examine the relation between labour 
market regulation and labour productivity based on OECD data from 
between 1984 and 2004. Th ey reach the conclusion that growth in 
labour productivity is greater in more regulated labour markets. Th ey 
explain this conclusion by observing that, with greater job security, work-
ers play a more active role in contributing to organisational and techno-
logical innovation. Schaik and Klundert (2009), who analyse the period 
between 1960 and 2005, fi nd the protection of employees benefi cial only 
between 1960 and 1980—in the period of technological copying and 
imitation; after 1980, as the role of innovation grew, protecting “insid-
ers” on the labour market had a productivity-reducing eff ect. Vergeer 
and Kleinknecht ( 2010 –2011) demonstrate, again for the 1960–2005 
period, that job creation deriving from deregulation went hand in hand 
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with a declining rate of labour productivity growth because the new jobs 
were created in areas of lower productivity. 
 Based on the above, it can be seen clearly that from the point of view of 
employment and the performance of labour markets, labour market fl ex-
ibility, industrial relations, and employment policy are decisively infl uen-
tial factors and, therefore, are justifi ed as the basis for the formation of 
clusters. At the same time, it has been found that, compared to the other 
subsystems discussed in this study so far, each author’s choice of values 
and general outlook is more conspicuous, and the results attained more 
contradictory. 
3.4.2  Labour Markets and Industrial Relations 
in the Member States 
 I examine labour markets in connection with employment policy and 
industrial relations. Labour market fl exibility is measured partly in terms 
of the proportion of employees in fi xed-term or part-time employment, 
the proportions of young people and long-term unemployed, and the 
level of employment, and partly with indices formed in the World Bank’s 
“Doing Business” survey (World Bank  2007a ) related to the rigidity of 
employment. Th e data on public expenditures in employment policy 
are broken down by types of labour market policy measures, separat-
ing labour market information services, activation measures and passive 
means of support. Industrial relations are characterised by the level of 
trade union density, extent of wage bargain coverage, and degree of coor-
dination in wage bargaining. 
 From the cluster analysis, it emerges that the 25 examined EU member 
states can be sorted into fi ve clusters. With the exception of Slovenia, all 
the post-socialist countries combine with Greece and Italy to form one 
cluster. In these countries, the ratio of those in fi xed-term or part-time 
employment is low, the rigidity of employment is moderate, and non- 
wage labour costs are slightly above average. Little is spent on active or 
passive labour market policy. Not only is there a low level of trade union 
density, but also the extent of wage bargaining is insignifi cant. Th e extent 
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and degree of coordination of wage bargaining is stronger in the two 
Mediterranean countries. Th e level of employment is below average. 
 In the second cluster, the two Scandinavian states, Denmark and 
Sweden, appear alongside Belgium. Th e labour market shows fl exibility 
similar to the Anglo-Saxon model, but the state spends generously on 
both active and passive labour market policy measures. Th is is accom-
panied by a comparatively high level of trade union density and a wide- 
ranging system of wage bargaining. Th e level of employment is high. In 
the case of Belgium, however, data for employment and joblessness are 
considerably less favourable than in the other two countries. 
 Th e third cluster contains the Netherlands alone and is similar to 
the preceding cluster. In this case, however, the proportion of those in 
 fi xed- term and particularly part-time employment is even higher than in 
the second cluster, while there is a lower amount of public expenditures 
on active labour market policy and greater spending on passive measures. 
Th ough trade unions are not highly organised, wage bargaining is wide-
spread and coordinated. Th e labour market is fl exible, and the level of 
employment is high. 
 Th e fourth cluster comprises the continental and Mediterranean coun-
tries (Austria, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Portugal, and 
Spain), as well as one former socialist country, Slovenia. In these coun-
tries, the labour market is more rigid compared not only to the Anglo- 
Saxon model but also to the second and third clusters. Th e proportion 
of those employed on fi xed-term contracts is high, and that of part-time 
workers is moderate, but indices measuring the rigidity of employment 
show high values, while non-wage labour costs are similarly elevated. 
Spending on active labour market policy is moderate, and it is high on 
passive measures, but it still falls short of that of either the second or third 
clusters. Trade unions are only moderately organised, but the system of 
wage bargaining is widespread and coordinated. Both employment and 
joblessness are around the EU average. 
 Th e UK and Ireland show the textbook characteristics we expect from 
the Anglo-Saxon model. Th e proportion of those working on fi xed-term 
contracts is low, while the number of those employed part-time is very 
high; overall, the employment indices reveal an extraordinarily fl exible 
labour market. Labour market policy expenditures are very low, except 
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those devoted to information services. Although trade unions are mod-
erately organised, wage agreements are not widespread. Th e employment 
level is high (Table  3.5 ).
 In Fig.  3.4 , countries form groups based on indicators showing indus-
trial relations and public spending on labour market policy measures 
(vertical axis) on the one hand and on the other hand the fl exibility of 
the labour market (horizontal axis) (S-stress: 0.066).
 Measurements made using various indicators have failed to refl ect an insti-
tutional peculiarity of labour markets in the continental and Mediterranean 
 Table 3.5  Labour market and industrial relations clusters 
 Clusters 
 1.  Low proportion of workers in fi xed-term or 
part-time employment 
 Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, 




 Low-level trade union density, with weak 
collective wage bargaining, though stronger in 
two Mediterranean countries 
 Rigidity of employment and somewhat above-
average non-wage labour costs 
 2.  High proportion of workers in fi xed-term or 
part-time employment 
 Belgium, Denmark, 
Sweden 
 Highly organised trade unions, with widespread 
collective wage bargaining 
 Flexible employment regulations, and slightly 
above-average non-wage labour costs 
 3.  Proportion of workers in fi xed-term and 
particularly part-time employment 
 Netherlands 
 Low-level trade union density, with widespread 
collective wage bargaining 
 Flexible employment regulations, low non-wage 
labour costs 
 4.  Moderate proportion of workers in fi xed-term 
and part-time employment 




 Moderately organised trade unions, with 
widespread collective wage bargaining 
 Rigid employment regulations and average 
non-wage labour costs 
 5.  Moderate proportion of workers in fi xed-term 
and part-time employment 
 UK, Ireland 
 Moderately organised trade unions, with weak 
collective wage bargaining 
 Flexible employment regulations, with low 
non-wage labour costs 
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countries to which the literature on labour markets ascribes great signifi -
cance; namely, the segregated nature of the labour market as evidenced in 
the varying levels of protection for labour market insiders and outsiders. We 
will return to this question when discussing the individual models. 
 Th e grouping of countries obtained above roughly approximates 
the grouping contained in the report of the European Commission: 
Industrial Relations in Europe 2008. Based on the VoC literature, the 
authors describe the regimes of industrial relations (Table  3.6 ), with the 
borderline cases featured in parentheses.
 Fig. 3.4  Two-dimensional MDS-based representation of labour markets and 
industrial relations 
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 Diff erences between the Commission’s analysis and my own relate 
mostly to uncertain borderline cases. Moreover, I combine the three 
dimensions into my cluster analysis, whereas the Commission report 
addresses industrial relations, only including other labour market projec-
tions via the Lisbon Strategy in its qualitative examination. 
 One borderline case is Ireland (Table  3.6 ). In this analysis, too, it is 
clear from the MDS diagram that the UK and Ireland, though quite dif-
ferent, can still be grouped in the same cluster. 
 Th e other marginal case is Finland, whose labour market is considerably 
less fl exible than those of the two Scandinavian nations, and that, for this 
reason, is omitted from the Nordic cluster, which nevertheless includes 
Belgium, in this analysis. According to indices of EPL in the World Bank 
database (“Doing Business”), Belgium’s labour market is exceedingly fl ex-
ible; however, employment data do not justify including the country’s 
institutional system in the cluster of Nordic countries. Looking more 
closely behind the data, the labour market is extremely segregated at the 
regional level. At the beginning of the 1980s, unemployment rates were 
still similar, but the regions have since strongly diverged, with the Flemish 
region falling below the EU-15 average, close to the Dutch level, while 
the Walloon and Brussels-Capital regions are considerably higher than 
the EU-15 average. In addition, mobility among the regions is extremely 
low (Estevão  2002 ) and did not change in the 2000s. 7 
 According to my analysis, the Netherlands is a “separate case”, clearly 
isolated from the continental countries and much more similar to the 
Scandinavians. Th is fi nding coincides with a common approach in the 
literature, which describes the Dutch solution as the polder 8 model, 
essentially meaning a consensus among social partners with the participa-
tion of the state. Following the crisis of the 1970s, this consensus played 
a major role in helping the Dutch economy embark on dynamic growth 
from the 1980s onwards. Th is type of corporatism is more limited and 
random than previously (De Beus  2004 ; Hemerijck and Sleegers  2007 ; 
Wolinetz  2001 ). 
 In the description of the Southern countries in the Commission’s 
report, the categorisation of variable or unstable features several times 
(Table  3.6 ), signifying a quite heterogeneous group of countries. It is 
not surprising that in my study, the Mediterranean countries are divided 
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between the clusters of old continental and new, post-socialist nations 
(Table  3.5 ). France, however, belongs in this analysis—similar to the 
fi ndings of Sapir ( 2006 ) and Amable ( 2003 )—to the continental clus-
ter (Table  3.5 ) and to the group of countries termed Centre-west in the 
Commission’s terminology. At the same time, there is no doubt that in 
the conception of the state’s role and of competition policy, there is an 
essential diff erence from Germany, for example (Aiginger et al.  2007 ). 
Presumably thanks to the unifi ed internal market, these diff erences could 
not be measured in the product market cluster. 
 It is interesting that Hungary appears as a borderline case in the 
Commission report in proximity to the Mediterranean countries. In con-
trast, both Berrou and Carrincazeaux ( 2005 ) and Cazes and Nesporova 
( 2007 ) regard the Hungarian employment regime as one of the most 
liberal among the post-socialist nations. 
 Question marks are attached to the group of post-socialist countries 
in the Commission report, as the authors believe it cannot yet be known 
which characteristics will prove enduring. For this reason, it is worth 
looking at what kind of viewpoint can be shaped based on the literature. 
Th e most striking feature of the labour markets of the new, post-socialist 
member states is what everyone mentions fi rst; namely, the low level of 
employment and activity. Initially, this low level was regarded as a con-
comitant of the transition, but it has remained comparatively low even 
in countries that subsequently underwent dynamic economic growth. 
Moreover, beginning in 1999, employment grew at a faster pace in the 
OMS than in the new members (Fialová and Schneider  2008 ). Certain 
structural peculiarities of both employment and joblessness are also 
repeatedly mentioned, including the exceptionally high level of unem-
ployment among the young and low-qualifi ed and the major disparities 
in joblessness within each individual country, which even the mobility of 
the workforce does not reduce (Cazes and Nesporova  2007 ; Rashid et al. 
 2005 ; Schiff  et al.  2006 ). 
 Opinions diff er regarding the causes of the enduringly low level of 
employment and its correlation with the institutional regime. Rashid 
et al. ( 2005 ) believe the root of the problem is that convergence in the 
CEE countries began with productivity growth, which brought higher 
wages but did not create jobs. Feldmann ( 2004 ) blames the infl exibility 
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of labour markets, while Fialová and Schneider ( 2008 ) point to greater 
fl exibility in EPL in the NMS compared to their older counterparts. 
Schiff  et al. ( 2006 ) state that the CEE places rank in the middle among 
industrialised countries in terms of the fl exibility of EPL. In their view, a 
lower EPL value correlates with a smaller shadow economy, and for this 
reason, International Monetary Fund (IMF) researchers recommend fur-
ther liberalisation of the labour market. However, Cazes and Nesporova 
( 2007 ) demonstrate that, in contrast with the OECD countries, in the 
CEE countries, stricter EPL increases employment. Th eir explanation for 
this is that stricter legal regulation whitens the economy, which is mani-
fested in growth in formal employment. Both IMF and International 
Labour Organisation researchers agree that cutting taxes on labour and 
an active employment policy can have a signifi cant impact on employ-
ment growth. 
 In describing industrial relations in the new, post-socialist member 
states, we encounter an unambiguous situation, as refl ected in the litera-
ture. After the change in the political system, with the liquidation of large 
socialist-era companies and privatisation, the level of trade union density 
declined substantially and both remaining and new trade unions lent 
their tacit support to painful reforms that were regarded as unavoidable. 
Employers’ organisations, meanwhile, did not exist and had to be created 
from scratch. Collective bargaining is decentralised, and trade unions 
refrain from taking action even when problems arise in the enforcement 
of collective contracts. Dimitrova and Petkov ( 2005 ) observe that values, 
basic principles, and standards in the area of industrial relations in the 
NMS are markedly diff erent from the European social model, which may 
undermine the prospect that the social aspect of expansion will proceed 
in a European direction. Th e Commission’s 2008 report on industrial 
relations likewise stresses, if in somewhat more tactful terms, that the 
EU’s eastward expansion has aggravated diff erences strongly, although 
it tends to place greater emphasis on convergence arising from common 
EU regulations. 9 In any event, strong trade unions did not stand in the 
way of market deregulation, which did not help create jobs, as might 
have been expected based on theoretical correlations. 
 Taking the examples of Poland and Hungary, Sissenich ( 2007 ) exam-
ines how the regulations of EU social policy were transplanted and what 
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role was played by non-state actors in this process. From this research, 
it emerges that both employers’ and employees’ organisations not only 
in these two countries but also in the other post-socialist countries were 
largely uninvolved or only moderately involved in the process of adapta-
tion. Th ese organisations failed to take advantage of the EU’s social dia-
logue to at least assert their preferences, even if accession did not occupy 
them particularly. Th e author explains this fi nding by noting that mem-
bership in both trade unions and civil organisations in general is consid-
erably smaller in the post-socialist countries than in the OMS, such that 
mediating organisations are weak and protest action is rare. 
 Only in Slovenia have industrial relations evolved in a way that permits 
integration with the models of the OMS. Here, trade unions obtained a 
powerful role, despite a similarly declining level of trade union density. 
Alone among the post-socialist countries, Slovenia is included among the 
old continental member states both in the Commission’s report (Table 
 3.6 ) and my analysis (Table  3.5 ). Th is separate path was made possible 
by two factors: on the one hand, Slovenia did not carry with it signifi -
cant foreign indebtedness through the change of system; on the other 
hand, thanks to the Yugoslav system of workers’ self-management, the 
workforce began from a much better position—and with much greater 
experience in advocating their interests—than in the other post-socialist 
countries (Stanojevic  2005 ). 
 To summarise, the examination of labour markets reveals that a high 
level of employment can materialise under very diff erent institutional 
arrangements. I discuss the signifi cance of these institutional diff erences 
from the point of view of social models of European capitalism in the 
next point. 
3.5  Social Protection and the Welfare State 
3.5.1  The Sustainability of the Welfare State 
 Even with the subsystems already discussed, it has been no simple 
task to concisely summarise the theoretical background and empirical 
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results provided by macroeconomics to aid this comparative economic 
 investigation. Th e questions that revolve around the welfare state and 
social protection present a more diffi  cult task than any that has come 
before. 
 Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ) place the focus so much on the system of 
production and enterprise that the welfare state does not feature at all 
in their idealised types of liberal or coordinated market economies. 
However, taking the criticisms into account, Soskice ( 2007 ) expands on 
these models by including the welfare state and political regime alongside 
the systems of production. Amable ( 2003 ) features social protection as 
a separate subsystem. Although the discussion of the disputed nature of 
the European social model cannot be elaborated here, it is beyond debate 
that the clearest distinguishing feature of the apparatus of European 
countries compared to other developed capitalist economies is a fi rmly 
established welfare state, making it inevitable that it will be analysed as a 
separate subsystem. 
 In the discussion of labour markets, it was previously evident that any 
examination of the economic context would unavoidably touch upon 
sensitive questions of social policy. Th e welfare state falls at least as much 
within the terrain of the sociologist or political scientist as within that 
of the economist. It is impossible to provide a picture of the arguments 
over the welfare state that rage within the various branches of scholarship 
because it would demand a book of its own. Just as with the other subsys-
tems, here, only research studies that bring us closer to mapping out the 
types of capitalism that exist within the EU will be assessed. Some of the 
literature dealing with models of capitalism speaks of social protection, 
some of the welfare state; however, these concepts are not sharply divided. 
For example, Amable ( 2003 ) writes of social protection but compares his 
own models with those of Esping-Andersen ( 1990 ), who defi nes welfare 
state regimes. It can be seen that those who approach the issue from the 
perspective of sociology, social policy, political science or political eco-
nomics tend to use the broader term of the “welfare state”, while those 
who carry out statistical investigations aiding macroeconomic or com-
parative economic modelling tend to opt for “social protection”. In the 
case of macroeconomic analysis, social protection can easily be grasped 
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through social expenditures; moreover, the OECD has a well-structured 
and defi ned database. 
 Th e most common explanation for the creation of the welfare state, 
widely put forward in the 1960s and 1970s, derives from functionalist 
sociology; namely, the welfare state provided an answer to the social prob-
lems and opportunities that arrived with industrialisation. Th e school of 
confl ict theory traces it back to political factors and social movements. 
Since the economic crisis of the 1970s, criticism has intensifi ed, and the 
most vexing question now—in the age of globalisation, in post-industrial 
and simultaneously ageing societies—is whether the welfare state can be 
sustained (Jæger and Kvist  2004 ; Kleinman  2002 ). In any event, despite 
every challenge, the welfare system has stubbornly survived and the aver-
age level of welfare expenditures has not decreased either in the OECD 
countries or the EU (Arjona et al.  2001 ; Jæger and Kvist  2004 ). 
 Genschel ( 2004 ) considers the various viewpoints regarding the con-
nection between globalisation and the welfare state in turn. Globalists 
regard the crisis of the welfare state and its shrinking as part of a con-
vergence process as a direct and inevitable consequence of internation-
alisation. Sceptics hold that no evidence supports the view that global 
interdependence restricts national political autonomy, observing that wel-
fare states have not decreased in size and that diff erences between nations 
have remained. A third, so-called revisionist trend states simply that glo-
balisation can help resolve the problems of the welfare state that originate 
in the welfare state itself. Th e disciplining power of international markets 
can make it easier for governments to rein in welfare expenditures that are 
susceptible to a dynamic increase. Taking into consideration the theoreti-
cal arguments and empirical research, the author determines that in the 
era of globalisation, there is no clear way out for the welfare state, while 
governments have possible choices. Iversen ( 2005 ) also refuses to hold 
globalisation responsible for the decline in welfare provision in developed 
countries. Instead, he attributes this decline to the diminishing contribu-
tion of the industrial sector to GDP, which has occurred in such a way 
that new jobs have been created mostly in services of low added value that 
play no role in foreign trade. 
 A wealth of macroeconomic models and empirical research has been 
used to evaluate how economic growth relates to social protection and 
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income disparities. Aronja et al. ( 2001 ), besides constructing their own 
model, digest and process the fi ndings obtained thus far. Th e most  frequent 
argument put forward against equality in economic theories is that sav-
ings are lower in a more egalitarian society, slowing economic growth. As 
the income disparities between employment groups increase, people will 
strive more to gain qualifi cations that secure jobs with high productiv-
ity and, hence, high wages. Arguing against inequality, others observe 
that poorer households are unable to invest even from credit—particu-
larly in human capital—which is detrimental from the point of view of 
growth. With major inequalities in place, there may be too many people 
among the voting populace for whom necessary, competition-enhancing 
economic reforms hold no interest. Th e likelihood of social and political 
unrest and tension is similarly detrimental to economic growth. Social 
protection, however, may harm growth by potentially deterring people 
from either saving or working for a living. If material benefi ts can be 
obtained more eff ectively by enforcing political interests than through 
economic activity, this situation might lead to the degeneration of enter-
prise and innovative capacity. Th e advantage of strong social protection 
is fi rmer social cohesion, where it is easier to make diffi  cult political and 
economic decisions (for example, on structural adjustments); certain 
social groups are not excluded from the majority of society, nor from 
opportunities to participate in the labour market, thus increasing eco-
nomic potential; and children from poorer social strata also have a chance 
to secure their long-term social and intellectual development. 
 Aronja et al. ( 2001 ) collected 24 studies from the preceding decade 
and a half that examined the correlations between growth, social inequal-
ity, and social protection. Based on these studies, it is not possible to 
determine which of the above theories are borne by reality or whether 
there is a trade-off  between growth and social protection and equality 
or if the latter promote the former because the results of these studies 
are contradictory. According to these authors’ own research built on the 
OECD database, there is no reliable proof of the relationship between 
growth and the fi nal distribution of income (after taxes and transfers). It 
is proven that greater social expenditure goes hand in hand with lower 
economic growth; in contrast, active expenditures that help people get a 
job promote growth. Th ese fi ndings suggest a similar conclusion to that 
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reached by Genschel ( 2004 ), namely, that various institutional solutions 
can prove economically successful. 
3.5.2  Social Protection in the Member States 
 In examining social protection, I am interested not only in the scale of 
expenditures in relation to GDP but also in their internal structure. Th e 
most important items that refl ect the distinctive character of each indi-
vidual system of social protection are old-age provisions and the pro-
portion of child and family support. Th e sources of fi nancing—state, 
employer, or benefi ciary—likewise refl ect essential institutional features. 
In addition to income disparities and sources of fi nancing, the poverty 
risk before and after welfare transfers are taken into account. 
 A cluster analysis of social protection paints a complex picture. In line 
with expectations, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Luxembourg are 
leaders in guaranteeing social protection. Expenditures are effi  cient, as 
income disparities in this group are the smallest, while the poverty risk is 
the lowest after welfare distribution, despite being above average before-
hand. Th e government takes the greatest share in fi nancing services. It is 
worth noting that, on the one hand, pensions in proportion to GDP are 
slightly above the average of the EU-25 states, while on the other hand, 
the proportion of family and child benefi ts, as well as support for those 
living with disabilities, is high within welfare expenditures as a whole. 
 Of the OMS, Ireland alone has low social and healthcare expenditures. 
Although disparities in income distribution are moderate, the poverty 
risk is high both before and after social transfers. Th e ratio of pensions 
to GDP is extremely low, due partially to the youth of the population. 
Consequently, it is also unsurprising that the proportion of social expen-
ditures on the elderly is low within total social spending, and that of 
family and child support is high. Th e government plays a conspicuously 
important role in fi nancing these expenditures. 
 Th e next cluster is a very populous one, containing all the continental 
countries except Luxembourg, together with the Mediterranean coun-
tries, the UK, Poland, Hungary, 10 and Slovenia. Th e level of expenditures 
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on social protection and healthcare is very similar to the fi rst cluster; that 
is, it can be described as high. Income disparities are moderate, however, 
making the poverty risk both before and after transfers similarly around 
average. Th e ratio of pensions to GDP is high. Family and child benefi ts 
comprise only a small portion of spending on social protection, while 
provisions for the aged are high. Th e government makes a smaller con-
tribution to the fi nancing of social protection expenditures, while the 
contributions of employers and benefi ciaries are higher than in the fi rst 
or second cluster. 
 Th e three Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and 
Bulgaria, make up the group in which social and healthcare spending 
is the lowest. With the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
disparities in income distribution are the largest here, while the poverty 
risk is slightly below average before social transfers and above average 
afterwards. Although the ratio of pensions to GDP is low, the share of 
family and child support in social expenditures is moderate, and that of 
provisions for the aged is high. Th e contribution of employers to spend-
ing on social protection is conspicuously high, while the government and 
benefi ciaries contribute relatively little (Table  3.7 ).
 In Fig.  3.5 , the horizontal axis indicates the level of development of 
social protection. Th e vertical axis permits us to gauge whether old-age 
and pension provisions or child and family benefi ts dominate the system 
of social protection.
 On the topic of social protection and the welfare state, the VoC lit-
erature is intertwined with the work of sociologists and social policy-
makers. In the wake of Titmuss’s pioneering works on social policy, 
Esping- Andersen’s book,  Th e Th ree Worlds of Welfare Capitalism ( 1990 ), 
proved to be a milestone. His formulation of three types of regimes—lib-
eral, conservative- corporatist, and social democratic—prompted a long 
succession of authors who refi ned or refuted these models or expanded 
their number. Th e most frequent alteration was to group the Latin or 
Mediterranean countries separately (Kleinman  2002 ). Currently, the divi-
sion into four models is accepted, and debate tends to focus more closely 
on the extent to which social policy can be integrated at the European 
level and on which model is sustainable. Caminada et al. ( 2010 ) identify a 
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decade-long convergence among the OMS from the mid-1980s onwards, 
followed by a divergence thereafter. Pöder and Kerem ( 2011 ), as well as 
Leibrecht et al. ( 2011 ), place the countries of CEE in a separate group 
alongside the aforementioned fourfold division. However, based on their 
empirical investigations, the former authors fi nd a convergence between 
the Mediterranean and continental (conservative) welfare regimes, while 
the latter authors determine a similar convergence between the Nordic 
(social democratic) and conservative welfare regimes. 
 Table 3.7  Social protection clusters 
 Clusters 
 1.  High level of welfare spending  Denmark, Finland, 
Luxembourg, Sweden  Low level of income disparities 
 Within welfare spending, high proportion of 
family and child benefi ts 
 High government contribution to the fi nancing 
of social protection expenditures 
 2.  Low level of welfare spending  Ireland 
 High level of poverty risk, with moderate 
income disparities 
 High government contribution to the fi nancing 
of social protection expenditures 




Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Slovenia 
 Moderate income disparities 
 Within welfare spending, a low proportion of 
family and child benefi ts 
 High ratio of pension expenditures to GDP 
 Low government contribution to the fi nancing 
of social protection expenditures, high 
contribution by employers and benefi ciaries 




 High level of income disparities 
 Within welfare spending, a moderate 
proportion of family and child benefi ts 
 Low ratio of pension expenditures to GDP 
 High contribution by employers to fi nancing of 
social protection expenditures, low 
contribution by government and benefi ciaries 
116 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
 Within the thematic area of social protection, not only interdisci-
plinary overlaps but also shared content were found because the topic is 
closely connected to the labour market. I examine labour market poli-
cies and their expenditures separately and, following Eurostat’s statis-
tical system, list only direct social allocations among social protection 
expenditures. In the study by Aronja et al. ( 2001 )—in accordance with 
OECD data collection—expenditures on active labour market policy are 
 Fig. 3.5  Two-dimensional MDS-based representation of social protection 
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also included in the latter. Sapir ( 2006 ) formulates his social models in 
two dimensions: welfare redistribution and labour market policy. Th e 
overlap is  unavoidable because the state’s labour market policy and regu-
lation determine the framework for operation of the labour market as a 
partial market, and they also constitute an important element of social 
protection. 
 Th e picture emerging from this cluster analysis roughly corresponds to 
what is found on welfare regimes in the literature in the wake of Esping- 
Andersen. Esping-Andersen himself ( 1990 ) explains the variety within 
welfare regimes not on the basis of diff ering expenditures in individual 
states, but rather on the basis of the type of institutional framework 
through which welfare provisions can be accessed, an approach later rein-
forced by experience. 11 Indicators used in the cluster analysis, meanwhile, 
clearly refl ect the institutional system that Esping-Andersen attributes in 
his 2002 study to the Nordic, liberal, and continental models. In his view, 
the distinctive feature of the Nordic model is that it provides universal 
income guarantees and well-developed services to children, the disabled, 
and the elderly in need of support, while its activation policy reduces 
long-term unemployment. 
 Th e cluster of Nordic countries in my analysis is clearly separate from 
that of the continental countries. Th e level of expenditures is somewhat 
higher than the average in the continental countries, although—thanks 
to the reforms of the 1990s—the quantitative diff erence is no longer 
conspicuously great. Structural diff erences are more noticeable, indicat-
ing varying institutional systems. Th e proportion of old-age provisions is 
great in the continental countries, conforming to the traditional, status- 
oriented model that makes it possible to maintain social status through-
out the various stages of the life cycle. By contrast, in the Scandinavian 
countries, family and child support is signifi cant, which—following the 
universal model—aims to level out income across the family’s life cycle 
in the spirit of an egalitarian ethos. A benefi cial eff ect of this result is 
that child poverty is negligible. Pension and healthcare expenditures are 
lower than the EU-15 average. Kiander ( 2004 ) explains that healthcare 
is cheaper than in the other EU member states because it is provided in 
public institutions, as opposed to the more expensive combination of 
social insurance and private care. Th e effi  cient operation of welfare insti-
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tutions and strong competition within the economy can be attributed to 
the fact that there is a high poverty risk after market income distribution, 
while the risk will be the lowest among the four clusters after welfare 
transfers. 
 Th e classifi cation of the UK and Ireland among welfare regimes 
generally elicits uncertainty in the literature. Esping-Andersen ( 1990 ) 
labels the English-speaking countries as liberal, residual welfare regimes, 
where the ideal type is the USA. From his book, it also emerges that the 
UK does not entirely fi t this model because healthcare is a universal ser-
vice fi nanced from taxes, just like education. Local governments hold a 
large supply of rented social housing. In 1990, the author classifi ed the 
welfare regime in Ireland as belonging to the corporatist-conservative 
model of the continental countries. A decade later, he assigned both 
countries—albeit in inverted commas—to the “liberal” welfare model, 
which, similar to the USA, supports market solutions and limits pub-
lic accountability to acute market failures. Th e role of means testing 
has strengthened, and in parallel, the emphasis has shifted from the 
traditional assessment of needs to work-conditional welfare provision 
(Esping-Andersen  2002 ). 
 In the cluster analysis, the UK appears as a borderline case among the 
continental countries. Within the structure of expenditures, the diff er-
ence compared to the continental countries is apparent not so much in 
child and family support, but rather in strikingly high housing benefi ts. 
Th e poverty risk and income disparities are high. In the MDS diagram, 
this ambiguous situation is clearly expressed in the UK’s relative sepa-
ration from the other countries of the third cluster. At the same time, 
Kleinman ( 2002 ) points out that even in the Th atcher era, the welfare 
regime did not become “truly” liberal; the changes were more radi-
cal in rhetoric than in reality. Pierson ( 1996 ) attributes this result to 
resistance in society and political unpopularity forcing governments to 
backtrack. 
 In this study, Ireland tends to display the characteristics of an Anglo- 
Saxon regime like the UK itself. Callan et al. ( 2008 ) likewise categorise 
their own homeland under the Anglo-Saxon model, given that the insti-
tutional system resembles that of the UK. Th ey nevertheless note that 
spending on social protection is not as low as the GDP-proportionate fi g-
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ure would suggest because, in Ireland’s case, there is a large gap between 
GDP and GNI (in 2004, the latter was just 85 per cent of the former), 
and GNI is a more realistic basis for comparison. However, even after 
making this correction, social expenditures are still considerably lower 
than the average in the OMS. 
 Esping-Andersen ( 2002 ) includes the Mediterranean countries in 
the continental welfare model, in the majority of which the traditional 
responsibility of family in the welfare regime has remained, especially in 
Southern Europe, but to the least extent in France and Belgium. Coupled 
with this is the dominance of social insurance, which provides good pro-
tection for those with a stable job throughout their working lives but 
which is unable to adequately manage the risks that accompany the 
spread of atypical employment. 
 Th e Mediterranean countries do not stand out among the continen-
tal countries in this study (Table  3.7 ) or in the European Commission 
report on industrial relations as it relates to welfare regimes (Table  3.6 ). 
Studies arguing in favour of an independent welfare regime cite charac-
teristics such as the importance of family in social protection, the ineffi  -
cient operation of welfare institutions, their clientelist and particularist 
nature, and the strength of party-political infl uence (Kleinman  2002 ). 
Th ese characteristics naturally cannot be expressed by the indicators 
used in this analysis. In the past decade, the Mediterranean countries 
have strived to improve the effi  ciency and sustainability of their wel-
fare regimes through a series of reforms (Guillén  2007 ; Sacchi  2007 ; 
Sakellaropoulos  2007 ). 
 Th e European Commission report on industrial relations (European 
Commission  2009c ) questions whether the new, post-socialist countries 
belong to the Anglo-Saxon residual model or to the segmented continen-
tal model. Th is cluster analysis acknowledges that these member states 
could not be grouped under a single welfare regime (Table  3.7 ). Poland, 
Hungary, and Slovenia belong among the continental countries. As can 
be seen in relation to the transformation in CEE, Poland and Hungary 
principally owe this “illustrious” position to the fact that they handled 
the joblessness that came with structural transformation by pensioning 
people off . Th e other post-socialist countries, by limiting the role of the 
state, display more characteristics of a residual regime, although they are 
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also set apart from this regime by the tradition of continental social insur-
ance, where the contribution of employers to fi nancing is high. 
3.6  Education 
3.6.1  Education and Growth 
 From the education system as a whole, Hall and Soskice ( 2001 ) incor-
porate the various forms of vocational training into their models of 
liberal and coordinated market economies, which is necessary for an 
examination of the production regime. In the liberal system, gen-
eral knowledge and skills can be acquired through formal training, 
as companies are reluctant to invest in their own training because 
those they train can easily fi nd employment on a fl exible labour mar-
ket. In the coordinated market economy—which the authors describe 
through the example of Germany—companies provide vocational 
training, which is overseen by employer organisations and teaches 
specifi c knowledge and skills. Estevez-Abe et al. ( 2001 ) examine Hall 
and Soskice’s classifi cation of vocational training regimes in liberal 
and coordinated market economies by extending it to the countries of 
the OECD. At the same time, they corroborate the complementary 
institutional similarities between the production regime, the labour 
market, and vocational training that Hall and Soskice propose with 
respect to the USA and Germany. 
 Amable ( 2003 ) notes that education systems vary greatly from coun-
try to country and that all-embracing comparative analyses are lacking. 
Most often, the education systems of the English-speaking countries tend 
to be compared with those of Germany and the Netherlands, with the 
former characterised by loose—and the latter by strict—standardisation 
and diff erentiation. Gangl ( 2000 ) regards dual education systems pro-
viding trade-specifi c training as advantageous for young people entering 
the labour market, such as those functioning in Austria, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Germany. In his analysis, Amable uses a wide range of 
variables, although he is unable to fi nd reliable, comprehensive data on 
vocational training. 
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 In neoclassical growth theory, education is a defi ning element of 
the economic environment because it develops human capital, which, 
in turn, increases labour productivity, and consequently—through 
growth—the equilibrium shifts to a higher output level. Endogenous 
growth theory not only highlights the power of education to increase 
innovative capacity but also assigns it an important role in the spread 
and dissemination of knowledge. A series of macroeconomic investiga-
tions have tried to confi rm theoretical expectations on an empirical 
basis, such as Akram and Pada ( 2009 ), who completed seven coun-
try surveys and apply 14 such research studies to several countries. 
Although time horizons, the range of countries surveyed, educational 
segments and applied statistical methods diff er, as do the strength 
and signifi cance of the fi ndings, all the studies unequivocally confi rm 
the signifi cant positive impact of education on economic growth. It 
is worth noting that, according to calculations by Neycheva ( 2010 ), 
public spending on education contributes more obviously to economic 
growth in the OMS than in the NMS. Little-known empirical investi-
gations refute the common perception that the education system was 
of a high standard in the era of state socialism. Skills and qualifi cations 
acquired under the previous regime by employees in the European post-
socialist countries already lagged behind the average in OECD coun-
tries in the mid-1990s (Commander  2007 ). 
 Hanushek and Wößmann ( 2007 , 2010 ) point out that surveys gen-
erally appraise education using quantitative criteria (enrolment ratios, 
years spent in school, and so on), although the quality of education can 
be just as important from the point of view of economic growth. Th ey 
use the results of international testing to assess the quality of education, 
including both emerging and developed countries in their investigations. 
Th eir analysis proves not only the signifi cant positive eff ect that quality 
education exerts on economic growth but also that this eff ect is relatively 
meagre in closed economies and substantially greater in open economies. 
Education’s positive economic impact is further enhanced if it is able to 
function within a productive institutional environment (markets, legal 
systems, and so on). Th e authors demonstrate that improving the educa-
tion system is not merely a fi nancial question, but that greater expendi-
tures bring results only as part of a set of coordinated measures. Th e key 
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to reforms is to ensure high-quality teaching staff . Th ese authors also 
attempt to create models for the long-term growth returns of educational 
reforms. 
3.6.2  Education in the Member States 
 Participation at the various levels of education, refl ecting the scope of 
the education system coupled with the scale of fi nancing, reveals much 
about the position and role of education in the economy. At the same 
time, only a few characteristics of the education system can be outlined 
based on available statistical data, and the internal structure and quali-
tative features of individual education systems cannot be described in 
detail here. Using data for joblessness and employment at the diff erent 
levels of educational qualifi cation, I attempt to establish the extent to 
which the education system adapts to the labour market. Both employ-
ment and joblessness are naturally also infl uenced by many other factors, 
and labour market data thus enable us to draw only limited conclusions 
regarding the education system. 
 Th e cluster analysis produces two truly pronounced groups: the fi rst 
and second clusters. By contrast, the dividing line between the third and 
fourth clusters is quite blurred, but drawing them together would have 
resulted in an overly heterogeneous formation. 
 Th e distinctive feature of the fi rst cluster is that employment on the 
labour market is very high among social groups of varying educational 
levels and is accompanied by a high enrolment ratio. Austria, Denmark, 
UK, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Slovenia belong to this 
group. Th e proportion of those with at most a lower secondary educa-
tion 12 and early school-leavers is below the average for all member states, 
albeit not the lowest of all. A very large number take part in adult educa-
tion. Th e proportion of those with an upper secondary education and—
among them—those taking part in vocational training is above average, 
while the ratio of those enrolled in higher education or holding higher 
technical or scientifi c qualifi cations is the highest of any of the clusters. 
Th ese countries (primarily the Nordic countries and, to the least extent, 
the Netherlands) spend the most on education when the expenditure per 
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student to per capita GDP and overall educational expenditures to GDP 
as a whole are compared. With one exception, 13 joblessness and employ-
ment indicators are the most favourable in this cluster at every level of 
education. Employment among those with a low-level education is also 
above the average of all the member states, although this level is exceeded 
by that for the Mediterranean cluster. 
 Th e second cluster consists of three Mediterranean countries: Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal. 14 Th e education systems of these countries paint 
a paradoxical picture, as a somewhat above-average enrolment ratio in 
higher education is paired with a strikingly high proportion of those 
with only a low-level education. Considerably fewer people participate 
in adult education than in the fi rst cluster, but more than in the third or 
fourth clusters. Although educational spending is below average, it lags 
signifi cantly behind only the fi rst cluster. Th e rate of employment among 
those with a low-level education is the most favourable, while that of 
people with higher educational qualifi cations is the poorest. 
 Th e third cluster contains Belgium, the three Baltic states, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Hungary, and Romania. In these coun-
tries, the proportion of those with a low-level education or early school- 
leavers is around average, as is the ratio of more highly qualifi ed people. 
However, there are fewer participants in either vocational training or 
adult education than the EU average. Spending on education is below 
average according to all examined indicators, except in Belgium, France, 
and Hungary. Rates of employment among people of all educational lev-
els are slightly below average and unemployment rates around average, 
except for a lower level of joblessness among the low qualifi ed. Within 
this cluster, Ireland can “boast” of better employment and joblessness 
fi gures than the other countries. 15 Luxembourg is a special case in this 
regard because many young people complete their studies abroad, par-
ticularly in higher education. 
 Th e fourth cluster comprises Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Germany, and Slovakia. Th e proportion of low-qualifi ed people is the 
smallest here, and the number of early school-leavers similarly low, while 
the proportion of those with at least an upper secondary education and 
those pursuing vocational training is the highest. Th e ratio of those 
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enrolled in higher education is below average, while the number of those 
taking part in adult education or holding technical or scientifi c qualifi ca-
tions is the lowest among all four clusters. Public spending on education 
is the lowest compared to GDP, but private expenditures are the highest. 
Spending per student in higher education compared to GDP is above 
average. Th e rates of employment and joblessness among those with a 
low-level education are the least favourable, while corresponding rates 
among the more highly educated are around average. 
 In this cluster, the deepest traces of the socialist education system 
can be seen. A large proportion of the population, exceeding levels in 
Western countries, was successfully enrolled in the education system, and 
their training served the aims of socialist industrialisation well. However, 
following the capitalist transformation, even a high level of education 
does not guarantee a high level of employment within the new economic 
structure. It can be assumed that Germany appears in this cluster as a 
consequence of unifi cation (Table  3.8 ).
 Th e horizontal axis in Fig.  3.6 shows the levels of education found in 
the individual countries, while the vertical axis shows diff erences in the 
rate of employment, where it can be seen that the employment of those 
with a low level of education has the greatest eff ect on the position of 
each country (S-stress: 0.068).
 It is interesting to compare our education clusters with the summary 
of the quality of education in the EU member states provided in the 
2006 PISA report (OECD  2007 ) (Table  3.9 ). PISA reports are prepared 
every three years, and in chronological terms, the 2006 data are compa-
rable with the fi gures in the cluster analysis, although the comparison is 
limited in its validity because the report provides a picture of the perfor-
mance of 15-year-old pupils, which can change in the future. Based on 
the results of the PISA report, the educational performance of the coun-
tries featured in the fi rst and second clusters is homogeneous. Th e fi rst 
cluster comprises very high-performing countries, while the second con-
tains poorly performing Mediterranean countries. Th e other two clusters, 
on the other hand, are heterogeneous, showing major diff erences in the 
performance of countries contained within them.
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 Table 3.8  Education system clusters 
 Clusters 
 1.  Below-average proportion of people with low-level 
education or early school- leavers, high proportion 
of people with upper secondary and higher 
education 




 Very high participation in adult education 
 Highest ratio of education spending to GDP 
 Most favourable employment and joblessness data 
 2.  High proportion of people with low-level education 
or early school-leavers 
 Italy, Portugal, 
Spain 
 Enrolment in higher education somewhat above 
average 
 Low participation in adult education 
 Below-average ratio of education spending 
 High employment among people with low levels of 
education, below-average for those with at least 
upper secondary education 
 3.  Roughly average proportion of people with low-level 
education or early school-leavers, similar to the 
ratio of people with higher levels of education 






 Slightly below-average ratio of people enrolled in 
higher education, few participants in adult 
education 
 Education spending below average according to all 
examined indicators 
 Below-average employment rates among people of 
all education levels 
 4.  Smallest proportion of people with low levels of 
education, number of early school-leavers low 
 Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Poland, 
Germany, Slovakia  Highest participation in vocational training 
 Lowest proportion taking part in adult education 
 Public spending on education lowest compared to 
GDP 
 Least favourable employment and joblessness rates 
among people with low levels of education 






 Fig. 3.6  Two-dimensional MDS-based representation of the education 
system 
 










Finland 563 547 548
Estonia 531 501 515
Netherlands 525 507 531
Slovenia 519 494a 504a
Germany 516 495 504a
United Kingdom 515 495 495
Czech Republic 513 483 510
Austria 511 490 505
Belgium 510 501 520
Ireland 508 517 501
Hungary 504 482 491
Sweden 503 507 502
Poland 498 508 495
Denmark 496 494 513
France 495 488 496
Latvia 490 479 486
Slovakia 488 466 492
Spain 488 461 480
Lithuania 488 470 486
Luxembourg 486 479 490
Italy 475 469 462
Portugal 474 472 466
Greece 473 460 459
Bulgaria 434 402 413
Romania 418 396 415
statistically significantly above OECD 
average
no statistically significant deviation from 
OECD average
statistically significantly below OECD 
average
a Comparison to OECD average based not only on point 
scores displayed here
 Table 3.9  Pupils’ average scholastic performance based on the 2006 PISA report 
 Source : OECD ( 2007 : 24, 52, 58) 
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 Notes 
  1.  For example, the crisis has triggered a major decline in GDP and a leap 
in unemployment in a state with an underdeveloped social welfare 
system (such as in the Baltic states), leading to a dynamic growth in 
welfare expenditures in proportion to GDP, even though this obviously 
does not signify the beginning of an expansion in the social welfare 
system itself. 
  2.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine ( 2008 ) acknowledge that, despite the evidence 
uncovered, their conclusions must be treated with caution. For example, it 
seems fair to criticise the fact that the maturity of the fi nancial system can be 
measured quantitatively only by econometric approaches, revealing nothing 
about the extent to which banks carry out the task of gathering information 
during the lending process to help the effi  cient allocation of capital. Th e case 
of China, meanwhile, can be incorporated into their theory only with 
diffi  culty. 
 Prompting us to exercise caution, for example, is the criticism by 
Zhu et al. ( 2004 ) of an oft-quoted article by Levine and Zervos ( 1998 ). 
Th e latter proved, based on data from 47 countries between 1976 and 
1993, that a developed fi nancial market measured in stock market 
liquidity, as well as a well-developed banking system measured in the 
stock of credit against GDP, had a signifi cant and positive impact on 
GDP growth. Zhu et al. ( 2004 ) demonstrate that the authors reached 
their conclusions with regard to the role of the stock market by omit-
ting outlier values that, if taken into account, would prove the article’s 
conclusions to be false. 
 Th e extensive literature dissects the question of how much the role of 
legal institutions determines the development of the fi nancial system. 
Although the former’s infl uence on the latter can scarcely be disputed, 
opinions about its importance are divided. Beck and Levine ( 2003 ) pro-
vide a comprehensive picture of this debate. 
  3.  Korhonen ( 2001 ) presents the transformation of the Finnish fi nancial 
system. 
  4.  Pye ( 2005 ) examines the transformation of the insurance sector in all the 
former socialist European countries and the CIS member states alike, dem-
onstrating both the relative underdevelopment of the region as a whole 
and the diff erences in development between the countries concerned. 
3 An Empirical Analysis of the Economic System 129
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
  5.  Kasman and Yildirim ( 2006 ) paint a more nuanced picture of the period 
from 1995 to 2002, fi nding that while the profi t effi  ciency of foreign banks 
in the CEE countries as a whole was greater than that of domestic banks 
and that foreign banks performed better in terms of cost effi  ciency in the 
Czech Republic and the three Baltic states, the performance of domestic 
banks in the latter regard was better in Hungary and Poland, while no 
signifi cant diff erence was observable in Slovakia and Slovenia. 
  6.  Cameron ( 2001 ) provides a historical overview of unemployment from the 
1970s onwards and its diff ering evolution in the various member states. 
Th e conclusion from this overview is that the level of employment was 
higher in member states where economic growth was also greater, where 
employer and employee bodies reached new, more fl exible agreements, and 
where governments pursued job- creating economic policies. 
  7.  For example, in 2007, the Flemish region faced a 72.3 per cent employ-
ment rate and 3.9 per cent unemployment, as opposed to Brussels’ 60.2 
per cent employment and 15.9 per cent unemployment and the Walloon 
region’s 62.8 per cent employment and 10.0 per cent unemployment 
(European Commission  2010b ). 
  8.  A polder is a tract of land artifi cially reclaimed from the sea and enclosed 
by dikes. If cooperation is lacking in maintenance of the dikes or a section 
of dikes is neglected, the whole area may be inundated. Th e Dutch consen-
sus-based decision-making model is traced back to this historical 
precedent. 
  9.  O’Hagan ( 2002 ) highlights the barriers to convergence in her book. 
Ireland (described as being on the semi-periphery) and Hungary (then still 
a candidate EU member) achieved their successes in the 1990s by taking 
the “low road” to competitiveness (with a comparatively well-trained 
workforce, low wages and an FDI-dependent labour market), while the 
European social model builds on the “high road”, based on the manufac-
ture of top-quality products in the countries of the centre. For this reason, 
it is not surprising that, even exploiting the opportunities of fl exible intro-
duction, EU legislation has not brought a breakthrough in industrial rela-
tions in either Ireland or Hungary. 
 10.  With regard to spending on social protection, Hungary and Poland are last 
in line within the cluster, but their institutional systems as a whole never-
theless place them in this group. 
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 11.  Historical experience shows there is not necessarily a connection between the 
level of welfare expenditures and the institutional arrangement. On the one 
hand, market solutions can prove relatively very costly: in 2007, the USA 
spent 16 per cent of GDP on healthcare, compared to 8.2 per cent in 
Finland, for example. On the other hand, for example, in Sweden, universal 
healthcare and pension provision came about irrespective of whether 11.3 
per cent (1950) or 40.1 per cent (1990) of GDP was spent on social protec-
tion. Th ey did not renounce the philosophy of their social institutional 
regime even when the level of state expenditures compared to GDP was 
whittled down from 70 per cent (1994) to 54.4 per cent (2001). Th e adjust-
ment of social spending to the economy’s current load-bearing capacity does 
not therefore determine the accompanying institutional regime (data source: 
OECD Stat, Tomka  2008 ). 
 12.  When analysing the education system, I applied the categories of the 
International Standard Classifi cation of Education (ISCED) employed in 
databases. Th e according levels of education are as follows: 
 0—Pre-primary (nursery) education; 
 1—Primary education, or the fi rst stage of basic education (six- year educa-
tional period starting from ages 5–7); 
 2—Lower secondary education, or the second stage of basic education; 
 3—Secondary education (upper level); 
 4—Post-secondary, non-tertiary education; 
 5—Th e fi rst stage of tertiary education, which does not lead directly to the 
acquisition of an academic degree (minimum duration of two years); 
 6—Th e second stage of tertiary education, which leads directly to the 
acquisition of an academic degree. 
 13.  Employment rate among those in the 25–64 age group with, at most, a 
lower secondary education. 
 14.  Data for Portugal are extreme compared to the EU as a whole, with the 
proportion of the population with a low-level education above 70 per cent 
in the 25–64 age group. Th e reason for this is that the Salazar regime delib-
erately kept people in a state of illiteracy prior to the democratic transfor-
mation (Bragues  2011 ). 
 15.  Ireland can claim relatively the largest number of persons holding techni-
cal or scientifi c qualifi cations among the 25 member states. 
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 4 
4.1  Combined Clusters 
 I attempt to examine the clusters obtained in the individual subsystems 
collectively in order to see what kinds of clusters would emerge as a result 
of taking into account all the subsystems together, with the existing clus-
ters as a basis. Because I form new clusters from cluster classifi cations 
as categories, a “two-step” cluster analysis has been applied using the 
SPSS software. Th e advantage of this process is that the cluster- formation 
process is able to handle categorical variables. Th e result is what is con-
sidered—according to the process—to be an optimal cluster number. 
Consequently, we obtain two clusters: one containing the OMS, and the 
other containing the NMS. 
 Given that the cluster number suggested by the software is only a rec-
ommendation, 1 it is customary to investigate other possibilities outside of 
the resulting “optimal” cluster number. Consequently, I try out solutions 
involving three, four, or more clusters. I list the clusters in the order in 
which they separated from the cluster of OMS as the number of clusters 
increased 2 and choose from among the various cluster numbers by com-
paring them with qualitative analyses found in the literature. 
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 Th e combined clusters essentially correspond to the four models that 
crystallised from the old EU member states in the literature that does not 
follow the dual classifi cation method (Table 2.1) and that, according to 
the results of this investigation, must be complemented with the CEE 
model (Table  4.1 ). In the following, we scrutinise these models, using the 
results obtained from analysis of the individual subsystems.
4.2  The Nordic Model as a Blueprint 
 In this analysis, Luxembourg is included alongside the Nordic coun-
tries of Finland and Sweden. No economic context can be attributed, 
given that Luxembourg formed a cluster of its own as a special case in 
three separate subsystems. For this reason, its customary classifi cation 
in the literature among its continental neighbours might be more justi-
fi ed. Denmark, at the same time, is missing from the cluster of Nordic 
countries. Nevertheless, Denmark can be regarded as a borderline case 
because, in terms of both its labour market regime and social protection, 
it belongs fi rmly within the cluster of Nordic countries. 
 Th e fate of the Nordic countries attracts attention strongly dispro-
portionate to their size; this does not apply only in Europe. One may 
recall that institutional analyses came to the fore partly precisely because 
of the debate over whether market economies are necessarily advancing 
in the direction of the free competition-based Anglo-Saxon model. For 
those who reason that there is no conformity to a universal rule, the main 
argument is the success of the Nordic countries. For this reason, a brief 
summary will be provided about the main attributes of these countries’ 
institutional arrangements, which the literature roughly agrees upon and 
which also emerged from this cluster analysis. 
 Table 4.1  Combined clusters of the EU-25 member states 
 North-Western cluster  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, UK, France, Netherlands, 
Ireland, Germany 
 Mediterranean cluster  Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
 Nordic cluster  Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden 
 Central and Eastern 
European cluster 
 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
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 Th e structural realignment that began in the 1970s, followed by inten-
sifying competition in the global economy and the deepening of European 
integration—which also determined the economic environment in coun-
tries that were not yet EU members—made the system known as the 
Swedish or Scandinavian welfare state unsustainable beginning in the 
second half of the 1980s. Th ese processes took place in diff erent ways 
in the various countries. Th e performance of the  Swedish economy has 
steadily deteriorated since the second half of the 1970s, making attempts 
to handle the situation not through structural reforms but via currency 
devaluation all in vain. Th e high level of employment, maintained amid 
a growing balance of payments defi cit and public debt, inevitably gave 
way to an employment crisis by the beginning of the 1990s. Th anks to 
Soviet export opportunities, the  Finnish economy was still living through 
prosperous times in the 1970s and 1980s, which plunged deeper at the 
beginning of the 1990s because of the loss of Soviet markets. Although 
 Denmark never suff ered a fi nancial and economic crisis as serious as the 
aforementioned two countries did at the beginning of the 1990s, slow-
ing growth and employment problems began to emerge in the 1980s 
(Kiander  2004 ; Andersen  2011 ). 
 In summary, at the time of economic hardship affl  icting the Nordic 
countries at the beginning of the 1990s, it appeared that the Scandinavian 
welfare state failed once and for all. However, successful reforms were 
carried out, helping these countries embark on a path of development 
beginning in the mid-1990s that would once again elevate them among 
the world’s leading economies. Although welfare expenditures were cut, 
they still remained higher than in other developed countries, particularly 
compared to the Anglo-Saxon model. In Sweden’s case, Lindbom ( 2001 ) 
examines in detail how the characteristics of the social democratic model 
described by Esping-Andersen (universality, the high replacement rate in 
pensions and sickness benefi ts, and so on) remained not only on the level 
of spending but also in the institutional system, while the quantitative 
reduction in welfare expenditures did not result in a qualitative change. 
Th e high level of welfare provision and the accompanying high level of 
taxation continue to prove eff ective in maintaining a strong degree of 
social equality, even if not to the extent preceding the 1990s. Among 
other factors, the outstanding innovative performance of the economy 
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and a fl exible labour market, combined with an active employment pol-
icy, has helped sustain the elements of the welfare system. While these 
distinctive features of the Nordic model are common knowledge, it is 
considerably less well known that competition has been fi erce on the 
product market since the deregulation of the 1990s. 3 As shown earlier, 
there has been a shift in the institutional framework of the fi nancial sys-
tem away from the continental bank-based system and towards a fi nan-
cial market regime. Opinions are split regarding how to interpret these 
adjustments; some hold that the current practice of Nordic countries is 
no longer an independent model, but rather a transitional solution on 
the path towards Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalism, which they term con-
solidated neo- liberalism (Ryner  2002 ). Apparently more convincing is 
the argument stating that it is typical of the overall modernisation of 
Sweden (from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards)—as 
the defi ning, trend-setting country in the Scandinavian region—that 
the stable market institutions of a capitalist economy have continuously 
developed in parallel with institutions supporting equality and solidarity 
(Bergh  2011 ). Th e combination of competition-based market solutions 
and those guaranteeing equality of opportunity is therefore not alien 
to Swedish development. It is also a fact that strict monetary and fi s-
cal policy was an essential element of the original model of the Swedish 
welfare state from the 1950s onwards. Th e monetary and fi scal loos-
ening that began in the mid-1970s can be regarded as an “aberration” 
occurring in response to the crisis of the time. For this reason, Anxo and 
Niklasson ( 2006 ) are justifi ed in their interpretation of the reform of the 
Swedish economy in the early 1990s—and the restoration of monetary 
and fi scal rigour—as a return to the essential elements of the original 
Swedish model. Th e 1990s saw the signing of collective agreements at 
the company level, rather than centralised wage bargaining. However, 
recentralisation began at the end of the 1990s, and the results of wage 
bargains in export-oriented industries paved the way for the economy 
as a whole. A new labour market authority was established in 2000 (the 
 Medlingsinstitutet —National Mediation Offi  ce), which ensured that the 
manufacturing sector retained a decisive role in the evolution of wages. 
Th is also restored another characteristic feature of the Swedish welfare 
state whereby wage agreements promote the international competitive-
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ness of Swedish exports (Anxo and Niklasson  2009 ; Schnyder  2012 ). 
It is true not only of Sweden but also of Finland and Denmark that the 
essence of the Nordic model was successfully preserved amid the trans-
formations (Lindgren  2011 ; Mailand  2011 ). In Part III, this topic will be 
discussed in detail. 
 In the fi rst half of the 2000s, the Nordic countries also drew attention to 
themselves by regularly appearing at the forefront of the Lisbon reforms, 
aiding the competitiveness of the EU, together with the Netherlands, 
Austria, and Ireland (Farkas  2008 ). Th e average pace of economic growth 
both between 1970 and 2006 and between 1990 and 2006 was slower 
than in the USA but exceeded the rate of growth in the continental coun-
tries and that of the Mediterranean countries between 1990 and 2006, 
similar to the English-speaking countries of Europe. 
 Witnessing these lasting successes, it became generally accepted by 
the mid-2000s that eff orts towards innovation, strong competition on 
product markets, and fl exibility on the labour market off set high public 
expenditures; thus, a renewed Nordic model was created (Aiginger  2008 ; 
Heipertz and Ward-Warmedinger  2008 ). Th is may mean the implemen-
tation of a model that better corresponds to the distinctive features and 
order of values of the European economic and social model. Not only 
does the oft-mentioned study by Sapir ( 2006 ) present the Nordic model 
as one capable of simultaneously accomplishing both economic effi  ciency 
and a high degree of social equality, but studies by other research insti-
tutes close to the EU also put forward the same interpretation (Schubert 
and Martens  2005 ). Aiginger et al. ( 2007 ) likewise draw the conclusion 
that while economic performance justifi es both the Anglo-Saxon and 
Nordic models, greater social cohesion counts in favour of the Nordic 
model. A book about the Swedish welfare state was published under the 
aegis of the IMF, which acknowledges—while also recommending fur-
ther reforms—that this distinctive institutional arrangement is capable of 
functioning (Th akur et al.  2003 ). 4 Labour market reform in the Nordic 
countries—which diff ers substantially among individual countries—has 
become a point of reference in EU reform plans, with the experiences 
of the Danish fl exicurity system serving as a guiding thread (European 
Commission  2007 ). In the midst of the 2008 crisis, World Bank experts 
looked upon the model of the Nordic countries as an exception from the 
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general rule of slow economic growth linked to extensive government 
spending. In order to avoid these two phenomena acting in tandem, 
there is a need for professional, transparent government, an effi  ciently 
functioning institutional system and the profound confi dence of society 
(Gill and Raiser  2012 ). In the history of the Nordic countries, the begin-
nings of this favourable accumulation of social capital reach to the time 
before the capitalist modernisation (Bergh  2011 ). 
 Th ese special circumstances severely limit the adaptability of the 
Nordic model. It is also incontestable that the ageing of society presents 
a danger to the fragile balance that the Nordic countries have shaped 
between economic effi  ciency, competitiveness, and social cohesion. In 
the mid-2000s, the question often arose of whether the Nordic countries 
proceed on an enduringly sustainable course. Th e storms of the 2008 
crisis took their toll on these nations to varying degrees; we shall return 
to this topic later. 
4.3  A North-Western, Not Continental, 
Model? 
 Th e cluster analysis has generated a group of countries that comprises 
both the North-Western continental and English-speaking nations. 
What appears at fi rst sight to be an astonishing outcome is nevertheless 
understandable if we recall the picture we obtain of the individual sub-
systems. Th ese data demonstrate that the EU’s unifi ed internal market 
has attained the strongest level of integration with respect to products, 
with only the Mediterranean countries standing out from among the 
OMS. Full-blown diff erences exist among the non-Mediterranean OMS 
in the areas of labour markets, the fi nancial system, and social protection. 
Th is confi rms the earlier mentioned approach of Sapir ( 2006 ), who clas-
sifi es the OMS on the basis of the labour market and social protection. 
Here, the Anglo-Saxon model appears only in these two areas and in the 
fi nancial system and in only two out of the three areas in either the UK 
or Ireland. Th e UK displays the expected Anglo-Saxon characteristics in 
both its labour market and fi nancial system. Looking at its social pro-
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tection regime, Ireland appears “more Anglo-Saxon” than the UK itself, 
while the Irish labour market also possesses typical Anglo-Saxon features. 
In the combined clusters, this all falls into place in a way that does not 
permit us to form a clearly separate Anglo-Saxon cluster, and instead, we 
can view the English-speaking nations as borderline cases in the North- 
Western group of countries. Th is kind of diluted presence of the Anglo- 
Saxon model indirectly also means that European integration as a whole 
can be set against the USA as a model that, despite its internal hetero-
geneity, can be diff erentiated from the American model. Th is coincides 
with the similarly aforementioned fi ndings of Ebbinghaus ( 1999 ). 
 Th e two English-speaking countries underwent severe ordeals in the 
2008 crisis, and for this reason, it is justifi ed to devote special attention to 
their situation prior to the crisis as a subgroup within the North-Western 
cluster. 
4.3.1  Anglo-Saxon Borderline Cases: The UK 
and Ireland 
 In the decade preceding the 2008 crisis, both the UK and Ireland were 
among the EU’s most successful countries. Even by global standards, the 
UK delivered outstanding performance among the developed countries, 
with its GDP growth rate of around 3 per cent. For its part, Ireland’s 
growth of around 5 per cent enabled it to close in by 30 percentage 
points on the EU-27 average per capita GDP between 1995 and 2008 
(Eurostat). 5 As mentioned in connection with the Scandinavian coun-
tries, both nations were also at the forefront on the basis of indicators 
intended to measure the progress of the Lisbon reforms. 
 In the  UK , the processes that characterised the period following the 
crises of the 1970s began before those of the other European countries. 
Th e service sector provided the economy’s pulling power, while a fl exible 
labour market and high level of employment led to the spread of low- 
skilled, low-wage jobs and increasing social inequality. British industry 
was pushed into the background, and there was no “patient capital” from 
banks behind companies fi nanced from the fi nancial market. Neither 
shareholders’ short-term attitude nor the supervising role of commercial 
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companies encouraged industrial concerns to develop a high-added-value 
production structure. Th e welfare system was curtailed, and the govern-
ment did not even target poverty reduction as a goal. In the Th atcher era, 
the UK displayed the characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon model, pursuing 
a neoliberal policy similar to that of the USA and shaping its institutional 
framework in this spirit. 6 
 With the Labour Party’s ascent to power in 1997, signifi cant changes 
took place in the welfare regime, and the British system began to more 
closely resemble the European system. Th e range of services expanded 
as state childcare support increased and the system adapted to the dual- 
earner model, while application of the means-testing principle typically 
remained in place. Nationwide collective agreements appeared in indus-
trial relations, at least in the public sphere. Th e number of students in 
higher education dynamically increased. Th e structure of the economy 
remained on the development path that evolved in the preceding cycle. 
Th e service sector acquired such importance that the loss of industry’s 
status no longer occupied economic policymakers (Rubery et al.  2009 ). 
 One of the drivers of the UK’s impressive growth was the perfor-
mance of the fi nancial sector, which continued to gain strength under 
the Labour government. As it could be seen in the examination of this 
subsystem, not only fi nancial markets—but also the banking sector—are 
more advanced than in the other member states. In the decade preced-
ing the crisis, fi nancial services expanded at a rate of around 6 per cent, 
double the rate of GDP growth, and the most dynamic escalation was 
seen in the banking sector. As a result, the banks’ combined balance sheet 
totals easily exceeded fi vefold the amount of British GDP prior to the 
crisis (Davies et al.  2010 : 325). At the outset of the period in question, 
the contribution of the fi nancial sector to GDP was less than 6 per cent, 
but this grew within a decade to close to 9 per cent. (By comparison, this 
ratio is 4 to 5 per cent in the major continental countries.) 
 Comparing the study by Rubery et al. ( 2009 ) to this cluster analysis 
with respect to the appraisal of the UK’s institutional arrangement, it 
is clear that similar empirical results can be assessed in diff erent ways, 
depending on where the emphasis lies. Rubery et al. ( 2009 ) also  recognise 
that the British institutional arrangement under the Labour government 
moved closer to Europe and away from the Anglo-Saxon model repre-
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sented by USA, also claiming that the changes took place while preserv-
ing the essence of the latter model. It was that the EU, particularly in 
the context of the non-Mediterranean OMS, functions as an eff ective 
“melting pot” on the unifi ed internal market, although important insti-
tutional diff erences remain—mainly in the other subsystems. During the 
British presidency of the EU in 2005, Tony Blair off ered the member 
states the UK model as the saviour of Europe. In evaluating this off er, I 
agree with Rubery et al. ( 2009 ) that the comparative advantages gained 
in the services sector—mainly in fi nance—across decades would be dif-
fi cult to transfer to other countries, although since the 2008 crisis, this is 
not an attractive alternative. 
 Financial services in  Ireland expanded to an even greater degree than in 
the UK. Th e contribution of fi nancial services to GDP in Ireland between 
1998 and 2008 grew from barely more than 6 per cent to over 10 per 
cent (Burgess  2011 : 234). During the 2008 crisis, however, precisely this 
advanced fi nancial sector placed a huge burden on both countries. In 
Ireland’s case, not only did the international fi nancial crisis have a “ripple 
eff ect”, but also the success story of the country already tritely known as 
the “Celtic tiger” was called into question. For this reason, it is worth 
scrutinising in a little more detail the path of development in Ireland 
prior to the crisis. 
 As is widely known, Ireland’s convergence process was built on attract-
ing FDI, which was already the focus of Irish development policy in the 
1958 Economic Development Plan. Th e outcome was seen as unsatis-
factory because the infl ux of capital—mainly from USA—made limited 
contact with local businesses, largely bringing assembly lines or simple 
textile industry work to Ireland. Upon the establishment of the European 
Economic Community in 1973, the Industrial Development Authority 
was established, which consciously strived to ensure that FDI fl owed into 
high-tech sectors. Th e 1980s saw the initial formation of chemical, phar-
maceutical, and electronics industry clusters and the successful building of 
contacts between multinational and local fi rms. However, the economic 
environment as a whole was unfavourable during this period because the oil 
crisis of the 1970s led to a recession in Ireland as well, with  multinational 
fi rms cutting investments and repatriating profi ts amid growing unem-
ployment. Th e state fi nanced the stimulation of the economy through 
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the government defi cit, which led to a fi scal crisis. Following this, the 
Irish success story unfolded in the 1990s. Macroeconomic conditions sta-
bilised as the country adopted a strict fi scal policy, reversing a 20-year 
trend. Th e 1992 Culliton Report brought new emphases to industrial 
policy, pointing out the severe dichotomy and separation between foreign 
and domestically owned companies. A “holistic” approach in industrial 
policy was recommended to the government in order to resolve this. Th e 
ensuing decade saw small domestic enterprises, which were often spin- 
off s from multinational fi rms, proliferate mainly in the software industry 
(Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan  2011 ). Parallel to the soaring of 
the US economy, the 1990s were characterised by GDP and GNP growth 
of 7 through 9 per cent. Precisely because of the substantial FDI pres-
ence, GDP exceeded GNP by 20 per cent. A more realistic refl ection of 
the situation in the Irish economy, GNP showed 216 per cent growth 
by 2005 compared to the 1987 base value of 100 (Kirby  2010 : 33). Th e 
government contributed to this economic performance by dynamically 
improving the education system. When characterising labour markets in 
my cluster analysis, Ireland’s appeared typically Anglo-Saxon in nature. 
At the same time, the corporatist element is fi rmly present in industrial 
relations, and from 1987, social partners regularly entered agreements on 
key issues of economic and social policy. Th is social accord was a similarly 
important element of economic development. Th e rapid rate of growth 
was interrupted by the “dotcom” crisis (the bursting of the bubble on the 
IT market), as well as by the unfavourable global economic eff ects of the 
terrorist attack on the USA on 11 September 2001. Export- led growth 
was replaced by growth based on internal demand, in which the construc-
tion industry played the greatest part. Labour costs per unit of output 
increased as the Irish economy began to lose its international competi-
tiveness. Th e 2008 global economic crisis brought slowly accumulating 
internal imbalances to the surface. 
 Opinions are divided on the assessment of the transformation in the 
Irish economy, even ignoring the crisis. Th ose still deeming this transfor-
mation an unequivocal success story to this day cite, on the one hand, the 
undeniable growth-generating role of FDI, and on the other hand, those 
instances connected largely to a specifi c individual sector in which spill-
over eff ects and domestic high-tech companies also appear (for example, 
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Barry and Bergin  2012 ). 7 Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan ( 2006 ) 
painted a more nuanced picture before the crisis. Although the role of 
domestic small businesses in high-tech fi elds grew during the glory years 
of the 1990s, within the sector of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), domestic fi rms were typically microenterprises, while medium- 
sized fi rms were foreign. Th e propensity to export within the SME sector 
grows as the size of the company increases; moreover, the drivers of the 
boom were large companies. Despite the existence of undeniably positive 
examples, the 2006 data also show that most of the turnover in sectors 
using high-level technologies was handled through foreign companies, 
and in low-tech sectors by domestic companies. Labour productivity is 
higher in foreign fi rms in every sector without exception (Andreosso- 
O’Callaghan and Lenihan  2011 ). Given that a typical feature of not only 
the Irish but also the European convergence model as a whole is that 
it builds on the involvement of foreign capital, we will return to these 
observations later. 
4.3.2  The German Locomotive Is Running Again 
 With the “reallocation” of Luxembourg, the combined cluster analysis 
also shows the usual cluster of continental countries, Austria, Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, and Germany, which are joined by the UK, 
Ireland, and Denmark as borderline cases. For a long time in the con-
tinental countries, the reforms of the two largest states were considered 
the least adequate in strengthening their competitiveness. In the midst 
of the 2008 crisis, analysts began to rethink their assessment of the 
German economy. It is worth examining the German reforms in a little 
more depth not only because its size makes the German economy of key 
importance in terms of the entire European integration process but also 
because we are talking about a completely diff erent type of process from 
the one observed in the case of the Nordic countries or Ireland. 
 For  Germany , too, the two oil crises of the 1970s brought an end to the 
unprecedented economic boom that followed WWII. Economic growth, 
however, slowed down substantially only after the second shock from 
1982 onwards; this is regarded as a turning point in German economic 
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development. Th e economic upturn at the end of the decade proved to 
be temporary, and the 1990s showed GDP growth of approximately 1.5 
per cent. Th e full employment of the early 1970s had given way to unem-
ployment of over 10 per cent by the mid-1990s, and in parallel with 
these developments, the social insurance system became unsustainable. 
Added to these interrelated and mutually reinforcing problems, from 
1990 onwards, a new challenge arrived in the form of German reunifi ca-
tion. A part of the country—the eastern states (“ Länder ”)—where labour 
productivity was one-third that of West Germany, had to be integrated 
with the West German economy. In the mid-1990s, transfers to the east 
amounted to 3 to 4 per cent of Germany’s GDP. It was partly due to this 
that between 1989 and 1998, public debt, expressed as a percentage of 
GDP, grew by 22 percentage points to 63 per cent. By historical stan-
dards, it represented a huge step forward that, by the beginning of the 
2000s, the per capita GDP of the eastern states had reached two-thirds 
of that of the western states, and labour productivity exceeded 70 per 
cent. However, by the middle of the 2000s, with the exception of a few 
urban growth centres, the convergence had ground to a halt. According 
to leading German economists, however, the slowing in growth and high 
unemployment experienced from the 1980s onwards can be traced back 
to structural causes that were unrelated to German reunifi cation (Siebert 
 2005 : 39–42), and they clearly hold the old European social model 
responsible for their country’s economic woes (Siebert  2006 , Sinn  2007 ). 
Th e process of correction and adaptation began in the mid-1990s, but 
its specifi c method was nevertheless infl uenced by the reunifi cation pro-
cess. In the opinion of certain researchers, before the reunifi cation, in the 
debate about how the reforms should be carried out, there was balance 
between the market radicals and those who supported reforming the tra-
ditional German model. Alarmed by the shock of German reunifi cation 
and its economic and social consequences, the economic and political 
elite clearly turned towards neoliberal solutions. First of all, for example, 
they quickly introduced the system of collective bargaining agreements 
in the eastern states, as well, but the bureaucratically interposed, rootless 
institutions did not function in the same way as similar, socially embed-
ded institutions in the western part of the country. From then on, the tra-
ditional corporatist German model increasingly eroded (Lehndorff  et al. 
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 2009 ). It is certainly striking that an acclaimed German economist such 
as Horst Siebert, in the subtitle of his book on the post-war history of 
the German economy, refers to the abandonment of the German model: 
“Beyond the Social Market”. What makes this even odder is that the 
author introduces the German social market economy, and it is clear from 
what follows that the passing decades saw a growing departure from the 
original concepts and ideals, and he could have found reference points for 
renewal within the original social market model. Instead, however, the 
author refers to the British, American, and Swiss models (Siebert  2005 ). 
 Th e correction process began when, in agreement with the weakened 
social partners, wage increases were reined in. Between 1996 and 2000, 
unit wage costs did not grow, while productivity increased by 2 per cent 
a year, which brought a strengthening of international competitiveness. 
It followed, by necessity, that internal demand remained lacklustre and 
that growth could only be driven by exports. Growth in the economy as 
a whole jumped before the crisis, in 2006–2007, to 3.4 and 2.7 per cent, 
but in 2008, it was down to 1 per cent (Sabbatini and Zollino  2010 : 245, 
250). 
 Th e cutback on wages did not represent an institutional change, and 
the German labour market was also typifi ed by the problems prevalent 
in the continental countries in general, that is, status preservation, gen-
erous unemployment benefi ts, passive labour market policy, high taxes 
and social insurance contributions, and the strong employment pro-
tection. Given the results for the Nordic countries, this should have 
been the obvious recipe for maintaining the social market economy in 
Germany. However, the elements of this—easier dismissals, high taxa-
tion, and a strengthening of active labour market policy—were all dis-
puted. In Germany, it was held that due to the strong bargaining power 
of workers in the “core” of the labour market, the state could implement 
labour-market reforms only step-by-step, beginning with atypical forms 
of employment (Eichhorst  2007 ). Th e Germans’ reservations regarding 
the Nordic labour market solutions were heightened by the fact that, in 
the Nordic countries, the state itself attempts to provide a substantial 
proportion of the employment in the context of welfare services, while in 
Germany even today, the most important segment of the labour market is 
export-oriented industry; that is, well-trained workers in the private sec-
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tor. Among the most developed countries, only the Netherlands, Austria, 
and USA have a higher employment rate for workers in the private sector 
than Germany, while Germany’s rate is roughly the same as that in the 
UK (Heipertz and Ward-Warmedinger  2008 : 283). 
 Th e “Hartz reforms” (named after the head of the reform commit-
tee) of the early 2000s, among other changes, permitted the conclusion 
of more fl exible employment contracts, while reducing unemployment 
benefi ts and tightening the rules for their disbursement. As the fear of 
Americanised labour-market solutions meant that it was not possible 
to carry out comprehensive reforms, the end result was a dual labour 
market in which traditional (permanent and protected) employment is 
increasingly displaced by fl exible, but unsecure, jobs. Th e “hybrid” sys-
tem of labour market institutions that is created by such layering gives 
rise to instability (Eichhorst  2007 ). Th e introduction of solutions that 
provide incentives to work, for example, the payment of unemployment 
benefi ts for 18 months rather than 36, also represented a cut in welfare 
expenses. With pension reform and other cost reductions, state redistri-
bution decreased from 48 to 43 per cent of GDP between 1999 and 2009 
(Jackson and Sorge  2012 : 1152). 
 Th e strengthening of competition in the global economy and the EU 
in 1990s brought changes to the system of corporate governance; pro-
cess and product innovation were strengthened both at large corporations 
and in the “ Mittelstand ”, the SME sector that is regarded as the strong 
point of the German economy. All this had an impact on labour relations 
and on the co-determination system. At companies, foreign ownership 
emerged, and the relationship with banks, with “patient capital”, loos-
ened. Th e fi nancial system—in line with the fi nancial-market liberalisa-
tion underway in the EU—shifted from being a bank-based system to a 
more market-oriented system. Trade union membership fell dramatically, 
and negotiations between social partners were decentralised from the sec-
tor level to the corporate level. 
 Behind these changes lies not only the pressure of competition in the 
global economy but also the transformation of the economic structure. 
Although some 90 per cent of German exports are industrial products, 
by the 2000s, almost 70 per cent of the employed worked in the service 
sector. Insurance-based unemployment benefi ts, dependent on status, 
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were created for specialised skilled workers in the industrial manufac-
turing sector. In the labour market, however, a growing percentage of 
workers have general training and skills, and a high number of these are 
women. Th e proportion of those on low wages has also increased (from 
11.1 per cent in 1995 to 17.5 per cent in 2006), which is on a par with 
the British level (Fleckenstein et al.  2011 : 17). In the more fl exible labour 
market, supporting women in work has become a more important task 
than ensuring the status of those with special training, and accordingly, 
the focus of social services has shifted from unemployment benefi ts to 
family policy, and the formerly conservative welfare system, based on the 
man as breadwinner, is slowly changing. 
 Th e German reforms have also raised the question of whether what 
we are seeing is Americanisation, following the Anglo-Saxon path, and 
opinions in this regard are divided. Some highlight the survival of spe-
cial characteristics (Boyer  2005b ), while others consider convergence to 
be the defi ning feature (Lane  2003 ). Streeck sees the transformation of 
Germany as nothing less than a case study of the return of capitalism. 
Such a return “seemed impossible three decades ago” (Streeck  2009 : 
233). Others regard the duality of the industrial economy working with 
well-paid, skilled workers, and the low-wage service economy, as well as 
the attendant low domestic demand, the declining investment in human 
capital and the growing social inequality, as factors that endanger long- 
term development (Lehndorff  et al.  2009 ). 
 Experience to date shows that in the wake of the reforms, by the mid- 
2000s, the competitiveness of the German economy had strengthened, 
and it had once again become the “engine” of European integration. Th e 
role it played in the years following the 2008 crisis will be discussed in 
detail later. 
4.3.3  The Other Half of the European Tandem: France 
 Th e other large continental country, France, took the path of gradual 
reforms, similar to Germany. Th e end of the post-war growth period and 
the start of the new era came at the beginning of the 1980s for the French 
economy, too. France, however, arrived at this point with a completely 
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diff erent system of institutions and in a far worse economic state than 
Germany did. Th e stagnating investment, double-digit infl ation, bur-
geoning defi cit, and currency crisis forced a change of economic policy 
from the Socialist president Mitterrand in 1983, and although long, this 
process led to the most dramatic institutional transformation among the 
OMS. 
 If we were to compare the French economic system in the four decades 
after the WWII with that of Germany, France and Germany would not 
fall into the same group of countries. With respect to this period, the 
ratings that label France as a state-led economy (for example, Schmidt 
 2002 ) are correct. Th e state not only closely regulated the economy and 
controlled macroeconomic processes through indicative planning but 
also was an owner of large corporations operating in what were regarded 
as key industries and providing public services, and even in commer-
cial banks; consequently, it employed around a fi fth of the labour force. 
At large corporations, the relatively low-skilled employees working in an 
infl exible Taylorist system were supervised by a high number of middle 
managers. Job protection was strong; the labour market displayed the 
features of the continental model. In labour relations, however, we do not 
fi nd the corporatist solutions typical of Germany and other continental 
countries and of the Nordic countries. A relatively small part of the het-
erogeneous labour force (25 per cent in the early 1970s) formed a few 
high-membership, politicised trade unions. Th e culture of contractual 
relationships between the various groups of society, which primarily per-
meates the Scandinavian countries, was absent here; labour relations, and 
the confl icts between capital and labour, were controlled by the state. Th e 
welfare state, as in other continental and Mediterranean countries, pro-
vided comprehensive protection that was dependent on status; that is, on 
one’s employment situation, a decisive factor in this being the  situation of 
the head of the family, in other words, the breadwinning male (Berrebi-
Hoff mann et al.  2009 ). 
 When they came into power in 1981, President Mitterrand and the 
Socialist government began with the traditional Keynesian policy of 
demand stimulation and nationalisation. However, they soon had to 
respond to the deepening fi scal and monetary problems with a change in 
economic policy. In the public sector, they carried out sweeping privatisa-
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tion; the strict monetary policy, the abolition of price and capital control, 
and the introduction of part-time employment regimes amounted to a 
deep restructuring of the institutional system that had been in place since 
the end of the war. Th e government made this result politically tolerable 
by introducing a series of social and labour-market measures. In addi-
tion to the burden that these measures placed on the budget, the early 
retirement option and generous social transfers kept employment at a 
low level, in contrast to the Scandinavian solutions that aimed to return 
workers to the labour market (Levy  2011 ). 
 Measures that seemed clearly liberal at fi rst glance, such as privati-
sation and deregulation, did not lead to an institutional system of the 
Anglo-Saxon kind. To ensure the stable management of large corpora-
tions and banks, the bulk of shares in the privatised companies were 
sold to a “hard core” of investors—long-term investors, including banks, 
insurance companies, and industrial corporations—thus circumventing 
the fi nancial markets. Some 15–20 per cent of the shares came to be 
owned by 15–20 holdings. Th is process was intended to guard against 
future takeovers of the companies. After a while, the development of the 
large corporations was set back by the lack of an advanced network of 
suppliers with which a cost-saving, “just-in-time” supply system could 
be established. In France, as a part of regional policy, from the 1960s 
onwards, incentives were given for siting industrial companies outside 
the Paris agglomeration. In the 1980s, these subsidiaries were used to 
build up the regional supplier networks of the companies that contin-
ued to have their headquarters in Paris. With the participation of local 
higher education, these subsidiaries assisted in the modernisation of the 
SME sector. Th is entire process, however, was coordinated no longer by 
the state, but rather by the large corporations. With respect to funding, 
the role of the fi nancial markets increased in comparison to the almost 
exclusively (state-owned) bank fi nancing of the previous period. Th e state 
contributed to the success of the changes by developing the education 
system and bringing it into line with the needs of the labour market. Th e 
legislation made it possible for the institutions of worker participation to 
emerge at corporate level, thereby neutralising the trade unions and inte-
grating workers into the corporation. Th e number of strikes decreased 
considerably, and in capital-labour relations, the state is now only a last 
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resort if agreement cannot be reached. Th e transformation was made eas-
ily because the French elite were selected during their university studies, 
at the “ grandes écoles ”, and during their careers, they move between state, 
fi nancial and business management posts every few years, building up a 
complex network (Hancké  1999 ; Schmidt  2003 ). 
 Th e reform of the French labour market began by following a simi-
lar logic to that of Germany in a series of small steps. However, France 
did not progress as far as Germany; in terms of competitiveness, the 
French economy fell behind that of Germany, and an even more dichot-
omised labour market was created. Atypical employment was partially 
liberalised. Th ere was a shift away from passive labour market policies 
towards the activation of the labour supply, which they tried to achieve 
through reductions in benefi ts and stricter controls (Eichhorst  2007 ). 
Attempts were made to lower the unemployment rate, which had been 
permanently high since the mid-1980s, by introducing a 35-hour work-
ing week; however, not even this represented a long-term solution. Th e 
government tried to alleviate unemployment by creating jobs in public 
services, and despite the privatisations of the 1980s, the state remained 
the largest employer (employing 21–24 per cent of all workers in the 
mid-2000s). From the 1980s onwards, there were constant shifts in the 
insurance-based, employment-linked Bismarck model of the welfare state 
towards minimum incomes based on national solidarity and working as 
a social safety net (Berrebi-Hoff mann et al.  2009 : 191). 
 Th e French transformation was also promoted by the obligations 
stemming from European integration (a European single-market pro-
gramme, preparation for adopting the euro). Th e most successful years 
were between 1997 and 2001, when the growth of the French econ-
omy exceeded the EU average; these were followed by years of mixed 
results. After the dismantling of state dirigisme, the social services system 
 compensating for the liberalisation reached such a level that the right-
wing president Sarkozy, when taking power in 2007, believed that it was 
unsustainable and perpetuated high unemployment. For this reason, he 
announced further liberalisation, but in response to the 2008 crisis, he 
attempted to revive certain elements of the old French dirigisme. His 
experiment had no resounding impact, partly due to EU regulation and 
partly due to his defeat in the 2012 election. 
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 When assessing the institutional transformation, scholars unani-
mously recognise that the changes were dramatic. Hancké ( 1999 ) and 
Levy ( 2011 ) place the emphasis on the changes, while Berrebi-Hoff mann 
et al. ( 2009 ) highlight the hybrid nature of the institutions that emerged 
in the wake of the reforms. Schmidt ( 2003 ) argues that the transformed 
French market economy remains a third variant of capitalism (con-
trary to the dual categories of the VoC model). In the cluster analysis, it 
became apparent—without casting doubt on the surviving unique fea-
tures of the role undertaken by the state—that the French economy fi ts 
into the group of continental countries. Viewed from the level of the 
EU-25 nations, the similarities that tie France to these countries seem 
more important that the peculiarities carried over and retained from its 
past. Amable et al. ( 2012 ), based on their institutional analysis, also con-
fi rm that France belongs among the continental countries; the problems 
and instability of the French implementation of the continental model in 
connection with the fi nancial crisis will be discussed later. 
4.3.4  The Smaller Continental Countries 
 Among the three small continental countries, the literature usually 
praises the results of the reforms in the Netherlands and Austria, but 
the path taken by Belgium is more contradictory. In my cluster anal-
ysis, the Netherlands displayed features similar to those of the Nordic 
countries, such as its labour market apparatus and its effi  cient education 
system; together with the Nordic countries, and to a greater extent, it 
has shifted towards a market-oriented fi nancial system. Austria has con-
sistently moved with the “hard core” of continental countries, Germany 
and France, but in terms of the labour market, it is usually grouped, 
together with the Netherlands, among the reforming continental coun-
tries (Eichhorst  2007 ; Sapir  2006 ), and in terms of its education system, 
it has joined the cluster of frontrunners. 
 Th e  Netherlands has traditionally been regarded as a trading nation since 
the sixteenth century, and even after the industrialisation of the nineteenth 
century, it did not have such a strong industrial base as Belgium. After 
WWII, until the oil crisis, the Netherlands showed dynamic economic 
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growth; the state, employers, and employees cooperated to reduce growth 
in prices and wages, thereby creating a supportive environment for invest-
ment. It was during this period, in the fi elds of oil refi ning, the chemical 
industry, the food industry, and the tobacco industry, that today’s well-
known Dutch multinational corporate giants were born. Th e fi rst oil crisis 
brought a greater slump in the Netherlands than in the other Western 
European countries. Th e expenses and burgeoning social services that 
came with high unemployment were initially covered by the income from 
oil and natural gas fi elds, which had begun production in the 1960s. Th e 
strengthening of the Dutch guilder on the basis of oil and gas exports, 
however, had a negative impact on the exports of other sectors, in a phe-
nomenon that has come to be known in economics parlance as the “Dutch 
disease”. In the 1970s, wages spiralled out of control, infl ation rose, and, 
after the second oil price explosion in 1980–1982, the Dutch economy 
went into a severe recession. After this, the reforms began, the results of 
which began to be seen in the mid-1980s. In 1982, the social partners 
established the Wassenaar Arrangement, under which they restored the 
practice of keeping wages down. Here, too, the measures intended to make 
the labour market more fl exible began with those in fi xed-term employ-
ment relationships. Th e spread of part-time employment was primar-
ily related to the fact that women began to work en- masse in the 1980s 
(Visser and Hemerijck  1997 ). 
 In the early 1990s, the reforms gained new momentum due to the 
renewed slowdown in the economy. As a consequence of privatisation 
and liberalisation, institutional investors took on a more prominent role 
among the owners of corporations, and both the outfl ow and infl ux of 
FDI doubled. In the Netherlands, deindustrialisation took place on a 
larger scale than in the other continental countries and was accompanied 
by a parallel increase in the ratio of services to GDP. Th e role of Dutch 
banks strengthened in the global fi nancial markets, and Amsterdam 
grew to become a fi nancial hub. However, the Dutch industrial multi-
national corporations also retained their importance. Labour relations 
took a paradoxical course. While in legal terms, the corporatist nego-
tiations became decentralised by the mid-1990s and the membership of 
trade unions declined considerably, the informal role of the Social and 
Economic Council and the so-called Labour Foundation strengthened. 
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Th e Dutch version of the fl exicurity system was enshrined in the 1999 
Act on Flexibility and Security, which was also accepted by the social 
partners. In the welfare system, the responsibility of the individual was 
emphasised; the pension system was placed on three pillars, comprising 
the citizens’ pension and the insurance-based pension related to employ-
ment, and voluntary pension insurance. Th e transformation of the wel-
fare system and reduction of state expenditure brought spectacular results 
in the second half of the 1990s in the form of an improvement in the bal-
ance of public fi nance. By the turn of the millennium, the Maastricht cri-
terion relating to public debt had also been met (Houwing and Vandaele 
 2011 ). 
 Belgium ’ s post-WWII upturn had already turned to recession by the 
end of the 1950s, a factor of which was the loss of colonial incomes from 
the liberated Congo; additionally, Belgium also had to take over the new 
state’s debts. Th e 1960s were a “golden decade” for Belgium, too, but the 
new automotive and chemical industry investments went to Flanders, 
while in Wallonia, with its loss-making, crisis-ridden coal mining sector, 
the industrial decline did not stop. Th e oil crisis and the accompanying 
steel industry decline hit Belgium hard, and during the 1970s, society 
showed little willingness to accept the necessary austerity measures. As a 
result, public debt spiralled out of control, remaining above 110 per cent 
of GDP throughout the 1980s, despite having only been 48.1 per cent 
back in 1970 (Mommen  1994 : 124, 214). 
 In Belgium, the reforms started later than in the Netherlands, and the 
state’s spending beyond its means continued in the 1980s. In the 1990s, 
FDI picked up in Belgium, too, but no national champions akin to those 
of the Netherlands emerged. Th e rise in foreign investors had already 
weakened the Belgian business networks by the time the debate on how 
best to keep economic decision-making in Belgium began. Th e majority 
of Belgian corporations are family-owned; a law passed in 2007 stopped 
them from being squeezed out of decision-making processes in joint stock 
companies. 8 In labour relations, corporatist cooperation has continued 
unabated, the proportion of trade union members is high, and collective 
wage negotiations are centralised. At the same time, the state’s role as an 
intermediary has come to the fore, and corporatism has weakened, but 
these results are not due to globalisation or neoliberal dominance, but 
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rather to the federal reorganisation of the Flemish and Walloon provinces 
in 1994, which was accompanied by the fragmentation of corporatist 
negotiations. Th e subdivision of the country has also left its mark on the 
labour market; as we have seen above, in terms of employment, there is 
a ten-percentage-point diff erence between the country’s two provinces, 
in favour of Flanders. Although the welfare reforms, similar to those in 
the Netherlands, are built on greater individual responsibility, in prac-
tice, hardly any austerity measures took place, and the changes are of 
lesser importance than those enacted in the Netherlands (Houwing and 
Vandaele  2011 ). 
 In  Austria , the post-oil crisis era brought a long series of step-by-step 
reforms. After WWII, the country became a textbook example of social 
partnership, where all strata of economic and social life were permeated 
by the parity system that was adhered to almost pedantically. Employer 
and employee advocacy groups agreed on economic and social issues in 
close cooperation with representatives of the Austrian People’s Party and 
Socialist Party. Essentially, the parliament merely enshrined the deci-
sions in law. Th e trade unions were strong; the Socialists were among 
the governing powers for 52 years between 1945 and 2008. Th e Austrian 
business sector carried less weight than in Sweden or the Netherlands. A 
substantial proportion of the major corporations were under state own-
ership; however, the presence of foreign, and especially German, inves-
tors was not negligible. “Austro-Keynesism” (a combination of the fi scal 
stimulation of demand and a strict monetary policy) was eff ective in 
managing the fi rst wave of the oil crisis, but the growing losses of state 
corporations forced a change of direction. 
 Privatisation took place in several stages, beginning at the end of the 
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s with the banks and industrial cor-
porations, while the turn of public services came only after EU accession, 
in compliance with the common market obligations. Th e latter stage also 
aff ected the SME sector, while until then, the sector had been supplied 
with cheaper raw materials and energy by the state corporations. In the 
course of the privatisation, eff orts were made to ensure that the head-
quarters of the corporations remained in Austria and to also keep the 
better-quality jobs there (Alfonso and Mach  2011 ). 
 In the wake of the liberalisation and deregulation carried out in 
the 1990s, fi erce market competition emerged. Austrian companies 
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responded with product and process innovation, which had not previ-
ously been among their strengths. Th e SME sector was backed up by 
the economic chambers, membership to which remained compulsory. 
Following the eastern expansion of the EU, the expansion of Austrian 
companies in the NMS gave a boost to the whole economy. 
 Even in the 1960s and 1970s, the Austrian labour market was more 
segmented than in other Northern European countries. In the tourism, 
construction and clothing industries, many guest workers were employed 
in the less favourable jobs even then. Th e liberalisation of the labour 
market further reinforced this segmentation, and the proportion of those 
working part-time and with fi xed-term contracts rose steeply from the 
1990s onwards. In Austria this resulted not from the government’s active 
deregulation, but rather from a process of spontaneous adaptation by 
the companies. Despite the decline in trade union density, the collec-
tive bargaining system remained, albeit in a far more decentralised form. 
In policymaking, however, social partners were pushed into the back-
ground, and the parliament took on a greater role. Th e restructuring of 
the welfare system also displays a process of constant adjustment. Within 
the classic Bismarck system, the fi rst minor austerity measures took place 
as early as the end of the 1980s, but the right-wing coalition accelerated 
the pace of the transformation at the beginning of the 2000s, with the 
slashing of unemployment benefi ts and the tightening of the rules gov-
erning the pension system, including the abolition of early retirement. 
Th e comprehensive pension reforms of 2003 triggered the largest strike 
in Austria’s history. In summary, Austria carried out signifi cant changes 
to its system of market economy institutions while managing to main-
tain a high degree of continuity (Alfonso and Mach  2011 ; Hermann and 
Flecker  2009 ). 
4.4  Mediterranean Europe 
 Th e Mediterranean countries, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, clearly 
make up a cluster separate from the Nordic and North-Western coun-
tries, which is a notable result because in the progression of the 2008 cri-
sis, to date, they have also constituted a markedly separate group within 
the euro area. It may come as a surprise that one of the founding member 
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states of the union, Italy, in spite of its developed northern regions, fi ts 
seamlessly into the cluster of Mediterranean countries. Th ere was not a 
single subsystem where, diverging from the other Mediterranean coun-
tries, Italy could have been placed among the continental countries. 
 In contrast to the success stories of previous decades, in recent 
years, we have heard of almost nothing but the diffi  culties faced by the 
Mediterranean countries, so it is worth taking a longer historical view to 
summarise just how they achieved their economic successes in the fi rst 
place and what kind of structural and institutional characteristics were 
responsible for the failure to sustain these. 
4.4.1  Convergence of the Mediterranean Countries 
 Italy ’ s economic performance was one of the post-WWII “miracles”, 
alongside those of Germany and Japan. Until the 1980s, the Italian 
economy displayed formidable growth (the average was 5.7 per cent in 
the 1960s and 3.8 per cent in the 1970s). Under the division of labour 
within the EU, in contrast to the North-Western countries that produced 
investment goods, the Italian economy specialised in the production of 
consumer goods. In the 1970s and 1980s, the small businesses of the 
North-Eastern region, concentrated in industrial zones and clusters, 
adapted well to the “post-Fordist” era, which demanded greater fl exibil-
ity; and while retaining their traditional consumer-goods-manufacturing 
operations, they extended their manufacturing operations to include the 
machines and equipment necessary for their production. Even in the 
1980s, however, they were capable only of maintaining the competitive-
ness of the economy as a whole by means of continuous currency devalu-
ation. Th e extremely modest growth of the 1990s was followed in the 
2000s by expansion of less than 1 per cent. It seems that Italy has become 
“bogged down” in a specialisation built on low skills, and in the high- 
growth, highly R&D-intensive sectors, it has been steadily losing ground 
in the global market since the 1990s. Th e fl exibility advantages of the 
small businesses are outweighed by measures such as increased spend-
ing on R&D, information technology, and human capital, and these are 
mainly the preserve of medium-sized and large corporations. Th is sum-
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mary assessment can be nuanced considerably by taking the country’s 
seemingly hopeless North-South divide into consideration. In the north-
ern part of the country, an internationally competitive corporate sector 
can be found, while the southern part is increasingly falling behind. In 
2007, in the two northern regions, per-capita GDP was 124–126 per 
cent of the EU-27 average, while in the southern region, it was 69 per 
cent (European Commission  2010b ). In the decades of dynamic growth, 
the central government pumped considerable resources into the lagging 
southern regions, with scant results. Th e high hopes attached both to the 
funding sources themselves and to the expected results ran out, and since 
the 1990s, the disparity between the two halves of the country has been 
growing again. Th is can be eff ectively illustrated with a single item of 
data: in 1997, there was a ten-percentage-point diff erence in the employ-
ment rate between the northern and southern regions, while in 2003, this 
fi gure was 20 percentage points (Simonazzi et al.  2009 : 214). 
 Th e EU accession of  Spain and  Portugal ended a long period of isola-
tion; after the dictatorships of Franco and Salazar, it was fundamentally in 
Europe’s best interest to strengthen democracy in the Iberian Peninsula. 
Although as a founding member of the European Free Trade Association, 
Portugal was theoretically a more open economy, the Franco regime left a 
more favourable economic legacy. Th e Portuguese economy had also been 
stressed by the pre-1974 colonial wars. Th e second wave of the oil crisis 
caused a severe economic slump, and the return to democracy—which 
entailed a strengthening of wage demands—led to an expansive fi scal 
policy. It was against this uncertain backdrop that the countries joined 
the EU in 1986, when per-capita GDP was 72.5 per cent of the EU-15 
average in Spain and 52 per cent in Portugal. Concerning the Iberian 
countries, it is diffi  cult to overstate the stabilising role of the institutional 
system adopted as a result of community membership. Economic growth 
was assisted not only by the joining of the internal market but also by 
the assistance received under EU cohesion policy. For example, between 
1994 and 1999, EU assistance amounted to 1.5 per cent of Spanish GDP 
and 3.3 per cent of Portuguese GDP. 9 Membership in the EU enjoyed 
enthusiastic public support, and by 2000, Spain’s per-capita GDP had 
grown to 81 per cent, and Portugal’s to 74 per cent of the EU-15 average. 
Until the end of the 1990s, Portugal’s growth was more dynamic, at an 
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average of 2.5 per cent per year, while Spain’s economy grew at a rate of 
2.1 per cent. Around the turn of the millennium, the situation reversed; 
Spanish convergence sped up, the approximately 20 per cent unemploy-
ment rate fell to 8 per cent before the 2008 crisis, while 5 million (mainly 
Spanish-speaking Latin Americans) immigrants joined the labour force 
among an ageing population. By 2006, Spain’s per-capita GDP not only 
exceeded the EU-27 average but also approached the EU-15 average (at 
98 per cent thereof ). It was also during this period that Spanish growth 
came to be overshadowed by the fact that the sectors driving it were the 
construction industry, commerce, fi nancial services, and catering, which 
do not participate in foreign trade and have a low R&D content (Royo 
 2008 : 36, 68;  2010 : 223). 
 In Portugal, following its entry to the euro area, fi scal discipline 
relaxed, and the balance of payments defi cit was also high. Th e budgetary 
consolidation attempts did not yield permanent results because rather 
than being based on structural reforms, they were based on increasing 
revenue. Economic growth slowed; indeed, there was actually contrac-
tion in 2003 (−0.8 per cent), the convergence changed to divergence, 
and per-capita GDP in 2006 was only 70 per cent of the EU-15 average 
(Royo  2010 : 233). 
 Greece at the end of the WWII was clearly an agricultural country, 
and it began to be industrialised from the 1960s onwards, which is also 
when international tourism began. In the wake of the civil war that broke 
out after the world war, the country remained deeply politically divided, 
reaching the point where, when a weakening of the right wing was 
expected at the next elections, it was used as a pretext for a military junta 
to take over the government in 1967, lasting for seven years. During this 
politically turbulent period, economic growth exceeded 8 per cent per 
year, but this was not accompanied by job creation. Th e economy was 
incapable of absorbing the labour capacities freed up from agriculture, 
and the surplus labour force was removed through an active emigration 
policy. (One-third of those in the 15–44 age group left Greece during 
this period.) Th en, from the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, the Greek 
economy went into a state of near stagnation, with growth of barely over 
1 per cent. In addition to the recessive impact of the oil crisis, heightened 
welfare expectations related to democracy also played a role. Th e wage 
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increases were detrimental to investments, and state spending led to a 
double-digit budget defi cit. Additionally, after the fall of the dictatorship, 
the government embarked on a massive nationalisation programme, and 
in this respect, Greece caught up with Italy and Portugal. Th e industrial 
crisis of the 1980s primarily impacted large and medium-sized corpora-
tions, and, as in Italy, the response was to reduce the size of companies. 
In the textile and food industries, a network of small enterprises work-
ing as subcontractors emerged. For small businesses, the employment of 
unpaid family members and informal working arrangements became a 
widespread means of cost-cutting. Th e labour market disparities deep-
ened between the state employees engaged in favourable terms, which 
increased greatly in number due to the unemployment resulting from 
the crisis and the mainly informal workers in the small businesses. In the 
1990s, fi rst, as a result of the single market program of the EU and then 
the Maastricht Treaty, some deregulation and privatisation took place in 
the Greek economy, too. All these factors, however, did little to change 
the fact that the Greek state was captured by interest groups, showed weak 
governmental performance, and was exceptionally corrupt by European 
standards. Despite the weak system of market institutions, the economy 
managed to display 3 to 4 per cent growth in the decade before the crisis. 
Th is result can be explained by the fact that capital market liberalisation 
and product market deregulation were carried out within such a rigid sys-
tem that even this small change stimulated growth. Contributing factors 
were the 2004 Olympic Games and the impact of support from the EU 
(Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis  2011b : 111–113). Th e price of this growth, 
built on the shaky foundations of the constant increase in the balance of 
payments defi cit and public debt, was paid by the Greeks in the 2008 
crisis. 
4.4.2  Changes in the Institutional System 
 Notwithstanding the diff erent historical paths, on the basis of our cluster 
analysis and the case studies of the individual countries (Banyuls et al. 
 2009 ; Bragues  2011 ; Della Sala  2004 ; Karamessini  2009 ; Kornelakis 
 2011 ; Royo  2008 ; Simonazzi et al.  2009 ), in terms of their institutional 
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arrangement and the methods of their transformation, there are striking 
similarities to be found between the Mediterranean countries. 
 In Italy, the North-South divide, and in the three other countries, the 
legacy of the authoritarian and/or outright dictatorial systems, left their 
mark on the system of market economy institutions and, to this day, 
remain an obstacle to the adoption of solutions that have proven success-
ful in the North-Western countries. 
 Th e ownership structure of the large corporations is concentrated, and 
they are mainly family-owned. Th e SME sector is extensive and lags far 
behind the large corporate sector in terms of its effi  ciency and innovation 
capacity. Th e size of the informal, shadow economy is also considerable, 
and since the 1990s, the majority of immigrants have found work in this 
sector. Th e informal sector reduces the tax base, which, in turn, limits 
the state’s scope for manoeuvring in regard to managing social problems. 
 Th e state sector had a substantial role in the decades following 
WWII.  In the 1990s, privatisations were carried out (which, with the 
exception of Greece, took place on a very large scale), but without the 
appropriate competitive environment, the expected improvement in effi  -
ciency failed to materialise. 
 Even in countries where the post-oil-crisis stagnation was followed 
by economic growth in the 1990s (Spain and Greece), this eff ect was 
achieved only at the cost of external and/or internal imbalance. All of 
the Mediterranean countries struggle with labour effi  ciency problems; 
Portugal and Greece have remained at a low level with some improve-
ment, while Spain, and to an even greater extent, Italy, have clearly 
diverged from the EU-15 average. Th e annual average change in pro-
ductivity during the pre-crisis years of the 2000s was negative in all 
four of the Mediterranean countries (Eurostat). Given the low level 
of R&D spending and the weak innovation performance, the modest 
 improvement or actual deterioration in labour productivity comes as no 
surprise. Th e emergence of competitors both within the EU (the NMS) 
and from outside the EU (China, India, and other emerging countries) 
led to market loss. In the period after the oil crisis, from the 1980s until 
the precursor of monetary union, every Mediterranean country tried to 
maintain competitiveness by means of currency devaluation. 
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 In the education system, huge growth in enrolment took place in com-
parison to the past in these countries, but by European standards, they 
came at the bottom of the league table in terms of the quality of the edu-
cation system, as well as in their implementation of the Lisbon reforms 
(Table A.7). 
 In the decades following WWII, the labour market, similar to the prod-
uct market, operated infl exibly, with strict state regulation in every coun-
try. Th e liberalisation process began in the 1980s, but assertive reforms 
took place only from the 1990s onwards. Th ey followed the same logic 
as in the continental countries; in other words, the unionised industrial 
workers managed to at least partially retain their position under labour 
law, which is why the fi xed-term or part-time employment contracts, 
the reduced labour-law obligations, were introduced in the lower-paid, 
less skilled sectors, especially the service sector. Th is opportunity also 
arose from the fact that the labour market had always been segmented, 
as workers in small businesses had never been unionised, not even in the 
heyday of the trade unions. Th e reforms that began from the “margins” 
made for an even more segmented labour market than in the continental 
countries. 
 Labour relations during the times of the dictatorships were defi ned by 
the lack of free trade unions; either they could not operate legally (Spain) 
or could perform their activities only with statist corporatist frameworks 
(Greece, Portugal). Following the transition to democracy, in these three 
states, as well as in Italy, the trade unions displayed a class-warrior men-
tality even when agreements were reached in spite of the confl icts (for 
example, in Italy, the moderation of wage increases in second half of 
the 1980s, and in Spain, the 1977 Moncloa Pact). Th e ferocity of the 
confl icts abated with the decline in unionisation and in response to the 
EU-wide acceptance of the ideal of social partnership. 
 Welfare systems everywhere were typifi ed by a strong reliance on the 
family; instead of universal care, they provided residual, fragmented ser-
vices; the institutions of care for children and the elderly were unde-
veloped. Th e most important component of the welfare system is the 
pension system, which served to protect employment status, that is, the 
place occupied in the social hierarchy during retirement years. Th ere were 
greater or lesser shifts everywhere towards adapting the social policy to 
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a dual-income model, as opposed to the family model based on a single 
(male) breadwinner. When women gained opportunities to work in the 
1990s, they were in a far less favourable situation compared to female 
workers in the northern countries. State redistribution was reduced in 
the name of liberalisation; therefore, fewer funds were available for the 
development of child and elderly care institutions. In the ageing societies, 
a paring down of the pension system was unavoidable. Spain went the 
furthest in establishing a low-level, universal system (that is, one that was 
no longer tied to employment status). 
 Th e Mediterranean countries did not respond to the global economic 
transformation of the 1980s with as comprehensive reforms as those in 
the northern countries. Th eir path-dependent and incremental reforms 
are more reminiscent of those of the large continental countries but 
shaped their economies to a far less extent than in the continental coun-
tries and often created ineffi  cient hybrid solutions. Th ey failed to show 
a breakthrough in precisely the areas that are critical from the perspec-
tive of sustained growth, so it is hardly surprising that researchers of the 
Mediterranean countries talk about feeble, “mimed” reforms, although 
there are signifi cant diff erences in the degree of these reforms between 
countries. 
4.5  The North-South Divide Among Old 
Member States 
 In the institutional comparison, there is no way of arriving at an indis-
putable, exclusively valid classifi cation or clustering. Depending on the 
aim of the research, it must be decided what level of clustering will yield 
an answer to our questions. In this case, I want to group, and create 
models of, the market economies of the EU member states in accor-
dance with how I can interpret the diff erences in their economic per-
formance. Th e above cluster analysis clearly revealed that in the OMS, 
there are far-reaching diff erences between the institutional systems of 
the Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean member states. Th e signifi -
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cance of this was painfully corroborated by the 2008 crisis, in which the 
Mediterranean countries became a disaster area. 
 Th e boundaries between the non-Mediterranean countries are not 
so clearly defi ned, as well illustrated by the borderline situation of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Given the diff erences between the Anglo-Saxon 
and continental countries, it is debatable whether there is any justifi -
cation for lumping them together with the group of “North-Western” 
countries. Th e diff erences between the Anglo-Saxon and continental 
countries are not the only ones up for debate, as it could be argued that 
despite various changes, France has retained more of the state’s economic 
role than other continental countries. In my assessment, for the purpose 
of this study, the similarities nevertheless justify that the North-Western 
countries are interpreted a group. Th is grouping shows two important 
factors that would otherwise be missed. First, that European integration, 
the operation of the internal market and community policies, compel 
these countries to employ similar institutional solutions. Th ese solutions 
aim to achieve the same as the reforms of the Nordic countries; that is, 
to adapt to the challenges of European and global competition while 
retaining as many social achievements as possible. Second, this is not just 
a “one-way street” involving the cutting of European welfare services and 
a drifting towards the Anglo-Saxon institutional system and, eff ectively, 
that of the USA. We can see in the British example that when it came to 
welfare services and labour relations, the Labour Party government was 
prepared to shift towards the Nordic and North-Western solutions. 
 It is clear that the longest journey has been made by the countries 
farthest from the institutional system that came to be sustainable in the 
post-oil-crisis world. Th ese include the French or Austrian economies, 
which operate with considerable state ownership, but Sweden, with its 
massive income redistribution, and Finland, which manufactured for the 
Soviet market, also carried out large-scale reforms. Overall, France that 
departed the most from its own original institutional system that had 
emerged after the WWII. Although there are still some peculiarities in 
terms of the state’s role, currently, there is certainly no justifi cation for 
classifying it in the same group as the Italian or Spanish economy, which, 
in the 1980s, could have still have been a defendable stance. 
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 Regarding the countries that previously served as a model in a certain 
sense, it is interesting to note that they have diff erent attitudes towards 
the changes. In Britain, after the neoliberal shift of the 1980s, the Labour 
Party’s correction to the “Anglo-Saxon free market model” in the 1990s 
took place in a way that ensured continuity. Following the failures of 
the 1980s, many theoreticians of the Swedish welfare state (for example, 
Rudolf Meidner) wrote essays about the downfall of this model. However, 
after one-and-a-half to two decades of successful growth, they—often 
the same authors—now take the view that with their reforms of the 
1990s, building on the most defi ning traditions of Swedish historical 
development, agreement between the social groups, and on contractual 
relationships, they have returned to their own roots, that is, to the origi-
nal model (Schnyder  2012 ). Most predominantly in Austria, through 
a model of “social partnership”, the reform process was based on small 
steps. Retaining certain elements of social partnership, without any 
major change in ideological direction, Austria developed an internation-
ally competitive, innovative economy from an economy built on state 
ownership and control and on natural resources. In terms of the ideology 
of economic policy, Germany departed the most radically from its past; 
as we saw earlier on, where this country’s reforms are concerned, even 
in the obvious cases, no references are made to a return to the original 
“social market economy” model. Of course, we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that, over time, if they were to again achieve sustained successes, 
the reform process would come to be interpreted as a return to their own 
model. Th e fi rst signs of such eff orts are observed (see Funk  2015 ). 
 If we compare this situation with the rate at which the Nordic and 
North-Western countries resolved to carry out reforms and the external 
forces that compelled them to do so, it is diffi  cult to fi nd any general 
inevitabilities. Th e larger internal markets in larger states provide more 
opportunities for delay, which Germany—for example—seized; however, 
Britain was at the forefront of a sharp change of direction back in the 
early 1980s. France was forced by severe imbalances to make a few dras-
tic changes, but beginning in the mid-1980s, a continuous stream of 
relatively small changes had already become the norm. For the small and 
open economies of Sweden and Finland, it took a full-on fi nancial crisis 
to set the reforms in motion. Denmark, the Netherlands, and Austria 
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did not wait for the situation to deteriorate, but the latter spun out the 
reform measures over a longer period. 
 While the Nordic and North-Western countries witnessed an insti-
tutional convergence with the retention of numerous peculiarities, the 
hybrid solutions of the Mediterranean countries did not constitute a sys-
tem that was capable of producing sustained, substantiated growth. Th e 
favourable global economic environment that the region experienced for 
a decade and a half beginning in the 1990s and the initial cheap funding 
opportunities that accompanied the introduction of the euro obscured 
the deeper institutional and structural problems that were glaringly 
exposed by the crisis of 2008. 
4.6  The Post-Socialist Countries 
 Th e post-socialist countries in my cluster analysis were clearly distinct 
from the other member states, but at the same time—as we have seen—
numerous studies attempted to place these countries into existing market 
models or to create clusters within the post-socialist countries. In my 
opinion, there is clear empirical evidence that the post-socialist countries 
do not fi t into the models that were developed for the OMS. Within the 
region, the diff erences between the countries have signifi cance depend-
ing on the purpose of our analysis. If we seek an answer to whether the 
institutional systems of the post-socialist countries have common unique 
features that diff erentiate them from that of the OMS and whether this 
is signifi cant with regard to their development prospects and to the 
European integration of the region, it is suffi  cient to focus on their com-
mon characteristics. If we also aim to determine whether there are oppor-
tunities for diff ering paths of development within the group of countries, 
we should also examine the diff erences between them. Th e 2008 crisis 
demonstrated the importance of both dimensions; the FDI-based model 
of reform made the region as a whole particularly vulnerable, but at the 
same time, the diff ering depths of the crisis also highlighted the impor-
tance of the diff erences between the countries. Th erefore, both approaches 
will be addressed. 
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4.6.1  The Central and Eastern European Model 
 Th e cluster analysis therefore indicates very assertively that the separation 
of the CEE countries from the OMS is more pronounced than their dif-
ferences, and on this basis, a CEE model of the market economy can be 
drawn. If we compare the individual institutional areas with those of the 
most similar old member state model, the peculiarities of the model can 
be seen more clearly. 
 In the product markets in the post-socialist countries, the carrier of 
advanced technological standards is FDI. At the same time, these mar-
kets fall into one of two groups depending on whether their functioning 
is characterised by moderate or more formidable bureaucratic obstacles, 
that is, a low or moderate state presence. Th eir clusters are positioned 
between the North-Western and Mediterranean clusters, with product 
markets that are less fl exible than the former and more fl exible than the 
latter. In regard to R&D&I, the post-socialist countries make up a group 
with the Mediterranean countries. Th e bank-based fi nancial system does 
fi t in with the model of the continental countries (in this respect, the 
fi nancial system of the Mediterranean countries can be described as 
being comparable with the continental model), but at a signifi cantly less 
advanced level. 
 A comparison of the labour market and labour relations presents a 
more complex picture than we have seen so far. Th e labour market lacks 
the duality that is typical of the Mediterranean and continental countries; 
this makes these countries akin to the Anglo-Saxon countries, but the 
labour markets of the latter group are less fl exible. In labour relations, 
also, the similarity is half-and-half because, similar to the Mediterranean 
model, the state intervenes in labour relations, but in collective bargain-
ing arrangements, the employer-employee relationship is not one of con-
fl ict. Only Slovenia made it into the group of continental countries. 
 In terms of the degree of social protection, the countries split into two 
groups. Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia fi t in with the continental coun-
tries, as a “more modest version” of them. In the other seven post-socialist 
countries, the level of welfare spending is low, and—with the exception of 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia—income disparities are high, showing 
the traits of a residual welfare state. For this reason, they display similarity 
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with the Anglo-Saxon model, but in terms of the structure of fi nancing, 
they have remained with the continental traditions of social insurance. 
 Th e extensiveness of the education system is on a par with the EU 
average, but the level of employment is worse, especially with regard to 
the employment of those with low qualifi cations. In the education sys-
tem, there are no clear models, such as those in the other subsystems, but 
the NMS show the most similarities with the education systems of the 
continental countries. Only Slovenia made it into the group of—mainly 
Nordic—countries that present the most successful education systems. 
 Overall, therefore, the institutional system of the market economies of 
the EU post-socialist countries has the most in common with the insti-
tutional system of the continental countries, but not to the extent of 
enabling these groups to be identifi able. In the labour and social system, 
we fi nd Anglo-Saxon elements, but we found no likenesses with any of 
the institutions of the Nordic countries. At fi rst glance, it may seem that 
the institutional solutions of the various subsystems were combined with 
each other in an arbitrary manner, and the use of the term “cocktail capi-
talism” coined by Cernat ( 2006 ) could be warranted. However, based on 
a closer examination of the elements of the CEE model, in my view, 
they can essentially be attributed to three factors: a shortage of capital 
and management skills, a weak civil society, and the impacts of the EU 
and international organisations on the NMS. Th e shortage of capital and 
management skills made foreign investment a necessity, accompanied by 
immediate liberalisation, without even a suggestion of the industrial pro-
tection measures customary in emerging countries at other times and 
in other regions. Th is result came from the economic paradigm prevail-
ing in the western countries and the level of integration achieved by the 
OMS. Th e shortage of capital made it a necessity for the fi nancial system 
to be bank-based because a substantial part of the FDI was realised in the 
fi nancial sector, that is, in banks. Th e functioning of the labour market 
and labour relations are diff erent from those of the OMS because civil 
society, specifi cally unionisation, is less eff ectual in CEE countries than in 
the OMS. Without the compulsion of EU legal harmonisation, the posi-
tion of employees would presumably be even weaker. A low or relatively 
high level of social protection, the suppression of welfare redistribution, 
correlates well among the NMS with the relative strength or weakness of 
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civil society and the depth of the roots and traditions of the institutions 
of social protection. Th e system of R&D&I is also easy to understand, 
given the lack of a domestically based, internationally competitive cor-
porate sector, which drives the innovation system in the Nordic, North- 
Western countries. Nowhere can state-induced R&D compensate for this 
lack. If my reasoning is correct—in other words, if the CEE model did 
not emerge arbitrarily as a form of “cocktail capitalism”, but as a response 
given to the starting conditions—it cannot be regarded as a transitional 
state that will automatically progress towards some other European capi-
talism model, and one could surmise that this institutional arrangement 
might be capable of reproducing itself. Th is possibility, however, would 
strongly limit the chances of convergence for the countries of the region, 
as it would entail the perpetuation of the asymmetric state of dependence 
on the economies of the OMS. 
 Th e complementarity between the elements of the institutional arrange-
ment described in the foregoing certainly suggests the likelihood of the 
model’s sustainability. Th e capital fl owing into less developed countries 
seeks out relatively cheap, but suitably skilled labour, and this attraction 
can be retained with a liberalised labour market. Th e survival of the liber-
alised labour market is assisted by weak unionisation, but the former also 
limits the strengthening of trade unions. Th e lower productivity resulting 
from the underdeveloped domestic economy and the lower added value 
of the production conducted at foreign corporations permit a relatively 
low level of investment in human capital both in education and in the 
social services. Th is result, however, not only makes the residual welfare 
state durable but also limits the development of R&D&I systems, which, 
in turn, maintains the asymmetric dependence on the OMS and the 
highly developed countries in general. Th is type of institutional comple-
mentarity can be dismantled if the FDI can fulfi l the role that economists 
expected of it at the time of the change in the political system, in other 
words, if the spillover eff ect enables the domestic economy to converge 
with that of the highly developed countries in terms of productivity. 
 Further research is needed in order to judge whether the survival or 
the transformation of the model is more likely. Th erefore, the diff erences 
within the CEE model need to be addressed, that is, the capitalist transi-
tion of the individual countries. Th e most similar subgroup of countries is 
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that of the Baltic States. We also found numerous common traits among 
the Visegrád nations. Although Slovenia diff ers from these countries in 
many ways, it still has more in common with them than with the other 
Southeast European countries, Romania and Bulgaria. Due to its unique 
and diff erent path, this topic will be discussed in a separate subsection. 
4.6.2  The Baltic States 
 Th e population of the Baltic states is currently less than 7 million, but 
owing to their radical departure from their Soviet past, their geopolitical 
importance and their rapid convergence in the pre-crisis period, their 
progress is nevertheless a focus of international attention. 
 Estonia is the smallest of the three, but this state, which had a popu-
lation of one and a half million at the time, played the pioneering role 
within the region. Th e towns of Estonia were under German infl u-
ence until the sixteenth century through the Teutonic Knights and the 
Hanseatic League. Th is Finno-Ugrian ethnic group remained culturally 
Germanic until the second half of the nineteenth century, in spite of a 
century of Swedish rule followed by two centuries of Tsarist Russian rule. 
Th e Estonian national movement that arose in the second half of the 
nineteenth century achieved its goal after the First World War (WWI); 
the Bolsheviks were unable to hold on to power and were expelled by the 
German army at the end of the WWI, and Estonia existed as an inde-
pendent nation state between 1918 and 1939. Following the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop pact, however, Estonia came under Soviet rule until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Without an understanding of the coun-
try’s turbulent past, it is impossible to understand the choices made by 
Estonia—and the other two Baltic states—whereby they developed their 
new market economy institutions. At the time of the fall of communism, 
Estonia was the most westernised among these countries: before the 
Soviet occupation, many Estonians had emigrated to Sweden, Finland, 
and North America; they could understand the broadcasts of the Finnish 
television and radio due to their shared linguistic roots, and the Estonians 
were the most open to the market economy. Even within the Soviet 
Union, Estonia was regarded as an experimental laboratory for reforms 
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from the 1960s onwards, but these decades brought great setbacks in 
terms of development. Its industrialisation took place before the Soviet 
occupation, and by approximately 1940, its per-capita GDP was on a par 
with that of Finland; in 1990, however, it amounted to only 40 per cent 
of Finnish GDP. At the same time, emigration to the west, deportations 
to Siberia and immigration from the Slavic regions of the Soviet Union 
dramatically upset the ethnic composition of this small nation, and by 
1989, only 61 per cent of the population remained Estonian (compared 
to 94 per cent in 1945) (Mygind  1997 : 19–21). 
 Th e goal of creating the nation state shaped not only the political 
system but also the economic system. Th e most sensitive issue of the 
political transformation was the restriction of citizenship for the Russian 
minority. Th ere were moves to also restrict the citizenship, and thereby 
the right to vote, of those who had been, or whose forebears had been, 
Estonian citizens prior to 1938. Following international protests, the act 
on citizenship was relaxed, but to this day, it prescribes knowledge of the 
Estonian language. Currently, the number of those without citizenship 
and those opting for Russian citizenship is below 10 per cent. 10 
 In the Estonian privatisation, a role was given to cash and voucher- 
based privatisation, as well as restitution, with the latter especially prev-
alent in the agricultural sector. Th e whole process was geared toward 
ensuring that ownership rights were transferred from the Soviet Union 
to Estonia. For this reason, cash privatisation only picked up pace when 
the Estonian kroon was introduced in 1992 and the fear that the use of 
the rouble would lead to the acquisition of assets by parties from other 
regions of the former Soviet Union subsided. Th e preferential purchase 
options available to employees and management also served to keep assets 
under domestic ownership. Th e rules for the distribution of the vouchers 
were elaborated in such a way as to put the minority at a disadvantage 
(Mygind  1997 ). 
 In terms of the stabilisation and liberalisation of the economy, Estonia 
became a model country for neoliberal economic policy. Foreign trade 
was rapidly liberalised, and a strict wage policy was pursued. Prices shot 
up after the liberalisation; once Russian raw materials were priced in line 
with global market levels, hyperinfl ation broke out, but it was reined in 
fairly quickly with a strict monetary policy. Th e Estonian central bank 
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functioned as a currency board, and the new currency was pegged to the 
German mark. Because credit creation was strictly tied to central bank 
reserves, the central bank was unable to infl uence the credit growth, could 
not carry out open market operations, and could not fi nance the govern-
ment defi cit. In the name of neoliberal policy, welfare benefi ts were cut 
drastically, especially pensions. Spending on education and higher educa-
tion, which were important for building the nation state, however, was 
generous. Th e weak employees’ and employers’ associations did not infl u-
ence state economic policy. Th is economic policy brought spectacular 
results in terms of stabilising the economy, on the one hand, and had 
an impact on the structure of the economy and the development of the 
institutional system on the other. Th e rapid liberalisation sealed the fate 
of the industrial corporations that manufactured for the Soviet market, 
and apart from the fl at tax, there were no investment incentives for FDI 
such as those off ered in the Visegrád countries. Consequently, the bulk 
of FDI—especially from nearby Sweden and Finland—fl owed into the 
banking sector, services and real estate sector, and a process of vigor-
ous deindustrialisation took place. Th e Estonian leadership presumably 
allowed this to happen not only because of the consistent neoliberal eco-
nomic policy but also because the majority of the industrial labour force 
belonged to the Russian minority (Bohle and Greskovits  2012 ). 
 In summary, Estonia embarked on a period of dynamic growth, pro-
ducing a growth rate of 6–11 per cent with the exception of one year 
between 1995 and 2007. Following the Russian crisis of 1998, until the 
crisis of 2008, per-capita GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) came 
20 percentage points closer to the EU-27 average. Th e external imbal-
ance, that is, the balance of payments defi cit, continued to grow, how-
ever, which led to a severe setback in the midst of the global economic 
crisis, but I shall return to an analysis of this topic later. One of the suc-
cesses in terms of development was that, as a result of the 2001 research 
and  development strategy, 11 by 2011, Estonia had joined Slovenia in 
the group of innovation followers, displaying performance close to the 
EU-27 average (European Commission  2012 ). Despite the diffi  culties of 
the crisis, the Estonian economy was able to adopt the euro in 2011. Th e 
downside of the development was that all these processes were accom-
panied by massive growth in economic inequalities. I will examine the 
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longer-term social and economic impacts of these processes during the 
analysis of the crisis years. 
 Latvia ’ s history is largely similar to that of Estonia, with the diff er-
ence that there was a brief interlude between the periods of German and 
Swedish infl uence, in the second half of the sixteenth century, when it 
was under Polish rule. Th e German occupation during WWI was fol-
lowed by independent statehood between the two world wars for Latvia, 
which lasted until 1939. After the Soviet occupation, the country was 
able to return to being an independent state in 1991. Th e ethnic compo-
sition had changed dramatically due to emigration, deportations and the 
Russian infl ux. In 1989, some 52 per cent of the population of approxi-
mately two and a half million was Latvian (compared to 83 per cent in 
1945). Th e unusual, Baltic-derived Latvian language was not conducive 
to a more active relationship with the western world, as was the case with 
the Estonians, and the market economy was a less familiar setup at the 
beginning of the change in political system. In the 1930s, incomes were 
on a par with those of the Estonians; alongside the industrialisation pro-
cess, Riga also played an important role as a centre of commerce (Mygind 
 1997 : 19–21). 
 In Latvia, too, the construction of a nation state was the main objec-
tive during the change of the political system; however, Latvia had more 
barriers to overcome than Estonia. Latvia, and especially Riga, was a 
Russian military base, and the Russians had a stronger position in Latvia’s 
industrial corporations than in those in Estonia. A strong Russian party 
was formed, so the exclusion of this ethnic group from citizenship was 
not sustainable after 1994, which was also partly due to vociferous inter-
national protests. Nevertheless, the tensions have remained to this day. 
In February 2012, a referendum was held on whether Russian should 
be an offi  cial language because 27 per cent of the population spoke 
Russian as their native tongue (and the proportion of those without 
 citizenship remains above 10 per cent). Th ree-quarters of voters rejected 
this proposal. 12 
 Th e Latvians also attempted to assert national criteria in the privatisa-
tion process, but deeper political divisions than those in Estonia led to 
more chaotic processes. Th e privatisation ran its course the most quickly 
in the agricultural sector, where it took the form of restitution because in 
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the rural areas—similar to Estonia—the majority of the population were 
indigenous. Voucher privatisation was intended to have a more promi-
nent role because it could be more easily controlled in line with Latvian 
interests; however, in reality, this measure could be enforced only in the 
smaller companies. By the time that large corporations were addressed, 
the company managers had acquired the most valuable corporate assets 
through lease agreements that included a purchase option. FDI had a less 
prominent role in Latvia than in Estonia (Mygind  1997 ). 
 Th e same elements of the neoliberal economic policy are found as in 
the case of Estonia, only implemented with less consistency. Th e low-
est point of the recession exceeded that of Estonia by 20.7 percentage 
points, and in 1992, the economic downturn was 34.9 per cent (EBRD 
 1999 : 73). Strict wage controls, liberalisation of the labour market, and 
weakness of the trade unions were also observed in Estonia. Foreign 
trade was liberalised gradually. Th e political confl icts also had an impact 
on stabilisation policy; following the upsurge in infl ation in 1992 (the 
increase in Russian raw materials prices), fi scal policy was strengthened 
under pressure from the IMF. Monetary policy played a greater role in 
the stabilisation process. In Latvia, fi rst, the Latvian rublis was intro-
duced, to be replaced in 1993 by the lat. Here, instead of a currency 
board, a central bank with full powers was established, but in terms of 
their actual functioning, there was little diff erence; the exchange rate of 
the lat was pegged fi rst to the SDR basket and, then, later to the euro. 
Th e openness of the economy and the strict monetary policy with its 
attendant lending restrictions triggered a process of deindustrialisation 
in Latvia as well. Th e social system was reformed with a similar approach 
and social consequences as those in Estonia, and this was the fi rst of 
the post-socialist countries to introduce a multi-pillared pension system 
(Mygind  1997 ). 
 Latvia’s transformation did not lead to the same success as that of 
Estonia. Latvia tried to forge an advantage by providing off shore banking 
and commercial services to Russia through its free ports and special eco-
nomic zones (Sommers and Bērziņš  2011 ). Th e growth rate and extent 
of convergence was similar to that of Estonia until the crisis, but in terms 
of its R&D&I performance, Latvia came last among the EU states, a 
situation that had not changed by 2011 (European Commission  2012 ). 
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 Lithuania , in contrast to the other two Baltic states, existed as an 
independent state as early as in the thirteenth century. In the fourteenth 
century, the marriage of the Grand Duke Jogaila and the Polish queen 
Jadwiga of the House of Anjou (the daughter of King Louis I of Hungary) 
gave rise not only to the Jagiellonian dynasty but also to a personal union 
with Poland. Except for a brief period in the fi fteenth century, the Polish- 
Lithuanian union functioned until Poland’s partition in the eighteenth 
century. After this, Lithuania came under Russian rule and remained so 
until Russia’s defeat in WWI. Between 1918 and 1939, Lithuania also 
enjoyed the freedom that it would regain only in 1991 after the fall of 
the Soviet Union. Before WWII, Lithuania was an agrarian nation and 
poorer than the other two Baltic states; its industrialisation did not take 
place until the Soviet era. At the time of the change in the political sys-
tem, Lithuania was the least open of the three Baltic states to a market- 
economy approach, and its unique Baltic language, which is also diff erent 
from Latvian, did not promote liaison with the western world, either. In 
1989, some 79 per cent of the population of 3.5 million was Lithuanian, 
but this represented only a one-percentage-point decrease in compari-
son to 1945 (Mygind  1997 : 19–21). In 1990, Lithuania made the most 
assertive declaration of independence, to which the Soviet leadership 
responded with an economic blockade. In 1991, Soviet troops carried 
out a military intervention, during which 13 civilians were killed at the 
radio and television centre in Vilnius. 
 For Lithuania, the Russian minority, by dint of its proportion, did not 
represent such a great problem as the other two countries, and the citi-
zenship act also accommodated minorities. Th e Lithuanian communists 
were pro-independence, and the 1993 elections brought victory for the 
left. Th ese circumstances led to slightly diff erent scenarios in terms of 
both the privatisation and the stabilisation process than in the other two 
Baltic states. In the absence of nationality problems, privatisation ran its 
course quickly, mainly taking the form of voucher-based and employee 
ownership schemes; in the agricultural sector, restitution was applied 
here, too. Th e members of the old nomenclature acquired corporations 
by taking out bank loans to buy vouchers from investment funds, which 
had obtained them from the general public. Th e collateral for these loans 
was the inventory stock of the companies—under their management—
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that they planned to purchase (Samonis  1995 ). Initially, foreigners could 
acquire only a 99-year lease. Th e stabilisation process—again, in the 
absence of nationalist pressure—took place more slowly; here, too, the 
recession was its greatest in 1992, at 21.3 per cent (EBRD  1999 : 73). 13 
Th e reduction of real wages took place later than in the other two coun-
tries, under pressure from the IMF. Fiscal and monetary policy was tight-
ened from 1993 onwards, successfully curbing hyperinfl ation (Mygind 
 1997 ). Th e country adopted its own currency, the litas, and after lengthy 
disputes, the Lithuanian central bank also functioned with the powers 
of a currency board. Th e fl at tax was also a feature of the Lithuanian 
transformation, as was pension reform, although private pension fund 
membership was not made compulsory. While in Lithuania, there was no 
determined neoliberal policy as in the other two Baltic states, the impov-
erishment of the old and the rapid growth in social inequalities occurred, 
and the trade unions also played no greater role than in the other two 
Baltic states (Bohle and Greskovits  2012 ). 
 Lithuania’s performance in terms of convergence falls between that 
of Estonia and that of Latvia, but it is closer to the latter. Th e extent of 
deindustrialisation did not match that of the other two countries, but 
Lithuania’s R&D&I performance was suffi  cient for it to overtake only 
the Latvians and the Bulgarians (European Commission  2012 ). 
4.6.3  The Visegrád Countries 
 In the fi rst half of the 1990s, besides the Baltic countries,  Poland ’ s rapid 
transition attracted the greatest interest and recognition. At that time, 
the start of the radical transformation and rapid growth of Estonia and 
Poland were the focus of international attention as a vindication of the 
neoliberal recipe, which was followed at the beginning of the 2000s by 
that of Slovakia, the “Tatra Tiger”, for similar reasons. Th e performance 
of the Polish economy during the 2008 crisis garnered more interest, and 
there was talk of a growth miracle (Lehmann  2012 ). 
 Poland suff ered major losses, even in comparison to the other socialist 
countries, during the change in the political system. For example, per- 
capita GDP in PPP matched that of Hungary in 1950, but by 1989, 
4 Models of Capitalism in the Enlarged EU 183
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
Hungarian GDP was 146 per cent of Poland’s. After WWII, Poland’s 
GDP had exceeded that of Greece, Spain, and Portugal; by the time of 
the change in the political system, these countries’ GDP was twice to 
two and a half times Poland’s. Th e rate at which the Polish economy fell 
behind accelerated in the 1980s; between 1979 and 1982, output fell by 
25 per cent due not only to the typical problems of socialist economies 
but also to the 1981 imposition of martial law and the isolation from the 
west that ensued (Rapacki  2008 : 21–22). 
 Th e strengthening political opposition was not broken by martial law, 
and the attempts at economic reform also failed to yield results. Poland 
arrived at the change in the political system with a massive public debt, 
constantly on the verge of state bankruptcy and, in 1989, hyperinfl ation. 
Th is situation forced the fi rst freely elected government to embark on a 
comprehensive stabilisation program; there was no real choice between 
“shock therapy” and a gradual transition. Th e stabilisation was made 
viable by the fact that the Maziwiecki government, dominated by the 
Solidarity movement, enjoyed the population’s trust and willingness to 
make sacrifi ces on the one hand and the support of the international 
fi nancial organisations on the other. Th e latter meant support for sta-
bilisation, credit from the World Bank, and the write-off  of half of its 
interstate and, later, its commercial bank loans. Despite the favourable 
external circumstances, tough measures were needed here. After prices 
spiralled out of control in 1990, infl ation was approximately 600 per cent 
(which is still lower than the approximately 900–1000 per cent infl ation 
of the Baltic states). Th e zloty was made convertible, and its exchange 
rate was pegged to the dollar at the true market rate rather than at the 
previous offi  cial exchange rate; strict monetary and fi scal policies were 
introduced, and in this way, infl ation was successfully curbed. Support 
for state corporations was cut dramatically. Th e lowest point of the reces-
sion was in 1990, when the economy shrank by 11.6 per cent (EBRD 
 1999 : 73; Lehmann  2012 ). 
 Privatisation got off  to a slow start, and by 1993, mainly the SMEs 
came under employees’ ownership through lease schemes. Th e right-wing 
government did not want to sell off  what were considered the key sec-
tors either to managers belonging to the nomenclature or to the work-
ers. Th e voucher-based privatisation began in 1994 within a strict legal 
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framework, thus avoiding corruption scandals similar to those of the 
Czech Republic (which we will discuss later). Th e management costs 
of the national investment funds executing the process were so high, 
however, that these failed to become an eff ective means of building the 
capital market (Soós  2010 ). Interest from foreign investors was also lim-
ited. Management buyouts became typical after 1993, when the post- 
communist successor party took power. Th e infl ux of foreign capital got 
under way following the write-off  and the rescheduling of debt in 1994 
(Belka  2001 ), but foreign investment plays a smaller role to this day than 
it does in the other Visegrád countries. 
 Th e development of labour relations got off  to an unusual start in 
Poland because the main opposition force was the Solidarity trade union, 
and civil society was far stronger than in other post-socialist countries. 
Nevertheless, the 6-million-strong trade union membership of the begin-
ning of the 1990s was halved by the end of the decade, with Solidarity 
members numbering approximately 1 million of these. By the time of 
EU accession, labour relations were very reminiscent of what was being 
experienced in the other Visegrád countries: a low level of institutionali-
sation and cooperativeness that stemmed from the helplessness of work-
ers and confl icts that rarely became open. According to Polish experts, 
the path led from social partnership to enlightened paternalism (Pańków 
and Gąciarz  2001 ). 
 At the end of the 1990s, the Polish government resolved to carry out the 
reform of social services. Th e reform of pensions, healthcare, education, 
and regional government are referred to as the “four reforms”. In stark 
contrast to the Baltic states, and similar to Hungary, the compensation 
for losses resulting from the structural transition to a market economy 
and the curbing of unemployment were resolved through the pension 
system. In comparison to the OECD average, the proportion of disability 
pensioners was higher, but early retirement reached an exceptionally high 
level. Th e reforms attempted to make the three-pillar pension system 
sustainable with respect to the future (Lehmann  2012 ). Th e education 
system was brought into line with labour market requirements, and per-
formance incentives were incorporated into teachers’ pay (Belka  2001 ). 
Th e transformation of the education system in the 2000s yielded results 
that were measurable in the PISA tests. In terms of R&D&I, Poland is 
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a moderate innovator, surpassing only Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and 
Romania (European Commission  2012 ). 
 Poland did not achieve as high a high peak growth rate as the Baltic 
countries, but its performance was more consistent. Th erefore, relative 
to the 1989 base, Poland boasts the highest rate of growth among the 
ten post-socialist countries: prior to the crisis, in 2007, more than one 
and a half times, or 169 per cent, of its GDP at the time of the change 
in the political system (EBRD  2008 : 13). Similar to the other Visegrád 
countries, Poland’s industrial output was successfully restructured so that 
products of a high and medium technological level accounted for half 
of exports by the mid-2000s (Eurostat). However, the performance of 
the entire economy was impaired by the low productivity of agriculture. 
Even in 2008, the proportion of those employed in agriculture was 14 
per cent, while the agricultural sector contributed only 2.2 per cent to 
GDP (European Commission  2010a : 47). Another reason for this result 
is that its income disparity indicators (risk of poverty, Gini coeffi  cient) 
are better than those of the Baltic countries but worse than those of the 
other Visegrád countries (Table A.8). 
 One of the secrets of Poland’s economic success is that while the gov-
ernments carrying out reforms were punished by the population at elec-
tions as a matter of course (Donald Tusk’s government was the fi rst that 
managed to remain in power after the 2011 elections), successive gov-
ernments did not dismantle each other’s reforms, but merely modifi ed 
them (Lehmann  2012 ). Polish economic policy, beginning with the fi rst 
reforms, was committed to liberal solutions; it became a reliable imple-
menter of IMF-inspired adjustment programmes, but this did not make 
its economic policy into a doctrine (Belka  2001 ). During the crisis, the 
clear signs of this Polish pragmatism can clearly be seen. 
 Following the change in the political system, the “velvet revolution” 
of 1989, the process of transition to a market economy also began in 
 Czechoslovakia . Th e formation of this young state, which was founded 
in 1918, began in a context that diff ered markedly from the other two 
Visegrád countries. On the one hand, the system, which stiff ened after 
the crushing of the 1968 “Prague spring”, lacked the economic and polit-
ical reform experience that the political and economic leaders of Hungary 
or Poland already possessed. On the other hand, the economy was more 
186 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
stable, the Czech tradition of fi scal discipline had been retained by the 
communist leaders, there was no substantial public debt and per-capita 
GDP was second-highest, after Slovenia, among the ten post-socialist 
countries. Nevertheless, a fi nance minister was appointed to lead the eco-
nomic reforms, in the form of Vaclav Klaus, who was a staunch propo-
nent of neoliberal economic policy and who announced radical changes, 
the creation of a market economy “without adjectives” (that is, no social 
market economy). Th is process was irreconcilable with the continua-
tion of support for the Slovak economy, which, during the socialist era, 
entailed the redistribution of up to 8 per cent of Czech national product 
to the Slovaks (Švihlíková  2011 : 189). Th e trade liberalisation applied 
as a part of the shock therapy also took a greater toll on the Slovak 
economy. Th ese tensions also contributed to the fact that on 1 January 
1993, Czechoslovakia split into the independent Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic. 
 Th e  Czech Republic was unable to avoid the recession brought about 
by the change in the direction of foreign trade, which reached its low-
est point in 1991 at 11.5 per cent, the spiralling of prices and a more 
than 100 per cent depreciation of the Czech koruna brought 52 per cent 
infl ation (EBRD  1999 : 73, 76). Th e momentum of growth lasted until 
1997, when the Czech economy sank into a mild recession, receding by 
approximately 1 per cent. Th e cause of this result was the unique brand 
of liberalism represented by Klaus, now in his capacity as prime minis-
ter. Th e Czech government opted for voucher privatisation because it 
expected that, in this way, joining the free market would not be limited 
by the situational advantage of the managers governing the companies, 
and it did not intend to put foreign capital in a more favourable position, 
either. Th e household vouchers, however, came to be owned by the priva-
tisation investment funds established by the state-owned domestic banks, 
and the companies were not modernised and reformed either technically 
or in terms of their management. Th us, the competitiveness of Czech 
exports remained weak, while imports grew. Th e initially favourable posi-
tion of the banks deteriorated due to the accumulation of bad loans. In 
1996, the government introduced strict austerity measures; the unpopu-
larity of these measures and the corruption scandals that accompanied 
the opaque process of the voucher privatisation led to early elections in 
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1998. Th e minority left-wing government was forced to sell the compa-
nies, which had been improved through the state restructuring agency, to 
foreign investors, as they did with the banks. Th e costs of bailing out the 
banks between 2000 and 2005 burdened the Czech budget to the tune of 
1.5 per cent of GDP (Myant  2007 ). 
 All in all, the modernisation of the Czech economy was also based on 
FDI, and similar to the other Visegrádi countries, the automotive indus-
try was the driving force. Th e rate of economic growth remained lower 
than in Poland or Slovakia, but to this day, it has retained second place 
in terms of per-capita GDP among the post-socialist member states. A 
major achievement of the Czech transformation was that, throughout 
the process, the high employment rate of over 70 per cent, which exceeds 
the EU average, was accompanied by 6 to 8 per cent unemployment 
(Eurostat). 
 In labour relations, the trilateral talks began promisingly, with a gen-
eral pact in 1991. Th e combination of the Klaus government’s philoso-
phy and economic diffi  culties led to a situation in which the consultation 
mechanisms failed to develop into true corporatist institutions. Th e pen-
sion system was built up in a decidedly egalitarian way, and the employ-
ment diffi  culties were not resolved to the detriment of the system, as in 
Poland or Hungary, but through the provision of support to employers 
and with active labour market policy measures. Th us, there was no press-
ing need to privatise the pension system, which was reformed gradually, 
and only voluntary private pension insurance was introduced (Bohle and 
Greskovits  2012 ). Th e employment situation and the social insurance 
solutions led to low social inequality indicators despite the fact that the 
Czech Republic spends only 18–19 per cent of its GDP on social protec-
tion. Nevertheless, one may doubt whether the Czech data could be more 
favourable than the Finnish, Swedish, or Danish fi gures in terms of the 
risk of poverty, the Gini coeffi  cient, or the EU 2020 poverty indicators. 
Th ese doubts are reinforced by regional disparities, as in the Scandinavian 
countries, there is up to a one-and-a-half-times diff erence in per-capita 
GDP between the individual regions, while within the Czech Republic, 
there is a threefold diff erence (European Commission  2010b ). Th e Czech 
government did not treat either R&D or education as a priority, and it 
produced indicators that were similar to its regional peers. Th e number of 
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participants in higher education and education spending remained below 
the EU average (Myant  2007 ). 
 Slovakia , owing to the shock therapy that began when the country was 
still part of Czechoslovakia, suff ered a greater recession (−14.6 per cent) 
and higher infl ation (58.3 per cent) in 1991 than the Czech Republic 
(EBRD  1999 : 73). Th e less developed Slovak economy was hit harder by 
the collapse of the Soviet markets, and its tourism was far more modest 
than that of the Czech Republic. In 1993, the unemployment rate was 
not even as high as 4 per cent in the Czech Republic, while in Slovakia, it 
was over 14 per cent (EBRD  1999 : 213, 265). Privatisation started with 
a small amount of restitution, the sale of small companies and, mainly, 
voucher privatisation. In Slovakia, the retention of state ownership and 
employee buyout schemes also remained popular alternatives. Following 
the transition to an independent state, the Mečiar government halted 
the privatisation and, in 1994, sold the large industrial corporations to 
domestic entrepreneurs, thus building up political clientele. However, 
this measure proved to be a temporary solution here, too, as the com-
panies were sold to foreign investors either voluntarily or due to bank-
ruptcy. Th e government tried to stimulate economic growth by squeezing 
the prices of public services below production costs and through infra-
structure developments, with the latter fi nanced by the state-controlled 
banks. Th e loose fi scal policy was paired with a strict monetary policy 
with high interest rates, which, although curbing infl ation, was unable 
to prevent the emergence of twin defi cits. While the Czech economy 
was negatively impacted by the 1996 narrowing of the western markets, 
the Slovak economy was impacted mainly by the 1998 Russian crisis. 
In addition to the economic diffi  culties, international isolation led to 
the fall of the Mečiar government, which was strongly nationalist and a 
threat to democracy. Slovakia was barred from joining the OECD, from 
the NATO expansion and from the start of the EU negotiations. 
 From 1998 onwards, the Dzurinda government switched to the neo-
liberal recipe also applied in the Baltic countries. Th e banks and public 
services were privatised, and attempts were made to attract FDI in indus-
try, costs were cut and the koruna devalued. Owing to the stability of 
the economy, from 2000 onwards, Slovakia set off  on a path of dynamic 
growth, with FDI bolstering industry here, too, especially the automo-
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tive industry. Th e sustainability of growth was provided for by the struc-
tural reforms of the second Dzurinda government from 2002 onwards. 
Th e introduction of the fl at tax system had greater international rever-
berations than the similar Baltic or Czech measures due to its consistent 
implementation. Th e pension reform reduced the state’s commitment in 
the long term; the restructuring of the fi rst pillar was accompanied by 
the introduction of a mandatory second pillar. By liberalising the labour 
market and reducing welfare transfers, the intention was to boost eco-
nomic activity. In the favourable global economic environment, employ-
ment began to rise. Th e education reform was mainly successful only in 
terms of fi nancial stabilisation and the restructuring of the institutional 
system in line with the declining number of children. Th e performance of 
the healthcare system triggered such general discontent that radical mar-
ketisation was seen as the solution. In this area, however, they were no 
longer able to consistently implement the accepted reforms (transforma-
tion of the hospitals into incorporated business entities and the insurers 
into profi table management organisations). Th e dramatic changes that 
were expected on the basis of the election campaign rhetoric of the left- 
wing Fico government elected in 2006 failed to materialise. Th e privatisa-
tion of public services was halted, and a few popular measures with a low 
budgetary impact were adopted (for example, they abolished the patient 
co-payment in the health sector), and joining the second pillar of the 
pension system was made voluntary (Beblavy  2010 ). With its reforms, 
Slovakia not only came out of international isolation and became a mem-
ber of the OECD, NATO, and the EU, but in 2009, it was able to adopt 
the euro. 
 With regard to labour relations, at fi rst, the trilateral corporatist nego-
tiations worked in Slovakia, but this practice was unable to take root 
under Mečiar’s authoritarian rule. Although the Dzurinda government 
passed a law on social partnership in 1999, against the backdrop of the 
austerity measures and later reforms, this law did not work in practice 
(Bohle and Greskovits  2012 ). In Slovakia’s case, exceptionally favour-
able income disparity indicators are found. Th ese indicators are slightly 
worse than those of the Czech Republic but remain close to those of the 
Scandinavian countries, which is why one can doubt their reliability even 
more than that of the Czech data (Table A.8). Th is result is diffi  cult to 
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believe, given the social spending amounting to 17–18 per cent of GDP, 
an unemployment rate that never fell below 10 per cent (Eurostat), and a 
Roma minority, which was stricken by similar education and employment 
problems, of a similar proportion to that of Hungary. Additionally, there 
is a four times diff erence in per-capita GDP at PPP between the Slovak 
regions, which is even greater than in the Czech Republic  (European 
Commission  2010b ). 
 If we analyse Slovakia’s performance since 1989, then only Poland’s 169 
per cent GDP growth was enough to surpass its previous 154 per cent. 
If we look at the EU-27 average, Slovakia needed the “helping hand” of 
the 2008 crisis to overtake Estonia, thus coming third among the post- 
soviet countries after Slovenia and the Czech Republic (EBRD  2008 :13, 
Eurostat). Slovakia achieved this impressive convergence in such a way 
that successive governments did not devote as much attention to either 
R&D or education as Slovenia or Estonia. 
 Hungary is the last to be discussed not out of courtesy by the Hungarian 
author to the neighbouring Visegrád countries, but rather because the 
path of this country’s development has diff ered to a certain extent from 
that of the previous three, especially since the beginning of the 2000s. 
Th ese diff erences can be attributed partly to the legacy of the past and 
partly to economic-policy decisions. 
 In 1956, Hungarian society rebelled against the dictatorship, and 
although the uprising was rapidly crushed, it had a profound eff ect on 
the communist party leadership. From the mid-1960s onwards, the 
essence of consolidation under Kádár was intended to make up for the 
missing political legitimacy by improving prosperity. To this end, the 
1968 economic reforms brought changes that were unparalleled in the 
entire eastern bloc. Following a number of setbacks and renewed eff orts, 
by the time of the change in the political system, several institutions of 
the market economy had already been created (for example, the partial 
liberalisation of prices, partial freedom of enterprise, a two-tier banking 
system, the introduction of personal income tax and value added tax, 
and so on). However, not even the partial reforms resolved the effi  ciency 
problems of the state socialist system, so the modest but constantly rising 
household consumption serving the political stability of the system could 
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be covered only by growing public debt. In 1990, the gross public debt 
exceeded USD 21 billion (Kornai  1996 : 956). 
 Th e National Round Table Talks conducted between the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party and the opposition parties in 1989 ensured a 
peaceful transition. At the fi rst free elections held in 1990, a right-wing 
coalition received a mandate to govern, led by the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum (MDF) with József Antall as prime minister. With its slogan of 
“quiet strength”, MDF attracted voters who highly valued stability, and 
the state of the Hungarian economy did not require the use of shock 
therapy as Poland did. Although the recession was severe in Hungary, 
too, bottoming out in 1991 at 11.9 per cent, infl ation never turned into 
hyperinfl ation (infl ation was 32–33 per cent in 1990–1991), nor did the 
liberalisation process have to begin from scratch (EBRD  1999 : 73, 76). 
 Th e burdens associated with the transformation soon triggered resis-
tance; in response to a petrol price increase planned by the government, 
a blockade by taxi drivers brought Budapest’s traffi  c to a standstill in 
October 1990. Although the price increase was necessary, the opposi-
tion took the side of the taxi drivers. Th e government arrived at a settle-
ment with the taxi drivers through the Reconciliation Council, and the 
drivers received price compensation. Two decades on, with hindsight, 
this confl ict began to reveal the traits that would prevent Hungary from 
maintaining its initial position as the frontrunner of the change in the 
political system. Th e vast majority of Hungarians, who, compared to 
their neighbours, had lived in relative freedom and affl  uence, expected 
the change in the political system not only to bring freedom but also to 
quickly allow them to enjoy the affl  uence of the western countries. Th e 
government could not rely on the same willingness to make sacrifi ces 
as in the case of the Baltic countries or Poland. With the deep politi-
cal divisions, whoever was in opposition at any given time had no com-
punctions about exploiting longings for prosperity in order to gain power 
in the short term. Th us, the successive government never embarked on 
 comprehensive reforms except when they were forced to do so by macro-
economic imbalances. Th ese measures were softened either by themselves 
or by their successors at the fi rst opportunity; therefore, they returned 
to the path beaten by the party leadership under Kádár. Th e expansive 
fi scal policy, which exceeded the country’s load-bearing capacity, and the 
192 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
“stop and go” economic policy that accompanied it could justifi ably be 
interpreted as the manifestation of a path dependency that spanned the 
change in the political system (Benczes  2011 ). 
 In Hungary, not only liberalisation but also privatisation had begun 
before the change in the political system with the 1988 Companies 
Act; however, these processes took place on a large scale only in 1990 
onwards. Th e free distribution of property was not supported either by 
economists or by economic policy makers, but it was out of the question 
anyway due to the country’s indebtedness. Th e restitution and employee 
ownership program continued to have little signifi cance. Th e acquisition 
of ownership by Hungarian nationals was supported with preferential 
privatisation loans. Unlike in the other post-socialist countries, the sale 
of the larger corporations to foreign owners had begun in 1988, and the 
fi rst substantial waves of sell-off s took place in 1992–1993 (Soós  2010 ). 
Th e socialist-liberal government that took power in 1994 restarted pri-
vatisation in 1995, selling energy companies and—after their restructur-
ing—banks to foreign investors. However, an analysis from the period 
noted that, in many cases, cannot talk about privatisation in the strictest 
sense of the word for energy companies because these companies were 
bought up by foreign state or community-owned companies (Voszka 
 1996 ). Overall, in Hungary, after the primary privatisation and owing to 
the green fi eld investments, FDI led to the emergence of a competitive 
export structure. 
 In 1995, the macroeconomic imbalances forced the implementation of 
the package of austerity measures named after the then-fi nance minister 
Lajos Bokros, comprising forint devaluation, surplus import duty, welfare 
spending cuts, and a wage freeze (Kornai  1996 ). Economic growth began 
and the public debt shrank due to the privatisation revenues. Hungary 
seemed to be on a sustainable growth curve, which was maintained by 
the right-wing government following its 1998 election victory until the 
spending spree in the run-up to the 2002 elections. Th e socialist-liberal 
coalition regained power with the promise of a “welfare regime change”. 
As a result of the budgetary spending, the public debt began to grow 
again, and the households also became externally indebted through for-
eign currency loans advertised with low interest rates. Th e government 
employed various tricks to buy time until the 2006 elections, which it 
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won, but afterwards, it had no choice but to impose austerity measures. 
Hungary’s convergence, in terms of per-capita GDP at PPP, stalled at 
62–63 per cent for several years beginning in 2003 (Eurostat). Hungary 
entered the 2008 crisis with a weakened economy, and the government 
no longer had the elbowroom to pursue an anti-cyclical economic policy. 
 Labour relations developed similar to those of the other Visegrád 
countries. Th e Reconciliation Council’s successful handling of the taxi 
blockade was not followed by a strengthening of trilateral interest repre-
sentation. Among the trade unions, the communist legacy organisation, 
the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions, became the larg-
est, but none of them developed into infl uential employee organisations. 
During successive governments, there were nuanced diff erences, but the 
position of employees and social partnership remained just as weak as in 
the previous three countries. Among the Visegrád countries, Hungary had 
the highest social spending, a factor in this was that, similar to Poland, 
the burden of the unemployment resulting from the change of economic 
structure was borne by the pension system. In 1998, the fi nancing of 
pensions was restructured to form a three-pillar system, of which the sec-
ond pillar—compulsory private pension funds—was nationalised by the 
Orbán government in 2010 (Bohle and Greskovits  2012 ). 
 In terms of innovation performance, Hungary comes second among 
the Visegrád countries, following the Czech Republic, which holds 17th 
place overall, at 19th in the ranking of the 27 member states (European 
Commission  2012 ). As the PISA report mentioned above shows, in terms 
of education, Hungary falls in the middle of the European ranking. Th e 
fi nancial conditions for improving educational performance, however, 
are less favourable than in the other Visegrád countries. Although GDP- 
proportionate spending on education was lower in the Czech Republic 
and in Slovakia than in Hungary, in Hungary, this spending has been 
falling steadily since 2006 (Eurostat). 
4.6.4  Slovenia’s Separate Path 
 Of the countries discussed so far, none has such a starkly diff erent assess-
ment in the literature as  Slovenia . Its population of two million, similar 
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to the Baltic states, is on the scale of a city state, but Slovenia was the 
only one of the post-socialist countries to have since become EU member 
states to choose a radically diff erent path of transformation. Th is diff er-
ence is also refl ected in my cluster analysis, as although the country falls 
into the CEE group, it is on the borderline with the North-Western (con-
tinental) countries. For researchers, Slovenia is a kind of test bed, regard-
ing which the question can be put, and possibly answered, of whether it 
would have been possible to transform the state socialist system into an 
institutional setup more akin to the old, North-Western member states, 
and what conditions would be necessary to do so. For this reason, more 
space is devoted to the study of the Slovenian transition than would oth-
erwise be warranted by the country’s economic weight. 
 As an independent state, Slovenia is even younger than the Baltic states, 
as it has existed only since 1991. Slovenian tribes arrived in the Balkans as 
early at the sixth century, but they lived as a part of the German-Roman 
Empire and, later, the Habsburg Empire. By the collapse of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, the industrialisation of the Slovene-inhabited 
regions had begun, but agriculture still dominated. Two-thirds of the 
Slovenian population became a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes that was established after WWI and later of 1929 Yugoslavia, 
while the remaining one-third became a part of Austria and Italy and has 
shrunk to a minority numbering a few tens of thousands. In this new 
state framework, Slovenia was the most advanced unit, as Slovenian per- 
capita national product exceeded the Yugoslavian average by 60 per cent 
(Ferfi la and Philips  2010 : 8). Slovenia became the engine of industrialisa-
tion and benefi ted from the relatively large Yugoslavian internal market. 
Th is process of development was halted by the Great Depression of 1929 
and later by the occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941. After WWII, Slovenia 
began to build up a Soviet-type planned economy, but the Tito-led state’s 
split with the Soviet Union also brought new economic policy solutions. 
Th e establishment of self-management in corporations was accompanied 
by political decentralisation; decision making moved from the national 
level to the level of the member republics. Th e abolition of the planned 
economy and the strengthening of ties with western economies led ini-
tially to dynamic, 5 to 7 per cent growth in Yugoslavia as a whole and, 
specifi cally, in Slovenia. Th is workers’ self-management or market social-
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ism, however, increasingly came to be ruled by the logic of the communist 
political system. Statism was revived at the level of the member republics, 
and the institutions of self-governance were hollowed out. After the 1973 
oil crisis, Yugoslavia—like Hungary—tried to keep itself afl oat by relying 
on foreign loans. In the 1980s, in economic terms, Slovenia was already 
functioning as a virtual independent state that, similar to the other mem-
ber republics, was eff ectively stagnating while struggling with infl ation 
of 30–40 per cent, peaking at 1385 per cent in 1989 (Ferfi la and Philips 
 2010 : 18–20). After a referendum, Slovenia announced its separation 
from Yugoslavia in 1991, and the predominantly Serbian Yugoslav army 
responded with a military assault. Owing to the ethnic homogeneity of 
Slovenia and the support of the West, the war lasted only ten days and 
ended with few losses. Following the introduction of political democracy, 
the transformation of the country to a market economy began. Owing 
to the loss of the Yugoslav markets and to the Balkan war, the economic 
transition sparked a recession in Slovenia, which reached its lowest point 
in 1991, with an 8.9 per cent drop in GDP (EBRD  1999 : 73). 
 Th e Slovenian leadership chose a method of economic transition that 
truly fi ts the description of gradualism usually described in the literature, 
given several factors. Th e last Yugoslavian Prime Minister, Ante Marković, 
embarked on radical market reforms in 1989, which led to a dramatic 
economic recession. Slovenian workers reacted to the fi rst attempts at sta-
bilisation after independence with a wave of fi erce strikes. Th e left-lean-
ing orientation of the majority of society was also refl ected in the election 
results. Th e Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, although not the communist 
successor party, but a spin-off  of the former young communists organisa-
tion, became the leading force in the coalition at the fi rst free elections in 
1990, and the president’s chair was taken by a reform communist politi-
cian. Th e unstable Western Balkan environment also may have provided 
an incentive for the government to avoid further shocks, and in spite 
of the various economic problems, the workers’  self- management sys-
tem provided the foundations for the construction of a neo-corporatist 
decision-making system (Rojec et al.  2004 ; Soós  2010 ; Stanojevic  2005 ). 
Yugoslavian market socialism, despite the distorted nature of the market 
relationships, provided extra know-how at the start of the transition in 
comparison to the countries that transitioned directly from a planned 
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economy, as in the case of the reforming Hungary. Unlike the latter, how-
ever, it did not have a public debt so large as to remove any possibility of 
choice. 14 
 Th e stabilisation of the economy began in 1991 with the introduction 
of the independent currency, the tolar. Th e market reform index used 
by the EBRD, as well as other indexes measuring economic freedom, 
unanimously show that Slovenia made progress in building a market 
economy, but at a slower pace than the Visegrád and Baltic countries. 
Slovenia put in place the conditions necessary for EU membership but 
maintained a higher degree of state intervention (Pezdir  2006 ; Šušteršič 
 2009 ). Th e uniqueness of the Slovenian path, besides the neo-corporate 
nature of the employer-employee relationship, lies mainly in the coun-
try’s attitude towards privatisation and FDI. In the fi rst step, similar to 
other countries, employer and employee acquisition and voucher-based 
privatisation represented the means of transforming ownership relation-
ships. However, there was no “secondary” privatisation; in other words, a 
substantial degree of employer ownership remained, and the corporations 
and banks that had been nationalised after the workers’ self-management 
form of “social ownership” remained under state ownership. Th e role of 
FDI continued to be far more limited than in the other post-socialist 
countries of the EU (Soós  2010 ). 
 Until the crisis, Slovenia showed impressive performance in terms 
of its convergence; in 1995, its per-capita GDP was 74 per cent of the 
EU-27 average, which was the most favourable fi gure among the 10 tran-
sitioning economies, and by 2008, this fi gure had risen to 91 per cent 
(Eurostat). In terms of its innovation performance, Slovenia is also close 
to the EU average, at the forefront of the “post-socialist camp” (European 
Commission  2012 ); much attention has always been devoted to educa-
tion, and Slovenia’s social system places it clearly among the continen-
tal countries. Although initially, a relatively expansive monetary policy 
was used to stimulate the economy, Slovenia nevertheless succeeded in 
 reducing infl ation, and this was the fi rst of the countries that joined the 
EU in 2004 to adopt the euro in 2006. 
 One striking point of view in the assessment of the Slovenian path 
places Slovenia, based on the features of privatisation, in the same group 
as Russia and Ukraine (Soós  2010 ), although based on the results men-
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tioned above, this is very formal and unconvincing preposition. Bohle 
and Greskovits ( 2012 ) point out that what can be observed in the 
Slovenian economic policy is not a general anti-FDI or protectionist atti-
tude but rather deliberate selection. Unlike the banking and utility sec-
tors and those based on simple work (for example, the textile and lumber 
industries), in the complex sectors, FDI has an important role, on a par 
with that ascribed to it in the Visegrád countries, which also explains 
Slovenia’s export performance. At the same time, the impact of the 2008 
crisis shows that not even this latter, clearly positive assessment gives the 
complete picture. Slovenian authors, through their detailed analysis of 
the export structure and competitiveness traits, have long warned that 
Slovenian gradualism has reached its limits and that, without further 
reforms, the growth achieved to date is not sustainable (Pezdir  2006 ; 
Rojec et al.  2004 ; Šušteršič  2009 ). Later, in the discussion of the manage-
ment of the crisis, the question of whether the Slovenian path will remain 
viable after the corrections or whether a change of model is unavoidable 
will be discussed at length. 
4.6.5  South-Eastern Europe: Romania and Bulgaria 
 Th e two South-Eastern European countries took paths that were simi-
lar to each other but diff erent from those of the other post-socialist EU 
countries. Initial gradualism did not lead to a development path similar 
to Slovenia’s; instead, the steps of liberalisation, institutionalisation, and 
privatisation were taken after a protracted transition. 
 Th e change in the political system in  Romania swept away the most vio-
lent dictatorship in CEE. Th e horrors of the Ceauşescu system, including 
the bankrupted economy, the destruction of villages, and the attempts to 
absorb and exile Hungarian and Saxon minorities, were known through-
out Europe. Th e party leader, who was in power since 1965, had built up 
a personal cult and maintained political oppression that, in the 1980s, 
was unparalleled in the region. Th e revolution that began in Timişoara 
in December 1989 brought Ceauşescu’s rule to an end quickly, and the 
number of fatalities topped one thousand. Th e president of the National 
Salvation Front, Ion Iliescu, set up a tribunal that sentenced Ceauşescu 
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and his wife, who held various political posts, to death; the sentence was 
carried out immediately, on 25 December 1989 15 (Bottoni  2009 ). 
 Th is dramatic end by no means marked the beginning of a radical 
transformation. Th e communist successor party and its leader, Iliescu, 
won the elections and indeed remained in power until 1996. A circum-
stance that favoured the transformation was that, in order to achieve 
independence from the West, Ceauşescu had to repay the public debt, 
albeit at the cost of hardship for the general population. Th e economic 
slump was not exceptionally pronounced in comparison to that of the 
Visegrád countries, and it reached its low point in 1991 at −12.9 per cent, 
while infl ation between 1991 and 1993 was 200–300 per cent (EBRD 
 1999 : 73, 76). Price liberalisation and currency devaluation were not fol-
lowed by structural reforms; the loss-making state-owned corporations 
received assistance, which temporarily slowed the growth in unemploy-
ment. Th anks to these measures, between 1993 and 1996, the economy 
grew by an average of 4 per cent. Privatisation got off  to an awkward 
start; aside from the agricultural restitution, the employer and employee 
buyout method was used only among SMEs. Th e government defi cit was 
not high (around 3 to 4 per cent), but a substantial part of the actual 
budgetary burdens remained hidden among debts between state corpora-
tions and tax arrears owed to the budget. It was possible to push infl ation 
down only by overvaluing the currency. Another sign of the unsustain-
ability of the economic processes was the growing balance of payments 
defi cit (Scrieciu and Winker  2002 : 6, 18). 
 Seeing these economic diffi  culties, the right-wing coalition that came 
to power in 1996 committed itself to accelerating the reforms, that is, 
to “shock therapy”. Prices began to be liberalised in the agricultural and 
energy sectors, which together with the indexing of wages and loosen-
ing of monetary policy, scaled infl ation back by more than 150 per cent 
by 1997, returning to single digits only in 2005. Th e economy shrank 
every year between 1997 and 1999 at an average rate of 4.4 per cent. In 
1998, a stabilisation program began with the support of the IMF. Th e 
privatisation programme was extended to large state corporations, which 
were sold off  to foreign investors on a large scale. Direct assistance for 
the remaining state corporations was reduced, but the low energy prices 
and the credit guarantees, which were usually paid out of state coff ers, 
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continued to represent concealed subsidies. Given these economic dif-
fi culties, unemployment was not exceptionally high (at approximately 10 
per cent) because the agricultural sector served as a buff er (Ahrend and 
Martins  2003 ; Scrieciu and Winker  2002 : 6–8). 
 Th e recession that came with the transformation dramatically increased 
poverty, which, in 2000, helped the left to regain power, so the results of 
the start of economic growth came to fruition when they were in govern-
ment. Once again, there was an attempt to return to gradualism, but the 
EU accession talks that began in 2000 marked the path of the institu-
tional reforms. Th e 4 to 8 per cent growth rate remained until the 2008 
crisis (Eurostat). Th e structure of the economy developed less favour-
ably than in the Visegrád countries. Th e share of agriculture, even in 
2008, was the highest in the whole of the EU both in terms of GDP 
(6.0 per cent) and in terms of employment (28.8 per cent) (European 
Commission  2010a : 47). In the industrial sector, seeing the inability of 
the state’s heavy industrial corporations to compete, Romanian busi-
nesses were able to secure comparative advantages in the labour-intensive 
branches of light industry (textile, footwear, and lumber). In light of the 
above, it comes as no surprise that in 2011, Romania was ranked 24th in 
the EU in terms of its innovation performance (European Commission 
 2012 ), and the performance of its economy is made possible only by the 
low level of welfare provision and modest funding for education. 
 Th e trade unions responded to the economic recession with fi erce 
strikes. Due to the state’s weak public policy and public administration 
performance, however, a tripartite consultation system failed to emerge. 
Th e left-wing governments were afraid of the workers’ movements, but 
the treaties on social dialogue never had any impact. Th erefore, even if 
they had wanted to, the trade unions could not have pursued a moderate 
strategy because the governments were incapable of credibly promising 
any future results with the potential to off set the short-term sacrifi ces 
(Bohle and Greskovits  2012 ). 
 Bulgaria embarked on a process of building democracy after a peace-
ful transition. In contrast to Ceauşescu, who strove for independence 
even from Moscow, Bulgaria’s government had been the Soviet Union’s 
most faithful satellite, which did not give rise to antipathy on the part 
of the population. Todor Zhivkov led the Bulgarian Communist Party 
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between 1956 and 1989, but he did not build as extreme a personal 
cult as Ceauşescu. Th e rigid planned economy reached the limits of its 
capacity by the 1980s, and the Bulgarian party leadership attempted to 
compensate for the declining economic growth with foreign loans. As in 
Romania, the “nationalism card” was played here, and the oppression of 
the 10 per cent Turkish minority became a source of international fric-
tion. Th ese economic and political diffi  culties, as well as the encourage-
ment provided by Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, led to opposition 
movements and mass demonstrations. In an eff ort to maintain power, the 
reformers in the party leadership removed the ageing Zhivkov, whose 
place was taken by the foreign minister Peter Mladenov, who entered 
into negotiations with the opposition. Th e fi rst free election was held in 
1990. A stable government was not formed until 1996, however, because 
in three elections, fi ve governments did not receive a clear mandate to 
carry out market reforms. Th e dominant force was the socialist successor 
party, which planned to arrive at a market economy after a 20- to 25-year 
transition (Frye  2010 ). 
 Th e economic recession reached its low point in 1991, at −11.7 per 
cent; then, in 1994–1995, three years of shrinkage gave way to growth 
of approximately 2 per cent. Infl ation exceeded even that of Romania, 
at 339.9 per cent in 1991, and did not fall much below 100 per cent in 
the following years. Th e unemployment rate was between 11 and 16 per 
cent throughout the 1990s (EBRD  1999 : 73, 76, 205). Th e paradoxical 
reform policy could not have yielded any other result. In an economy 
that was geared almost entirely to supplying the Soviet markets, trade was 
liberalised and price controls lifted, but in 1994, controls on a number of 
prices were reinstated. On the one hand, the government tried to use the 
unifi ed exchange rate as a nominal anchor and narrowed the monetary 
supply; on the other, the government supported loss-making corpora-
tions through state-owned commercial banks. A law was passed on priva-
tisation, but in practice, company managers who were affi  liated with the 
party state, the supporters of the successor party, benefi ted from a con-
cealed privatisation process and were able to build their own corporations 
from the profi ts sucked out of the state corporations. Th e voucher-based 
privatisation scheme and employer and employee buyouts, also provided 
an opportunity to build up a clientele. FDI steered clear of Bulgaria, 
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which was not due solely to the uncertain business environment. In 
1990, Bulgaria suspended the repayment of its debts; its foreign debts 
exceeded USD 12 billion. Th e negotiations and restructuring of debts 
took three years, and Bulgaria made its full return to the foreign capital 
markets around the turn of the millennium (Mihov  1999 : 7–8, 38). 
 By 1996, the postponed reforms had pushed the country into another 
recession, which again ran to double fi gures (−10.1 per cent), while infl a-
tion shot up to over 300 per cent, with the following year’s average exceed-
ing 1000 per cent (EBRD  1999 : 73, 76). In the wake of the failures of 
the transition, in 1997, a strong majority of votes was scooped up by the 
right wing, which was committed to liberal reforms. Th e employer and 
employee buyout programs that began with the socialists were continued, 
but forgetting their own criticisms, voiced in opposition, the right-wing 
government also used these to reward their supporters. A new develop-
ment was that large state corporations were also privatised either by direct 
sale or through the stock exchange, this time to foreigners as well (Frye 
 2010 ). Th e new government managed to reach agreement with the IMF 
and also began to implement the stabilisation program that it supported. 
Trade and price liberalisation continued. A key element of monetary 
policy was the establishment of a currency board; the lev was pegged 
to the Deutschmark. A disciplined fi scal policy was introduced, and tax 
collection was improved. Owing to these measures, infl ation decreased, 
falling to single digits from the turn of the millennium onwards, and 
the banking system was also successfully stabilised (Demopoulos and 
Fratzekos  1998 ). Until the 2008 crisis, economic growth settled at a level 
of 5 to 6 per cent, while the unemployment rate did not fall below 10 per 
cent until the last few years before the crisis. Th e ability to sustain these 
results was helped by the fact that the deep political divisions abated. 
Interestingly, a factor in this process was that the 2001 elections were won 
by a new moderate right-wing party headed by the one-time Bulgarian 
Tsar Simeon II, who lived as an emigrant up until 1996 (Frye  2010 ). 
 Th e structure of the economy in Bulgaria, similar to that of Romania, 
is characterised by a share of agriculture that, even in 2008, exceeded 
that EU average, accounting for 5.5 per cent of GDP and 7.5 per cent of 
employment (European Commission  2010a : 47). Th e country’s ability 
to attract foreign capital increased in the 2000s, with the ratio of FDI 
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to GDP exceeding that of the Visegrád countries by the middle of the 
decade. In terms of its structure, however, as in the Baltic countries, the 
FDI went mainly into the fi nancial sector and property development and 
less into the tradable sectors. 
 With regard to labour relations, welfare provision, the innovation sys-
tem and education, Bulgaria’s story is very similar to that of Romania. In 
Bulgaria, too, workers responded initially to the economic recession and 
the diffi  culties entailed by the market reforms with strikes. Th e ability of 
the trade unions to mobilise failed to result in tripartite consultation and 
a neo-corporatist system. Th ere is good reason to assume that in Bulgaria, 
the weakness of the state was the key factor ensuring that the agreements 
on social partnership were not followed by actions (Bohle and Greskovits 
 2012 ). Th e EU’s poorest member state clawed its way back to achieving 
66 per cent of its 1989 GDP in 1998; therefore, it was able to maintain 
a very reduced level of welfare services and educational expenditures. In 
terms of innovation performance, Bulgaria is ranked 26th among the EU 
member states (EBRD  1999 :73, European Commission  2012 ). 
 Th e growth of the 2000s was accompanied in both countries by (pri-
marily external) macroeconomic imbalances, which, even before the 
2008 crisis, foretold stalling growth. 
4.7  A Unique Feature of the Central 
and Eastern European Model: 
Modernisation Based on FDI 
 Having reviewed the transitions of the individual countries, I now sum-
marise the conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of the capitalist 
transformation because, when making the comparisons, I was confronted 
with results that are inconsistent with generally held beliefs. Additionally, 
this summary allows me to verify the fi ndings regarding the CEE model 
made in connection with the cluster analysis. I separately scrutinise a 
defi ning features of this process, namely, the fact that the modernisation 
process was founded on FDI. 
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4.7.1  Lessons of the Transition 
 Th e current crisis in the euro area has given broad scope for Eurosceptic 
thinking. Taking a longer historical view, it must be emphasised that in 
the post-socialist countries, the opportunity for EU membership and 
the preparations for this membership played an exceptionally impor-
tant anchoring role in the course of building the market economies. Th e 
signifi cance of these factors was enormous from two perspectives. On 
the one hand—as Csaba ( 2009a ) analyses in detail—neither the econo-
mists of the post-socialist countries nor the advisors of the international 
organisations were equipped to carry out the transition from socialism 
to capitalism. Apart from a general framework outlining a combination 
of stabilisation, liberalisation, institution building, and privatisation, the 
specifi c recipe adapted to the region’s characteristics was not available. In 
the absence of the appropriate theoretical background, after the initial 
steps of macroeconomic stabilisation, the adoption of community law 
provided a point of reference for building up the institutional system of 
the market economy. On the other hand, the eff orts to join the EU also 
helped the transition to be carried through in countries where the inter-
nal power structure might have otherwise made it highly likely to become 
stuck in “patrimonial” (King  2007 ) or, to use another term, “uncoordi-
nated” (Lane  2007 ) capitalism. Without EU membership, through their 
historical traditions and under the infl uence of post-communist forces, 
Bulgaria and Romania would have most likely drifted onto a path similar 
to that of Ukraine or other CIS countries. Th e IMF and international 
experts also infl uenced the transition, but countries turned to the IMF 
only as a last resort. Bulgaria’s example is a good illustration of this lim-
ited scope of infl uence. Th e IMF attempted to reach agreement for years 
in vain, which yielded a result only when the internal political relation-
ships changed in response to the protracted crisis. In places where the 
IMF was able to act more quickly and more eff ectively, such as Poland or 
Estonia, this process was made possible by the willingness of the govern-
ment and society to reform. 
 In the literature, the steps necessary for the transition from a state 
socialist economy to a capitalist market economy are commonly referred 
to as the “SLIP” agenda, an acronym for Stabilisation Liberalisation, 
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Institution building, and Privatisation. A study of the individual coun-
tries has confi rmed this to be a sound interpretive framework. Th e litera-
ture does not, however, support the commonly held view that what took 
place in the region was adherence to a consistent neo-liberal recipe sug-
gested by international organisations. Csaba ( 2009a ) points out that the 
contrasting of gradualism and shock therapy in the transition literature 
draws attention away from the more important issues. Th is assessment is 
emphasised by a study of the transformation of the individual countries. 
Th e general frameworks of the transition were determined by theoreti-
cal insight; however, the choice of specifi c solutions can be much more 
eff ectively explained by the historical legacy, that is, the political and eco-
nomic circumstances, than by the impact of theory. 
 Th e transformation as a whole cannot be perceived as a comprehensive 
course of shock therapy; the privatisation took place at a diff erent time 
than did stabilisation and liberalisation, even in the Baltic countries that 
chose the most radical transformation. Institution building in the eco-
nomic—or, more precisely, the institutional economic—sense is by no 
means the same as formal organisational restructuring. Th e permanent 
alteration of the rules of play and the solidifi cation of the new institu-
tions are clearly possible only as outcomes of a longer historical process. 
In terms of the speed of stabilisation, the extent of the imbalances left 
genuine opportunities to choose in only a handful of cases. It can be 
said of Czechoslovakia that, in spite of the country’s stable economic 
situation, Klaus announced a radical program of reforms that was—as 
we have seen—unacceptable for the Slovaks. In Hungary’s case, one can 
talk about genuine gradualism only in the sense that the reform social-
ist measures involved the introduction of certain market institutions. 
After the change in the political system, the process of liberalisation and 
transformation of the ownership structure took place rapidly in com-
parison to the region’s other countries. Romania and Bulgaria did not 
transform gradually, either, but instead postponed the reforms before 
taking the same steps that had been implemented immediately by the 
Baltic countries. We can talk about a deliberate gradual transformation 
only in the case of Slovenia, which was in a position to do so by virtue 
of its special characteristics, although it, too, has now reached the limit 
of this capacity. 
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 Every country except Hungary experimented with the creation of 
national capitalism. In Hungary, this phase was omitted due to the coun-
try’s high public debt, and even the strongly nationally oriented Antall 
government began to sell off  corporations to foreign investors. Th is result 
indicates that the key role of FDI stemmed not from any commitment 
to a neoliberal doctrine, but rather from a lack of capital and manage-
ment knowledge. In the Baltic countries, the governments’ adherence to 
neoliberal economic policy was something of a means to an end; they 
saw in it a guarantee of emancipation from the former Soviet empire. 
As described above, this commitment was not the same for each coun-
try and was also proportionate to how threatened the countries felt by 
the Russian minority. A neoliberal conviction without any external com-
pulsion was found where the Klaus government was concerned, but the 
launch of voucher-based privatisation showed that the government did 
not want to give preference to foreign capital. However, every country 
except Slovenia sooner or later made an eff ort to attract FDI. In Slovenia, 
however, non-foreign-owned property means state property, the well- 
known drawbacks of which had become serious and inevitable by the 
time of the 2008 crisis. 
 Th e importance of the historic legacy is also underlined by the devel-
opment of labour relations. Nowhere—with the exception of Slovenia—
did the workers’ movements, temporarily strengthened by the change of 
political system, give rise to neo-corporatist employer and employee rela-
tionships similar to those of Western Europe. Th us, the region returned 
to the historic path that was characterised by weak representation of 
workers’ interests, which is modifi ed more or less as a formality by the 
requirements of EU laws. 
4.7.2  Growth Opportunities and Limits in the Central 
and Eastern European Model 
 Th e literature fully agrees that a defi ning feature of the CEE transforma-
tion was modernisation based on FDI.  In a comparison of the EU-27 
member states, the unique character of the post-socialist member states 
lies not in the high volume of FDI relative to GDP, but in the asymmetry 
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of the sizes of the inward and outward FDI stocks (Table A.9). Among 
the OMS, the ratio of inward to outward FDI stocks does not exceed two, 
even in the countries with the lowest per capita GDP (Greece, Portugal); 
among the post-socialist countries, only Slovenia has a ratio below two, 
accompanied by the lowest GDP-proportionate rates, while for the oth-
ers, these rates are between 2.82 and 61.53 (Romania’s and Bulgaria’s are 
above 60). 
 As seen above, King ( 2007 ) places emphasis on dependency when talk-
ing about the Visegrád states as liberal dependent countries. Nölke and 
Vliegenhart ( 2009 ) simply view dependence on FDI as an element that 
defi nes every material aspect of their model elaborated for the Visegrád 
countries. Bohle and Greskovits ( 2012 ) paint a more nuanced picture, 
pointing to the signifi cance of the distribution of FDI between the sec-
tors; that is, whether it went into tradable sectors because only in this case 
can it support sustainable economic growth. 
 Th e Commission produced an assessment on the fi fth anniversary of 
the EU, in which it sees the infl ux of FDI as a source of successful inte-
gration of the NMS (European Commission  2009b ). In the midst of the 
crisis, the World Bank’s experts published a book on how the European 
model could be restored to its former glory, and in this, the successful 
FDI-based model of the CEE countries is compared with the unsuccess-
ful model of the Mediterranean countries based on portfolio and other 
capital fl ows (Gill and Raiser  2012 ). 
 In order to assess the growth prospects of the CEE countries, we need to 
examine in more detail whether, based on experience to date, the region’s 
long-term convergence can be ensured by FDI-based economic develop-
ment. According to economic theory, FDI supports growth in the receiv-
ing country’s productivity via two channels: directly through investments 
on the one hand and indirectly through the spill over eff ect on the other. 
Th e latter is especially important because this is how FDI can be expected 
to promote the modernisation of the domestic economy. A great many 
empirical studies have been made of these impacts on the CEE countries. 
From two wide-ranging literature reviews, it can be inferred that in the 
vertical backward linkages, the impact of FDI was clearly productivity 
boosting, while in the horizontal linkages, the majority of the studies 
could demonstrate only a weak relationship (Gorodnichenko et al.  2007 ; 
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Hanousek et al.  2010 ). A study by the ECB also listed extensively the 
often-contradictory empirical analyses found in the literature. Th eir own 
measurement found a positive linkage between FDI infl ux and produc-
tivity growth; however, the authores note that this is not automatic, but 
depends on the absorption capacity of the receiving country (Bijsterbosch 
and Kolasa  2009 ). 
 Th e aforementioned EU research (European Commission  2009b ) and 
that of the World Bank both take into account the results of econometric 
studies on the role of FDI. However, they go beyond these and evaluate 
the development of the CEE countries along the lines of a very similar 
logic. According to both analyses, the chief strength of this model is that, 
in addition to facilitating economic growth, it facilitated the emergence 
of a capital-intensive export structure conforming to high technological 
standards. Th e openness of trade, the infl ux of FDI and the institutional 
development due to the EU accession were the main drivers of growth. 
Th e Commission’s report highlights that, “during the period 2000–2008 
accession the NMS an extra growth boost ... Model simulations suggest … 
the NMS enjoy a 50–100 basis point advantage relative to other emerg-
ing economies with comparable fundamentals” (European Commission 
 2009b : 17). Th e Commission’s report also examines the processes from 
the perspective of the OMS. On the one hand, few jobs were lost to the 
relocation of production because some 70 per cent of the FDI went into 
market acquisition and services. On the other hand, in many sectors, 
it was possible to maintain competitiveness only by moving production 
facilities, while retaining the part of production that required specialist 
know-how, technological development, and ownership. Th e report does 
not, however, mention what kind of limitation these features of the FDI 
movement could represent in the longer term from the perspective of the 
convergence of the CEE countries. 
 Gill and Raiser ( 2012 ) emphasise that Europe is the only region in 
the world in which capital fl ows in the “right” direction; that is, into the 
poorer countries with a higher growth rate. Th ey attribute the success of 
the convergence to the fact that the companies of the Nordic and North- 
Western countries restructured their value chain after the fall of commu-
nism. Th ese companies relocated their assembly operations to the NMS, 
and the low wages there strengthened their competitiveness. Th is was also 
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benefi cial for the NMS because it allowed them to integrate the global 
economy with increased productivity. Th ey regard the EU as a three- 
speed union, with the leading Nordic and North-Western countries, the 
eastern followers, and the laggard southern countries. 
 None of the analyses asks the question of whether this model makes 
it possible to achieve, in the longer term, the ultimate goal of the CEE 
countries, namely, to converge with the living standards of the Western 
European countries. Th ese studies outline a division of labour, in terms 
of production, between the North-Western countries and the CEE coun-
tries. Although this does not preclude the possibility of subsidiaries in the 
latter countries climbing higher up the value chain, there is no reason to 
assume that the parent companies will surrender their key positions in 
innovation, technology development, and strategic decision-making. Th e 
development of domestic companies—as the empirical studies quoted 
above have shown—is promoted considerably only among the suppliers 
by the technological transfer that comes with FDI; the horizontal impact 
is minimal. Th e third opportunity could be the accumulation of capital 
based on domestic savings, but in CEE, the high level of FDI infl ux 
was accompanied by a low level of savings, unlike in the emerging Asian 
countries. 
 As shown earlier in relation to Ireland, how diffi  cult it is in an emerg-
ing country, even with several decades of deliberate economic policy, to 
narrow the productivity gaps between domestic and foreign companies. 
Empirical surveys show that even in the developed countries, there is a 
general tendency for the economic performance of multinational corpo-
rations to be better than that of domestic companies. Possible reasons 
for this include the fact that multinational companies are present in the 
 sectors with a higher R&D content than the domestic companies; how-
ever, the state incentives for FDI could also put them at an advantage. 
From this, Bellak ( 2004 ) draws the conclusion that the diff erences in per-
formance between the companies are determined not by their foreign or 
domestic nature, but rather by whether they are multinational or bound 
to a national economy. Th erefore, economic policy should concentrate 
not on ownership, but on eliminating the performance gap. Th is distinc-
tion is appropriate in the developed countries. However, in the case of 
emerging countries that are weak in capital, the two approaches over-
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lap considerably. Th e comparison of Ireland and Sweden by Andreosso- 
O’Callaghan and Lenihan ( 2011 ) showed that, in contrast to Ireland, 
Sweden’s foreign companies are more evenly distributed across the indus-
trial and services sectors, while the export-oriented and high-tech sectors 
are dominated by domestic companies. Th ere are no data for a wider- 
ranging international comparison, but a good approach to the problem is 
to compare the productivity of the large corporate and SME sectors, for 
which EU data sources are available. Th e 2007 data are still unaff ected by 
the impact of the crisis (Fig.  4.1 ).
 Figure  4.1 clearly shows that—with the exception of Poland—the gap 
between the large corporate and SME sectors is the greatest in the coun-
tries that are struggling with the greatest diffi  culties in the present crisis. 
Among the post-socialist countries where FDI was on a large scale and 
fl owed into the manufacturing industry and where the contribution of 
the large corporate sector to GDP matches or exceeds the EU average, it 
was possible in Slovakia only to reduce the productivity gap between the 
SME sector and the large corporations to the level of the North-Western 
member states. Th e reason why a far weaker performance is shown in 
Slovakia at the level of the medium-sized corporations cannot be deduced 
from the statistical data. Estonia and Latvia lack an FDI-based large cor-
porate sector similar to that of the Visegrád states, which is also related to 
the small size of the former two countries. 
 Overall, the development model of the CEE countries undoubtedly 
led to successes. If, from the period after the transformational recession, 
we treat 1995 as the baseline (this, importantly, being the fi rst available 
data in the Eurostat database) and compare this with the year before the 
crisis, then in terms both of GDP and of fi nal consumption, which  better 
expresses the prosperity of the population, with the exception of the two 
richest states, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, a growth of 10–30 per-
centage points could be observed. A comparison with the 1989 baseline 
could also be made, but due both to the quality of the statistical data 
from that time and to the quality of the commodities making up GDP 
back then, this comparison is suitable only as a very approximate guide 
(Table  4.2 ).
 However, it is also clear from the foregoing that the features of the cur-
rent CEE model do not support the thinking that prevails in the EU doc-
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uments (for example, the Commission report discussed above), namely, 
that the new, post-socialist member states are on a growth path that 
only from the OMS diff ers in quantitative terms and that convergence 
is only a matter of time. We can realistically defi ne the current position 
n
 Fig. 4.1  Difference in labour productivity between large and medium-sized 
enterprises and between large companies and the SME sector, relative to the 
average for the whole economy, as percentage points, in 2007.  Source : 
Author’s calculation based on Wymenga et al. ( 2011 ).  Note : Labour produc-
tivity is measured in terms of gross added value per employed person 
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and future growth of the NMS by applying Porter’s ( 1998 ) competitive 
advantage theory presented in Part I.  To use Porter’s terminology, the 
CEE economies are in the factor-driven stage because we have to classify 
them on the basis of the home-based economy. 16 
 On the basis of Porter’s ( 1998 ) theory, for the transition to long-term 
convergence and the innovation-driven stage—which was the goal of 
the EU’s Lisbon Strategy and, later, the Europe 2020 strategy—FDI, 
the presence of foreign multinational corporations is necessary, but not 
in itself suffi  cient. Multinational corporations position their activities, 
which are present in the various phases of the value chain, in the various 
countries in accordance with their global strategy. In other words, the 
domestic base, as described above, remains in the home country in which 
the company has its seat. An emerging economy that bases its strategy 
only on multinational corporations could be destined to remain a factor- 
driven economy. In certain phases of development, the focus of economic 
policy must shift towards indigenous corporations. 
 In other words, the economic policy framework that the EU tends to 
designate (for example, in the study quoted several times above, ensuring 
macroeconomic stability, a sustainable balance of payments, eff ective use 
of subsidies from EU funds, and so on) is necessary, but not in itself suffi  -
cient to ensure that the NMS progress in the direction of convergence in 
the long term. Th e present institutional frameworks are adequate only for 
a growth path that perpetuates asymmetric mutual dependency between 
the OMS and NMS. Th e most important promise of the change in the 
political system was that the CEE countries, which were left out of the 
mainstream of development after the WWII, could converge with the 
more fortunate western countries within a historically foreseeable time 
frame. 
 Th e task of economics and political economy is to answer the question 
of what path can be taken by the NMS towards an innovation-driven, 
home-based economy. Among the countries that converged only very 
late, after WWII, only Finland shows convincing evidence that it has 
succeeded in entering this stage. Finland, however, had a means of travel-
ling the path from the factor-driven economy to the innovation-driven 
economy. Th e global economic environment of the time made it pos-
sible, during the investment-driven stage, for the state—partly through 
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its ownership of large corporations—to play a key role in the modernisa-
tion process, and the source of capital accumulation was chiefl y national 
capital. Even still, we are only talking about economic factors, and we 
have not gone into detail regarding the diff erences in terms of social capi-
tal relative to the CEE countries. 17 
 If one aims to maintain convergence as a defi ning element of the system 
of economic policy targets of the post-socialist member states, a way to 
supplement the FDI-based model in the current stage of global economic 
and EU integration with a set of tools that facilitate the development of a 
innovation-driven, home-based economy in the original Porterian sense 
must be found. Additionally, all this should be achieved by building on 
genuinely extant social institutions, norms and attitudes and genuinely 
extant social capital. 
 If the 2008 crisis had not occurred, then due to the low income levels 
of the post-socialist countries, these questions might have remained theo-
retical for a long time, and the present model could have assured growth 
potential for a long time to come. Th e Czech Republic and Slovenia 
might have been the experimental countries that either became stuck at 
the current level 18 or were capable of joining the core countries. Th e cri-
sis, however, is transforming the entire landscape of the global economy, 
and the development opportunities available to the CEE member states 
need to be reassessed in this light, as does the question of whether, in the 
wake of the crisis, the individual countries in the region have embarked 
on diff ering paths of development or whether they can still be interpreted 
in the framework of a single model. 
 Notes 
  1.  Th e number of clusters, based on Akaike’s information criterion and its 
relative change, is almost always two. 
  2.  Th e single cluster of new member states would have broken up only in the 
seven-cluster version, without any defi nitive economic explanation. 
  3.  Th e Swedish reforms are discussed in detail by Freeman et al. ( 2010 ), the 
Danish reforms by J. G. Andersen ( 2011 ). 
  4.  Th e authors’ subtitle—Can the Bumblebee Keep Flying?—indicates that 
we are dealing here with something of a curiosity compared to the eco-
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nomic mainstream. Th e analogy was borrowed from the Swedish prime 
minister. In theory, bumblebees should not be able to fl y, given their large 
bodies and tiny wings. Th e IMF’s meticulous authors restore the scientifi c 
world order at the end of their work, referring to a study in which physicists 
explain how such fl ight is indeed possible. 
  5.  Hereinafter, the Eurostat on-line database ( http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes ) is referred to as “Eurostat”. 
  6.  When analysing social protection, it has been indicated that the process of 
liberalisation was not complete even at this time; due to political resistance, 
the Th atcher government stepped back from privatising the National 
Health Service (Pierson  1996 ). 
  7.  Kirby ( 2010 ) provides a wide-ranging survey of the literature on Ireland’s 
economic development. 
  8.  A 30 per cent threshold was determined necessary for initiating a manda-
tory takeover off er (Houwing and Vandaele  2011 : 130). 
  9.  It is an interesting comparison that the community support provided to 
Spain—not including the agricultural fund—between 1986 and 2006 
accounted for three times as much as the amount of the Marshall Plan 
(Royo  2008 : 48). 
  10.  http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html , date accessed 23 
February 2015 
  11.  For a related analysis of the Estonian Research and Development Council, 
see Tiitset al. ( 2003 ). 
  12.  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17083397 date accessed 25 
February 2012. 
  13.  Th ere are signifi cant diff erences in GDP data among the sources. Th e data 
in this study are based on the Report of EBRD from 1999, on the one 
hand, because this organisation specialises in the research of this region 
and, on the other hand, by that time, corrections had been made. It is espe-
cially important to note because according to Mygind ( 1997 : 58–59), on 
the basis of earlier EBRD data, the decline was more than ten percentage 
points greater in case of Estonia and Lithuania. Th ese years are not included 
in the online database of Eurostat. 
  14.  Th e public debt of all of Yugoslavia was 15.99 billion USD at the end of 
1991, and the part controlled by the federation (one-third) was distributed 
in the agreement on succession issues. Th e successor states began negotia-
tions with the international organisations and the “Paris Club” creditors. 
Negotiations had been conducted since 1988 with the “London Club” 
(which included the private creditors) about debt restructuring processes, 
4 Models of Capitalism in the Enlarged EU 215
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
and as a result, by mid-1993, the debt of 7.3 billion USD shrank to 4.3 
billion USD.  Th is result was greatly facilitated by the fact that the 
Yugoslavian government bonds were purchased for 20 per cent of their 
book value on the secondary market; thus, basically, the states themselves 
acquired their own debt (Stanič  2001 : 758–761). 
  15.  Please note that for those Romanians who belong to the Romanian 
Orthodox Church, the day of the execution was an ordinary day, not 
Christmas day. 
  16.  Th e competitiveness report of the World Economic Forum places these 
countries higher in the classifi cation—with the exception of Bulgaria—
and these countries are in the innovation-driven stage or are on their way 
there, that is, in a transition phase (Schwab  2009 ). However, in the 
report, the aspects of the assessment broke away entirely from the origi-
nal theory of Porter ( 1998 ); the basis of comparison was per capita GDP 
compared at market rate and the exports of mineral products as a share 
of overall exports. In this study, in assessing the prospect of the CEE 
model, Porter’s aspects are more relevant; therefore, these aspects will be 
reviewed. 
  17.  Th e survey of Eurobarometer in 2004 reveals the diff erences in social capi-
tal among the member states rather well (Eurobarometer 2005 ). 
  18.  Th e Czech Republic has not been able catch up as far as fi nal consump-
tion is concerned since 1995 (Table  4.2 ); the structural problems that 
were hiding behind Slovenia’s spectacular economic performance would 
have spoiled the achieved consumption level anyhow, even without the 
crisis. 
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 Part III 
 Market Economies of the EU in the 
2008 Global Crisis 
 Regarding what institutional studies forecast about the performance of 
individual models during the crisis, the greatest vulnerability was shown 
by the institutional systems of the Mediterranean countries and the CEE 
countries. At the same time, in terms of the driving factors, the severity 
and persistent eff ects of the crisis, some of those areas of the institutional 
system that were not considered signifi cant in the market economic mod-
elling in the VoC literature (for example, the sectoral structure of the 
economy and FDI and an exchange rate regime outside the euro area) 
have been given emphasis. Th erefore, it is informative, from an insti-
tutional point of view, to have an overview of the driving factors of the 
crisis in the various European models. Th e processing of institutional 
changes in the literature has not been performed entirely, so I have to rely 
largely on the analyses of the European Commission and the OECD. In 
the interest of transparency and better understanding, the characteris-
tics of the models and the changes are summarised in respective tables 
(Tables 5.2, 6.2, 6.5, 7.3, 8.2, 8.4, and 8.6). In case of the changes, not 
only obvious institutional changes have been taken into account but also 
regulatory changes; it cannot be determined whether these changes are 
parametric or whether they will change the institution over time. Within 
the models of capitalism, if a distinction is made between subgroups (in 
the case of the North-Western countries and the CEE countries), I make 
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the comparison on the basis of the subgroups, taking their characteris-
tic features from before 2008 into consideration. In Part III, statistical 
data are taken from the Eurostat database on several occasions, but con-
stant reference to Eurostat would signifi cantly deteriorate readability. Th e 
online Eurostat database has been used in all cases where the data source 
does not indicate otherwise. 1 Data for the coming 2–3 years are taken 
from the autumn forecast (2014) of the European Commission avail-
able at the time the manuscript was completed ( European Commission 
2014a ). 
 Note 
 1.  Data from the Eurostat online database downloaded on 11 January 2015 are 
used in the case of real GDP growth rates, the 5-year change in the share of 
world exports, general government gross debt, general government defi cit/
surplus, consolidated and non-consolidated private sector debt as a percent-
age of GDP, housing price indexes, rates of those at risk of poverty after and 
before social transfers as a percentage of the total population, severely materi-
ally deprived people as a percentage of the total population, people at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion as a percentage of the total population (EU2020 
poverty indicator), the GINI coeffi  cient of equalised disposable income, and 
the income quintile share ratio (S80/S20). Data downloaded on 22 January 
2015 are used in the case of the balance of the current account as a percent-
age of GDP, the 1-year percentage change in export market shares, high-tech 
exports as a percentage of exports, unemployment rates (aged 15–74, less 
than 25 years), employment rates (aged 20–64), unit labour costs for the 
whole economy, and real eff ective exchange rates for 42 trading partners. 
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 5 
 Crisis-Resistant Nordic Countries? 
 In my cluster analysis, Denmark is considered a borderline case between 
the Nordic and the continental European countries. Because Denmark 
manifests the characteristic features of the Nordic countries in exactly 
those subgroups in which the OMS diff er the most (labour market and 
social services), I include Denmark among the Nordic countries. In 
2009, the Nordic countries suff ered a decline that extended beyond the 
EU average (−4.4 per cent); Finland experienced the greatest depression. 
Th e Swedish and the Finnish economies recovered rapidly and consider-
ably exceeded the growth rate of the EU-28 in 2010 and 2011 (2.1 and 
1.7 per cent, respectively). When 2012 brought a 0.4 per cent downturn 
to the entire EU, only Sweden was able to avoid recession and only the 
Swedish economy was likely to achieve signifi cant growth in the coming 
years. As far as unemployment is concerned, all three countries perform 
better than the EU average (Table  5.1 ).
 If we study the processes of the last half decade in greater depth, it 
becomes clear that not only the short-term prospects show the more ben-
efi cial situation of  Sweden . By the time the global crisis hit the Swedish 
economy, the far-reaching results of the reforms made in the 1990s could 
be felt and detected in persistent growth, increased employment, stable 
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public fi nances, and impressive places in international competitiveness 
rankings. Th is advantageous starting position made it possible for Sweden 
to pursue counter-cyclical economic policy. Recovery was facilitated in 
2009 by currency devaluation, interest rate reduction and fi scal  incentives 
amounting to 1¾ per cent of GDP (road and railroad investments with 
labour market packages). Due to the strict fi scal policy of earlier years, 
in spite of the economic recovery measures, Sweden’s defi cit was only 1.3 
per cent in 2013, when it hit the deepest point and the structural defi cit 
of the budget did not rise above 1 per cent, either. In order to main-
tain fi scal discipline, in 2011, the fi scal policy framework was renewed, 
containing a top-down budget process where the expenditure ceiling is 
established fi rst and then the government allocates expenditures within 
this limit to individual budget areas (Bergman  2011 ). 
 Th e Swedish banking system pulled through the 2008–2009 crisis 
years relatively well. Th e state aid provided for the recapitalisation of 
banks, and asset relief interventions between 2008 and 2012 was only 
0.2 per cent of the 2012 GDP. Although in the Nordic countries—as we 
have seen above—the role of the fi nancial markets increased, the Swedish 
banking system is large relative to GDP, and the banking sector assets 
amount to four times the GDP 1 ; at the same time, the system is rather 
concentrated because four banks dominate the market. Foreign credit 
exposure accounted for 158 per cent of GDP in 2013 after deleveraging 
in the Baltic states. Th e exposure of the Swedish banks to those countries 
aff ected by the crisis of the euro area is insignifi cant, and towards the 
Baltic states, credit exposure is 10 per cent of the GDP. A risk factor is 
that deposits constituted only 40 per cent of the total funding in 2013, 
and half of the wholesale market funding instruments was short term for 
years; only in 2013 did the share of long-term funding increase signifi -
cantly. At the same time, it is very favourable that capital adequacy ratio 
is well above the Basel III requirements and that the authorities made sev-
eral of the elements of the banking regulations stricter. State guarantees 
in 2012 were 1.1 per cent of the GDP (4.87 per cent in the 2009 peak 
year), which means that bank restructuring costs were low, compared to 
the other countries in Europe (European Commission  2014g ; ECFIN 
DG  2014o : 51–56). 
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 Th at the banking system did not experience greater diffi  culties was 
closely related to the fact that the overheated property market fortunately 
did not collapse, as it had in other countries. Th e increase in house prices 
began as early as 15 years before the crisis. Demand was increased by the 
growing income, low interest rates on mortgage and low property taxes, 
while high construction costs, weak competition in the construction sec-
tor, shortage of land for construction due to the planning and zoning 
processes, and long procedures for building permits all limited the supply, 
subsequently leading to high housing prices. Th e low interest rate envi-
ronment, expansive monetary policy, income tax cuts, the reduction of 
property taxes, and the rapid revival of economic growth were able to pre-
vent a drop in housing prices. Nevertheless, the housing market remained 
a risk factor together with the great extent of indebtedness of households. 
Th e non-consolidated debt of the private sector is approximately 240 per 
cent of the GDP, which is well over the EU threshold of 160 per cent, 
which is the reference value for the macroeconomic imbalance procedure 
of the EU. Household indebtedness (80 per cent of GDP) is the more 
dangerous of the two because a considerable part of corporate debt (50 
per cent of GDP) originates from cross-border intra-company loans usu-
ally serving the purpose of tax minimisation between countries (ECFIN 
DG  2014o : 30–32, 39–49). 
 Th e competitiveness of Sweden remained strong even during the crisis 
years, which is demonstrated by the fact that it has an on-going current 
account surplus. Neither the unit labour cost (ULC) nor the evolution 
of the real eff ective exchange rate (REER) indicates that Sweden would 
be at a disadvantage in terms of cost competitiveness. According to the 
analysts of the European Commission, there are no imbalances behind 
the persistent Swedish surplus and this surplus is not fed by the artifi -
cially constrained internal demand, but it rather off sets the severe defi cits 
originating from the 1990s. At the same time, further corrections can be 
expected. Nevertheless, even after the correction, a sustainable, close-to- 
balance surplus can be forecast (ECFIN DG  2013f  ). 
 Naturally, due to the crisis, Swedish exports had to confront great dif-
fi culties because more than half of its products are transported to the EU 
countries, and in 2012, the Swedish krona (SEK) appreciated. Swedish 
exports are strongly diversifi ed, but certain traditional products (paper 
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and pulp products, sawn goods, motor vehicles, telecommunication 
products, and so on) face persistently decreasing demand. Th erefore, due 
to these factors, the country suff ered losses on the export market—14.9 
per cent during fi ve years before 2013—but without the increasing mar-
ket share on the services market, such losses would have been greater. 
Services currently account for one-third of exports, and their signifi cance 
is increasing. Services are becoming integrated into industrial activities, 
and the borderline between the two is often blurred (for example, in 
logistics). In Sweden, where deindustrialisation did not take place in the 
same manner as it did in other developed countries and where industry 
still provides one-third of output, this intertwining is especially signifi -
cant. Knowledge-intensive business services are actually considered the 
engine of growth. Competitiveness maintained against the diffi  cult exter-
nal circumstances was complemented by the fact that competition was 
not weakened, even in the years of the crisis. Sweden was one of those 
member states that integrated the EU directive on the liberalisation of 
services before the deadline. Th e OECD indicators of product market 
regulation in 2010 showed better values for Sweden than the OECD 
average (OECD  2013i ). 2 
 Sweden still tops the EU innovation ranking; the years of the crisis did 
not change its top position. At the same time, such processes began—
rather due to the globalisation than the crisis—which raised anxiety in 
the Swedish experts. Sweden is often labelled as a headquarter economy 
because a large number of multinational companies are present in the 
Swedish economy relative to the size of the country and their presence 
is maintained not by the subsidiaries but by the headquarters. However, 
after the liberalisation in the 1990s, the proportion of foreign ownership 
has grown through mergers and acquisitions, for example, in the auto-
motive and pharmaceutical industries. Th e state authorities and the local 
governments did their best to save some of the outstanding brands of 
high quality—in vain—because in the international market, they could 
not off set their disadvantage, which resulted from the small size of the 
country. Until now, this has not been seen as a huge loss because the 
companies in which the majority of shareholders were foreign have spent 
large amounts of money on R&D. However, between 2005 and 2009, 
the R&D expenditure of foreign-owned companies decreased from SEK 
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32.9 billion to SEK 23.2 billion, while that of domestic-owned com-
panies increased from SEK 40.4 billion to SEK 44.5 billion. Moreover, 
the foreign R&D expenditure of the 20 largest Swedish-owned compa-
nies increased more quickly in the developed countries than in Sweden; 
furthermore, outsourcing the R&D activity to low-income but rapidly 
growing countries began as well. Expenditures of R&D are concentrated, 
large corporations (with 250 or more employees) spend more than 80 
per cent of expenditures (which is not striking in Europe), and three- 
quarters of expenditures are related to fi ve large corporations (which is 
not an outstanding proportion among the small European countries). A 
survey was performed in which information was gathered about what the 
large corporations plan to do in the coming fi ve years. Th eir replies reveal 
that 60 per cent do not plan to decrease their R&D expenditures; more-
over, they wish to increase these expenditures even further. Among the 
companies that intend to increase their R&D expenditures, the propor-
tion of Swedish-owned companies was higher than foreign-owned ones. 
Nevertheless, in Swedish innovation policy, the consequence was drawn: 
these companies should not concentrate on one of the segments (small 
or large enterprises, domestic or foreign, and so on), but the whole busi-
ness environment must be made attractive in order to retain or encourage 
R&D in the rapidly integrating international economy (Swedish Agency 
for Growth Policy Analysis  2011 : 68–71, 84–85). 
 Swedish employment began to improve quickly after the decline caused 
by the crisis; in 2012, the unemployment rate was 8 per cent, and the 
employment rate in the age group between 20 and 64 was 79.4 per cent, 
but this rate could not reach the pre-crisis level. Th e favourable perfor-
mance of the labour market is closely related to the reforms of the previous 
period. Th e fl exible product market, the introduction of a tax system and 
a system of unemployment benefi ts, which intensifi ed job-search activi-
ties, both shortened the length of unemployment, even during the years 
of the crisis, and protected people from persistent unemployment. Th ese 
factors were complemented by the consensus-oriented dialogue between 
the social partners and the fl exible wage agreements that adapted to the 
economic cycle. Trade union density was still very high, approximately 
70 per cent, and in spite of the decentralisation tendencies, the sectoral 
level remained dominant. Th e collective agreement for 2010–2012 cov-
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ered 88 per cent of employees. Th e government also introduced a com-
plex labour market package, which included several areas from job-search 
incentives, through reducing the tax on labour income and supporting 
job creation to increasing the number of admitted students to higher 
education and vocational training. Th e  government wanted to prevent 
what happened at the beginning of the crisis in the 1990s, when employ-
ment could not return to the pre-crisis level. In order to do so, the experts 
deemed it necessary to introduce further reforms as well (for example, 
approximating the employment protection regulations of the employ-
ees with fi xed-term contracts and with open- ended contracts); however, 
the most critical issue seems to be the employment of unskilled young 
people and non-EU immigrants (Harbo Hansen  2011 : 7–10; Eurofound 
 2014 ). Th e severity of the problem is presented well by the fact that youth 
unemployment remained 23.6 per cent in 2013, which is strikingly high, 
even if we consider that an age bracket containing a considerable number 
of people entered the labour market and that half of the jobseekers are 
university students. Th e increase in both youth and overall unemploy-
ment could have also occurred because Swedish economic policy tradi-
tionally does not strive to maintain the level of employment at a time 
of decline or structural change. In contrast to France or Germany, in 
Sweden, the labour force was not maintained by reducing working hours. 
Redundancies in Sweden aff ected primarily the more vulnerable groups 
(Anxo  2012 ; EC SWD  2014i : 18). From the viewpoint of transition 
from school to work, a warning sign for the future is that PISA results 
in 2012 show below-average performance, while the public expenditure 
on education was high, amounting to 6.8–7 per cent of GDP (OECD 
 2013j : 5,  2014b : 258). 
 Th e crisis did not bring substantive change to Swedish social policy; 
the necessary steps for the sustainable pension scheme had been made 
earlier. Social disparities are still among the lowest. At the same time, 
they have been increasing dynamically since the 1990s as a result of the 
increasing inequality in market income and the concentration of income 
from capital. Th e increase in income disparities did not stop in the years 
of the crisis (Table A.8). 
 Among the three Nordic countries,  Finland ’ s economy suff ered most 
from the decline in 2009, shrinking by −8.3 per cent. In the subsequent 
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two years, it seemed that the growth rates recovered rapidly, but in 2012, 
the economy entered a recession again, and the prospects in terms of 
growth for the coming years are gloomy. Nevertheless, according to the 
2014–2015 Global Competitiveness Index, Finland is the fourth most 
competitive economy in the world (Schwab  2014 : 13). As shown below, 
this outstandingly positive evaluation is not confi rmed by either the 
European Commission, the OECD, or the analyses made by Finnish 
experts. Th e crisis at the beginning of the 1990s was followed by reforms 
in Finland as well, and similar to Sweden, Finland also began a success-
ful development path. Nevertheless, the 2008 crisis revealed structural 
problems, which meant that the Finnish had to face diffi  culties that were 
greater than those faced by Sweden. 
 What made the 2009 decline even more serious was that the export 
decreased by one-third partly because 80 per cent of the exported goods 
were investment and intermediate products, the demand for which is sen-
sitive to fl uctuations in the business cycles. Moreover, the Russian market 
has played an important role in Finnish exports, and the decline was also 
strikingly dramatic in Russia. Due to its strict fi scal policy, Finland had 
reserves; therefore, the missing export demand was compensated by fi scal 
incentives, which amounted to 1.8 per cent and 1.5 per cent of GDP in 
2009–2010. Th e size and means of the fi scal package (tax reduction and 
support for the unemployed and local governments) did not diff er from 
the practice usually applied by other countries, but its structure did. Only 
one-third of the measures were one-time, and the others did not have a 
defi nite ending date; consequently, their survival would make the budget 
unsustainable, the stability of which is jeopardised anyway by those costs 
caused by the ageing society and that actually exceed those of the other 
developed countries. Since 2013, Finland has been trying to gradually 
terminate the fi scal incentives by tax increases and expenditure ceilings, 
but due to the weak growth prospects, this is not entirely without risks, 
either. As the result of insuffi  cient budget revenue, the stabilisation of 
the budget must be continued with expenditure cuts, and in spite of the 
less than 3 per cent defi cit, the public debt is slowly approaching the 
Maastricht criteria of 60 per cent, probably exceeding it in 2015. 
 In Finland, the fi nancial crisis did not aff ect the banking system; the 
banks were well-capitalised and remained profi table, and they were not 
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exposed to the economies in trouble. Th is does not mean that there are 
no risks. Th e banking system is very concentrated, Nordea Bank Finland, 
the subsidiary of the Swedish Nordea group, holds two-thirds of the 
total assets. Th e growth of the fi nancial sector liabilities resulted mainly 
from the increase in foreign (Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and English) 
deposits and wholesale funding, which makes the banking system vulner-
able. Th e situation in the housing market is a risk factor as well, although 
to a decreasing extent. Th e real prices of housing have been increasing 
dynamically since the beginning of the 1990s and by 92 per cent between 
1993 and 2007. Th e increase in demand was facilitated by high loan-to- 
value ratios for fi rst-time buyers, tax deductibility of mortgage interest 
payments and low property taxation. In 2009 there was a risk that after 
the transitional decrease in demand—given the low mortgage interest 
rates; the real estate bubble may have developed, but the Finnish Financial 
Supervisory Authority managed to stop the process with the help of its 
2010 guidelines. Th e tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments will 
be gradually phased out. New construction activities have decreased since 
the beginning of the crisis. Altogether, it can be expected that the housing 
market will stabilise. Th e indebtedness of the private sector grew during 
the crisis, but it does not seem risky either in the case of households or in 
the case of companies (ECFIN DG  2013d : 17–18, 33). 
 In Finland, labour productivity increased by an average of 2.8 per cent 
annually between 1991 and 2008, which means that Finland managed 
to catch up with the top-performing countries in the world. Finland’s 
external positions were strong, and the country repeatedly ran current 
account surpluses. Catching up in terms of labour productivity came to a 
halt in 2008–2009, the current account turned negative in 2011, and the 
defi cit of 1.8 per cent grew further, reaching 1.9 per cent in 2012. In the 
fi ve years preceding 2013, Finland suff ered a 32.2 per cent loss in export 
market share for several reasons. 
 It aff ected cost competitiveness unfavourably that while wage growth 
had always been in line with the increase in productivity, after the wage 
agreement in 2007—in which the crisis were not yet taken into account—
ULC increased more suddenly than its main competitors. Wage negotia-
tions were decentralised in 2007–2008, but the expected system, which 
would fl exibly adapt to the market changes, did not emerge; therefore, in 
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2011, a new centralised national agreement was made between the social 
partners. In the wage agreements that have been concluded since, wage 
growth has already been contained. Th e evolution of the wages did not 
have a primary role in the evolution of competitiveness, and the increase 
in energy costs played at least as important a role in the increase of costs. 
Th e companies maintained their cost competitiveness by profi t reduc-
tion, which, on the other hand, reduces their investment possibilities. 
Nevertheless, as for the future, cost items remain important because pro-
duction began to shift from high-tech products to more price-sensitive 
intermediate products (ECFIN DG  2014e ). 
 Among the reasons for the loss of market share, non-price competi-
tiveness factors weigh more. Th e geographic distribution of exports was 
markedly unfavourable before the crisis, and, among its competitors, 
Finland exported relatively the most to the fast-growing Brasilia, Russia, 
India, and China (BRIC countries), but during the crisis Finland lost 
market shares as well. One of the reasons for this can be found in the 
product structure. Losing market shares in the case of electronic prod-
ucts and products of the forestry and paper industries began as early as 
the beginning of the 2000s. Th e export performance in machinery, the 
chemical industry and the metallurgical industry began to improve after 
2010, but this improvement was not enough to off set the losses suff ered 
by the above-mentioned industries, similarly to the trade balance of ser-
vices, which moved within a range of +/−1 per cent in the last decade. 
Th e importance of the electronics industry is shown by the fact that at 
its highest peak, in 2000, it provided 11 per cent of Finnish added value, 
and half of the growth in added value could be attributed to this sector. 
At that time, the production of Nokia alone accounted for 4 per cent 
of GDP and contributed to the growth by 2 percentage points. By the 
end of 2012, Nokia had relocated its industrial production outside of 
Finland and exported services only, especially R&D. Half of the decline 
in Finnish GDP during the crisis could be attributed to the electronics 
industry (ECFIN DG  2013d : 23). Th e declining export performance is 
also explained by the fact that the number of exporting companies is low 
and the range of products they off er is limited. In 2012, 1 per cent of the 
Finnish exporting companies handled 76 per cent of gross exports, and 
small companies showed only faint willingness to export. Th e eff ect of 
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the non-tradable sectors also contributes to the problems of competitive-
ness because their current level of productivity falls substantially behind 
that of manufacturing. While in the product markets, the freedom of 
competition reached the level of the Nordic countries, competition pres-
sure in commerce, public services, transport and communication services 
was weak, and the increase in labour costs began as a result (ECFIN DG 
 2014e : 35, 45). 
 Finland is steadily among the leading innovators within the EU. Th e 
restructuring of the information technology sector and its expectedly 
persistent shrinkage caused diffi  culties for Finland in keeping its lead-
ing position. Th is sector is—by nature—R&D intensive, which explains 
why the R&D expenditures of the private sector in Finland account for 
almost 3 per cent of GDP. Nokia alone fi nanced approximately 30 per 
cent of the R&D expenditures. At the same time—contrary to the case 
in Sweden—the R&D intensity of the other industries is not too high in 
Finland. Th e state has borne only one quarter of the R&D expenditures 
so far. In 2012, both the private sector and the state decreased their R&D 
expenditures, from 3.80 per cent of the previous year to 3.55 per cent of 
GDP, which is—naturally—still an outstanding value. Th e critical issue 
is the effi  ciency of the Finnish research and innovation system in turning 
investment in R&D into new innovative products and services. Another 
challenge Finland must face is that, thanks to the successful convergence 
of the previous period, a substantial part of the industry is running close 
to its technological frontier, which means that any step further is possible 
only by way of innovating new products and processes (OECD  2012b : 
44; EC SWD  2014o : 21). 
 Th e Finnish labour market functioned very well before the crisis, but 
the level of employment was lower than that of the other two Nordic 
countries. Th e level was lower in case of the young, the elderly and 
women of child-rearing age, which was refl ected in the low prevalence of 
part-time work. In response to the crisis, unemployment did not increase 
as dramatically as GDP plummeted. One of the reasons for this was that 
the temporary layoff  of employees was possible and that these employees 
could be reemployed when the economy started to recover without the 
cost of recruiting new employees. After the decline in 2009, recovery of 
the economy was due largely to the fi scal stimulus package and the mone-
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tary easing of the ECB, but after this temporary eff ect, the labour market 
stagnated, and the unemployment rate was around 8 per cent. In estab-
lishing the system of fl exicurity, Finland did not go as far as its Nordic 
neighbours; thus, introducing unemployment benefi ts that are intensify 
job-search activities remains to be done, as does the extension of active 
labour market policy programmes. Th e actual age of retirement increased 
(by 0.8 year between 2008 and 2013), but it may decrease again due to 
the recession and sluggish growth; however, it would be important to keep 
the employees in the labour market for a longer period of time because 
of the ageing of society. Th e old-age dependency ratio is 26 per cent in 
Finland, which is well above the OECD average (19 per cent). Th e pen-
sion reform in 2005 did not bring such radical changes as in Sweden, and 
early retirement was still widely available; however, this reform is not sus-
tainable within the given demographic circumstances, and the restriction 
of disability pensions cannot be avoided, either (Braconier  2010 : 5, 18). 
 Th e education system in Finland is still among the best in the world, 
according to the latest PISA report, although a minor decline can be 
seen compared to the previous report. During the crisis, public spend-
ing on education maintained its high share (above 6 per cent of GDP), 
but because of the further budgetary consolidation, a signifi cant, 
300- million-euro decrease can be expected (OECD  2013j : 5,  2014b : 
258; EC SWD  2014o : 17). 
 As far as income inequalities are concerned, the same can be reported 
about Finland as about Sweden. Compared to the EU member states 
or the OECD states, Finland is among the countries with the lowest 
inequality indicators, but since the beginning of the 1990s, inequali-
ties have increased a great deal. Th e reasons are similar: the diff erences 
between the factor incomes have increased (the share of labour income 
has declined) and welfare provision has decreased. Given the increas-
ing inequalities, it is important that the income of highest earners has 
dynamically risen and that the regional labour outcome disparities have 
increased (OECD  2010b ). 
 Denmark achieved steady growth of approximately 2 per cent in the 
decade preceding the crisis, which fell behind the growth dynamics of the 
other two Nordic countries. In 2006 and 2007, this growth was based on 
credit expansion and a bulging housing bubble. Th e crisis resulted in a 
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5.1 per cent decline in GDP, which was accompanied by a 20 per cent—
calculated in real terms—decrease in housing prices. Th e year 2010 saw 
some improvement due to the fi scal stimulus measures and the more 
favourable export opportunities, but in 2012, another recession took 
place—similarly to the euro area (ECFIN DG  2013c : 11). Th e Danish 
government did not give up its disciplined fi scal policy, which was also 
characteristic of the other two Nordic countries. Government defi cit hit 
its deepest point in 2012, with 3.9 per cent, and public debt remained 
at the level of approximately 45 per cent, even in the years of the crisis. 
 By contrast, the indebtedness of the private sector (230 per cent of 
GDP) in the case of Denmark exceeds by far the reference value of the 
EU for non-consolidated debt (160 per cent), and the corporate sector 
accounts for only approximately 100 per cent of this. Th e substantial 
indebtedness of the households presents a serious risk. However, it must 
be noted that the savings of Danish households are also larger than in 
other countries. Due to the introduction of the compulsory private pen-
sion scheme, 11 per cent of wages are collected for this purpose; thus, the 
net fi nancial wealth of households has accounted for 50–100 per cent of 
the GDP since the mid-1990s. At the same time, private pension schemes 
and real estate are considered illiquid assets; thus, they decrease the risk 
of indebtedness slightly and the authorities attempt to prevent any fur-
ther increases in indebtedness by making mortgage lending stricter. Th e 
bursting of the real estate bubble weighed heavily on the banking sector, 
which was otherwise less exposed to the South European economies. Th e 
size of the banking sector relative to GDP is huge, the amount of its assets 
are more than four times greater. Th e government had no alternative but 
to accept the introduction of bank rescue packages, and the cost of the 
recapitalisation of the banks between 2008 and 2012 accounted for 4.4 
per cent of the 2012 GDP. As the result of the crisis and the new regula-
tory requirements, the banking system became somewhat more concen-
trated by way of resolutions and mergers and the fi nancial supervision 
has been strengthened (ECFIN DG  2013c : 14,  2014d : 23–24; European 
Commission  2014g ). 
 In 2013 and 2014, in the innovation scoreboard of the EU, Denmark 
entered the group of innovation leaders as the fourth in addition to the 
big three of Sweden, Germany, and Finland (European Commission 
5 Crisis-Resistant Nordic Countries? 239
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
 2013b : 5,  2014c : 5). Nevertheless, similarly to Finland, Denmark also 
had problems in terms of competitiveness. Denmark’s current account 
remained in the positive even during the years of the crisis, but between 
2008 and 2013, it suff ered a 17.9 per cent loss in export market shares. 
Although in 2011, some improvement was experienced, the old problem 
remained: Denmark maintained its position in the traditional markets, 
but new export possibilities opened up in markets to which Denmark 
had never exported. Th is means that the geographic specialisation, 
which was a positive factor before the crisis, became a negative one. In 
Denmark, the large share of the SME sector in the corporate structure is 
greater than in Sweden or in Finland, which makes it more diffi  cult for 
Denmark to make an appearance in the market of the BRIC countries. 
Th e product structure of Danish exports has been found to be favourable 
during the crisis from the viewpoint that the products of the pharmaceu-
tical industry and food industry react less sensitively to cyclic changes. 
In recent decades, the product structure shifted towards high-tech prod-
ucts, but due to the strong food industry exports, the proportion of the 
low-tech products is still higher. It must also be added that within this 
product category, exports are concentrated in the higher-value segment. 
Th e problems of Danish competitiveness are found in the decline of cost 
competitiveness and in the slow growth of productivity rather than in 
the geographic distribution. In the last decade, ULC increased more than 
that of its main competitors, and its correction took place as the result 
of the crisis. In addition to wage increases, the fact that Denmark par-
ticipates in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II has contributed 
to the increase in ULC because, between 2000 and 2009, the Danish 
krone appreciated along with the euro, relative to the currency of the 
trading partners. Denmark’s rate of wage increase did not exceed that of 
Sweden, Finland or the Netherlands, but its rate of productivity growth 
was slower (ECFIN DG  2013c ). 
 After the crisis hit the country, social partners agreed to reduce the 
wages, which improved competitiveness. In Denmark, trade union den-
sity steadily decreased, similarly to the other member states of the EU, 
but even in 2010, it was at two-thirds of the workforce. Decentralising 
wage negotiations fi ts into the EU trend, the loose national frame-
work is fi lled with content by primarily sectoral and, second, corporate 
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agreements, which is known as centralised decentralisation (Eurofound 
 2014 ). 
 In its 2010 report on competitiveness, the Danish government 
provided the same reasons for the slow growth of productivity as the 
researchers of the OECD. Besides the large public sector and the pri-
vate services sector, the part of the economy exposed to international 
 competition is relatively small. Another probable reason—in addition 
to the insuffi  ciency of competition—is that the great (relative to GDP) 
amount of expenditure on education is not proportionate to the perfor-
mance of the educational system. Average PISA results are achieved when 
public spending on education is around 8 per cent. Th e most important 
tasks are to improve vocational training and to accelerate the process of 
receiving a degree. Utilisation and commercialisation of research results 
does not reach the expected level, given that public spending on R&D 
is quite high (Danish Government  2010 ; McGowan and Jamet  2012 ; 
OECD  2013j : 5,  2014b : 258). 
 Th e Danish labour market is operating in the internationally well- 
known system of fl exicurity, which is based on the joint mechanism 
of fl exible labour market regulation, generous unemployment benefi ts 
(especially in low-income cases), and the forceful application of active 
labour market policy. Th e 2008 crisis provides an opportunity to observe 
whether the system is able to return—relatively quickly—to the low level 
of unemployment after the economic decline. Persistently high unem-
ployment makes it impossible to maintain the three labour market insti-
tutions jointly, and the system becomes inoperable. As a result of the 
crisis, the unemployment rate doubled from 3.4 per cent in 2008 to 7 
per cent in 2013. Th e employment rate suff ered a decrease of 4.1 percent-
age points during the same period, but the 75.6 per cent rate in 2013 is 
still decidedly higher than the EU average (68.4 per cent). Th e increase 
in unemployment exceeded that of the other two Nordic countries, but 
employment in Denmark before the crisis surpassed the level that would 
have been reasonable on the basis of output, and the fi rst reaction to 
the crisis was redundancy. While in several countries, adaptation to the 
situation included reducing the working hours, in Denmark, adaptation 
manifested in reducing the number of employees. At the same time, the 
increase in unemployment was surpassed by the decline in employment. 
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Th ere are several reasons for this. Before the crisis, the number of mem-
bers of the unemployment insurance fund decreased, and those who 
were not insured do not appear in the unemployment statistics. As the 
result of the crisis, the enrolment ratio increased, and migrant workers 
began to leave the country. Although circumstances were unfavourable, 
the fl exibility of the system remained, which is demonstrated well by the 
notion that the number of people entering and leaving the labour market 
remained high. Naturally, the rate of fi nding a job is more unfavour-
able than it was before the crisis, but time spent unemployed remained 
short. Even during the crisis, 60 per cent of the unemployed found work 
within 13 weeks, and 80 per cent of the unemployed found work within 
26 weeks (Andersen  2012 : 125, 129). Another sign of fl exibility is that 
the unemployment rate for young workers is favourable compared to 
the international data; in 2013, it was 13 per cent. Th e current reforms 
aim to reduce disability pensions, integrating as many disabled people 
as possible in the labour market, phasing out early retirement options 
and employing workers with migrant backgrounds, that is, increasing 
job opportunities (EC SWD  2014d ). All in all, the fl exicurity system has 
coped with the crisis until now, but it is too early to decide whether, after 
the crisis, it will be successful in preventing persistently high unemploy-
ment in the long run (Table  5.2 ). Th e table summarises the complete 
chapter. Th us I refered to it in general in the intorduction of this Part.
 After the fi ve-year period of the crisis, the institutional systems of 
the Nordic countries do not show substantial changes compared to the 
model we have known until now. It is invariably characteristic of the 
Nordic model that economic growth is built on R&D&I, the necessary 
reform measures are brought about on the basis of cooperation among 
social partners, the level of employment is high, the role of the active 
labour market policy measures is important, strengthening competition 
is accompanied by a high level of social protection, and the fi scal pol-
icy of the state is disciplined. Th e crisis has drawn attention to the fact 
that although the Nordic model is usually characterised by the duality 
of intensive competition and extensive social protection, in reality, the 
competition in Denmark and Finland is strong in the tradable sectors. 
Although it is a general phenomenon in the market economies that there 
is a diff erence in the intensity of competition between the tradable and 
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non-tradable sectors, the extent of this diff erence in the two countries 
weakens the competitiveness of the entire economy. 
 Among the three countries, Sweden was the most successful in pull-
ing through the hard times of the crisis, the country where the char-
acteristics of the Nordic model manifest the most clearly and where 
the most consistent reforms were carried out in the previous one and 
a half decades. Naturally, these small, open economies cannot isolate 
themselves from their economic environment, the EU and especially 
from the impacts of the crisis phenomena of the euro area, which 
restrict their possibilities for growth. Th e perspective of the model is 
deteriorated and/or jeopardised by another factor—besides the external 
economic environment—that is, the ageing of society. Competition, 
which is strengthening due to globalisation, and the related increase 
in terms of social inequality did not come to a halt, which may under-
mine one of the most important “trademarks” of the model. Schnyder 
( 2012 )—in connection with Sweden—draws our attention to the fact 
that the high level of employment can be maintained only by badly 
paid jobs created in private households (clearing, maintenance jobs, 
and so on), and as a consequence, it may happen that certain social 
groups (especially immigrants or women) may get stuck in these. Th us, 
segregation of the labour market appears here as well, as confi rmed by 
Anxo ( 2012 ). If this segregation is maintained, it would destroy the 
egalitarian Nordic system. It is very instructive to compare these two 
approaches because it indicates the same facts are interpreted diff er-
ently by the authors, that is, the values and the preconception of the 
author cannot be eliminated from the process of interpretation. While 
Schnyder places emphasis on the integration of the neoliberal elements 
and the gradual breaking down of the Swedish (Nordic) model, Anxo 
places emphasis on the survival of the institutional characteristics. Anxo 
points out that, even with the right-wing government, the power struc-
ture remained balanced among the social partners; therefore, the cost 
of the crisis was shared. Changing the taxation and the welfare system 
in order to strengthen work incentives meets the characteristic features 
of the original Swedish model, which has always given work preference 
over passive support. 
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 During the crisis, factors that are usually not covered by the compara-
tive institutional studies also gained importance. Sweden could benefi t 
from having the most diversifi ed economic structure of the three coun-
tries, which may also be because its population is twice as large as that 
of Denmark or Finland. Th e product structure of exports and their geo-
graphic distribution also had a signifi cant eff ect. Although Finland—as 
described above—in certain areas (the labour market and pension scheme) 
did not implement reforms as profound as those in Sweden, its growth 
prospects, which are worse than those in the other two  countries, could 
not be attributed primarily to the lack of such reforms but rather to the 
fact that the sectoral restructuring of the industry is a time- consuming 
process. 
 Th ese three countries are almost like a testing area in which the eff ects 
of the monetary union can be investigated. Sweden was able to use, and 
indeed used, the currency depreciation device, but Finland could not 
live with the possibility of independent monetary policy, and neither 
did Denmark, because it was a member of the ERM II. Th is diff erence, 
however, did not signifi cantly infl uence the impact of the crisis. Th e 
eff ect of the depreciation of the Swedish krona was only temporary, and 
Finland and Denmark benefi ted from the monetary easing of the ECB, 
but its eff ect was also temporary. Finnish experts have also come to the 
conclusion that the application of the depreciation of currency does not 
have utmost importance in the crisis management, but this correlation 
is true only if the institutional system is functioning well (Korkman and 
Suvanto  2013 ). 
 Above, I have described the numerous hardships that Nordic countries 
have faced in the wake of the crisis. Th e EU’s economic governance, the 
government documents created in connection with the EU 2020 strat-
egy and other studies all indicate that, with their traditional professional 
governance, these countries are planning adequate steps to overcome dif-
fi culties and that these steps are adequately taken as well. For this reason, 
this model stands the chance of continual revival within the framework 
of the external restraints. 
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 Notes 
 1.  Th e total amount of the assets, as indicated in the analyses made by the 
Commission, was four times the GDP (ECFIN DG  2014o : 51; EC SWD 
 2014i : 13). By contrast, according to the statistical appendix of EC SWD 
( 2014i : 42), in 2009, it was 320.1 per cent and continuously decreasing; in 
2013, it was 289.1 per cent, and the same can be calculated on the basis of 
the ECB database. 
 2.  Th e mentioned weak competition in the construction sector belongs to 
exceptionally poor examples. 
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6.1  The English-Speaking Countries: 
Diminishing Attraction 
 Th e fact that the economic crisis aff ected the UK and Ireland more 
severely than it did the other North-Western EU member states may raise 
doubts about whether in the future they will still be as successful as they 
were before the crisis when—as described above—they were among the 
most competitive within the EU, besides the Nordic countries. Th erefore, 
it is reasonable to put these countries into an individual sub-category—as 
they were before the crisis—and investigate the institutional changes that 
have taken place since the outbreak of the crisis. 
 Economic growth in the  UK was approximately 3 per cent before the 
crisis and only the decline beginning in 2008 pulled down the average 
to 2.4 per cent (Table  6.1 ). Th e easy access to credit and the rise in asset 
prices was stimulated by fi nancial innovations and deregulated fi nancial 
markets. Banks relied more on wholesale funding and securitisation than 
on the collection of deposits. When the disturbances occurred on the 
international fi nancial markets and interbank lending became paralysed, 
asset prices dropped in the UK and interest rates soared. Th e fi nancial 
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crisis spread rapidly to the real economy, the consumption of the house-
holds and investments declined—in 2009, the economy shrank by 4.3 
per cent. Real estate prices fell by 4.6 per cent in 2008 and by 9.2 per 
cent in 2009. Th e decreasing amount of tax revenues, the automatic sta-
bilisers, and the restructuring of the fi nancial sector resulted in the rapid 
increase of fi scal defi cit; and public debt—which had previously been 
low—exceeded the Maastricht benchmark of 60 per cent as early as 2009. 
Th e Bank of England cut interest rates several times as of 2008 (in March 
2009, the base rate was only 0.5 per cent) and increased the money sup-
ply, which meant substantial quantitative easing. As part of the latter, 
the Bank of England purchased primarily government securities in the 
amount of GBP 375 billion (accounting for one-quarter of the annual 
GDP) between 2009 and 2013. Th e cost of recapitalisation measures and 
asset relief interventions accounted for 6.5 per cent of 2012 GDP. Th e 
market share of the four largest banks was approximately 80 per cent, 
and in two of them, the government obtained ownership: 39 per cent in 
Lloyds Bank and 82 per cent in the Royal Bank of Scotland. By 2014, 
the government had reduced its share-holding in Lloyds to 25 per cent 
by way of reprivatisation (IMF  2013e : 16, 25; European Commission 
 2014g ; EC SWD  2014j : 14).
 Fiscal consolidation progressed, but with diffi  culties, although the def-
icit decreased from 10.8 per cent in 2009 to 5.8 per cent in 2013, includ-
ing certain one-off  revenues as well (for example, the transfer of GBP 28 
billion from the Royal Mail pension fund). Th e public debt exceeded 87 
per cent in 2013, and a decrease can be expected only from 2017–2018. 
Budgetary saving measures—which weighed heavily on community 
investments and welfare expenditures—held back economic growth any-
how, and the government tried to fi nd the balance between the aspects of 
fi scal consolidation and stimulating growth. In order to fi nd this balance, 
certain taxes were increased, but corporate tax was reduced to 20 per cent 
by 2015; thus, this became one of the lowest taxation rates in the OECD 
countries (EC SWD  2014j : 7–8). 
 Th e crisis made it quite obvious that in addition to the crisis manage-
ment measures, the regulatory framework of the fi nancial system had to 
be changed. Experts of the Bank of England have come to the conclu-
sion that seeking self-interest does not create a self-regulating system, 
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as assumed by regulatory organisations before 2008. Th eir presumption 
concerning the attitude of the economic actors was not right; besides, the 
organisations regulating the fi nancial sector were not adequate either in 
the UK. Th e spheres of authority were divided by three organisations and 
their cooperation was not effi  cient. Th e Bank of England, the Financial 
Services Authority, and Her Majesty’s Treasury created a tripartite sys-
tem, which was univocally condemned by the professionals after the cri-
sis. 1 Since 2012, the supervision of the banks has been performed by 
Prudential Regulation Authority, which belongs to the Bank of England, 
and the supervision of certain non-bank fi nancial institutions has been 
performed by the Financial Conduct Authority. Th e Financial Policy 
Committee, established under the purview of the Bank of England, over-
sees macroprudential policy. Although the effi  ciency of the institutional 
changes performed so far is questionable (for example, in the concen-
trated banking sector, the harmonisation of the micro- and the macro-
prudential supervision seems diffi  cult), and the set of tools applied by the 
Financial Policy Committee is not strong either, the City is afraid that 
the increase in the regulatory burden may jeopardise the international 
competitiveness of the UK as a fi nancial centre (IMF  2013e ). 
 Th e fi nancial sector remained dominant in the economy of the UK, 
regardless of the crisis. Th e trade surplus of the fi nancial services was USD 
64 billion in 2012, which is three times larger than that of the USA. As 
far as bank assets are concerned, the UK ranked fourth globally, follow-
ing China, the USA and Japan; the UK ranked fi rst in international bank 
lending, and the country defended its position in the forefront in the 
case of fi nance-related legal and accounting services (Th e City UK  2013 : 
4, 7). Th e experts of the European Commission are also convinced that 
there are signs—especially in London—that parallel to the recovery of 
the global economy, the export activity of the fi nancial sector is gather-
ing strength again. At the same time, a risk factor for the banking system 
for the future is that after adjustment, real estate prices began to increase 
again quite signifi cantly, especially in London. Consolidated debt of the 
private sector in the case of both corporations and households stabilised 
after a temporary decline at a relatively high level, at approximately 180 
per cent of GDP (ECFIN DG  2014q : 30, 44–45). 
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 Th e UK lost 19.8 per cent of its global market shares during the fi ve 
years of the crisis between 2008 and 2012, which exceeds the loss suff ered 
by Germany or France. Losing global market shares did not stop in 2013, 
but its rate slowed down after 2011. Th e sharp depreciation of the ster-
ling took place in 2008–2009, which did not facilitate exports because 
exporters increased their sterling-denominated prices, and in 2012, an 
appreciation followed. Th ere has been a large defi cit in the trade in goods 
since 1997 (6–7 per cent of GDP in recent years), which is counter-
balanced by the dynamic increase in services. Not even the crisis could 
change this composition. Th ere are persistent structural characteristics 
that explain the diff erent dynamism of the export of goods and that of 
services. While the UK ranked seventh among the EU-27 member states 
between 2000 and 2010 in terms of productivity growth in services, the 
country ranked 16th in terms of the industrial sector. Th e diff erences 
concerning productivity growth are in line with the sectoral distribu-
tion of R&D performance. Th e UK is an innovation follower in the EU 
scoreboard, and R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP was below 
the EU-27 average by 0.1–0.2 percentage points before and after the 
crisis as well. At the same time, the intensity of R&D investments in the 
UK in the fi eld of services is one of the highest within the EU, and more 
specifi cally, the share of knowledge-intensive services within all services is 
one of the highest. By contrast, the intensity of R&D investments in the 
industrial sector is only tenth in the EU. Development of the industrial 
sector is hindered by the lack of a skilled labour force. While horizontally, 
the skill of the labour force is in line with the structure of the econ-
omy, vertically, there is wide discrepancy: more than 40 per cent of the 
labour force is either under- or overskilled; thus, there is a mismatch of 
labour market needs and skills. Th e extension of the apprenticeship pro-
gramme has been seen as a possible way to tackle this problem (ECFIN 
DG  2013h : 30–31, 35). Th e 2012 PISA report showed that while the 
performance of the British students is average, public expenditure on the 
education system as a whole is around the OECD average, but public 
expenditure specifi cally on public education exceeds the OECD average 
(OECD  2013j : 5,  2014b : 257). 
 Th e fl exible labour market is functioning surprisingly well; even 
experts are amazed. By 2013, the employment rate reached 74.8 per cent, 
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which is the highest value reached since 2008. Th is result is a result of 
the moderate rise in real wages and the expansion of part-time employ-
ment and self-employment. Th e expansion of part-time employment and 
the curtailment of welfare services theoretically would increase income 
inequalities, which were among the highest among the OECD countries 
(measured by the Gini coeffi  cient of household disposable income). Th e 
impact of the crisis is controversial so far. Th e crisis has decreased the 
inequalities because the fall in real incomes was larger at the top of the 
income distribution than at the bottom; nevertheless, absolute poverty 
increased (André et al.  2013 ). Th e Gini coeffi  cient decreased below the 
EU-28 average by 2013, but the rate of severely materially deprived per-
sons increased from 4.5 per cent in 2008 to 8.3 per cent in 2013. 
 Regarding labour relations, decentralisation of wage negotiations had 
already taken place before the crisis. Trade union density was 26 per 
cent in 2011, including the 56.3 per cent level in the public sector, and 
the 14.4 per cent level in the private sector. As a consequence, collec-
tive bargaining coverage extended over 67.8 per cent of the public sector 
employees and 16.9 per cent of those employed in the private sector. 
Th erefore, it does not come as a surprise that the crisis management mea-
sures were accompanied by few agreements between the social partners; 
major strikes were held in the public sector in 2011 due to the austerity 
measures (Eurofound  2014 ; Grimshaw and Rubery  2012 ). 
 Th e introduction of a profound reform in the welfare system is in 
progress. Within the Universal Credit programme—instead of individ-
ual welfare services—working-age people will be entitled to receive one 
single benefi t; thus, welfare provision to those who are employed and 
to those who are not will not be separated. Th e reform is expected to 
make the system more effi  cient and to strengthen the incentive to work, 
and without a doubt, this transformation enhances the application of the 
means-tested principle compared to the universal service provision. Th e 
Labour government began to curb welfare services as a reaction to the 
crisis, and this was closely and strongly followed by the Conservative- 
Liberal Democrat coalition, which came to power in the 2010 election. 
Th e modernisation of the system had already begun before the crisis. By 
modernisation, the New Labour ideology meant that the actors of the 
civil or private sector would take an increasingly larger role in public 
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services, as opposed to the government. Th e coalition government is even 
more determined to follow this path, but in the context of the crisis, it 
is doubtful whether the fragmented system is able to provide the public 
services and to avoid even greater regional diff erences (Grimshaw and 
Rubery  2012 ). In connection with the investigation of the welfare sys-
tem, one must face that the same facts can be interpreted quite diff erently 
depending on the approach of the researcher. Hemerijck ( 2013 ) recalls 
that Th atcher’s reforms had taken the welfare state, which was showing 
more extended universal features, into the direction of a typical, Anglo- 
Saxon residual model. Th e author points out that as of 1997 the Labour 
Party—at the level of welfare provision, in case of certain institutions—
became closer to the European welfare states, for example, the “New 
Labour” reforms were inspired by the active labour market traditions of 
the Nordic countries. In relation to the change of government in 2010, 
he fi nds that the turn of events matters and sees the logic of Th atcher’s 
era refl ected in the distribution of the burden imposed by the austerity 
measures. Grimshaw and Rubery ( 2012 ) emphasise the continuity of the 
neoliberal system, which became increasingly dominant as the crisis and 
the 2010 coalition government came about. Overall, statistical data to 
date have indicated that the relative position of the welfare system of the 
UK has not changed within the EU. Th e amount of social expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP is still close to the EU average. Nevertheless, 
regarding regional inequalities, unfavourable changes have happened. In 
2007, only one region, West Wales, belonged to the category of the less 
developed regions (where per capita GDP is below 75 per cent of the 
EU average); in 2011, there were fi ve. In 2007, 20 of 37 regions reached 
or exceeded the EU average, and in 2011, there were only seven such 
regions (European Commission  2010b : 12,  2014d : 2). Th e increase in 
the regional inequalities is associated with the fact that in the regions that 
had been aff ected by the industrial decline, the public sector provided 
two-thirds of the growth in working places during the boom years, which 
then fell victim to the austerity measures. 2 
 In the economy of  Ireland , the imbalances started to accumulate well 
before the global fi nancial crisis. As we have seen in Part II, since the 
beginning of the 2000s, economic growth was diverted from the export- 
driven path and was heated by internal demand, especially by the growth 
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in the construction industry. Housing investments began to decrease as 
early as in 2007 by 15 per cent and in 2008 by an additional 30 per cent. 
Economic decline had been 2.6 per cent in 2008 before the slowdown of 
global economic growth, which was followed by a 6.4 per cent contrac-
tion in 2009. With the burst of the real estate bubble, the banking sector 
began to suff er huge losses, and it collapsed before the Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy in the USA.  Th e government immediately—almost in a 
panic—introduced a guarantee not only for deposits but also for other 
liabilities of the six largest banks. Owing to the intertwining of the Irish 
banks with the European banking system, there was such a huge pressure 
on the Irish government that it could never withdraw this guarantee. Th is 
weighed extremely heavily on the budget: between 2008 and 2012, 40 
per cent of the 2012 GDP was spent on recapitalisation of the banks and 
asset relief interventions. In the 2000s, Ireland recorded fi scal surpluses, 
but in 2009, the defi cit was 13.9 per cent, and in 2010, it was 32.4 per 
cent, in which the costs of the bank bailout took a great part, naturally, in 
addition to the decrease in revenue resulting from the economic decline. 
In this context, the Irish government required the support of the EU and 
the IMF. Th e fi nancial assistance package included contributions from 
the EU of EUR 45 billion and from the IMF of approximately EUR 22.5 
billion, and the use of Irish fi nancial assets amounted to EUR 17.5 bil-
lion (EC SWD  2012b : 4; European Commission  2014g ; OECD  2009c : 
18, 31). 
 Th e path leading to the crisis has been reconstructed by Irish and 
international (EU, OECD) experts similarly. In the favourable interna-
tional environment, loans became available with low euro interest rates 
in the Irish banking system. Th is lending was covered not so much by 
deposits, but rather by short-term fi nancial resources obtained from the 
interbank markets. Ireland—similar to Spain, Portugal, and Greece—
off ered great investment potential, especially in the real estate sector. Tax 
allowances off ered for real estate development were not withdrawn by 
the government due to the coming election, although the signs of over-
heating had clearly been visible by that time. At the peak of the boom, 
the contribution of the construction industry to GDP reached 20 per 
cent. In the increasing competition, bank lending began to extend over 
riskier transactions, and the loose regulatory measures and the ineffi  cient 
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bank supervision were not able to stop it. During the restructuring of 
the banks, the National Asset Management Agency collected the toxic 
assets, more than 60 per cent of which originated from the Anglo-Irish 
Bank; however, this bank accounted for only 18 per cent of the mar-
ket. Failures of their management and their unacceptable practices in the 
case of the banks, especially in case of the Anglo-Irish Bank (which was 
nationalised as part of crisis management), all contributed to the evolve-
ment of the fi nancial crisis, and these defi ciencies were not eliminated by 
the market competition (contrary to the neoliberal presumption) and did 
not manifest in a decrease in bank shares. Th e institutional changes nec-
essary for strengthening the banking supervision were accomplished in 
2010–2011. Financial regulation and supervision were placed back under 
the purview of the Central Bank of Ireland, from which they had been 
detached in 2003. From loose principle-based regulation, they changed 
over to a more tightened rule-based regulation (Clarke and Hardiman 
 2012 ; OECD  2009c ). Th e share of non-performing loans (NPL) was 
still 24.6 per cent in 2013, which presents further risk for the banks and 
makes them unprofi table. Th e size of the banking system decreased sig-
nifi cantly, total assets of the banking sector were ten times the GDP in 
2009, but in 2013, it was only six times the GDP (EC SWD  2014s : 43). 
 Th e Irish government—partly due to the pressure from the Troika 
(EU, ECB, IMF)—performed an inexorably consistent fi scal consolida-
tion. Th e government managed to decrease the defi cit from 30 per cent in 
2010 to 8 per cent in 2012, and according to the government’s plans, the 
defi cit would drop below the 3 per cent Maastricht benchmark by 2015. 
Fiscal measures implemented between 2011 and 2013 total over EUR 13 
billion (8 per cent of GDP), two-thirds on the expenditure side, includ-
ing a EUR fi ve billion decrease in current expenditure and a EUR 2.7 
billion decrease in investments. As the result of the consolidation eff orts, 
Ireland was able to pay back the loans and to close the related agreement 
(which was concluded in 2010) in 2013. Th e institutional framework of 
persistent fi scal discipline was strengthened, fi scal planning containing 
the medium-term and annual expenditure ceilings was introduced, and 
in 2011, the independent Irish Fiscal Advisory Council was established, 
with a wide sphere of authority (IMF  2013b : 5–6). In light of the above 
measures, public debt is expected to sink below 110 per cent in 2015. 
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 Economic growth was hindered by the curtailment of public spending 
and the indebtedness of the households and the corporations, which was 
related (in both sectors) to real estate investments. In 2012, the consoli-
dated debt of the private sector was 281.5 per cent of GDP. In the case 
of enterprise indebtedness, it must be mentioned, however, that a sub-
stantial part of the debt is related to Ireland’s large multinational corpora-
tion sector, representing just 2 per cent of the companies and accounting 
for 57.4 per cent of the gross value added of all domestic enterprises. 
Deleveraging began in the case of indigenous fi rms as well as in the case 
of households. Th e latter have reduced their debts by almost 20 percent-
age points relative to GDP, but the rate has remained above 100 per cent, 
which is one of the highest in the EU (ECFIN DG  2014i : 19–22). 
 In view of the subdued domestic demand, only exports can enhance 
economic growth in which the Irish economy has achieved good results, 
as far as the fl uctuating external economic environment made it pos-
sible. After the outbreak of the crisis, profound adjustment was accom-
plished in the Irish economy. Real property prices decreased by 51 per 
cent between 2007 and reached their lowest point in March 2013. 
Since then, the housing market has stabilised, and housing prices have 
begun to rise in Dublin (ECFIN DG  2014i : 23). Th e decline in ULC 
between 2008 and 2010 was the greatest within the euro area, partly 
because labour productivity increased and partly because wages were 
kept low and the REER was devalued. Current account defi cit hit the 
deepest point in 2008 at 9.4 per cent, and in 2010, it swung to a sur-
plus. Th e structural changes in the economy have resulted in productiv-
ity growth, and the sectors with lower productivity—construction and 
tourism—have shrunk. Th e multinational companies operating in the 
high-technology sector have become engines of growth, primarily in the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries. Consequently, there has been a 
shift towards tradable sectors. Within industry, the greatest losses were 
suff ered by the domestically dominant food industry. Th e structural 
duality of the Irish economy—as described in Part II—became more 
profound as a result of the crisis. Th is also causes great diffi  culties because 
employment creation is focused in the domestic SME sector. Within ser-
vices, computer services show huge development but—in spite of the 
fact that in this fi eld, the role of the domestic fi rms is important and sig-
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nifi cant—in the fi eld of exports, multinational companies take the lead. 
Th e Irish economy as a whole belongs to the category of the innovation 
followers within the EU, but 70 per cent of the R&D expenditure of 
the business sector comes from foreign-owned companies (ECFIN DG 
 2014i : 38–46; Pina  2011 : 32). 
 Owing to the economic decline and the fi scal austerity measures, the 
unemployment rate jumped to 13–14 per cent, which was too much for 
the fl exible labour market to tackle. What made the situation even worse 
was that the decline was the greatest in the labour-intensive sectors, for 
example, in the construction industry and in tourism, where a great pro-
portion of the unskilled labour force was employed. A dangerous feature 
of unemployment is that the proportion of the long-term unemployed 
exceeds 60 per cent, which may lead to a rise in structural unemploy-
ment. Youth unemployment, with its 26.8 per cent level, still exceeded 
the EU average in 2013. Th e economic diffi  culties changed the direction 
of migration (which had been dominant for two decades) in 2011: net 
emigration included 34 thousand people, and half of them were Irish 
citizens (OECD  2013h : 260). 
 Further liberalisation of economic policy was the answer to the prob-
lems of unemployment, which aff ected primarily the public sector. 
Th e unemployment benefi t system changed as well, but in practice, it 
involved only those below 26 years of age; thus, it remains to be seen how 
successful it will be in decreasing long-term unemployment. Due to the 
structural changes in the economy, the discrepancy between labour mar-
ket demand and supply has increased (compared to the pre-crisis state of 
aff airs); for instance, employment in the construction industry will not 
return to its earlier level. Consequently, the application of the measures 
of the government’s active labour market policy has become necessary. 
In Ireland, even before the crisis, there was a dual system in vocational 
training and education, with the active participation of social partners. 
However, the majority of the apprenticeship positions were available in 
the construction industry—meeting the earlier labour market needs; 
therefore, the transformation of this system is in progress as well (EC 
SWD  2014s ; OECD  2013f ; Pina  2011 ). Ireland has always considered 
education a fi eld of strategic importance even during the crisis: according 
to OECD data, public spending on education climbed over 6 per cent 
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of GDP in 2010–2011, and it has been refl ected in the Irish students’ 
above-average performance in the 2012 PISA report (OECD  2013j : 5, 
 2014b : 257). 3 
 Expenditures on social protection benefi ts (at a level of 18 per cent of 
GDP) were low compared to the EU before the crisis, and the propor-
tion of means-tested benefi ts as a percentage of GDP exceeded by far 
the same fi gure for the UK.  In Ireland, these expenditures amounted 
to 4.4  in 2007 and, in the UK, to 3.5 per cent (EC SWD  2014j : 39, 
 2014s : 45). However, in view of the temporal trend, in the years of rapid 
economic growth, the sphere of state-provided welfare benefi ts dynami-
cally widened. Th is process was broken by the crisis, and the austerity 
measures aff ected all areas of welfare benefi ts from the family supporting 
benefi ts through the increase in retirement age to the introduction of a 
less generous pension scheme (Hemerijck  2013 ). During the crisis, the 
indicators of poverty as well as social inequalities rose equally, but data 
also suggest that welfare transfers substantially decrease the risk of pov-
erty (Table A.8). 
 Social partnership does not have deep roots in Irish society. Th e Irish 
economy skipped the post-war “Golden Age” of the welfare state. Ireland’s 
relations to the UK, its agricultural economy and the social importance 
of the Catholic Church, which was against the redistribution of income, 
all drove the country towards a minimalist, residual welfare state, which 
was very similar to the practice pursued by the Southern-European coun-
tries (Dukelow  2011 ). As of 1987, three-year agreements were concluded 
by the state, the employers and the trade unions; thus, social partnership 
evolved. However, this served the purpose of maintaining the competi-
tiveness of the country rather than the development of a welfare state. 
Th is result can be seen as an explanation to the fact that trade unions were 
rather passive when the crisis hit the country. Th ese trade unions con-
cluded the Croke Park agreement for the period between 2010 and 2014. 
Pursuant to this agreement, wages have decreased by 25 per cent in the 
public sector since 2009 (Erne  2013 : 42). Th is must be considered a huge 
step backwards, even if we take account of the fact that in the boom years 
of the Celtic Tiger, the non-tradable sector, specifi cally the public sector, 
was the main benefi ciary of the increase in wages. However, in 2013, it 
turned out that the decline in income is not enough for the undertaken 
262 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
decrease in defi cit. Croke Park II on another decrease of  average 7 per 
cent was not signed fi rst; however, the revised agreement under the name 
of the Haddington Road Agreement was signed by several trade unions, 
and as a result, it entered into force on 1st July 2013 (Table  6.2 ).
 As seen in Part II, the economic and social systems of both the UK and 
Ireland correspond—only as far as certain sub-systems are concerned—to 
the ideal type, which is identifi ed in literature as the Anglo-Saxon model 
that evolved during the 1980s. However, the USA and the UK share 
certain features of their development path, and these features gained cru-
cial importance during the 2008 crisis. Ireland also shares these features, 
namely, that the liberalised fi nancial system, the mortgage-based securiti-
sation and real estate development were the engines of economic growth. 
Th is also means that in case of the two European countries, the crisis did 
not come merely as a contagion that spread through global economic 
relations as an exogenous impact, but there was an endogenous factor 
as well. Th e question arises of how it will aff ect the institutional system 
if—due to the crisis—the sources of growth (as described above) cannot 
function in the same way they did earlier. 
 Regarding the processes of the crisis and those of crisis management, 
the UK and Ireland presumably will take diff erent paths. Th e UK’s role 
as an international fi nancial centre is based on centuries-old experience 
and expertise, and income originating from this sector cannot be replaced 
either from the aspect of national economy or that of government bud-
get. It has been a recurrent suggestion from British experts as well as 
from experts of international organisations in the context of economic 
development that the role of industrial production and that of the related 
services must be increased; however—as Hay ( 2013 ) points out—nei-
ther public opinion nor academic circles mentioned the necessity of a 
comprehensive change of strategy. Huge investments would be needed 
for an export-driven growth strategy, but the necessary capital is miss-
ing. New markets would be needed, where other competitors would be 
more experienced; furthermore, no rapid growth can be expected within 
the EU.  Realistically, only incremental changes might be expected. In 
vocational training, the government is clearly for a shift towards the dual 
system and tries to involve the employers as well by fi nancial incentives 
to employ young people in the framework of the apprenticeship sys-
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tem. Th us—similar to Ireland—a hybrid solution would result, because 
in the VoC literature, it is compatible with the fl exible labour market 
when employers do not spend money on the education of those who can 
change jobs easily. 
 Introducing more tightened regulation in the fi nancial system and 
transforming fi nancial supervision demonstrate a clear detachment from 
the institutional solutions in use so far, which were based on liberal 
regulation. Th e sustainability of the new regulation depends largely on 
the international environment. When defending its interests, the City 
strongly puts forward the argument that the increasing burdens of regu-
lation jeopardise the UK’s position among the most important fi nancial 
centres of global economy (Th e City UK  2012 ). In the USA, the long- 
term impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act on the new fi nancial regulation 
cannot be seen yet, but fi nancial institutions have already started to look 
for loopholes, and fi nancial lobbyists have already started to fend off  the 
regulations in those fi elds that are not within the scope of the Act (Deeg 
 2012 ). 
 After half a decade of the crisis, there are no signs of a radical institu-
tional transition in the British economy. At the same time, it is not likely 
that the fi nancial system plays the same dynamising role as it did before 
the crisis. Th e functioning of the European banking supervision and the 
Basel III provisions concerning capital standards all make it quite likely 
that—in spite of the lobbying activity of the fi nancial sector—things will 
not be back on track. Indebtedness of households also makes it impos-
sible for loan-based consumption and real estate development to again be 
the engine for growth in demand. Th is possibility is also hindered by the 
fact that a generation who obtained loans to pay their high education fees 
is entering the labour market. 
 Th e future of institutional development in Ireland is an open question. 
Although the Irish fi nancial system exceeded the British system in relative 
terms and the export of fi nancial services is strong, the fi nancial system 
does not have the same central role as it has in the British economy. 
Its oversized development is closely related to real estate development 
and the related lending activity. Because the indebtedness of the Irish 
residents is dangerously large, getting back to the earlier development 
path is even less likely than in case of the British. Furthermore, Ireland’s 
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euro area membership provides less room for manoeuvring in the fi eld of 
regulation than in case of the UK. 
 Th e most critical issue in Ireland is whether the productivity of the 
domestic economy is able to catch up with rapidly recovering multina-
tional companies. If the dual economy persists, Ireland will take the same 
development path as the Baltic states—but at a higher income level—that 
is, Ireland will be able to keep up its competitiveness only if wages and 
welfare provisions remain at a low level relative to its European neigh-
bours. In addition, social partnership presents assistance to this economic 
policy. If they succeed in keeping the diff erence between the productivity 
of the multinational large corporations and the domestic SME sector 
down, at a level similar to that of other developed countries, the develop-
ment of Ireland may be similar to that of another small North-Western 
EU member state, such as the Netherlands. 
6.2  Enduring German Economic Hegemony 
and Postponed French Reforms 
 During the years of the crisis, the positions of the continental countries 
rearranged. Germany—which had been referred to as the “sick man” of 
Europe for more than a decade after the unifi cation of Germany—is 
now often described as the hegemonic economy of Europe, in contrast 
to France, the recovery of which seems to be slow. Th e Benelux countries 
were variously burdened with stabilising their fi nancial sectors. Austria 
has gone through the diffi  cult years quite well (Tables  6.3 and  6.4 ). Let 
us examine the two large continental economies.
 Germany was hit by the economic crisis after the 2006 jump in growth. 
It happened already in 2007 that certain banks which had invested in the 
mortgage market of the USA (Hypo Real Estate, Sachsen Landesbank) 
got into trouble but the German politicians were hoping at that time that 
the crisis fundamentally remained an American problem. Th e German 
banks had substantial outstanding claims in the Mediterranean coun-
tries as well; for example, consolidated claims towards the Spanish banks 
amounted to almost one-quarter of Spanish GDP. In 2008, an act sta-
bilised the fi nancial markets, and the German government launched 
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stimulus packages aiming at assisting growth and employment, altogether 
amounting to 3.1 per cent of the 2008 GDP between 2008 and 2010 
(OECD  2010c : 63). In 2009, this measure could not prevent the 5.6 per 
cent decline of GDP due to the world trade collapse. Expenditures on 
fi nancial and economic consolidation elevated public debt over 80 per 
cent in 2010. In 2012, the budget showed a surplus, and it seems that 
Germany is able to return to a budget that is sustainable in the long run, 
in which the greatest risk is the ageing of society (EC SWD  2014q ). 
 In Germany, the fi nancial crisis was not fuelled by a real estate cri-
sis. Th e supply of the real estate market was increased by the subsidised 
construction of houses after the unifi cation, while the low level of popu-
lation growth, higher real interest rates (compared to other countries), 
and tighter regulations concerning mortgages held the demand back. 
Nevertheless, the recapitalisation of the banking system and the asset 
relief interventions between 2008 and 2012 amounted to 5.5 per cent of 
the 2012 GDP (European Commission  2014g ). Th e regionally organised 
state-owned  Landesbanken were the sources of one-third of the losses, 
one part of which undertook risky transactions, as they were politi-
cally infl uenced. Although in 2011, an act was passed on the restruc-
turing of the banks; the reform of the  Landesbanken proceeded slowly. 
Th e state ( Land ) guarantee behind these banks will be terminated until 
the end of 2015 due to the regulation of competition in the EU. Th e 
banking system is based on three individual pillars: privately owned 
(commercial) banks, banks owned by the public sector (saving banks 
and  Landesbanken ), and credit co-operative banks; this system makes 
the banking system quite fragmented. Th e capital adequacy ratio of the 
banks was low before the crisis, and in spite of the restructuring, banks 
remained vulnerable, although their capital started to increase. Between 
2008 and 2012, the core tier 1 capital of the 12 largest German banks to 
the risk-weighted assets increased from 8.3 per cent to 13.6 per cent. Th e 
system of fi nancial supervision did not perform well in Germany either 
during the crisis, the new act that meets the EU requirements concern-
ing the regulatory framework entered into force as of 1 January 2013. As 
a result, the Financial Stability Commission was set up that consists of 
the representatives of the  Bundesbank , the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority and the Federal Ministry of Finance. More effi  cient micro and 
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macro prudential supervision is expected from the regulatory body. Th e 
operation of the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund was extended until 
2014 (EC SWD  2013g : 15–16). 
 Regardless of the diffi  culties of the fi nancial system, Germany has 
proved to be quite successful in the real economy, the source of which 
can be found in the country’s international competitiveness. After the 
lowest point in international trade in 2009, German exports began to 
grow rapidly again, and by 2010, both exports and GDP exceeded the 
pre-crisis level. In addition to the usual surplus of the merchandise trade 
balance, the usual defi cit of the services balance decreased. Th us, the cur-
rent account surplus exceeded 6 per cent of GDP as of 2010, which 
is the reference value in the EU’s excessive imbalance procedure (the 
range between +6 and  − 4 per cent is considered the balance). Th e com-
petitiveness of Germany has strengthened for several reasons. As of the 
mid-1990s, the companies relocated the labour-intensive phases of their 
production to countries where wages were lower. Deeper integration into 
the global value chain is shown in the decrease of German value added 
of export products. Wages were strongly kept down after the mid-2000s, 
correcting the expenditure on wages that had soared after the unifi ca-
tion. Th e extent of wage moderation was greater in the tradable sectors. 
Between the introduction of the euro and the onset of the crisis, REER 
defl ated by GDP within the euro area fell by more than 10 per cent, 
which was accompanied in other—mainly Mediterranean—member 
states of the EU within the euro area by an increase in REER and an 
increase in current account defi cit. During the crisis, REER depreciated 
towards the non-euro-area partners (due to the nominal depreciation 
of the euro), and ULC increased over the euro area average due to the 
increase in wages. Non-price competition is demonstrated by the fact 
that between 1995 and 2007, German companies increased their market 
share in almost all segments of the R&D-intensive industries. Germany 
is one of the EU’s innovation leaders in the innovation scoreboard of 
the EU and during the years of the crisis already the non-price factors 
dominated in competitiveness (Belitz et  al.  2011 ; ECFIN DG  2014g ; 
European Commission  2014c : 5). 
 Th e German export companies specialised in exporting investment 
goods in the 2000s because, this way, they could improve their market 
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position in the emerging countries. Germany could increase its mar-
ket share in the R&D-intensive sectors, specifi cally in machinery and 
the automotive industry. Although the crisis hit these sectors as well, it 
proved to be only temporary. At the same time, the geographical distribu-
tion of German exports has changed. While in the pre-crisis decade, the 
share of the euro area in German exports was approximately 46 per cent, 
in 2012, it dropped below 40 per cent. In 2007, almost 60 per cent of the 
German current account surplus originated in the euro area, but in 2012, 
barely one-third did. Th e main reason for the decline was the contrac-
tion of demand caused by the crisis of the Mediterranean countries. At 
the same time, the decline in exports was not accompanied by a propor-
tionate decrease in imports. Furthermore, imports originating from the 
four Mediterranean countries between 2009 and 2012 increased by 25.8 
per cent, while German exports towards the same countries increased 
only by 2.4 per cent. As a consequence, a certain adjustment of the 
pre-crisis imbalances has been accomplished within the euro area. As of 
2008, the current account surplus surged—compared to countries out-
side Europe—due to the commercial activities performed partly with the 
USA, partly with the emerging countries. Germany managed to decrease 
defi cit  vis-á-vis China (ECFIN DG  2014g : 84–85, 88; Jannsen and 
Kooths  2012 : 369). Th e success of German exports is further enhanced 
by the fact that the most important companies are present in many coun-
tries with many products. German companies manage their exports via 
long-run customer and market relations, similar to their domestic eco-
nomic activities. Th ey can utilise this traditional institutional feature of 
the German economy because they export investment tools and not stan-
dardised goods. German experts call our attention to the export activ-
ity of German companies, which is successful outside of Europe as well, 
may help the economy of the euro area countries, which have been hit 
heavily by the crisis. Th e latter companies can integrate themselves into 
the global value chains of German exporters and enter the international 
markets together, which would otherwise be impossible due to high entry 
costs (Jannsen and Kooths  2012 ). 
 However, all these successes were not enough to protect Germany 
from losing global market share (10.7 per cent) between 2008 and 2013, 
which is—to a certain extent—inevitable for the developed countries as 
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a result of the appearance of the emerging countries. In the pre-crisis 
decade, labour productivity growth in the entire German economy was 
under the OECD average and fell behind the growth level of the USA or 
the UK (Erber and Fritsche  2009 ). After the decline caused by the crisis, 
the growth rate seemed to return to the pre-crisis level (between 1 and 2 
per cent) in the coming years. 
 In connection with the German economy, the dilemma often arises in 
which the savings of the households as well the companies are so high, 
while, at the same time, the domestic investments of the companies and 
consumption are so low that it may pull back economic growth and 
Germany may become too exposed to external demand. Th e analysis 
made by the European Commission provides a detailed account of all 
those varied impacts, the result of which is a great amount of savings. In 
case of households’ increasing income inequalities (after the 2000s), the 
taxation policy and awareness of the social problem of ageing played a 
role in the increase in savings, which limited the growth of consumption. 
Wage moderation also contributed to the slow increase in consumption. 
German companies were attracted to foreign investments because, with 
the introduction of the euro, external risks diminished, and higher profi ts 
and increased demand were available abroad. In Germany, tax rates were 
higher; credit conditions were less favourable, which again encouraged 
foreign activities. Th e increase in savings in the case of companies may 
have been infl uenced by international expansion and the wish to be inde-
pendent from bank fi nancing. A further reason for low domestic invest-
ment in the German economy is that a source of public savings was the 
decade-long curbing of infrastructural investment, and currently, it has 
reached a point where it hinders the development of the entire economy 
(ECFIN DG  2014g ). 
 Th e performance of the German economy during the crisis is often 
considered a success story because Germany increased employment. 
Unemployment increased by only 0.2 percentage points in 2009, at the 
deepest point of the crisis. In 2013, the employment rate was 77.3 per 
cent, and the unemployment rate was only 5.2 per cent. Several factors 
made this possible. Th e working age population decreased a little bit—
compared to the other OECD countries—in the years of the crisis. Th e 
decline aff ected the tradable sector, where capital-intensive production is 
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taking place. At the same time, the labour-intensive, non-tradable sectors 
(for example, the construction industry) did not decline, and because there 
was no real estate bubble, private consumption did not decrease either. 
Because before the crisis, there was a labour shortage in many compa-
nies, during the crisis, the companies opted for keeping their employees. 
However, the institutional reforms of the labour market were even more 
important. Th ese are known as the already-mentioned Hartz reforms 
in the 2000s. Th ese reforms provided a framework that made adaption 
easier during the crisis. Th e extension of the short-time work scheme was 
encouraged by reducing the employee-paid social security contribution. 
As a result, according to the estimations, 235,000 workplaces have been 
saved, which accounts for 0.6 per cent of employment. Collective agree-
ments have become more fl exible, and company-level agreements have 
been signed in order to maintain employment, with the applied tools of 
reducing weekly working hours and suspending annual bonus payments. 
After the elections in 2013, a grand coalition was formed, and one of the 
conditions imposed by the Social Democrats was the introduction of the 
general minimum wage as of 2015. It is too early to assess the impact of 
the general minimum wage on employment (EC SWD  2014q ; Hüfner 
and Klein  2012 : 13). 
 Despite these successes, there are still challenges the German employ-
ment policy has to face. Owing to the rapidly ageing population, it would 
be very important that women’s participation in the labour market should 
increase; in Germany their participation—specifi cally with regard to the 
number of hours worked—is below the average of the developed coun-
tries. Tax regulations and the shortage of childcare facilities hinder full- 
time female participation, it is clear that the institutional system moves 
towards the dual-earner-based family model with diffi  culties. Women 
account for two-thirds of all employees working in “Mini-Jobs”. During 
the crisis, the share of workers with fi xed-term contracts rose substantially: 
they accounted for 15 per cent of all employees, but among those aged 
15–24 years, 57 per cent had a fi xed-term work contract. Th e diff erence 
between EPL for regular work contracts and fi xed-term work contracts is 
also greater than in many other developed countries. Th is situation car-
ries the risk that fi rms are less likely to invest in the training of the young; 
therefore, social disparities will increase. Th e dual vocational system has 
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already been weakened by the fact that many young people with migrant 
backgrounds cannot obtain in school the knowledge required for appren-
ticeship training. Th e number of people participating in higher education 
is not enough to meet the anticipated needs of the labour market; thus, as 
of 2007, the Higher Education Pact 2020 has aimed to provide help by 
increasing state support to higher education. Regardless of the crisis, in 
2011, the second phase of the programme (until 2015) began amounting 
to EUR 4.7 billion (Hüfner and Klein  2012 : 25–26). German students 
performed above average according to the 2012 PISA report. Th is was 
achieved when public spending on education was only 5 per cent of GDP 
(below the OECD average) (OECD  2013j : 5,  2014b : 258). 
 Owing to its high performance, Germany did not have to apply such 
austerity measures in the social welfare provisions as many other coun-
tries did. In 2010, as part of the savings package, certain transfers were 
curtailed (Hemerijck  2013 : 358–359). In 2013, the grand coalition was 
formed, increasing the pension benefi ts of certain groups and making 
early retirement possible. Th e indicators of income inequalities showed 
improvement during the crisis, and the poverty indicators are below the 
EU average; nevertheless, these indicators are among the highest among 
the North-Western countries (EC SWD  2014q ; Table A.8). 
 Because the reforms in Germany began to achieve some results just 
before the crisis, it is not surprising that their responses to the crisis did 
not bring any great changes in the institutional system: the same contra-
dictory processes that had started in the 1990s continued. Th ese changes 
were incremental in nature, they were built onto the old institutions, and 
therefore, a kind of layering occurred. As demonstrated in Part II, due 
to the impacts of the EU and the globalisation eff ects, the fi nancial sys-
tem has shifted from the banking system (acting as “patient capital”) to 
a more liberalised, more market-oriented fi nancial system. In corporate 
management, the “stakeholder” attitude has been replaced by the “share-
holder” attitude. Th is replacement has been complemented by the steps 
taken to liberalise the labour market, weaken trade union density, and 
decentralise collective bargaining. At the same time, the crisis specifi cally 
enhanced the traditions of corporatist cooperation and helped the coun-
try pull through the crisis and avoid mass unemployment (Lehndorff 
 2012 ). In certain areas, old institutions developed further. As far as 
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labour relations are concerned, cooperation remained strong, and works 
councils have been reorganised in order to operate more fl exibly. In dual 
training—which has served as an example in many countries in the fi eld 
of vocational training reforms—more comprehensive professional skills 
have received more emphasis, and employers have remained the main 
partners of the state in running the training, while trade unions have 
been pushed to the background (Jackson and Sorge  2012 ). 
 It is worth noting that in international economic relations, the same 
has proven to be the key to German success as underlined by all institu-
tional analysis without exception, which is an essentially German feature: 
the cooperation and coordination between economic actors. Th e sustain-
ability of the present group of institutions is jeopardised mainly by the 
demographic processes and by the duality of the labour market and its 
social and economic consequences. 
 France had a less open economy than Germany; therefore, the 2008 
crisis caused a lower decline, which was at  − 2.9 per cent in 2009. Th e 
automatic fi scal stabilisers functioned effi  ciently. In the two years after 
2009, it seemed that the economy could return to the pre-crisis—that is, 
not too strong—dynamism, but after 2012, the economy was again close 
to stagnation. Th e unemployment rate climbed to almost 10 per cent, 
and it has been prognosticated that it currently remains there. Similar 
to the other governments, the French government also took measures to 
tackle the crisis in order to stabilise the banking system and to boost the 
economy. Th e banking system was in a relatively better state than in many 
other countries, thanks partly to its diversifi ed activity and partly to a 
relatively prudent approach to lending. Nevertheless, government inter-
vention was necessary as well. An entirely state-owned agency ( Société de 
Prise de l ’ État ) has been set up for the recapitalisation of banks, and in 
order to ensure their liquidity, and the seven leading French banks estab-
lished an organisation ( Société de Financement de l ’ Économie Française ), 
one-third of which was owned by the state. Th e cost of recapitalisation 
between 2008 and 2012 amounted to 1.3 per cent of the 2012 GDP. Th e 
instruments for stimulating the economy (infrastructural investments, 
supports provided to SMEs, and so on) were not of outstanding volume, 
either, accounting for 1.25 per cent of GDP. However, besides decreasing 
revenue, the fi scal defi cit was still 7.2 per cent in 2009. Th e decline in 
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revenue actually began in 2007 due to the tax reductions. Th e defi cit will 
not reach the Maastricht reference value of 3 per cent for years. Public 
debt exceeded 90 per cent in 2013, and it will certainly rise for a few 
years, although in 2007, the French public fi nance met the Maastricht 
criteria. Regarding long-term sustainability, France is in a more favour-
able position than most of the EU member states because due to the 
favourable demographic situation, the anticipated costs of ageing are 
lower. Th e fi scal discipline is expected to be helped by the High Council 
for Public Finances, an organisation that is independent from the govern-
ment and that was set up in 2012 (EC SWD  2014p : 13–14; European 
Commission  2014g ; OECD  2011a : 24). 
 Th e banking system stabilised after the diffi  culties of the crisis, and 
the top fi ve banks—holding 80 per cent of all banking assets—increased 
their capital, thereby meeting the Basel III provisions concerning capital 
standards by 2013. At the same time, there are some vulnerable points 
in the banking system. Th e claims of the French banks towards four 
European Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) 
and Ireland are still considerable, although their volume has decreased 
gradually since 2009, when these claims amounted to 15.7 per cent of 
GDP. Another critical issue is that the French banks are too reliant on 
wholesale funding. With the help of an act passed in 2010, the system of 
fi nancial supervision was renewed, which has functioned rather well since 
(OECD  2011a : 28–31). From the viewpoint of the stability of the fi nan-
cial system, it was benefi cial that there was no housing bubble. Although 
the real prices of real property increased by an annual 9 per cent between 
2000 and 2007, in the course of two years during the crisis, correction 
was only 7 per cent, and in 2011, real estate prices already exceeded the 
2007 level and then fell slightly again. As a consequence, the indebted-
ness of households—the majority of which derives from mortgages—is 
not critical, although the increase in debt has not ceased. Nevertheless, 
having the low level of new lending in mind, it can be predicted that the 
stock of debts will decrease gradually. In the corporate sector, the level 
of indebtedness is slightly higher than the EU average, and although its 
decrease has not started yet, measured using the debt-to-equity ratio, it is 
not particularly worrying (ECFIN DG  2014f : 45). 
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 Th e greatest challenge the French economy must face is the improve-
ment of competitiveness. Th e current account defi cit is approximately 
1.5 per cent, which is below the  − 4 per cent EU reference level, but in the 
decade before 2005, it was positive. France lost 21.5 per cent of its shares 
in the export market of goods and services between 2003 and 2008 and 
13 per cent between 2008 and 2013, due mainly to the losses suff ered in 
the market for goods. With the increasing exports of emerging countries, 
the volume of the global market increases therefore—similar to the other 
developed countries—the French economy cannot avoid the deteriora-
tion of its relative position either, but its extent is one of the greatest in 
the EU. One of the reasons why France was less successful in redirecting 
its exports to the rapidly growing economies was that 48.2 per cent of its 
exports were directed to the euro area in 2011. Furthermore, while 69.3 
per cent of the German industrial products were high-tech, or medium-
high- tech products, these products in France represented only 62.0 per 
cent because high-tech sectors (for example, the pharmaceutical and aero-
nautical industries) proved to be resistant during the crisis, on the other 
hand, the medium-tech sectors were hit heavily. Th e price factors and 
the cost and non-price factors of the French economy’s competitiveness 
deteriorated in the 2000s. Labour productivity increased at the same rate 
as the average of the euro area, but wages increased more rapidly; there-
fore, ULC increased more rapidly, even if not as quickly as in Italy or in 
Spain. Nevertheless, this growth was in sharp contrast with the German 
evolution of events. Not only did the expenditure on wages contribute to 
the increase in costs, but also that in the fi eld of services competition was 
modest. French companies also reduced costs by relocating their produc-
tion to CEE or to the Maghreb countries. However, as opposed to the 
Germans, which relocated only certain elements of the production pro-
cess, kept one part of value added in the country, and retained domestic 
skills and know-how, the French relocated the whole production process. 
Th is relocation means that products deriving from the relocated produc-
tion are not included in the French export statistics. Th e main reason for 
the decline in competitiveness is not found in the decrease of price com-
petitiveness, but in the non-price factors. Th e share of microenterprises is 
greater among French companies than among German companies, and 
these microenterprises are less suitable for export activity. As a result, 
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French exports are more concentrated than German ones. French com-
panies off set their declining cost competitiveness in a way that decreasing 
profi t was built in the export prices. At the same time, it had the conse-
quence that the business sector had to restrain its R&D expenditures and 
investments and, therefore, these dropped lower than those of the com-
petitors, which further deteriorated their competitiveness. Th e French 
government announced its National Pact for Growth, Competitiveness 
and Employment in 2012 and enacted a series of measures to stimulate 
innovation in the private sector. With the help of competitiveness clus-
ters ( pôles de compétitivé ), the connection between the public and private 
research activities was strengthened. In the EU’s innovation scoreboard, 
France is among the innovation followers. Th e World Economic Forum 
(WEF) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) also shows that business-
men do not consider the business environment too friendly (ECFIN DG 
 2013e : 17–18, 27–30,  2014f : 36–38, European Commission  2014c : 5). 
 What makes fi ghting high unemployment more diffi  cult is that the 
French labour market is highly segmented; there is a high degree of diff er-
entiation between outsiders and insiders, which unfavourably aff ects par-
ticularly the young and low-skilled workers. During the crisis, employers 
wanted to keep their employees by way of reducing working hours, and 
dismissals were accomplished mainly among employees with fi xed-term 
contracts (Jany-Catrice and Lallement  2012 ). Th e proportion of workers 
with fi xed-term contracts is not much higher than the EU average (in 
2011, 15.1 and 14.1 per cent). However, the number who were able to 
switch from fi xed-term contracts to open-ended contracts within a year 
was 14 per cent in France, 45 per cent in the UK, 29 per cent in Italy, 
and 23 per cent in Germany. In 2013, the social partners signed an agree-
ment on the reform of the labour market, the aim of which was to take 
the labour market into the direction of fl exicurity. Th ey aimed to make it 
easier for, in times of economic diffi  culties, working hours to be reduced 
temporarily, and in order to save jobs, company-level and sectoral agree-
ments can be modifi ed. Th ey also aimed to make individual and collec-
tive dismissals more fl exible. Disincentives were built in, as opposed to 
short-term fi xed-term contracts. Such measures and similar measures were 
intended to decrease the segmentation of the labour market. By contrast, 
82.8 per cent of the contracts signed in 2013 were fi xed-term contracts. 
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Th e labour tax wedge was the highest after Belgium; therefore, according 
to the provisions of the National Pact for Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employment, social partners have reduced the employment costs for the 
companies, which may have a benefi cial eff ect on employment, as well 
as competitiveness. However, the high and indexed minimum wage has 
survived, which weakens fl exible labour market adaptation. Furthermore, 
the success of labour market reforms has been jeopardised by institutional 
characteristics, namely, the weaknesses of labour relations. Th e diff erence 
in the extent of wage bargain coverage and that of trade union density was 
the greatest in France among the developed countries (95 per cent and 8 
per cent, respectively, according to Eurofound ( 2014 ) data). Th erefore, 
the representativeness of the trade unions was the lowest in France, and 
regardless of the decentralisation of the wage agreements, the collective 
agreements could be extended over all the sectors or regions, which could 
also be done by the government at the request of any of the negotiating 
parties. However, this is not the only aspect characteristic of labour rela-
tions’ quality. Based on the index-gauging opinion shared by business 
leaders, the willingness to cooperate between employers and employees 
is rather poor in France—only Italy and Romania (within the EU) show 
worse results. According to the WEF Global Competitiveness Report 
(2013–2014), general behaviour has been assessed as 3.4 on a scale of one 
to seven (from confrontation to cooperation), which means that France 
ranks 135th out of 148 countries (ECFIN DG  2013e : 38–41; EC SWD 
 2014p : 19; OECD  2013d ; Schwab  2013 ). 
 France is among those few OECD member states in which social 
inequalities measured by the Gini index did not grow between the mid- 
1980s and 2008. Th e high minimum wages have contributed to this 
result. Th e labour market situation, which has been deteriorating because 
the crisis could not be counterbalanced by the welfare provision, and 
the various indicators measuring risk of poverty and income inequalities 
have risen, but altogether, they are still below the EU average. As previ-
ously mentioned, the impacts of economic liberalisation beginning in the 
1980s were compensated by a high level of welfare provision, even though 
means-tested benefi ts also appeared as part of this provision. High social 
spending was the main reason why general government expenditures 
exceeded 55 per cent of GDP in 2011 (only Denmark had higher  fi gures 
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within the EU). Decreasing expenditures, which would aff ect social 
expenditures, is constantly on the agenda, but substantive measures have 
been taken only in relation to the pension reform. Th e generous pension 
system is an especially large burden if the government aims to accomplish 
a sustainable budget. In 2010, the government passed the decision on 
the gradual increasing of the retirement age and the restrictions on early 
retirement. Th e pension reform approved in 2013 will be able only to 
halve the defi cit of the system by 2020. Th e maintenance of moderate 
income inequalities has been made more diffi  cult by the fact that a dual 
system developed not only in the labour market but also in higher educa-
tion. Th e problem has already arisen in public education: schools are not 
able to subdue the diff erences between the various social backgrounds, 
and the diff erence between pupils in terms of performance became wor-
risome at the end of the 2000s, in which the learning diffi  culties of pupils 
with migrant backgrounds play a part as well. In the fragmented higher 
education, the process of diff erentiation continues, and there is a gap 
between schools known as “ grandes écoles ” (which function in a selective 
environment, are fi nanced favourably and are showing excellent results) 
and other higher education institutes (OECD  2013d ; EC SWD  2014p : 
15; Hemerijck  2013 : 359–360). 
 According to the 2012 PISA report, French students’ performance is 
average, while public spending on education only slightly exceeds the 
OECD average. In the education system—similar to many other European 
countries—the greatest eff orts have been taken towards practice- oriented 
vocational training; nevertheless, the number of apprentices decreased 
by 8.1 per cent in 2013 (EC SWD  2014p : 22; OECD  2013j : 5,  2014b : 
258). 
 During the crisis, the French institutional system took the same path 
as the country took in the course of the earlier reforms in the previous 
decades. Th e case of the Nordic countries and Germany confi rms that 
strengthening competition, liberalising the fi nancial and labour mar-
kets and enhancing cooperation between social partners can be pulled 
together—although sometimes with diffi  culties. However, in the French 
version of the continental model, the weaknesses of social partnership 
were compensated by the prominent role of the state. After weakening 
this outstanding role, the cooperation between social partners could not 
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provide as supportive a background to the competitive functioning of 
the economy as in the Nordic countries or in Germany. Amable et al. 
( 2012 ) indicate that behind the diffi  culties of the French economy lies 
the change in the political background. Th e economic and social impacts 
of the reforms, which have been on the agenda since the 1980s, disturbed 
the balance of interests and, consequently, the compromise between the 
political right and left wings. No dominant social block that would be 
able to push the economic or social policy into the direction of a clearly 
neoliberal or social democratic/continental direction has developed since 
then. As a result of the crisis, the relations to the liberalised EU market 
and the views on the role of the state have become even more polar-
ised. Th ere was a fl icker of hope that following the agreement between 
the social partners in 2013, there would be more cooperation between 
the partners, but after the socialist—but at the same time more market- 
friendly—Manuel Valls was appointed in March 2014, the diff erences 
became more acute, again. One thing seems to be certain: if France wants 
to maintain its competitiveness, the strictly market-based capitalism 
model—with all of its social consequences—can be avoided only if the 
country can strengthen the institutions built on the cooperation of the 
social partners in the economy and in politics because the absence of this 
cooperation can no longer be replaced by state interventions (Table 6.5). 
6.3  Adjustment in the Smaller Continental 
Countries 
 Th e Netherlands suff ered a 3.3 per cent decline in 2009 after the pre-
vious years of a 2.7 per cent average growth rate. Th e recovery of the 
economy has been slow; a modest boom was followed by contraction 
in 2012 and in 2013 (by  − 1.6 per cent and  − 0.7 per cent, respectively). 
Unemployment did not increase fi rst compared to the pre-crisis period, 
but it was 5.3 per cent in 2012 and 6.7 per cent in 2013. Six–seven per 
cent is expected for the coming some years. Th is occurred in spite of 
the fact that the government allowed the automatic stabilisers to work, 
although due to the strict fi scal regulation, it should have decreased 
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expenditures, given that defi cit was 2 per cent. Th e discretionary instru-
ments applied in the fi scal package in 2009–2010  in the Netherlands 
amounted to 2 per cent of GDP, including tax reduction, infrastructural 
investments, and employment promotion measures—similar to the other 
countries. Th e Netherlands recorded a budget surplus in 2008 (0.2 per 
cent), but in 2009, it turned into a defi cit of 5.5 per cent. Th e discre-
tionary instruments were only temporary, they were originally planned 
to last until 2010 (OECD  2010i : 22–24). In 2011, fi scal consolidation 
began, and since then, the defi cit has decreased—in 2013, it was 2.3 per 
cent. However, public debt, which was 42.7 per cent in 2007, has grown 
by more than 20 percentage points since the crisis, and it is expected to 
remain at around the level of 70 per cent in the coming years. 
 Th e analysis of the fi nancial systems in Part II indicates that the fi nan-
cial sector plays an especially important role in the Dutch economic sys-
tem. Th e greatest amount of claims is towards Germany, the USA and 
the UK, and the largest exposure is to Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland, 
relative to the GDP of the borrowing countries. Th e Netherlands’ inter-
national embeddedness is fi rm, and the presence of the banking system is 
quite strong in the domestic real estate sector as well, to which 30 per cent 
of all loans were provided. Th e international fi nancial crisis brought the 
banking system to the brink of collapse in late 2008. Fortis Netherlands/
ABN AMRO, which had been a member of a large international banking 
consortium, was nationalised. In 2010, Fortis Netherlands was integrated 
into ABN AMRO, and its name ended. After restructuring, ABN AMRO 
remained a Dutch state-owned bank, which can return to private hands 
via a stock market listing in 2015. Th e other large Dutch conglomerate, 
including ING, needed recapitalisation due to the losses suff ered in the 
mortgage market of the USA. One of the four major banks, SNS REAAL 
Bank, was nationalised in February 2013. In addition to nationalisation 
and recapitalisation, the Dutch government also provided direct loans 
and government guarantees to support the fi nancial system. Th e three 
major banks paid back half of the support received for recapitalisation by 
2010. Recapitalisation and asset relief between 2008 and 2012 amounted 
to 4 per cent of GDP in 2012. Th e crisis of the Dutch banking system 
also resulted from the fact that the regulation, although in compliance 
with international requirements, was relatively lax compared to that of 
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many other countries, in terms of capital requirements, accounting and 
supervision rules, as well as bankruptcy procedures. Th e supervisory body 
functioning in the framework of the Dutch National Bank has already 
been strengthened, and the Financial Stability Committee has been 
established, but according to the experts of the IMF, further measures are 
needed to extend the entitlement of the Dutch National Bank (European 
Commission  2014g ; OECD  2010i : 28–30; IMF  2013d : 12–14). Th e 
banking system was still large after the crisis; in 2013, total assets of the 
banking sector amounted to 373.6 per cent of GDP (EC SWD 2014ü: 
46), 4 while at the same time, the banking system was very vulnerable as 
a result of mortgage debt and its dependence on wholesale funding. Th e 
high level of mortgage debt of households was attributable partly to tax 
deduction on mortgage interest and partly to the small, strictly regulated 
social housing market. Social housing has been enjoying subsidies and 
support since 1901, and therefore, social housing accounts for one-third 
of the housing market, which cannot be seen anywhere else in Europe. 
Since the mid-1990s, most subsidies have been abandoned, while social 
housing remained strongly regulated, which led to a substantial decrease 
in the construction of social housing, and home ownership was stimu-
lated. Although between 2008 and 2013, housing prices decreased by 
20 per cent, this happened continually and not suddenly; prices have 
stabilised since 2013. Due to their indebtedness, households did not have 
much savings—although the amount of savings increased during the cri-
sis; therefore, substantial interbank funding was needed. Another reason 
for deposit funding gaps is that the two pillars of the pension system 
(the formally voluntary but practically mandatory second pillar and the 
voluntary third pillar) absorb many savings. Th e operational rules of the 
second, occupational pillar prescribe the funding ratio between the value 
of the assets and the net present value of nominal liabilities, which must 
be met. During the crisis, this funding ratio naturally declined; thus, pre-
mia had to be increased, which pro-cyclically decreased the income of the 
households and, consequently, the demand (ECFIN DG  2013g : 29–39). 
 At fi rst sight, it may seem surprising that the Netherlands recorded 
current account surpluses, even in the years of the recession (hitting 
the lowest point in 2009 at 5.2 per cent) and that, since 2010, it has 
exceeded 6 per cent of GDP (exceeding the +6 per cent threshold of the 
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EU’s excessive imbalance procedure). In order to assess this fi gure, several 
characteristics of the Dutch economy have to be taken into account. Net 
exports of natural gas constitute a factor adding to the surplus, account-
ing for approximately 1–2.5 per cent of GDP. Th e geographical location 
of the Netherlands (with the port of Rotterdam being a trade gateway 
to Germany) and the developed transport infrastructure and logistics 
sector have given a huge impetus to re-exports. In 1995, re-exports 
accounted for only one-third of the Dutch goods balance, while in 2013, 
it accounted for roughly one-half, contributing some two percentage 
points to the total current account surplus. Th e relative underperfor-
mance of domestically produced exports can be explained by the fact 
that they are dominated by foodstuff s, chemical products, and machinery 
equipment. Th e demand for these products is increasing more slowly 
than the demand for computers and electronic equipment in re-exports. 
Th e services balance has been positive since 2004 primarily because the 
Dutch legal and taxation environment is favourable to multinational 
companies; therefore, multinational companies are keen on setting up 
their global headquarters in the country. Moreover, multinational com-
panies generate profi ts that are far above the EU average. Not all this 
income is retained in the Netherlands, however, because Dutch shares in 
foreign hands amounted to 55 per cent of GDP in 2011 (compared to 
only 20 per cent in Germany). However, the presence of multinational 
companies is a very important source of income and provides an explana-
tion for the fact that the Dutch non-fi nancial corporate sector has shown 
a persistent savings surplus. Moreover, profi ts repatriated by the foreign 
subsidiaries of Dutch enterprises accounted for 1.1 per cent of GDP in 
2004 and 4.7 per cent in 2011. In the Netherlands, an increasing share of 
exports is directed to emerging markets, but due to the country’s role as a 
trading centre, it is hardly surprising that three-quarters of its exports are 
still directed to the EU (more precisely, one-quarter of them is directed to 
Germany) (ECFIN DG  2014p : 21–28). Th e 9.5 per cent loss of export 
market shares between 2008 and 2013 befi ts the necessarily occurring 
and frequently mentioned trend characteristic of developed countries. 
Th e cost competitiveness of the Netherlands is not at risk, regardless of 
whether the evolution of ULC or that of REER is examined. Regarding 
non-cost competitiveness, the Netherlands is among the innovation 
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 followers in the EU’s scoreboard; its R&D expenditure is around the 
EU average. Business enterprise expenditures on R&D are a slightly 
below the EU average and concentrated on a limited number of multina-
tional companies. Th e Dutch manufacturing sector has shifted towards 
the medium-high-technological products. Since 2012, the government 
has been running its enterprise policy featuring a sectoral approach to 
public- private partnerships involving the actors of the business sector, 
including the SMEs and research institutions with the aim to develop 
sector- specifi c policies and to encourage private investments in the area 
of R&D&I (EC SWD  2013k ). 
 Hemerijck ( 2013 : 183) presents the Dutch labour market as an exam-
ple of how to manage to strike a balance between fl exibility and the pro-
tection of the employees (the latter provided for employees with part-time 
and fi xed-term contracts as well). Th e cluster analysis in Part II described 
the Dutch labour market as an individual case, that is, as a unique reali-
sation of fl exicurity. However, given the declining employment trend, 
EU experts warn of the duality of the labour market (EC SWD  2013k : 
13). According to the index showing the EPL, protection for regular 
employment is the fourth highest in the Netherlands among the OECD 
countries, while protection for temporary employment is the ninth low-
est (OECD  2013a : 273). Th e good performance of the educational sys-
tem and, more precisely, the vocational education system results in low 
youth unemployment (11 per cent in 2013), although it has been on the 
increase lately, especially among the families with migrant backgrounds. 
 Th e ageing of society makes it necessary for the average number of 
working hours to be increased, which is otherwise relatively low. Th e 
main reason for this is that part-time employment is widespread among 
women. In order to make better use of labour potential, an agreement 
was made between the government and the social partners in April 2013. 
On the basis of this agreement, certain acts that entered into force in 
2015 were passed. Th e EPL will be liberalised further, which is expected 
to decrease the duality of the labour market. Th e maximum length of 
time for which statutory unemployment benefi ts are paid will be gradu-
ally reduced from 38 months to 24 months, and there will be further 
measures to improve labour market participation and mobility. To this 
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end, schemes for people with disabilities have been reformed as well (EC 
SWD 2014ü: 20–22). 
 Due to the ageing population, the otherwise generous Dutch pension 
system had to be reformed. In addition, the crisis itself has produced 
austerity measures in the entire system of welfare provision as well. Th e 
coalition government of the Christian Democrats and Social Democratic 
Party could not push through its plans because the government fell in 
2010 and because the Conservative Liberal minority government was in 
power only until 2012. In the spring of 2012, the caretaker government 
managed to push through a consolidation package, which was imple-
mented by the Conservative Liberal government in coalition with the 
Social Democrats after the 2012 elections and was complemented with 
another. Th e austerity measures included several areas of welfare provi-
sion, but the most important changes were introduced in the pension 
system and in health care. In tertiary education, as of 2012, students are 
expected to fully fi nance their studies privately but can take low- interest 
loans from the government. Th e retirement age has been raised, and 
reforming the second pillar of the pension system is also on the agenda 
because the fi nancial crises in 2000 and 2008 caused losses that crushed 
the ambitions that the introduction of the second pillar in the pension 
system would be enough to sustain the 70 per cent replacement rate (EC 
SWD  2013k : 18; De Deken and Maarse  2013 : 13). 
 In the mid-2000s, several reforms were introduced in the Netherlands 
with the aim of shifting from government control to a market-based sys-
tem of health care. However, the increase in costs could not be stopped. 
Health care costs (as a percentage of GDP) are among the highest in the 
OECD countries, while life expectancy at birth is similar to the Western 
European countries’ average. According to the government’s own assess-
ment, the health care system is “stuck in the middle” between a centrally 
planned and a market-oriented system. Th e reforms introduced between 
2010 and 2015 aimed partly to curtail the growth rate of public health 
expenditures and partly to enhance competition (De Deken and Maarse 
 2013 ; OECD  2012d ). 
 Th e Netherlands belongs among those welfare states that have tried 
to make welfare provision sustainable with the help of marketisation for 
two decades. In addition to the processes described above, the share of 
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benefi ts received on the means-tested principle is high and increasing 
compared to other North-Western continental countries (4.7 per cent of 
GDP in 2011 [EC SWD 2014ü: 49]). In the fi eld of social protection, at 
the end of a long and gradual transition, a unique combination of welfare 
and workfare elements, universal and selective social rights, and public 
and private expenditures has come into existence. During the crisis, obvi-
ously, the welfare, universal elements got pushed into the background and 
the workfare, selective elements gained ground (Yerkes and Van der Veen 
 2011 ). Th e impact of the changes that came into force in 2015 cannot 
be seen yet, but the results so far are ambiguous. Th e good news is that 
the Dutch society remained inclusive in nature. During the crisis, neither 
the risk of poverty indicators nor the indicators for income inequalities 
grew (Table A.8). At the same time, the total cost did not decrease com-
pared to the other Nordic countries. Th e expenditures on social protec-
tion (in Eurostat data, public and private expenditures appear together) 
were high in 2011, accounting for 30.5 per cent of GDP (in comparison, 
in Sweden, it was 29.0 per cent of GDP, and in Denmark, it was 32.8 
per cent). 
 In the fi rst years of the crisis, the traditional tripartite solutions did not 
function smoothly, but altogether, the cooperation between the social 
partners remained strong according to the legacy of the “polder model”, 
which is described in Part II. Trade union density is only approximately 
20 per cent, but collective agreements cover more than 80 per cent of 
the employees. Th e number of company-level agreements has risen, but 
sectoral agreements are still dominant (EC SWD  2013k : 17; Eurofound 
 2014 ; Freyssinet  2010 ). 
 Th e Dutch students performed above average in the PISA tests in 2012 
(OECD  2013j : 5). In the Netherlands, public expenditures on education 
were slightly above the OECD average, even during the years of the crisis, 
but within government expenditures, the share of education is decreas-
ing. Th e government is planning to decrease the spending on education 
further, which means that further reduction can be expected relative to 
the GDP, as well as within government expenditures (in the case of the 
latter, it is will drop from 19.1 per cent in 2005 to 16.6 per cent in 2017). 
It remains to be seen what eff ect this will have on the quality of education 
(OECD  2014b : 258; EC SWD 2014ü: 10). 
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 From the above, it can be seen that the Netherlands has several 
 favourable structural and institutional features; however, the eff ects of 
the fi nancial sector’s consolidation and the mortgage debt accumulated 
in the households persistently slow down its development. 
 Belgium weathered a minor decline compared to the Netherlands in 
2009; its economy contracted by 2.6 per cent. After the boom in 2010, 
growth was modest—similar to the other countries in the euro area—
but Belgium’s advantage of one percentage point against the Netherlands 
remains. It is anticipated that a growth of approximately 1 per cent 
will follow in the coming years, and thus, the gap may close, and the 
Netherlands may take the lead. Th e unemployment rate of above 7 per 
cent was not higher than it was before the crisis, and it has stabilised at a 
level above 8 per cent since 2013. 
 When Belgium prepared for the euro adoption, it continually decreased 
its public debt, which was reduced from above 130 per cent in the begin-
ning of the 1990s to 86.9 per cent in 2007. In spite of the eff orts that 
were taken for one and a half decades, this decrease meant a high starting 
level in the crisis, and the government introduced a moderate fi scal stim-
ulus package accounting for 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2009–2010 (OECD 
 2009a : 10). Fiscal defi cit was 5.5 per cent in 2009, and Belgium has been 
successful in maintaining this defi cit at the level of 3 to 4 per cent. Public 
debt exceeded 100 per cent in 2011, and it is expected to remain at this 
level (100–110 per cent) in the coming years. Primarily, the large pub-
lic debt and the costs of the ageing society (which are rising at a higher 
rate than the EU average) weigh heavily on the budget. In 2012, the 
old-age social security system was curtailed, and the rules pertaining to 
early retirement were tightened. Th e workfare system of unemployment 
benefi ts entailed savings in the budget as well. Minor austerity measures 
have always been on the agenda pertaining to health care and other social 
expenditures, but it seems that these measures will not be enough for long- 
term fi scal sustainability. Th is situation may remind us of the reforms of 
the 2000s, which had modest results (Hemerijck  2013 : 187). Within the 
federal state, the spheres of authorities have been constantly changing; 
therefore, increasingly more complicated coordination has been needed, 
which made managing the budgetary processes more diffi  cult. In 2012, 
fi scal federalism developed further in the framework of a reform known 
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as the “sixth reform of the state”, and certain social expenditures and the 
related tax collection rights were given to the regions and communities. 
Th e majority of expenditures related to ageing have remained at federal 
level for the time being (OECD  2013c ). Th e weakness of the federal 
state is well demonstrated by the fact that, following the 2010 elections, 
Belgium did not have an elected government for 589 days. In 2014, four 
and a half months after the general elections held on 25th May, the new 
government was formed on 11th October. 
 Th e restructuring of the banking sector substantially contributed to 
the increase in public debt. Th e assets of the Belgian banks amounted 
to nearly four times the Belgian GDP in 2008, according to the ECB 
database. 5 Th e three largest fi nancial conglomerates (BNP Fortis, Dexia, 
KBC) experienced severe market pressures as early as the second half of 
2008 and were in need of capital injections, partly due to their exposure 
to the US market and partly owing to individual reasons. For instance, 
Fortis suff ered from a fragile balance sheet resulting from the acquisi-
tion of ABN AMRO (OECD  2009a : 18). Th e situation was critical, in 
spite of the fact that no real estate bubble evolved in Belgium, although 
housing prices were increasing rapidly and real prices has been stabilised 
since 2008. Neither the corporate nor the household consolidated debt 
put the banking system at risk. Recapitalisation and asset relief between 
2008 and 2012 amounted to 10.7 per cent of the 2012 GDP (European 
Commission  2014g ). Th e market position of the banks including KBC 
and BNP Fortis improved, and government subsidies were no longer nec-
essary. Th e repayment of assistance schemes is on-going. Dexia proved to 
be a persistent problem: in 2011, it was split and subsequently recapital-
ised for a second time, and the Belgian and French banking arms were 
nationalised. Th e Belgian banks substantially decreased their exposure 
to foreign countries, especially to the Southern European public sector. 
However, the increasing Belgian government bond holdings pose further 
risk to the fi nancial sector. Assets of the Belgian banks (60 per cent of which 
were foreign-owned) in 2013 hardly amounted to more than two and a 
half times GDP, and altogether, it can be said that the banking system sta-
bilised. Th e supervision of the fi nancial sector was reorganised in 2011: 
two centres, “twin peaks” of the banking supervision—the National Bank 
of Belgium and the Financial Services and Markets Authority—were set 
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up. Th e legal framework of fi nancial supervision was tightened further 
in 2013 (EC SWD  2014l : 15–16; OECD  2013c : 16–17). Th e Belgian 
current account had deteriorated since the beginning of the 2000s, and 
its surplus of 5 per cent eroded to 1.9 per cent in 2007. During the cri-
sis, the current account turned slightly negative, but it is expected to be 
in balance in the coming years. Between 2008 and 2013, Belgium lost 
9.1 per cent of its global market shares, which is clearly the result of the 
increasing international trade activity of the emerging countries. Th ese 
data in themselves do not give serious cause for concern; however, the 
background factors do indicate trends that may lead to a persistent loss 
in competitiveness. Th e deterioration in the current account was caused 
by the downward evolution of the goods balance, which could not be 
compensated by improving the services balance. Th ere are a few factors 
that hindered the growth of Belgian goods exports. On the one hand, in 
the last decade, the share of capital goods in manufactured exports was 
below 10 per cent and that of intermediate goods was approximately 
60 per cent. Th is means that there is a minus-ten-percentage-point dif-
ference in capital goods and a plus-ten-percentage-point diff erence in 
intermediate goods compared to Germany, France, or the Netherlands. 
At the same time, the demand for intermediate goods is increasing more 
slowly than the demand for capital goods. On the other hand, during the 
crisis, Belgian companies managed to direct the majority of their exports 
to the increasingly growing emerging countries; however, 70 per cent 
of Belgian exports are still oriented towards the EU member states. Th e 
third factor is the decline in cost competitiveness. Th is can be detected 
in the appreciation of REER, which had been on-going since the begin-
ning of the 2000s and in which certain correction was performed during 
the crisis, but it was not enough to regain competitiveness (ECFIN DG 
 2014a : 17–21). 
 In Belgium, there are institutional constraints imposed on increasing 
non-cost competitiveness and cost competitiveness. Th e most important 
factor in non-cost competitiveness is technological competitiveness. In 
Belgian exports, the share of high-tech and medium-high tech products 
was 57.2 per cent in 2011, which is lower than their share in German 
or French exports (69.3 and 62 per cent, respectively) but similar to that 
in Dutch exports (56.7 per cent). Th e share of high-tech products in 
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Belgium was 18 per cent, which is similar to the German case (18.8 per 
cent) but lower than the French and the Dutch cases (26.2 and 27.3 per 
cent, respectively) (ECFIN DG  2013a : 25). Belgium’s innovation per-
formance places the country among the innovation followers in the EU’s 
scoreboard (European Commission  2014c : 5), in compliance with the 
importance of the intermediate goods and with the fact that it is not the 
services related to the high-tech products that grow within the exports 
of services but rather the transport and business services. Belgian R&D 
expenditures are at the level of the euro area average. Since the beginning 
of the 1990s, the majority of the R&D policies have been decentral-
ised among the regions, and as a consequence, the potential for synergies 
between the regions is lacking. Th e Walloon Region’s innovation strategy 
is laid down in the document known as the “Marshall Plan 2022”, while 
Flanders’ innovation strategy is described in “New Industrial Policy”. 
Two-thirds of the Belgian R&D expenditures are from the business sec-
tor, which is considered the optimal proportion; however, business R&D 
is indeed highly concentrated, and more than half of industrial R&D is 
realised by foreign-owned companies (ECFIN DG  2013a : 44–45; EC 
SWD  2014l : 21). Th ese resources will remain intact only if they manage 
to keep the R&D activity of the companies in Belgium. Enhancing inno-
vation is also important because Belgian export products should advance 
higher in the value chain from their present medium position in order to 
be able to maintain the higher wage costs. 
 Two factors erode cost competitiveness. Th e prices of certain inter-
mediary inputs, such as energy prices and the prices of certain services 
on the market in which competition is weaker, are higher than in neigh-
bouring countries. Recently, the evolution of wage costs has been less 
favourable than in the case of competitors. ULC has been growing more 
rapidly compared to Germany since the adoption of the euro and, since 
2005, compared to the euro area average as well. In 1996, a central-
ised, coordinated wage bargaining system was introduced with the par-
tial aim of maintaining international competitiveness. Th e wage increase 
determined as the result of this system is transferred to sectoral wage 
agreements, which cover more than 90 per cent of employees. Th e wage 
increase was adjusted to the expected wage increase of the major trading 
partners, and it was implemented in the entire country, regardless of the 
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regional and sectoral diff erences in productivity. Th e system functioned 
well in the beginning, but in recent years, the wage increase in the refer-
ence countries has been overestimated. In order to increase competitive-
ness, the calculation of the wage norm was changed in 2012, but the 
automatic indexation of wages survived, which made ex post correction 
more diffi  cult if there were forecast errors (ECFIN DG  2013a : 20–21). 
 Th e crisis did not increase the unemployment rate directly, thanks 
to shortened working hours and other supportive measures; neverthe-
less, the unemployment rate crept over 8 per cent in 2010, and it is not 
expected to decrease in the near future. Th is rate is below the EU average, 
but it is higher than the German, Dutch, or Austrian levels. However, the 
protection of the employees with open-ended contracts is slightly below 
the OECD average, which theoretically presumes a labour market that is 
fl exible enough. One of the reasons for the middling performance of the 
Belgian labour market is that the tax wedge on labour is still the largest 
in Europe. Additionally, in the above-described centralised wage bargain-
ing system, there is not enough room to manage those huge disparities 
that still exist between the regions in terms of employment. In 2012, the 
employment rate was 58.2 per cent in the Brussels region and almost 
65 per cent in the Walloon Region, while it exceeded 70 per cent in the 
Flemish region (ECFIN DG  2014a : 27–28). Th e disparities are not only 
geographical in nature. Th e employment of the low-skilled, the elderly, 
and those with migrant backgrounds is well below the EU average, while 
the general rate is close to the EU average. Th e impact of this phenom-
enon is refl ected in the rising indicators of poverty, although these are still 
below the EU average. Th e indicators for income inequalities did not rise 
(Table A.8). 
 Th e labour market would function more effi  ciently if the educa-
tion system reacted more adequately to the needs of the labour market. 
Education policy is in the hands of the regions, but neither the Walloon 
region nor the Flemish region has accomplished the reforms that were ini-
tiated in the fi elds of vocational training and adult education. Th e 2012 
PISA report shows that Belgian students performed at an average level in 
sciences and at a higher than average level in maths and reading. Public 
spending on education was generous even during the crisis (more than 6 
per cent of GDP) (EC SWD  2014l : 17; OECD  2013j : 5,  2014b : 258). 
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 Trade union density is the highest in Belgium after the Nordic coun-
tries, exceeding 50 per cent. Th e tripartite system is invariably central-
ised, and the major employer and employee organisations cover the entire 
country. Th e sectoral agreements can be extended over all actors of the 
sector concerned under the authorisation of the legal regulation. During 
the crisis, the cooperation between the social partners became confl ict rid-
den, and negotiations were hindered by the absence of a third party, that 
is, by a long period in which there was no government. Th e number of 
working days lost due to strikes increased, especially in 2011 (Eurofound 
 2014 ; Freyssinet  2010 ). Overall, social partnership remained functional, 
but the forms of social dialogue have not changed, and no adaptation to 
the changed environment has occurred. Th e indexed, centralised wage 
bargaining system, which was built on the wage norm, is no longer able 
to provide an adequate framework in an economy, the functioning of 
which is rather erratic territorially. 
 Although Belgium has an extensive banking sector, households have 
not become indebted, which means that Belgium has an advantage over 
the Netherlands in this respect. On the other hand, this advantage is 
counterbalanced by high public debt and territorial division; thus, the 
prospects for growth are very similar in the case of the two countries. 
 Luxembourg has proved to be an outlier case in the cluster analysis in 
terms of product markets, R&D and the fi nancial system; therefore, it was 
not detailed among the models of capitalism when the empirical results 
were interpreted. Nevertheless, it is worth examining this country when 
creating an overview of the impacts of the crisis because Luxembourg—
with a population of just over half a million—has a signifi cant fi nancial 
sector, and the stability of it is important for the whole euro area. 
 Th e crisis caused a 5.3 per cent decline, and, subsequently, growth 
changed in the same manner, as it fl uctuated in the euro area. It is 
expected to remain around 3 per cent between 2014 and 2016. Before 
the crisis, the current account balance recorded on average a surplus of 
approximately 10 per cent of GDP annually (it reached 7.3 per cent even 
in 2009), and it is expected that the surplus will be around fi ve to 6 per 
cent in the coming years. Th e current account surplus is large in spite of 
the fact that the trade balance of goods has showed a defi cit (around 10 
per cent) for decades; however, the exports of services counterbalance. 
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 Luxembourg embarked upon specialisation in the services of banks, 
insurance companies, and investment funds in the 1920s, and the coun-
try has been dealing with this area since then, even when legal regula-
tions became stricter in other countries. Th e size of the banking sector 
is demonstrated well by the data from the ECB database, according 
to which the assets amounted to 34 times the GDP in 2008 and 20 
times the GDP in 2013, which is several times higher than the highest 
European fi gures. 6 In absolute terms, however, the assets accounted for 
EUR 736 billion in 2012, which is lower than the amount of assets in 
Belgium, not to mention the banking assets of the UK in the amount of 
EUR 10 trillion. Th e size of the insurance sector was four times GDP 
in 2012. Regarding investment funds, Luxembourg has an outstanding 
role globally. Luxembourg is the second-largest centre after the USA, 
where the fund industry regained steam after the sharp decline in assets 
( − 24 per cent) in 2008. In 2013, this activity covered more than 3900 
funds and over EUR 2.6 trillion in assets. Luxembourg’s fi nancial system 
weathered the crisis well, but it had to take part in the recapitalisation 
of several banking groups (DEXIA, Fortis, and ING), which consumed 
5.9 per cent of the 2012 GDP. Nearly 90 per cent of banking assets are 
owned by international banking groups. For this reason, it was signifi cant 
that the government’s guarantee scheme covered deposits only in banks 
and subsidiaries but not in foreign branches. Nevertheless, the scheme 
accounted for more than 4 per cent of GDP. Th e inter-linkages of the 
banking system with the domestic economy were limited, and the small 
size of the domestic banking sector protected Luxembourg from adverse 
consequences. Th e profi tability of the fi nancial system has been declin-
ing since the crisis, which has been an especially enormous problem for 
Luxembourg because one-quarter of value added is generated here. So 
far, economic stability, low taxes, professional expertise and strict rules 
pertaining to banking secrecy have all contributed to the attractiveness of 
Luxembourg. Th e stability of the fi nancial system has been advanced by 
the fact that, in tandem with the growth of the fi nancial system, effi  cient 
fi nancial supervision has developed. International pressure to prevent tax 
evasion at the time of painful fi scal consolidation has been growing since 
the crisis. Luxembourg, having seen the unavoidable change, in 2013, 
ended the transitional period of a 2003 EU directive and introduced 
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the automatic exchange of information in tax matters with competent 
government tax authorities commencing in 2015. If international regu-
latory eff orts prove to be successful, income from the fi nancial sector 
may become persistently lower (ECFIN DG  2014k : 30–35; European 
Commission  2014g ). 
 Although Luxembourg is keen on adapting to the changing environ-
ment, and certain segments of the fi nancial system (investment funds 
and private banking) have shown promising developments since the 
crisis, it is disadvantageous that the country’s economy depends largely 
on the fi nancial system. In Luxembourg, the real economy has the same 
problems as the Belgian economy, only their extent is greater: in exports, 
intermediary products prevail, more than 80 per cent of exports are 
directed to the EU, REER has appreciated, and ULC has grown more 
rapidly than in the case of major trading partners, in which automatic 
indexation has played a part in Luxembourg. In terms of competitive-
ness, it is not advantageous that the R&D expenditures of the private 
sector have fallen. In 2012, these expenditures amounted to 1.0 per cent 
of GDP, which could not be counterbalanced by increasing public spend-
ing. On-going reforms are aiming to enhance the cooperation between 
the public and private institutions in the fi elds of R&D. Luxembourg 
is an innovation follower in the EU’s scoreboard; in 2014, Luxembourg 
took the lead in this group (EC SWD  2014v : 23; European Commission 
 2014c : 5). Th e high level of indebtedness of the private sector is not such 
a huge problem as it may seem at fi rst sight. In 2012, the consolidated 
debt of the companies amounted to 260.6 per cent of GDP, which is 
attributable to the fact that multinational companies frequently use their 
subsidiaries in Luxembourg to handle intra-group fi nancing operations 
(EC SWD  2014v : 12). 
 Th e employment rate is high, and the unemployment rate was 5.9 per 
cent in 2013, which is enviable compared to those of the other European 
countries. Th is good overall picture, however, masks several weaknesses. 
Th e supply of labour fl owing into Luxembourg from neighbouring 
countries puts the local residents at a disadvantage. Automatic wage 
 indexation, poor incentives to work, and strong EPL make the labour 
market relatively rigid (ECFIN DG  2014k : 27–28; OECD  2012c ). Th e 
tripartite consensus-based decision-making, which had strong traditions 
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in Luxembourg, has functioned a bit erratically since the crisis. Trade 
union density is nearly 40 per cent. Wage bargaining is usually performed 
at the company level, but the sectoral agreements are important as well, 
the validity of which can be extended by the government to all actors of 
the sector—similar to the French practice (Eurofound  2014 ). 
 Public debt grew from the pre-crisis 6–8 per cent to 23.6 per cent in 
2013, which is still quite low, but it is unknown when the trend will turn 
round. Th is generous social system cannot be sustained if there is not 
as much income fl owing in from the fi nancial sector as there was previ-
ously, not to mention the fact that the costs of ageing weigh increasingly 
heavily on the social system. Th e 2012 pension reform was limited and 
cannot provide long-term sustainability. As a result of the crisis, the pro-
portion of those who are at risk of poverty has increased, but compared 
to the EU, this proportion is still low. Th ere has not been any change in 
the indicators for income inequalities (Table A.8). Th e greatest diffi  culty 
Luxembourg must face in the fi eld of education is that the ratio of stu-
dents with migrant backgrounds is high. Th is may explain why students 
in Luxembourg performed under average on the PISA tests. Vocational 
education—especially for children in immigrant families—did not func-
tion effi  ciently, and the government tried to help with the introduction of 
the dual system (EC SWD  2014v ; 19–20, OECD  2013j : 5). 
 Due to the changes that have taken place in the fi nancial system, 
since the crisis, the provision of fi nancial services has no longer pro-
duced as ample a source of income for Luxembourg as it did previously. 
Nevertheless, there have been no signs so far that because of the above 
factors, Luxembourg would be forced to radically change its economic 
structure or its international position. 
 When  Austria was hit by the crisis, the country had experienced growth 
of approximately 3 per cent for half a decade, and its unemployment rate 
was 3.8 per cent. Th e crisis brought a 3.8 per cent decline, which is con-
sidered mild compared to the other EU member states. Th e unemploy-
ment rate changed to a smaller extent than GDP; it actually increased 
by one percentage point in 2009, compared to the year before. Austria’s 
government responded to the crisis with two national stimulus packages 
between 2009 and 2010, including tax cuts, measures supporting the 
purchasing power of private households and infrastructural investments, 
298 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
which amounted to 3.5 per cent of GDP (rising to 4.2 per cent of GDP 
if the similar measures by the  Länder are taken into account) (Kaniovski 
and Schratzenstaller  2010 : 350). Th e government defi cit hit its highest 
point in 2009, at 5.9 per cent, and public debt exceeded 70 per cent. 
Although the government defi cit already decreased to 1.5 per cent in 
2013, the decrease in public debt was expected to begin only after 2014. 
Regarding long-term sustainability, the ageing population causes the 
most diffi  cult problem to be tackled. 
 Th e greatest risk for Austria during the crisis was exactly the same as 
that which provided outstanding profi tability in the previous almost two 
decades: banks with extensive operations in Central, Eastern and South- 
Eastern Europe. Th e foreign assets of Austrian banks amounted to 133 
per cent of GDP in 2008, and the participation of the European post- 
socialist countries and Turkey exceeded 60 per cent of GDP. Th e crisis 
brought deep recession to those countries that were dependent on the 
infl ux of foreign capital, naturally exposing Austrian banks to risks. Th e 
Austrian government applied measures similar to those taken by other 
governments in order to stabilise the banking system. Two medium-sized 
banks were nationalised, one of the fi ve largest banks ( Österreichische 
Volksbanken AG ) was partly nationalised, and the other banks also received 
capital injections. Recapitalisation and asset relief between 2008 and 2012 
amounted to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2012. Th e generous state guarantees 
also contributed to the fact that the fi nancial sector was not really shaken 
by the crisis. Until 2013, banks did not pay back the capital they had 
received, but the nationalised banks were reorganised, and the privati-
sation process started. In the case of the nationalised  Kommunalkredit 
Austria AG , because privatisation failed, its winding down was approved 
in 2013. Th e tier 1 capital ratio of internationally active banks was still 
lower than their competitors’ ratio in 2012, in spite of this growth. 
In 2012, the  Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Austrian Financial 
Market Authority issued prudential guidelines in which it was required 
that the Basel III capital standards were introduced as early as 2013. For 
the banking subsidiaries operating in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe, a non-obligatory reference value (110 per cent) was determined 
in terms of the loan-to-local stable funding ratio. Concerns at the begin-
ning of the crisis did not become a reality, and deleveraging the Austrian 
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banks did not occur in the area. Th e exposure of the Austrian banks 
amounted to 66 per cent of GDP at the end of 2012, their local depos-
its increased, and the loan-to-deposit ratio decreased to 104 per cent. 
Certain rearrangement took place in the region, and the presence of the 
Austrian banks decreased in Ukraine, Hungary, and Romania, while their 
presence increased in the Czech Republic, Poland, Turkey, and Croatia. 
Th e ratio of NPL in the region was still on the rise in 2013, meaning 
that this region, which was invariably regarded as a key market for the 
Austrian banking system, poses further risks. In Austria, the increase 
in real estate prices has not caused problems for the fi nancial system—
although the increase in prices have accelerated recently; the problem 
exists rather because some households (25 per cent of the loans in 2012) 
took loans denominated in Swiss francs, whose value has skyrocketed 
(EC SWD  2014k : 13–14; European Commission  2014g ; IMF  2013a : 
11–12; OECD  2013b : 15–17). 
 Th e EU accession and the Eastern enlargement have transformed the 
economic relations of Austria. Th e export of goods and services in terms 
of GDP was only 34 per cent in 1995, and this ratio rose as high as 
almost 60 per cent until 2007. Th e percentage of goods within exports 
is more than 70 per cent. Th e outstanding signifi cance of the export of 
goods correlates to the fact that industrial products play an important 
role in the foreign trade relations of Germany and the CEE EU member 
states, which are major partners of Austria. Austria managed to achieve 
favourable positions in the value chains that developed in this region 
with the leadership of the German industry. Th e structure of industry 
is well-diversifi ed in terms of sectors and technology as well. Th e REER 
defl ated by ULC has not appreciated since the euro was introduced, 
which also helped sustain competitiveness, and price competitiveness 
could be maintained. Th e growth of productivity continuously exceeded 
the increase in real wages. Similar to many other EU member states, com-
petition is weaker in the service sector than in the industry sector, which 
is exposed to competition from international trade (Ragacs et al.  2011 ). 
Austria recorded a current account surplus of over 3 per cent before the 
crisis, but it remained in the positive during the years of the crisis as 
well. Austria was able to maintain its market share within the EU, the 
euro area; nevertheless, its share of the world market decreased by 17 per 
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cent between 2008 and 2013 despite increasing trade with certain emerg-
ing countries. R&D expenses also amounted to approximately 2.8 per 
cent of GDP in the years of the crisis, which is very close to the level of 
expenses represented by Denmark or Germany. At the same time, Austria 
is listed only among the countries that are classifi ed as innovation follow-
ers by the Innovation Union Scoreboard, and the Austrian government’s 
ambition for the future is to break into the group of innovation leaders. 
Unfortunately, this goal is impeded not only by the weak relationship 
between publicly fi nanced research and the business sector but also by the 
low number of people with higher education qualifi cations (EC SWD 
 2014k ). 
 Overall, it can be said that the integration of Austria was successful; 
it has contributed to the growth of the economy by adding 0.5–1 per-
centage points on a yearly basis since the 1990s. In addition to the large 
corporations privatised in the 1990s, the engine of the economy is the 
domestically owned, fl exible, medium-sized enterprise sector. Th e latter 
is able to spread those technologies and organisational techniques that 
were originally introduced in large corporations. Medium-sized enter-
prises have gradually developed, their R&D activity is relatively strong, 
and their strength lies in manufacturing medium-level technological 
products. Th ese entirely or partly family-owned enterprises give 75 per 
cent of employment. Until now, family ownership has not prevented 
organisational innovation, but it can be challenging that there will be 
a generation change in one-third of the companies in the next decade 
(Röhn et al.  2013 : 35). 
 Labour relations in Austria are enduring; there is mutual commitment 
between employers and employees. EPL, in terms of employees with 
open-ended employment contracts, is at the average level of the OECD 
countries; that is, the labour market is fl exible. However, this fl exibility 
is occupational fl exibility and is utilised mainly within the company; the 
mobility of employees is low. Th ese features are not valid for all segments 
of the labour market because the employment of unskilled workers or 
workers with migrant backgrounds is lower. Th e rate of workers with 
fi xed-term contracts is below the OECD average, but the related EPL 
is above the OECD average. One-third of women work part-time, and 
involuntary part-time employment remains low. Th e duality features of 
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the labour market can be found in Austria as well, but these features are 
less sharp than those in Germany or in France. Additionally, in Austria, 
an effi  cient step in adapting to the crisis was the shortening of working 
time. Employment is supported by their diff erentiated vocational edu-
cation system. Austrian young people may choose from various levels 
of education, ranging from apprenticeship-based education, which con-
sists of 20 per cent school education and 80 per cent practical training, 
through vocational colleges to the Universities of Applied Sciences. Social 
partners are active in running the vocational education system. Due to 
this system, the unemployment of the young was the lowest in the EU—
together with the Netherlands and Germany—at approximately 7 per 
cent, even during the years of the crisis (Röhn et al.  2013 : 38–40). Th e 
PISA report made in 2012 basically shows the average performance of the 
students, and this result was achieved in a way that public expenditure 
on education was only slightly higher than the OECD average. At the 
same time, participation rates in higher education are very low in all age 
groups, compared to the developed countries. Even in the youngest age 
group (25–34 years), there is only one European country, Italy, in which 
the rate of participants is lower (22 per cent) compared to the Austrian 26 
per cent and the OECD average (40 per cent) (OECD  2013j : 5,  2014b : 
44, 258). 
 Th e inequality indicators in Austria are below the EU average. Th e 
inequality and poverty risk indicators rose slightly in 2008. Although 
these indicators have decreased since 2008, they have never reached their 
pre-crisis level. Apart from some cost-cutting measures, no considerable 
institutional changes were implemented in the welfare system. Population 
ageing, however, puts huge pressure on the health care system and—in 
spite of the pension reform in 2003—the pension system; therefore, the 
possibility of early retirement has been limited since 2013. In Austria, the 
family, especially women, plays an important role in the social system (for 
example, only 12 per cent of children under the age of two are in institu-
tional care), which means that women need to solve the very serious issue 
of fi nding a balance between family and work. Local communities act as 
support to the social services system; in Europe, Austrians are the most 
active in performing unpaid, voluntary work (EC SWD  2014k ; Röhn 
et al.  2013 : 41–42). 
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 Although the system of social partnership weakened after the intro-
duction of the liberal reforms and the EU accession, the cooperation 
between employers and employees remained strong in Austria, and the 
above-described changes were based exactly on this system. Th e year 
2006 witnessed the grand coalition coming to power again, and it con-
tributed to the revival of social partnership. Cooperation between social 
partners was especially important during the crisis, as they managed to 
avoid the increase in unemployment by shortening the working time. 
On the one hand, this cooperation was important from a social point of 
view, and after the crisis abated, the economy revived soon with the help 
of retained employees. Th e more decentralised approach in the case of 
the collective agreements during the crisis facilitated fl exible adaptation. 
Th e state could again rely on the support of the social partners when 
it came to curbing the increased state expenses and making a return to 
the sustainable budget (Hermann and Flecker  2012 ). A slow but con-
tinuous change was always characteristic of Austria’s adaptation before 
the crisis and during the crisis. Perhaps this is the reason why no other 
country managed to reconcile the otherwise contrary aspects of fl ex-
ibility and stability, which have fundamental importance in well-being 
(Table  6.5 ).
6.4  Hybridisation, Layering, and Path 
Dependency 
 During the years of the crisis, the outlines of a new model could not 
be detected in the institutional changes of the North-Western countries. 
Instead, the categories of hybridisation, layering, and path dependency 
are more suitable for depicting what occurred. Th e changes are incremen-
tal; that is, they were superimposed on those changes that occurred in the 
1990s, and groups of institutions have become even more hybrid than 
the models characteristic of the 1980s. Th e specifi c solutions of the indi-
vidual countries, the speed and extent of the changes—as we have already 
seen—were considerably infl uenced by the particular path they had pre-
viously taken. Th is phenomenon is well known as path dependency. 
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 Hybridisation seems to be the most appropriate term for characterising 
the changes because these changes cannot be defi ned either as an advance 
towards or as a withdrawal from the neoliberal model, which evolved in 
the 1980s. During the two decades preceding the crisis, the expansion of 
the neoliberal model remained one of the fundamental questions of insti-
tutional comparison. Adverse tendencies can be observed in the various 
institutional areas. 
 Before the crisis, the growth model that characterised primarily the UK 
and Ireland is usually associated with the USA and neoliberal thinking, 
that is, that economic growth is based on the securitisation of mortgages 
and, consequently, the indebtedness of citizens and fi nancial innova-
tions. Th ese elements appeared outside of the North-Western countries 
as well, for example, in Denmark, Spain and the Baltic countries. Th ese 
countries are still struggling with the consequences. In the fi nancial sec-
tor, it became clear that wherever prudent regulation remained, smaller 
damages occurred. Germany’s regionally organised publicly owned banks 
( Landesbanken ) showed that not only extreme deregulation but also 
political infl uencing can cause damages. Particularly, huge losses were 
accumulated in those countries, where loose regulation went along with 
state-induced, political infl uencing, such as in Ireland and Spain (see 
details below). Making the regulation more strict and strengthening and 
reorganising fi nancial supervision have become a general process coordi-
nated at the EU level. 
 As far as labour relations are concerned—with the exception of the 
UK and France—the decentralisation of wage bargaining, the lessening 
of trade union density and the stabilisation of social dialogue took place, 
paradoxically, parallel to each other, as a general tendency. It seems that 
maintaining wage bargaining in a more fl exible form, which is  adaptable 
to rapidly changing market conditions, is in the interest of both parties. 
Social partnership in certain countries has explicitly contributed to suc-
cessful crisis management (especially in Austria and Germany). In the 
Benelux countries, even if there were confl icts in the fi rst years of the 
crisis, social partnership remained functional, just as in Ireland. It is true, 
however, that in the latter country, trade unions were in a weaker position. 
Approaching the issue from the other side, it can be seen that the confl ict 
between employers and employees in France has clearly  worsened eco-
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nomic performance. In Belgium, the territorial division has hindered the 
successful operation of social partnership. In fact, all countries remained 
on the path on which they had been treading since before the crisis; either 
the positive or the negative eff ect of path dependency has asserted itself. 
 Due to turning private debt of the fi nancial system into sovereign debt 
and other eff ects of the crisis, which reduced government revenue, aus-
terity measures were introduced everywhere in the system of social ser-
vices. Th e ageing of the population could not leave the pension systems 
of the countries unaff ected. Each country has achieved reforms, with var-
ied determination. No further marketisation took place in the provision 
of welfare benefi ts, with the exception of the Netherlands. Means-tested 
benefi ts are signifi cant not only in the Netherlands but also in Ireland, 
the UK, and Germany (in 2011, 7.8 per cent, 3.8, per cent, and 3.4 per 
cent of GDP, respectively) (EC SWD  2014s : 45,  2014j : 39,  2014q : 41). 
 As opposed to the above-mentioned tendencies, which are controver-
sial in terms of neoliberal institutional solutions, liberalisation defi nitely 
continued in the product and labour markets, and it has led to competi-
tive disadvantages where further liberalisation has not taken place. It is 
true for each continental country (even where it has not been mentioned 
specifi cally) that in the network industries and in certain services, compe-
tition is more limited than in other areas of the economy. Th e large dif-
ference in the regulation of the tradable and non-tradable sectors causes 
palpable competitive disadvantages for the Belgian and French econo-
mies. Until now, in the literature of institutional analyses, little atten-
tion has been given to corporate structure, but the examples of Germany 
and Austria underline its signifi cance. Th e SME sector, which is able to 
apply advanced technologies and develop these technologies further, as 
opposed to the excessively numerous microenterprises, is indispensable 
for international competitiveness. 
 As a result of liberalisation, which was implemented in a hotchpotch 
manner on the labour market in the continental countries in the 1980s 
and 1990s, a more or less dual labour market has evolved. Th e crisis ampli-
fi ed the diff erence between those who were employed with open-ended 
contracts and those with fi xed-term contracts; the latter became the fi rst 
victims of the lay-off s. In the case of employees with fi xed-term contracts, 
in the majority of the continental countries, by reduction of the working 
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time, the labour force could be kept, which, otherwise, was not charac-
teristic of the English-speaking countries. Th e persistent segmentation 
of the labour market causes obvious economic drawbacks. Diff erences in 
the legal status of the employees are usually dissolved everywhere by more 
fl exible regulations, that is, by curtailing employment protection. Taking 
into account high youth unemployment, vocational training proved to 
be the most critical area of the educational system in this period. Th e 
introduction of dual training was generally seen as an educational mes-
siah. It is not known what the future holds for the dual training having 
been abstracted from the German-Austrian institutional environment 
and whether it will live up to expectations. 
 Th e place of the English-speaking countries’ institutional system 
among the North-Western countries cannot be defi ned unambiguously. 
It was exactly the fi nancial system which gained particular importance 
and in which the UK deviates from the other North-Western countries 
the most. Nevertheless, the UK and Ireland still only partly meet the 
criteria of the ideal type that is usually described as a liberal market econ-
omy or the Anglo-Saxon model based on the institutional system of the 
USA. Th e relatively large size of the banking system, its signifi cant role, 
the system of welfare provision and the state’s responsibility in it diff er 
from the ideal type of the Anglo-Saxon model; the innovation system is 
not a cradle of radical innovations. Th erefore, these countries cannot be 
clearly, markedly separated from the other North-Western countries in 
the future, either. At the same time, the outstanding signifi cance of fi nan-
cial services subsists in case of the UK; consequently, its unique position 
is preserved because it has deep historical roots, as shown in this chapter. 
It is not yet known how far the increasing Euroscepticism of its popula-
tion and the planned restriction of the free movement of labour have 
drawn the country away from the EU and how these events infl uence its 
institutional system. By restructuring the economic system after the cri-
sis, Ireland, which is in favour of social partnership and EU membership, 
may become more similar to the North-Western countries. 
 Luxembourg still stands out in terms of all categorisations; it repre-
sents a unique combination of an off shore centre and certain institutions 
of the old continental model (a rigid labour market and generous welfare 
benefi ts). 
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 Th e category of the North-Western countries is still very heteroge-
neous, with the UK being the most detached country from the group. 
From Ireland through the Netherlands to France, the countries blend the 
elements of the liberalised and the traditional continental institutional 
systems in diff erent proportions. During the crisis, the German and the 
Austrian institutions proved to be the most successful. In addition to the 
retained social partnership and the gradual and continuous institutional 
reforms introduced in the 1990s, the fact that in their economies, the 
weight of the fi nancial services was lower and the weight of industrial 
export was higher than in the competitor countries also played a signifi -
cant role in this success. 
 In the future, two processes will presumably run parallel to each other. 
On the one hand, the diff erences originating from countries’ specifi c, 
individual development paths will survive in their responses to the com-
mon challenges (competition from emerging countries, the ageing popu-
lation, and so on); nevertheless, the EU regulations, the reform programs 
and sharing of each other’s best practices will encourage a slow and lim-
ited institutional convergence. 
 Notes 
 1.  Michael Cohrs (Member of the Financial Policy Committee, Bank of 
England) cited Alan Greenspan in demonstrating the false presumptions of 
the system before 2008: “All of the sophisticated mathematics and computer 
wizardry essentially rested on one central premise: that enlightened self-
interest of owners and managers of fi nancial institutions would lead them to 
maintain a suffi  cient buff er against insolvency by actively monitoring and 
managing their fi rms’ capital and risk positions” (Cohrs  2012 : 2). 
 2.  http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2014/10/09/state-regions/ date accessed 10 
December 2014 
 3.  According to the online Eurostat database, data concerning public spending 
are also above 6%, while other sources publish data indicating public spend-
ing between 5.2 % and 5.9 % (EACEA  2013 : 7). 
 4.  In other analyses of the Committee, diff erent data can be found about the 
size of the banking systems. According to ECFIN DG ( 2014p : 46), the 
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Dutch banking sector is 5 times the GDP (in the UK, it is 6.5 times the 
GDP). According to ECFIN DG ( 2014k : 31), the Dutch banking sector is 
4.5 times the GDP (in the UK, it is 5.5 times the GDP). 
 5.  According to the OECD ( 2009a : 18), the amount of assets was fi ve times 
the GDP in 2008, and the reason for the discrepancy in the data is not 
known. 
 6.  According to the European Commission’s analysis of macroeconomic imbal-
ances, total assets amounted to 17 times GDP in 2014 (ECFIN DG  2014k : 
31), and other data concerning the other countries do not comply with the 
data downloaded from the ECB database, either, or with data in the appen-
dices of the Commission’s assessments of the national reform programmes. 
It would also require some explanation that in the 2013 assessment, the 
share of foreign banks in 2009 is 90.6 %, and in the 2014 assessment, the 
same (2009) piece of data is 64.7 % (EC SWD  2013i : 39,  2014v : 40). 
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 Within the EU, the Mediterranean countries suff ered most from the eco-
nomic crisis, and the consequences have infl uenced the development path 
of the entire European integration. Since 2009, there have been few years 
in which these countries’ economies did not contract, and from among 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, public debt remained under 100 per 
cent only in case of the latter. Of the two small Mediterranean island 
countries, Cyprus and Malta, the former faced persistent diffi  culties.
7.1  Destruction of the Crisis in the Old 
Mediterranean Member States 
 Th e crisis in the Mediterranean countries has put the entire euro area at 
risk. In 2010, Greece, as a member of the euro area, received a loan from 
the EU and the IMF, and Portugal followed suit in 2011. In 2012, Spain 
received fi nancial support for the recapitalisation of its banks through the 
European Financial Stability Facility, which was created as a temporary 
crisis-resolution mechanism by the euro area. Italy did not reach this 
 The Search for a Way Out 
in the Mediterranean Countries 
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point, but the country is facing a protracted crisis with persistently high 
unemployment. Th e weaknesses of these countries’ institutional sys-
tems, which have been described in Part II, have already prognosticated 
that these countries are more vulnerable to external shocks (Table  7.1 ). 
Examining the driving factors of the crisis is important not only to con-
fi rm the above statement but also to examine how these countries’ crisis 
management aff ects their institutional systems and economic potential. 
 Th e economic growth of Italy was not strong in the years before the 
crisis (Table  7.1 ), and even when the global economic environment 
was favourable between 1999 and 2007, Italy reached only 1.6 per cent 
growth, compared to 2.2 per cent for the euro area. Th is diff erence in 
growth increased during the years of the crisis; between 2007 and 2013, 
GDP decreased by 1.7 per cent in the euro area, while in Italy, it decreased 
by 8.7 per cent (ECFIN DG  2014j : 23). Th e Italian government did not 
have room for manoeuvring to alleviate the crisis because Italy’s public 
debt had already been signifi cant when the crisis began. In the beginning 
of the 1990s, Italy’s public debt was 120 per cent of GDP, and in the run-
 up to euro adoption, it gradually decreased to 100 per cent until 2004. 
At that time, the decrease stopped in spite of the fact that Italy benefi ted 
from a radical drop in interest rates after the euro was introduced. In 
2008, the public debt was 102.3 per cent, while in 2013, it increased to 
127.9 per cent despite the fact that the Italian government—unlike those 
of the other member states—did not introduce a fi scal stimulus package. 
Although certain anti-crisis measures were taken in November 2008 and 
February 2009 (mainly for the benefi t of the most vulnerable groups), 
these measures were off set by cutting costs or by increasing revenues 
(OECD  2009d ). Th e decline in GDP and the operation of automatic 
stabilisers increased the government defi cit to 5.3 per cent in 2009. As a 
result of the crisis of the other Mediterranean countries and Ireland, in 
Italy—which is known for its traditionally loose budgetary discipline—
the fi nancing cost of Italian government bonds increased. Although there 
are on-going austerity measures, Italian government debt is expected to 
exceed 130 per cent in the coming years (ECFIN DG  2014j : 22). In 
2012, the balanced budget rule was incorporated into the constitution 
according to the EU requirements. Th e realisation of the budgetary disci-
pline will be infl uenced largely by whether the Italian government man-
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ages to achieve the necessary coordination of the government levels while 
fi scal federalism strengthens. 
 A unique feature of the Italian situation is that the banking system 
pulled through the crisis well in 2008–2009, partly due to its conser-
vative business model and partly because there was no housing bubble 
in Italy. Th erefore, the costs of restructuring and asset relief interven-
tions (0.4 per cent of 2012 GDP) did not weigh heavily on the budget. 
However, in 2011, the sovereign debt crises of the euro area aff ected the 
Italian banking sector as well, and Italy began to lose access to interna-
tional wholesale funding, increasing its cost. As a result, the banks were 
in need of the Eurosytem’s 1 three-year long-term refi nancing operations 
between 2011 and 2012. Furthermore, after foreign investors reduced 
their exposure to Italian sovereign debt, between 2010 and 2013, the 
stock of Italian government securities held by the Italian banks rose from 
211 billion euro to 416 billion euro. Th e increase in NPL (15.1 per cent 
in 2013) worsened the profi tability of the banking system and its ability 
to supply credit. Th e performance of the various segments of the banking 
system is very diff erent. Th e performance of the top-5 banking groups 
is similar to their European competitors, but the numerous small banks 
with high density in their branch networks have modest performance 
only. Th e entire banking system is infl uenced by the ownership struc-
ture that evolved in the 1990s. Th e capital of privatised banks was taken 
over by non-profi t foundations, and the banks were obliged to gradually 
sell their controlling interests. Nevertheless, 30 per cent of the banking 
system is still under these banks’ control, and 4 out of the top-10 banks 
exercise infl uence exceeding the level of their actual ownership. Th is 
means that internal accountability is weak within banks’ management 
and that the interests of the individual members prevail. Writing off  bad 
loans is slow, partly because of the lengthy judicial process and partly 
because the market demand for distressed assets is limited. Altogether, 
the experts in the IMF and the EU agree that banks have strengthened 
their capital position, but due to low profi tability and the weaknesses of 
the real economy, Italy remains vulnerable (EC SWD  2014t : 51; ECFIN 
DG  2014j : 19–21; European Commission  2014g ; IMF  2013c : 27–29). 
 Th e greatest problem of the Italian economy is not in its fi nancial sys-
tem but rather in its weakening competitiveness in the real economy. 
7 The Search for a Way Out in the Mediterranean Countries 323
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
Th ere was a small surplus in the current account balance after the euro 
was adopted, but in 2002, it turned into a defi cit, and only in 2013 
did the Italian current account balance return to a surplus. Th e sever-
ity of the problem is demonstrated well by the fact that Italy’s loss of 
export market share was 18.4 per cent between 2008 and 2013, and this 
decline of export volumes and export market share has been on-going 
since 1999 (with the exception of one or two years). Th e structure of 
exports has not changed much since the mid-1990s; in 1996 and in 
2011, the share of high-tech Italian exports was 10 per cent, while that 
of medium-high-tech goods was 39 per cent. Th e share of medium-low- 
tech products increased from 18 per cent to 25 per cent at the expense of 
low-tech products (ECFIN DG  2014j : 27). Regardless of whether either 
ULC or ULC-defl ated REER is taken into account, cost competitiveness 
decreased because productivity growth lags far behind the euro area aver-
age. Th e nominal compensation per employee is in line with the euro 
area average. Between 1995 and 2007, the growth of real GDP per hour 
worked was 0.46 per cent  vis-á-vis 1.2 per cent in the euro area (Crafts 
and Magnani  2011 : 19), and this gap remained during the years of the 
crisis. Since 2011, wages have been moderated; public wages have been 
frozen, and the other non-tradable sectors have also experienced moder-
ate wage dynamics. Wages in the more productive tradable sectors still 
increased. Real wage adjustment was performed through a reduction in 
hours worked, and in the fi rst phase of the crisis, companies tried to keep 
their employees. Th e dismissal of employees began in mid-2011, when the 
economy again fell into recession. Th e integration of the Italian compa-
nies in global value chains is relatively limited; the share of foreign value- 
added in Italian exports is the lowest among the European countries, 
only partially because the proportion of small-size companies is large. 
Th e unfriendly, bureaucratic business environment and ineffi  cient public 
administration hold back inward FDI, which would assist integration 
into the global value chain. Italy’s investment rate is not insuffi  cient in 
terms of quantity; thus, the moderate growth in productivity is explained 
rather by low technology absorption and the weakness of its innovation 
system. Italy recorded shares of ICT investment similar to France and 
Germany only until the mid-1990s. Rent seeking also contributed to the 
fact that capital fl owed more massively into sheltered non-tradable sec-
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tors; thus, non-tradable sectors gained ground against the tradable sectors 
(ECFIN DG  2014j : 37–38). In the Innovation Scoreboard of the EU, 
Italy is among the moderate innovators during the crisis as well. Th e lat-
est Regional Innovation Scoreboard shows that there have been changes 
at the regional level. In 2004, the region of Piemonte became a member 
of the Regional Innovation Followers for the fi rst time (on the basis of the 
data of 2010), in addition to two other Northern Italian regions (Friuli- 
Venezie Giulia and Emilia-Romagna), while the other Italian regions 
remained in the group of the regional moderate innovators (European 
Commission  2014e ). According to Italian experts, in the mid-2000s in 
district economies, in the case of medium-sized enterprises, structural 
changes, internationalism, and outsourcing began to take place, and the 
crisis put an end to these processes (Simonazzi  2012 ). Th is standpoint is 
confi rmed by the improving innovation performance experienced in the 
Northern regions of Italy. 
 Since the 1990s, deregulation has exacerbated the segmentation 
of the labour market in Italy, which has led to a dual labour market. 
Despite modest economic growth, employment opportunities have wid-
ened somewhat, which has been termed “growthless job creation”; new 
jobs were available through temporary contracts, and pay was low. Th e 
entry wage for young people aged 21–26 in 2002 reverted to the level of 
20 years previously. Th is change led to a high rate of young people co- 
habiting with their parents, delays in forming a family and an extremely 
low fertility rate (Simonazzi  2012 : 185). Employment reduction hit tem-
porary workers fi rst. According to Eurostat data, the unemployment rate 
of young people aged 15–24 climbed from 20.3 per cent to 40 per cent 
between 2007 and 2013. Th is fi gure fails to express the large underlying 
inequalities between certain parts of the country. In 2011, in the South, 
the employment rate of young people aged 15–34 was 31.7 per cent, 
compared to 56.5 per cent in the rest of the country (Simonazzi  2012 : 
190). Th is also means that wage moderation was more signifi cant dur-
ing the crisis than shown by the average data because people with lower 
wages fell out of work to a greater extent. In 2012, an important labour 
market reform was adopted which—by way of improving the exit fl ex-
ibility for employees with open-ended contracts—addresses the rigidity 
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of the labour market and introduces disincentives to the use of temporary 
and atypical contracts (EC SWD  2013h ). 
 In 1993, the social partners and the Italian government signed a tri-
partite agreement on the system of wage indexation and on the company- 
level distribution of productivity gains. Due to the large diff erences in 
productivity in various parts of the country, the latter was an impor-
tant element of fl exible adaptation. In 2009, 2011 and 2012, these par-
ties concluded new agreements that decentralised collective bargaining 
even further and simultaneously widened the possibilities for divert-
ing from the national agreement. Nevertheless, there was a severe split 
between the trade unions: the main left-wing trade union confederation, 
the General Confederation of Italian Workers ( Confederazione Generale 
Italiana del Lavoro ), refused to sign the agreements and organised strikes 
and demonstrations in 2009. Fiat played a major part in concluding the 
new, company-level agreements because bargaining took place under 
threat of relocation to Serbia and Poland (Freyssinet  2010 ; Simonazzi 
 2012 ). Ultimately, in 2013, all involved parties could agree upon the 
trade unions’ representativeness at both the sectoral level and the fi rm 
level. 
 Th e Italian authorities estimated that in 2008, the shadow economy 
accounted for approximately 17 per cent of GDP and that undeclared 
work accounted for 12.2 per cent of all employment (EC SWD  2013h : 
24); in an international comparative study, Italy’s shadow economy is 
estimated as 21 per cent (Schneider and Kearney  2013 : 4). Due to tax 
evasion, the tax base is limited, which decreases revenue from taxes, and 
as a consequence, it is impossible to reduce the tax burden (as large as the 
Belgian one), which weighs heavily on labour. 
 Th e budgetary austerity measures reduced welfare expenditures, 
which—due to the contraction of GDP—have grown anyhow in rela-
tive terms and exceeded 29 per cent between 2009 and 2011. In Italy, 
pension expenditure (16 per cent of GDP)—which is one of the highest 
in the EU—has not changed compared to the earlier periods. Th e pen-
sion reform in 2012 intended to restrain long-term growth in age-related 
expenditures by increasing the retirement age (EC SWD  2013h : 16, 25). 
In these circumstances, the share of people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (Europe 2020 indicator of poverty) increased by 3 percentage 
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points (Table A.8). Th e severe material deprivation rate increased from 
the pre-crisis 6 to 7 per cent to 12.4 per cent in 2013. 
 Econometric simulations also indicate that the weakness of human 
capital plays an important role in explaining Italy’s productivity gap. Th e 
labour market in Italy values seniority more than education or skills. 
Although the last decade saw the share of the population aged 25–34 
with less than upper secondary education decreasing, their share was 
still the fourth highest in the EU in 2012. By contrast, the share of the 
population with tertiary education was the lowest in the same year. Th e 
PISA surveys indicate that Italy’s performance is below the OECD aver-
age; moreover, they demonstrate that there are huge regional inequalities, 
with the Northern regions having scores well above the OECD average 
(ECFIN DG  2014j : 39–41). Th e 2012, labour market reform attempted 
to support the transition from education to work for young people by 
modernising the apprenticeship system. In 2012, an agreement was con-
cluded with Germany to foster cooperation on work-based learning in 
vocational education and training (EC SWD  2013h : 25). 
 Th e economic growth of Italy continues to be hindered by the weak 
performance of its government and public administration. In the WEF 
Global Competitiveness Report, Italy’s ranking is between 139th and 
143rd of the 144 countries in terms of public trust in politicians, the 
burden of government regulation, and the transparency of government 
policymaking (Schwab  2014 : 223). Th e consequences of these fac-
tors can be seen in the absorption of Cohesion Policy funding. In May 
2014, Italy, Slovakia, and Bulgaria absorbed less than 60 per cent of the 
EU funds available for the 2007–2013 period (European Commission 
 2014d : 175). 
 Spain arrived at the threshold of the crisis after a decade of rapid 
growth: between 1997 and 2007, the rate of growth was below 3 per cent 
in only one year (2002). It seems that Spain was successful in mastering 
fi scal discipline and managed to control its government defi cit after the 
euro was introduced; moreover, between 2005 and 2007, it built up bud-
get surpluses. As a consequence, public debt continually decreased, hit-
ting the lowest point in 2007 at 35.5 per cent. Th e deepening imbalance 
of the current account indicated that the Spanish data do not result from 
a sustainable growth path. At the beginning of the 2000s, the defi cit was 
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approximately 3 per cent—which is only natural and sustainable in the 
case of a catching-up economy—and later, it increased to 10 per cent by 
2007. Th e fi rst shock of the global crisis was relatively well tolerated by 
the Spanish economy; the contraction (−3.6 per cent) was smaller than 
the EU average. Th e slow recovery was yet again followed by a decline of 
approximately 1 to 2 per cent in 2011–2013. Th e economy was expected 
to grow again in 2014, and above 2 per cent growth was foreseen for 
2015. 
 Due to the considerable surpluses built up in recent boom years, the 
Spanish government had room for manoeuvring to react to the crisis with 
a fi scal incentive package. In 2008, the government tried to stimulate 
the economy by way of tax reduction and, in 2009, by public invest-
ments—these measures amounted to almost 2 per cent of GDP in each 
year (OECD  2010h : 60). In addition to these measures, due to the oper-
ation of automatic stabilisers and the revenue slowly coming from the 
continually shrinking economy, government defi cit jumped to 11 per 
cent in 2009 and decreased to 6.8 per cent from approximately 10 per 
cent only as late as 2013. Public debt was already 92.1 per cent in 2013, 
and it is expected to creep up to 100 per cent by 2015. 
 Th e international fi nancial markets lost confi dence in Spain and 
were concerned with whether the country would be able to pay back its 
increasing debt. Th e Greek crisis also cast a shadow on Spain. Th e year 
2010 saw a considerable leap in the Spanish government bond yields, 
forcing the Spanish government to implement austerity measures. In 
addition to increasing taxes, there was a 5 per cent decrease in wages for 
public employees in 2010 and freeze in 2011, the indexation of pensions 
was abolished, and the state infrastructure expenditures were decreased 
(Éltető  2011 : 46). Similar to those in the other Mediterranean coun-
tries, these measures indicated the beginning of a multi-annual series of 
austerity measures. In 2012, public expenditures related to health care, 
education and active labour market policies and expenditure on public 
employment had decreased. Nevertheless, the actual fi gures are found to 
be a bit worse than expected; thus, newer and newer measures have to be 
taken. Th e institutional framework of the budget has been strengthened. 
Th e supply and assessment of data were made more frequently, which 
was of utmost importance because of the independence of the regions 
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in enabling budget execution. In 2013, an independent fi scal  institution 
was established to issue reports and opinions about the fi nancial and 
macroeconomic situation (EC SWD  2014ö ). 
 Th e expansion in the construction and services sectors is considered 
the driving force behind the Spanish recovery. As early as 1995, gross 
value added in construction was 12 per cent in Spain, which was approxi-
mately twice the EU average. Th e factors behind this situation are far 
more complex than simply the decrease of interest rates related to the 
introduction of the euro. In Spain, the demand for private housing was 
initiated under the Franco dictatorship, with the deliberate intention of 
social pacifi cation. Th e labour-intensive construction industry and the 
development of infrastructure in the country’s economic policy served 
the purpose of compensating for the losses suff ered in agriculture and 
industry and absorbing unemployment after the EU accession. Th ese 
processes were harnessed by two powerful lobbies (one linked to hous-
ing and construction and the other to banking)—of which the origins 
can be traced back to the Franco era—and the construction of houses 
was facilitated by government measures. Tax relief was granted by the 
government on the purchase of houses, while the subsidies for renting 
were eliminated. Corrupting the local politicians, lands have been reclas-
sifi ed, and as a result, it became possible to construct new houses in green 
areas, especially along Spain’s Mediterranean coastline. Th e housing stock 
was not small in the fi rst place compared to the number of residents, 
and a considerable portion of investments were second properties, often 
holiday homes (Dellepiane et al.  2013 ). It must be added that the huge 
wave of immigration received by Spain also contributed to the larger 
boom in the housing market (Gonzalez and Ortega  2013 ). Housing 
prices increased twofold in real terms between 1995 and 2008, but due 
to the crisis, the housing bubble burst. Between 2007 and 2013, housing 
prices fell almost by half in real terms, and this process ceased only in 
the last quarter of 2013. After the housing bubble burst, 700,000 houses 
remained unsold, and their number is decreasing slowly (ECFIN DG 
 2014n : 15–16; Éltető  2011 : 43; OECD  2012f : 51). 
 Similar to other countries, the banking sector in Spain also contributed 
to the housing bubble. A considerable amount—two-thirds, according 
to 2011 data (OECD  2012f :56)—of loans to real estate developers and 
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builders was given by local savings banks ( cajas ), which were often under 
the infl uence of regional politicians. Political control and poor supervi-
sion led to extremely risky lending practices (Dellepiane et al.  2013 ). Th e 
major commercial banks, which had been managed professionally and 
more prudently and had expanded their operations abroad, mainly in the 
EU and Latin America, were able to more easily manage their portfolios, 
which were worsening due to the loans to real estate development, even 
after the outbreak of the global crisis (Neal and Garcia-Iglesias  2013 ). 
In 2009, when the government became aware of the challenges that sav-
ings banks had to face, the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of Banks 
(FROB:  Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria ) was established, 
for which 75 per cent of the capital was provided by the central gov-
ernment, and the remainder was provided by the funded deposit insur-
ance entities set up by the incorporated banks. Th e FROB supported 
the recapitalisation and merger of savings banks, and the legal provisions 
reduced the ceiling on voting shares of public administrations from 50 
per cent to 40 per cent, as of 2010. Moreover, the new law also stipu-
lated that in the governing bodies of savings banks, the representatives 
of municipalities should be elected by their assemblies rather than by 
the government (OECD  2010h : 41–43). When the crisis deepened, the 
Spanish banking system assumed a very diffi  cult position after wholesale 
bank funding had fallen sharply, and the fi nancing available through the 
Eurosystem was not enough, either. At the request of the Spanish gov-
ernment, in July 2012, Eurogroup provided a support package in the 
amount of 100 billion euro through the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism within the framework of an 18-month programme, out of 
which 41.3 billion euro was actually used. Th e programme successfully 
came to an end, and the changes in the system of the savings banks con-
tinued: after the mergers, only 12 savings banks remained out of 45. 
Privatisation of the state-owned properties resulting from the fi scal con-
solidation is advancing as well. An asset management company—mainly 
owned by private entities—called SAREB ( Sociedad de Gestión de Activos 
Procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria S.A. ) was established, to which 
troubled assets were transferred from the banks. Surveillance of the banks 
was strengthened. Th e cost of recapitalisation and asset relief between 
2008 and 2012 amounted to 8.4 per cent of the 2012 GDP (European 
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Commission  2014g ). Th e Spanish banking system has been stabilised; 
however, it remains fragile, which is demonstrated rather well by the fact 
that the ratio of NPL was still increasing (13 per cent) at the end of 
October 2013 (European Commission  2014b : 14). Th e reduction of pri-
vate sector debt accelerated at the end of 2012, largely due to the business 
sector. Th e savings and investments of households were well balanced 
until the beginning of the 2000s; however, households became increas-
ingly indebted due to the loans required for housing purchases (ECFIN 
DG  2014n ). Th e private sector stock of debt reached its highest peak 
in 2009, when it amounted to 202.4 per cent of GDP in consolidated 
terms, and the Spanish private sector became one of the most indebted 
members of the EU. By 2013, this debt decreased to 172.2 per cent of 
GDP in consolidated terms. 
 Regarding one of the key indicators refl ecting the external imbalance 
of an economy—the current account balance—the same process can be 
observed as in case of the other member states of the EU in a similar 
position. As a result of declining exports and increasing exports, there 
was a rapid adjustment implemented during the crisis, and the country 
ran current account surpluses in 2013. However, if we examine the com-
petitiveness of the Spanish economy, the picture is more complex than 
in the case of Portugal or Greece. Labour productivity in Spain grew 
more slowly than in Portugal or Greece—it was below euro area average: 
between 1999 and 2003, its annual rate was 0.3 per cent, and between 
2004 and 2008, it was 0.5 per cent. By contrast, the compensation of 
employees per head grew by 3.0 per cent and 4.4 per cent, and ULC 
increased by 2.8 and 3.8 per cent annually in the periods concerned. 
Th ese fi gures are higher than the euro area average or the EU average, 
which means that the price competitiveness of the Spanish economy has 
declined, while—due to the infl ation—real compensation of employees 
per head was 0.0 per cent between 1999 and 2003 and 0.8 per cent 
in the years immediately preceding the crisis. Moreover, REER defl ated 
by ULC appreciated by 0.9 and 2.9 per cent, respectively (European 
Commission  2013a : 15–16, 19). In case of all Mediterranean countries, 
it is often put forward that the appreciation of the euro and increasing 
energy prices contributed to the declining competitiveness. However, this 
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does not change the fact that the main problem is to be found in the 
modest growth of productivity. 
 Th e Spanish case also followed the Mediterranean scenario in that 
manufacturing declined rapidly: its share was approximately 20 per cent 
of GDP in the 1980s, but it was only 12 per cent of GDP in 2010. 
Concurrently, an evident shift could be observed towards the non- tradable 
sectors. Th is similarity is also refl ected in that there is a large share of low- 
skill industries, and the share of technology-driven sectors is considerably 
smaller than that of the EU-15. However, the export structure—in terms 
of factor input and labour skills—is rather similar to the EU-15 average, 
and in this respect, the Spanish economy is diff erent from the Portuguese 
and Greek economies (Aiginger  2013 : 30–40). Concerning the technol-
ogy content of products, although the share of high-tech products is low 
and price competitiveness declined, Spain’s export market share remained 
stable: more stable than those of the major economies within the euro 
area (with the exception of Germany) (ECFIN DG  2012d : 29). Several 
factors made this possible. On the one hand, product specialisation was 
directed to the products for which prices grew more rapidly. On the other 
hand, ULC in the exporting fi rms did not increase at the same rate as in 
the economy as a whole, and these fi rms were more productive. Export 
activity is very concentrated in Spain—only 1 per cent of fi rms account 
for two-thirds of goods exported. Th ird, there was a sort of geographi-
cal diversifi cation—the EU-15’s share in total Spanish exports decreased 
between 2000 and 2010 from 71 per cent to 63 per cent, and Spain 
increased its exports to the BRIC and Middle Eastern and North African 
countries. At the same time, the import content of exports moved from 
27.6 per cent in 1995 to 39 per cent in 2007, which indicates the poor 
competitiveness of domestic producers but also shows the increasing 
integration of the Spanish economy in the global value chain (ECFIN 
DG  2012d : 30). During the crisis, REERs and ULCs fell; thus, there was 
a recovery in price competitiveness. Th e export base is widening, and the 
number of exporting fi rms has grown steadily since 2008 (ECFIN DG 
 2014n ). 
 For the recovery of economic growth, it is essential to increase pro-
ductivity. In Spain, the corporate structure is not favourable in this 
respect. Th e average size of the Spanish fi rms is below the average size of 
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fi rms in the EU-15 countries, and the weight of the micro-enterprises 
is larger in all sectors, with the exception of the construction sector 
 (Mora- Sanguinetti and Fuentes  2012 ). Spain has made considerable prog-
ress towards liberalisation in terms of product market regulation, even in 
the network industries, which improved the business environment in the 
last one and half decades. Th e law on the guarantee of market unity, 
which aims to address regulatory fragmentation in the Spanish internal 
market, came into force in 2013 (EC SWD  2014ö ). Spain was a moder-
ate innovator, according to the innovation scoreboard in 2014, following 
Italy and the Czech Republic. In 2012, Spain’s R&D expenditure was 
1.3 per cent of the GDP. Due to the crisis, the intensity of R&D expen-
ditures decreased; moreover, the number of companies operating in the 
high- and medium-high-tech industries declined as well (Bielawska and 
Vázquez  2013 ). Th ere are huge diff erences among the Spanish regions in 
terms of innovation performance, and it is diffi  cult to bridge this gap by 
innovation policies adjusted to the regions (EC SWD  2014ö ). 
 Th e situation in the labour market is a critical issue from the aspect 
of increasing productivity and competitiveness, as well as from a social 
aspect. Spain has been fi ghting the problem of unemployment for a long 
time; in the 1990s, the rate of unemployment was approximately 20 per 
cent, and as the result of economic growth, Spain managed to bring it 
down to 8.2 per cent, which was the lowest point, in 2007. Th e supply 
side of labour has increased as, gradually, more women and the massive 
infl ow of immigrants enter the labour market. Th e explosive development 
of the construction sector made it possible for the low-skilled to fi nd 
jobs. Th e demand for fl exible employment was met by the application of 
fi xed-term contracts, which led to the most extremely dual labour market 
within the EU. At the beginning of the 2000s, one-third of the working 
population was already employed in this way, while the EU average was 
approximately 13–14 per cent. Th e rate of unemployment increased rap-
idly and steadily during the crisis, and by 2013, it reached 26.1 per cent, 
while youth unemployment reached 55.5 per cent, which was surpassed 
only by Greece. Unemployment rates are dramatically high in Spain, 
partly because fi rms did not apply working time reduction—as done in 
many other countries—and partly because fi xed-term contracts made it 
possible to dismiss employees. All this was closely related to the bust in 
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the construction sector, where low-skilled workers were employed mainly 
in fi xed-term contracts. Managing the issue of youth unemployment is 
made more diffi  cult by the fact that during the boom of the construction 
sector, there was a rise in the relative wage of low-skilled workers and a 
decrease in the skill premium, which attracted many to choose working 
instead of studying (Dolado et al.  2013 ). According to the estimation of 
Schneider and A.T. Kearney ( 2013 : 4), the size of shadow economy is 
19 per cent—the same as in Portugal—although Portugal’s position is 
signifi cantly more favourable in terms of the labour market. 2 In 2010, a 
labour market reform was implemented in several steps, which weakened 
the employment protection of the employees with open-ended contracts 
in order to decrease the duality of the labour market (OECD  2012f  ). 
 An important element of the labour market reforms was that the 
framework of wage bargaining changed, and as a consequence, labour 
relations changed as well. Companies are allowed to opt out from sectoral- 
level—previously the dominant level—agreements; thus, wage bargain-
ing shifts towards companies. Trade union density weakened in Spain 
as well; in 2010, it was 16.4 per cent. Trade unions objected the labour 
legislation reforms of the left-wing Zapatero and those of the centre-right 
party (which won the general elections in November 2011); therefore, 
two general strikes were called in 2010 and 2012. In the meantime, in 
February 2011, a tripartite agreement was concluded for the pension 
reform and active labour market policy. In addition, in February 2011, 
the agreement for employment and collective bargaining was signed by 
the employers’ and employees’ organisations (Eurofound  2014 ). 
 Th e crisis slowed down immigration, but it could not stop it—espe-
cially immigration from poorer countries. Even when job opportunities 
began to decrease, the majority of immigrants did not choose to return 
to their countries of origin: those groups remained in a greater number 
and were socially more adaptable, including immigrants from Romania, 
Morocco, Ecuador, and Columbia, as opposed to Bulgarian immigrants, 
for example (Ródenas et al.  2013 ). Th e unemployment rate was higher 
among those with migrant backgrounds, and their employment remains 
a persistent challenge because the construction sector will not be able to 
absorb the size of the labour force it did before the crisis. 
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 Fiscal consolidation curtailed welfare provision in Spain as well. Th e 
eff ect of the crisis is well demonstrated by the fact that the severe material 
deprivation rate increased from 3.6 per cent (in 2008) to 6.2 per cent in 
2013. Th e other indicators for poverty and social inequality increased as 
well (Table A.8). Th e pension reform brought about restrictive changes, 
limiting the costs related to the ageing population by increasing the 
retirement age from 65 to 67 years old and by changing the method of 
calculating pensions (Banyuls and Recio  2012 ). 
 Spanish students performed below average on the PISA tests, but this 
is not the only indicator of the fact that the Spanish education system 
needs further strengthening. Labour market needs are not met by either 
tertiary education or vocational training, which also contribute to the 
dramatically high rate of youth unemployment (in addition to the driv-
ing factors of the crisis and the above-detailed characteristics of labour 
market institutions). Spain, as a response, has attempted to make some 
progress by implementing dual vocational training (EC SWD  2014ö ). 
 Portugal was one of the few relatively less prosperous EU member states 
that could not gain much from the convergence successes of the 2000s. Its 
modest 1.2 per cent growth between 2004 and 2008 was not followed by 
a dramatic decline in 2009; the economy shrank by 3 per cent, but as of 
2011, a three-year continuous recession followed. Presumably, 2014 was 
the fi rst year when growth was approximately 1 per cent. Th e Portuguese 
economy tolerated the fi rst shock relatively well because the economy was 
relatively closed, there was no real estate bubble and there was no con-
siderable amount of toxic assets in the banks. A signifi cant consolidation 
was performed in the budget between 2005 and 2007, after the defi cit 
had crept up slowly to 6.2 per cent by 2004 following the introduction 
of the euro. In the 2009 elections, the left-wing managed to be re-elected, 
and these politicians’ promise during the campaign was kept: after many 
years of a wage freeze, the wages in the public sector were increased. A 
stimulus package was approved as well, including tax reduction, social 
and employment assistance, and other forms of subsidising economic 
activities. Due to the impacts of automatic stabilisers, the defi cit jumped 
to 9.8 per cent in 2009, and in 2010, it jumped even further, to 11.2 per 
cent. Public debt had been increased slightly but monotonously from 
50.3 per cent in 2000; during the crisis, it soared, reaching 83.6 per cent 
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in 2009. Th e interest rate of government bonds increased signifi cantly, 
partly due to the weak growth prospects and partly because there was an 
increasing mistrust towards the Mediterranean countries. At the  beginning 
of 2011, banks reported serious international fi nancing problems. In 
April 2011, the government required external fi nancial help and then 
resigned. Th e elections in June 2011 were won by the opposition (Reis 
 2013 ). 
 Th e troika and the Portuguese authorities approved the Economic 
Adjustment Programme in May 2011 (European Commission  2014h ). 
In return, Portugal received external fi nancing in the amount of EUR 78 
billion. One-third was fi nanced by the European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism, another third by the European Financial Stability Facility, 
and the remaining third by the IMF.  EUR 77 billion of this amount 
was duly utilised. According to the assessment of the troika, Portugal 
successfully completed the programme on 17th May 2014 (European 
Commission  2014h : 7). A special fi eld of fi scal consolidation was that 
public-private partnership projects had to be renegotiated and made 
transparent because Portugal was the highest user relative to GDP, espe-
cially in the case of road construction—in 2011, accumulated investment 
in these projects accounted for 9.5 per cent of GDP (OECD  2012e : 64). 
In 2010–2011, the pension funds of the telecommunication companies 
and banks were re-routed to the general social security system. Th e pen-
sion funds of the banks accounted for 3.5 per cent of GDP. In addition, 
there was a wide range of austerity measures, including common devices: 
reducing wages and staff  in the public sector and limiting public services 
and welfare provision; that is, two-thirds of the measures were on the 
expenditure side and one-third on the revenue side. Th e fi scal framework 
and planning were strengthened in May 2011, in line with the European 
fi scal framework, and an independent Fiscal Council was set up (OECD 
 2012e : 20–24). Due to the persistent problems related to fi scal disci-
pline, stabilising the institutional background is of utmost importance 
in Portugal. Having modest growth prospects in view, government defi -
cit may sink below the Maastricht benchmark of 3 per cent by 2016, 
and public debt is slowly decreasing from the 128 per cent observed in 
2013. Th e austerity measures could not end here, especially because the 
Constitutional Court annulled certain provisions in 2012, and their 
336 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
 fi scal impact had to be off set. Fiscal adjustment in 2014 included further 
reduction of the public-sector wage bill and a pension reform, notably 
increasing the retirement age to 66 years (EC SWD  2014x ). 
 Th e Portuguese banking sector—similar to the other Mediterranean 
countries—covered the gap between domestic savings and credit demand 
from the international fi nancial market. On the threshold of the crisis, 
household debt was 80 per cent of GDP, and corporate debt was approxi-
mately 130 per cent of GDP. Although Portugal has the highest hous-
ing stock (compared to its population) after Spain in the OECD area, 
most of these houses are owner-occupied dwellings as opposed to tenures. 
Eighty per cent of debts were household debts; nevertheless, no housing 
bubble developed. As a result of the recession, housing prices decreased to 
83.5 per cent in 2013, compared to the year 2010. Portuguese banks had 
the fourth-highest credit-to-deposit ratio within the EU, but it seemed 
to be manageable until 2010. Due to the breakdown of wholesale mar-
ket funding and the exposure to Portuguese government securities, in 
2010, Portugal needed to receive assistance from the Eurosystem, then, 
in 2011, from the EU and the IMF. In 2013, 10 per cent of the assets 
of the eight largest banks originated from the above-listed international 
sources. Bank deleveraging is assisted by the fact that their deposits have 
been increasing since 2012. Th eir capital ratios are satisfactory, but their 
profi tability is weak. In 2013, the top eight banks had an aggregate loss 
of approximately EUR 1.9 billion (EC SWD  2014x : 16; OECD  2012e : 
85–86, 94–95). 
 Before the crisis, in addition to facing sluggish economic growth, 
Portugal faced massive twin defi cits. Th e current account defi cit exceeded 
10 per cent every year beginning in 2005, and only in 2012 did it decrease 
to 2 per cent due to shrinking internal demand and recovering exports; 
in 2013, an almost steady state was achieved. Th e problems related to 
competitiveness, which are so characteristic of the other Mediterranean 
countries, can be found in Portugal as well. Th e increase in productivity 
was only 0.9 annually between 1999 and 2003, and 1.1 per cent annually 
between 2004 and 2008, exceeding the euro area average by 0.1 percent-
age point in each case. Th is means that productivity per working hour 
was 63 per cent relative to the EU-27 average, and it could not change 
from this level. Th e annual 4.5 and 3.2 per cent increases in wages in these 
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periods meant that ULC increased by 3.5 and 2 per cent in these periods, 
respectively, signifi cantly exceeding the euro area average. Infl ation was 
higher in Portugal; thus, the real compensation of employees increased 
only by 1.4 and 0.4 per cent, however, this was higher than the euro area 
average; REER defl ated by ULC appreciated by 1.7 and 0.6 per cent 
(European Commission  2013a : 15–16, 19). 
 Th e non-price factors of competitiveness show similar problems as 
those we have seen in the case of Spain or those to be described in the 
case of Greece (see below). Th e industrial sector shrank in Portugal as 
well, and its contribution to GDP decreased from the level of approxi-
mately 20 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s to 12 per cent in 2008. Low- 
tech products (products of the textile, leather and footwear industries) are 
dominant in industrial production and, as a result, in exports (Aiginger 
 2013 : 30, 37, 40). In the medium-low-tech product market, Portugal 
lost market shares because of the competition from the CEE countries. 
In exports, the ratio of goods and services was approximately 70 and 
30 per cent in 2008 and in 2013, respectively, which means that it is 
not possible to persistently improve the current account balance without 
improving the competitiveness of industrial products, even if the balance 
of trade for services indicates a surplus. Portugal suff ered a loss of market 
shares mainly against the developed EU member states (with the excep-
tion of Spain), and the improvement of its position outside the EU was 
due primarily to trading with its former colony, Angola (OECD  2010f  ). 
 Th e question has been raised by many: how could it be that, although 
imbalances had accumulated in Portugal, growth was not as large as 
in the case of Spain or Greece. Portuguese public debt was lower than 
Greek debt, but the debt of the households and companies was higher 
(Table  7.1 ); that is, a huge amount of capital fl owed into the country. 
Another frequently given answer to the mystery of the modest growth is 
that the Portuguese currency was overvalued when the euro was adopted. 
However, as Reis ( 2013 ) points out, this argument is weakened by the 
fact that no correction was performed later, either, and the appreciation of 
REER was continuous until the crisis. Experts generally agree that in the 
background of the modest growth of productivity, the declining competi-
tiveness and the appreciation of REER, there has been a shift in the struc-
ture of the economy towards the non-tradable sectors of low productivity, 
338 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
while the growth of productivity within the sectors was low. Th e data 
concerning the labour productivity of the entire economy are made even 
worse by the especially low performance of agriculture (OECD  2010f  ). 
Among the explanatory factors, we have to take into account that the 
skill level of the Portuguese labour force is low (more details are pro-
vided below). Large dispersion among company-level labour productivity 
shows that even ineffi  cient companies can survive. On the basis of this 
fact, Reis ( 2013 ) draws the conclusion that the domestic fi nancial system 
was not developed enough to allocate capital from the integrated fi nan-
cial market effi  ciently. A further explanation is that, due to regulatory 
constraints and insuffi  cient competition, excessive rent attracts entrepre-
neurs to invest in non-tradable sectors. In the framework of the Simplex 
programme—as part of the adjustment—measures were taken in order 
to improve the business environment. Nevertheless, no breakthrough has 
been achieved in the allocation of loans (OECD  2012e ). Liberalisation 
of the product market is shown by the fact that the indicator created by 
the OECD methodology decreased from 1.7 (2008) to 1.3 (2013) (EC 
SWD  2014x : 42). 
 During the fi ve years of the crisis, a certain extent of correction took 
place in competitiveness. ULC decreased, REER depreciated, and price 
competitiveness strengthened. Exports began to increase: after the loss 
of export market shares of the previous years (during the fi ve years pre-
ceding 2013, it was 15.7), in 2013, there was a 7.7 per cent growth. 
Portugal also succeeded in diversifying exports geographically towards 
the rapidly emerging countries: Angola, Algeria, Brazil, and China. It 
was also successful in improving the composition of exports when trans-
port vehicles were given greater emphasis (OECD  2012e ). Th e stock of 
inward FDI has been on the increase since the crisis hit its lowest point; 
in 2012, it was 55 per cent of GDP. Th e improvement of the innovation 
system is essential for persistent progress. Portugal is a moderate innova-
tor, according to the innovation scoreboard in 2014, assuming 18th place 
between Spain and Greece. In 2010, Portugal’s innovation performance 
approached the EU average, with 79 per cent, but during the crisis, this 
fell back to 74 per cent in 2013 (European Commission  2014c : 64). In 
2012, 1.5 per cent of GDP was spent on R&D; half was spent by the 
public sector and the other half by the business sector. 
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 In the decade before the crisis, the Portuguese employment rate was 
over 70 per cent, which was far better than the EU average. At the same 
time, the unemployment rate also increased, reaching 8 to 9 per cent 
in the pre-crisis years. Moreover, the rate of long-term unemployment 
also steadily increased. Th e rigidity of the labour market was one of the 
strongest within the EU, which led to the development of the dual labour 
market. Th e ratio for those employed in fi xed-term contracts was more 
than 20 per cent, well over the EU average. In 2009, the labour code 
introduced several changes; nevertheless, Portugal overtook only Spain, 
France, and Greece in terms of labour market rigidity. Th e crisis caused 
huge destruction in the labour market: the employment rate sank below 
65.4 per cent in 2013, the unemployment rate increased to 16.4 per 
cent, and the rate of youth unemployment reached 38.1 per cent. Th e 
mean unemployment duration almost doubled; in 2011–2012, it was 
17.5 months (Carneiro et  al.  2014 : 446). In 2011, new reforms were 
launched, the labour market was further liberalised, and the diff erence 
between the degree of protection off ered to employees with open-ended 
contracts and that off ered to those with fi xed-term contracts decreased. 
Unemployment benefi ts were curtailed in order to stimulate employ-
ment, and these benefi ts were made more easily accessible to the young, 
who would not have been entitled to such benefi ts under the same condi-
tions as older people. Th e relatively high guaranteed minimum income 
was frozen, and as a result, it was expected that low-skilled workers would 
be employed more easily. Low-skilled workers account for a consider-
able segment of Portuguese economy, and they lost their jobs fi rst. Th e 
rigidity of EPL was still above the OECD average, even after the reforms 
(Baglioni and Mota  2013 ; OECD  2012e ). Altogether, it can be said that 
Portugal has made huge strides in restructuring the labour market insti-
tutions. Th e impact of such measures is diffi  cult to assess in the midst of 
the recession. In 2014, a small decrease in unemployment was expected. 
 Th e Portuguese mechanism of wage agreements was detrimental 
to employment as such, as well as to competitiveness. Th e Portuguese 
Ministry of Employment extended the agreement concluded by the trade 
unions and employer associations to an entire sector, regardless of the 
representativity of the participating organisations. Th us, coverage of col-
lective agreements exceeded 90 per cent. Th e agreements deal with the 
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minimum wages, not the anticipated wage growth. Furthermore, there 
was a pressure from the sheltered sectors—including the public sector—
aiming at wage increases in the labour market (Carneiro et  al.  2014 ). 
In 2011, the Socialist government froze the extension of wage agree-
ments as part of the international rescue package. However, the new, 
Conservative-Liberal government implemented the measures, abandon-
ing the expansion of the agreements and expanding the opportunity 
to conclude company-level wage agreements. Th e number of collective 
agreements has declined dramatically since 2011, mainly at the branch 
level, and the ratio of employees covered by agreements was 43 per cent 
according to the estimations of the Ministry. Th is process weakens the 
trade unions, the density of which has been declining for a long time—
similar to other countries; it is estimated to be approximately 20 per 
cent. As a result of the austerity measures in 2011, the two trade union 
confederations organised general strikes, but in the meantime, one of 
them, the General Workers’ Union ( União Geral de Trabalhadores ), with 
members mainly from the banking sector, public utilities and large cor-
porations, signed two agreements in the framework of the tripartite nego-
tiations in March 2011 and in January 2012. Since then, no agreement 
has been concluded; the standpoint of the government and that of the 
trade unions became too distant from one another (Eurofound  2014 ). 
Nevertheless, both employer and employee organisations have been 
undergoing a restructuring process in the past few years to achieve con-
centration and coordination in the fragmented and competing interests 
groups (Baglioni and Mota  2013 ). 
 Th e Portuguese system of social assistance shares the common char-
acteristic features of the Mediterranean countries. Th e diff erence is that 
the employment of women is more extensive; therefore, the system is not 
as family based. In Portugal, the monitoring system for supervising the 
use of social welfare benefi ts is stricter than in the other Mediterranean 
countries (Baglioni and Mota  2013 ). During the crisis, the decline in 
wages and pensions and the increasing taxes severely tried Portuguese 
families; substantive adjustment began only in 2011. Until then, poverty 
and inequality indicators had even shown an improvement compared 
to the years before the crisis. In 2013, a 2-percentage-point deteriora-
tion can be seen for the EU poverty indicator and the indicator for the 
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severely materially deprived. Among the inequality indicators, the GINI 
index did not increase, but the income quintile share ratio did (Table 
A.8). Due to the guaranteed minimum income, which was introduced 
in 1997, the ratio of those unemployed poor people who do not receive 
social assistance is lower than in Italy, in Greece or in Bulgaria, but it is 
still 42.3 per cent. At the same time, the income threshold for eligibility 
of the minimum income scheme was lowered in 2010 and again in 2012 
(EC SWD  2014x : 19). 
 Th e legacy of the dictatorship in Portugal can still be traced in the 
education level of the population. In 2009, 30 per cent of the people aged 
25–64 had upper secondary education, compared to the OECD average 
of 73 per cent. During recent, decades there has been substantial prog-
ress, but catching up is slow, even in the younger generations. Th e ratio of 
people who have attained upper secondary education in the age group of 
25–34 years (who were born during democracy) is only 60 per cent of the 
OECD average. Th e PISA 2012 study shows that Portuguese pupils’ per-
formance was average in mathematics, but it was below average in science 
and reading—the tendency of gradual improvement shown in the previ-
ous period has ended. During the crisis, tertiary attainment improved, 
increasing from 21.1 per cent in 2009 to 29.2 per cent in 2013, although 
it remains below the EU average of 36.6 per cent. Th e most substan-
tial reforms in recent years were performed in vocational education and 
training. Portugal also wants to enhance practical, “on-the- job” training 
by involving companies (EC SWD  2014x : 20; OECD  2012e : 28). 
 Greece has proved to be the weakest link in the euro area. In relation to 
the Greek crisis, the risk of the disintegration of the euro area appeared 
together with the fear that a potential Greek national insolvency would 
bring down the other vulnerable Mediterranean countries as well; as a 
consequence, all European economies would be involved in a severe cri-
sis. Th erefore, more attention has been paid to the Greek situation than 
what would otherwise be reasonable in the case of a country with a popu-
lation of 11 million. 
 As summarised in Part II, the Greek economy had been growing 
during the period prior to the crisis, but this growth was due to factors 
that were not sustainable. Th e average growth between 1996 and 2008 
was nearly 4 per cent, and it dipped below 3 per cent only in one year, 
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2005. Recession began in 2008, with −0.4 per cent, and it hit the lowest 
point in 2011 and 2012, with a contraction of 8.9 per cent and 6.6 per 
cent, respectively. It is uncertain when the growth rate will turn positive 
permanently. 
 Imbalances in the system were forecast by a twin defi cit; in 2006, the 
current account defi cit as a percentage of GDP reached double-digit lev-
els, creeping up to 15 per cent by 2008 (but it had been moving between 
6 and 8 per cent in the preceding period), and the balance was disturbed 
in the mid-1990s. Public debt had always been approximately 100 per 
cent in the prime of economic growth; it decreased by a few percentage 
points only before the euro was introduced. After 2000, there were only 
two years when public debt was a double-digit fi gure and not a triple-digit 
fi gure. During the crisis, it soared dramatically, reaching 175 per cent in 
2013. In the second half of the 1990s, there were eff orts to reduce the 
defi cit, but in reality, the defi cit never sank below the Maastricht bench-
mark of 3 per cent. Data supplied in relation to the adoption of the euro 
in 2001 were found to be misreported, and the European Commission 
repeatedly expressed its concerns to the Greek authorities regarding the 
reliability of data. Greece was subjected twice (in 2004 and in 2009) 
to the excessive defi cit procedure. Th e fi rst procedure was abrogated in 
2007. In March 2009, the European Commission found out—as the 
result of a data revision—that data concerning 2007 and approved by 
Eurostat were not real either; thus, the abrogation of the procedure was 
a mistake (Visvizi  2012 ). Additionally, the lack of trust that emerged in 
connection with Greece as a result proved to be fatal during the crisis. 
 Greece survived the initial shock fairly well because its exports to the 
Balkans were quite strong in 2008 and its economy was relatively closed; 
however, the Greek economy had slowed down a bit in 2007 due to inter-
nal imbalances. In 2009, Greece’s GDP shrank by 4.4 per cent, which 
was on par with the EU average. At the same time, in 2009, when elec-
tions were held, the defi cit soared to 15.2 per cent due to the non-limited 
expenditures and plummeting tax revenue. Th ere were several steps until 
this fi gure was “created” at the end of 2010. Th e left-wing government, 
which won the elections (and raised objections about the austerity mea-
sures of the Conservative government earlier), declared in October 2009 
that the anticipated defi cit would be approximately 11–12 per cent of 
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GDP, much higher than that forecast by its predecessor. At the same 
time, the Solidarity Fund was established, from which allowances in the 
amount of EUR 866 million were disbursed to people with low incomes 
in 2009. Having the high and uncertain size of defi cit in mind, the Greek 
borrowing opportunities deteriorated dramatically. Th e austerity mea-
sures announced for 2010 could not restore credibility. On the advice of 
the leaders of the euro area, who were not really prepared to manage the 
crisis, Greece required fi nancial aid not only from the EU and the ECB 
but also from the IMF in April 2010 (Visvizi  2012 : 21–22). Th e frame-
work of the fi rst package (covering the period of 2010–2013) was EUR 
110 billion, of which EUR 52.9 billion was paid by the euro area mem-
ber states and EUR 20.1 billion by the IMF. Because the 2012 national 
elections failed to give defi nite authorisation to any of the political parties 
and because the coalition was forming rather slowly, the payment terms 
of the package were not fulfi lled on time, and in order to maintain stabil-
ity, a second package—in the amount of EUR 130 billion—was agreed 
upon in 2012. Under the second programme, the remaining amount 
from the fi rst package was disbursed; in April 2014, EUR 139.9 billion 
from the European Financial Stability Facility and EUR 8.3 billion from 
the IMF were disbursed. Th e entire amount up to the end of 2014 was 
expected to be EUR 164.5 billion. In 2012, the private sector had to take 
part in restructuring the Greek debt—government bonds in the amount 
of EUR 200 billion were exchanged (EC SWD  2014r : 5). 
 Th e Greek government introduced very strict defi cit-reducing mea-
sures as early as 2010 (9.1 per cent of GDP), including tax increases (5.5 
per cent) and budgetary saving measures (3.6 per cent) (OECD  2011b : 
43). Defi cit decreased by 6 to 7 percentage points, but due to the steadily 
declining economy and the high interest rates—in spite of increasingly 
newer austerity measures—defi cit soared to 12.2 per cent in 2013. A 
substantial fall in the defi cit was expected in 2014. 
 Greek banks did not have toxic assets and had adequate capital; there-
fore, they survived the fi rst wave of the global fi nancial crisis in good 
condition. Th e Greek case is unique; while, in other countries, losses 
occurring in the banking system were transformed into sovereign debt 
through the government-driven restructuring of banks, in Greece, 
the indebtedness of the government weighed heavily on banks. At the 
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end of 2009, Greek banks had a stock of government securities in the 
amount of 23 per cent of GDP, which is much higher than in the other 
Mediterranean countries (OECD  2011b : 57). In restructuring public 
debt, Greek banks also took part in the Private Sector Involvement pro-
gramme, and according to estimates, they suff ered a loss amounting to 
EUR 37.7 billion (20 per cent of GDP). Deposit outfl ows, closure of the 
interbank market, and the subsequent dependence on the Eurosystem all 
led to rising funding costs, and the suddenly increasing amount of NPL 
(as a consequence of the crisis) imposed a further burden on the economy. 
Mainly with the help of the international rescue packages via the Hellenic 
Financial Stability Fund (temporarily established for this purpose), the 
capital base of the four core banks was restored in 2012. One core bank 
went under government control, but the other three retained private 
management. Private investors became entitled to buy all government- 
held shares at a predetermined price at regular points in time over the 
next four and a half years. Th e healthy units of the non-core banks will 
be absorbed by the core banks; thus, the concentration of banks increases 
(OECD  2013e ). Th e total cost of restructuring amounts to 19.2 per 
cent of 2012 GDP (European Commission  2014g ). Th e share of NPL 
was still increasing; in 2013, it amounted to 31.3 per cent. Borrowing 
by households and by the corporate sector increased dynamically in the 
mid-1990s (at the same time, savings decreased), especially after the 
euro was adopted. Nevertheless, Greece started from a low level, and its 
level of debt was lower before the crisis than that of most OMS. Real 
estate investments increased dynamically as well, together with housing 
prices, but no housing bubble developed. As the economic situation dete-
riorated, demand naturally decreased, and a continuous price correction 
took place. Housing prices decreased to 73.4 per cent in 2013, compared 
to the year 2010. 
 Th e competitiveness of the Greek economy before the crisis was not 
in line with the increase in the standard of living characteristic of the 
2000s. At the cost of the above-described imbalances, per capita GDP 
reached 95 per cent of the EU average in 2004. As a result of the cri-
sis, per capita GDP decreased to 73 per cent in 2013. During the fi ve 
years of the crisis, Greece suff ered a 27.3 per cent loss in export market 
share by 2013. Th e problems of competitiveness derive from price or cost 
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factors and non-price factors. Greece achieved an annual 3.4 per cent 
growth in productivity between 1999 and 2003 and an annual 1.1 per 
cent growth in productivity between 2004 and 2008, which exceeded 
that of the other Mediterranean countries and the other OMS, but the 
6.8 per cent and 3.5 per cent growth in the compensation of employees 
per head in both of the two periods, respectively, outperformed the euro 
area average. Consequently, nominal ULC increased as well by an annual 
3.3 and 2.4 per cent, respectively. After 2004, the growth in productivity 
slowed, which meant that productivity per working hour again dropped 
below 80 per cent of the EU-27 average. Th e growth in real compensa-
tion was not too high; it was 3 per cent between 1999 and 2003 and 0.1 
per cent between 2004 and 2008, as Greek infl ation was higher than the 
euro area average. In these periods, REER appreciated by 0.9 and 0.8 per 
cent, respectively (European Commission  2013a : 15–16, 19). Th e fact 
that, in Greece, profi t margins were maintained at a higher level than 
in the case of the partners in the EU contributed to the deterioration of 
price competitiveness (Alexiou and Nellis  2013 ). 
 It is even more important that as far as non-price factors are concerned, 
Greece’s performance is weak and that there are severe structural problems 
in the background. Th e contribution of the Greek manufacturing indus-
try to GDP is 8 per cent, which is outstandingly low compared to the 
EU member states. Moreover, low-tech products are dominant. Th e same 
can be detected in the structure of exports, and large corporations are 
less concentrated among the exporters compared to the other EU mem-
ber states, which may be the consequence of the average small corporate 
size. In Greece, shipping and tourism account for more than half of the 
exports of goods and services, in which there is growing price competi-
tion (OECD  2011b : 34–35). In accordance with the above, Greece—as 
a moderate innovator—ranks 19th in the Innovation Union Scoreboard 
2014. Total expenditures on R&D were 0.69 per cent of GDP in 2012, 
of which business expenditures on R&D reached 0.24 per cent of GDP 
(EC SWD  2014r : 16). 
 Measures taken as part of crisis management restored cost competi-
tiveness. Wages decreased by 25 per cent (not only in the governmental 
sector), and the real compensation of employees per head did not reach 
80 per cent in 2013, as it did in 2000. REER defl ated by ULC returned 
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to the level present at the end of the 1990s. Greece’s price competitive-
ness has not improved nearly as much as its cost competitiveness. Perhaps 
this is the reason why exports recover slowly. Although Greek imports 
declined, the substantial current account defi cit returned to balance only 
in 2012. During the fulfi lment of the terms and conditions of the rescue 
packages, several measures reduced red tape, strengthened competition, 
improved tax collection and may have had benefi cial eff ects on the busi-
ness environment in the medium or long term. Nevertheless, the indica-
tor for product market regulation is still above the OECD average, even 
after the reforms (OECD  2013e ). According to the WEF competitive-
ness index, Greece advanced from the 96th place to 81st place in 2014 
(Schwab  2014 : 13). It remains to be seen how persistent and profound 
the eff ects of the reforms—which have been dictated externally—will be. 
Tax evasion is an issue often mentioned in relation to Greece. In 2008, 64 
per cent of all Greek taxpayers declared income below the tax-free income 
ceiling (Karamessini  2012 : 164). Although Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index has shown slight improvement, Greece 
ranked 69th in 2014: last among the EU member states together with 
Bulgaria, Italy and Romania. According to OECD estimates, if tax collec-
tion effi  ciency had been similar to the OECD average, in 2011, the level of 
Greek government revenues relative to GDP could have been 6 percentage 
points higher (OECD  2013e : 24). In contrast, Schneider and A.T. Kearney 
( 2013 : 4) estimate the size of the Greek shadow economy in relation to 
GDP to be 24 per cent, which is not excessively high compared to the NMS. 
 State-owned companies contributed considerably to the Greek pub-
lic debt: in 2011, there were more than 180 of them. In 2009, the loss 
generated by state-owned companies amounted to 0.7 per cent of GDP, 
which was partly due to their weak managements and partly to the level 
of wages, which was 1.5–3 times higher than the wage level in the private 
sector. Privatisation undertaken as part of the rescue packages progressed 
reluctantly, in which slow preparation, ambiguous legal issues and mod-
est demand took part as well (OECD  2011b : 94; Visvizi  2012 : 19–20; 
Visvizi  2013 ). 
 Th e Greek labour market reform was launched at the end of 2011. 
In the framework of this reform, the protection of the employees was 
loosened, the minimum wage decreased, the fl exibility of working time 
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increased and wage bargaining was decentralised. Non-wage labour costs 
were reduced, which was necessary because, due to the relatively high 
minimum wage, companies tried to avoid employing young and unskilled 
workers. At the same time, a considerable proportion of employees were 
registered with minimum wages, thereby avoiding paying the  progressive 
income tax and social security contribution. Due to the diff erent tax rules, 
self-employment was an attractive option, especially for skilled middle-
class professionals. As a result, the employment rate was low compared 
to the EU, and the number of hours worked per employee was high 
(Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis  2009 ,  2011a ). As shown above, the decrease 
in labour costs indicates that the reforms were successful in making the 
labour market more fl exible. Nevertheless, in a shrinking economy, where 
a large part of those 150,000 employees who were to be laid off  in the 
public sector until 2015 also appeared gradually, even a fl exible labour 
market failed to absorb such an amount of labour supply. Th e pre-crisis 
unemployment rate had been around 10 per cent, but in 2013 it soared 
to 27.5 per cent. Th e employment rate had been 64 per cent and plum-
meted to 52.9 per cent. Th e youth unemployment rate was a shockingly 
high 58.3 per cent in 2013. It seems that any improvement of the situa-
tion will be very slow. 
 Crisis management weakened the positions of employees. Th e 
National General Collective Employment Agreement remained, but the 
scope of collective bargaining has been limited. Th e Minister of Labour 
was entitled to extend the validity of sectoral-level collective agreements 
to all actors in the sector. Th is possibility was suspended for the time of 
fi scal adjustment. Th e scope of decentralised company-level agreements 
has been extended. Trade union density was approximately 28 per cent 
before the crisis: 18 per cent in the private sector and 60 per cent in the 
public sector. Recent data are not available. Th e Greek people objected 
the austerity measures and organised national and company-level strikes. 
In 2011, there were 455 such cases in the private and public sectors 
(Eurofound  2014 ; Karamessini  2012 ). 
 Th e Greek social welfare system is not really eff ective, as demonstrated 
by the fact that there is almost no diff erence between the proportion of 
those who are at risk of poverty before and after the social transfers. Th e 
non-coverage rate of the jobless poor is the highest in Greece at 68.2 per 
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cent within the EU (EC SWD  2014r : 12). As described above, social 
benefi ts and wages decreased as the result of crisis management, so it is 
hardly surprising that social inequalities and the rate of those at risk of 
poverty have increased signifi cantly (Table A.8). Th e rate of the severely 
materially deprived almost doubled by 2013, when it reached 20.3 per 
cent. Th e pension reform in 2010 reduced the scope of the state guaran-
tee to the basic pension and brought the pension system of civil servants 
in line with the private sector pension system by eliminating its more 
favourable provisions (Karamessini  2012 ). 
 Th e reform of the education system has been part of the obligations 
imposed by the rescue package; indeed, Greek education is in great 
need of reforms, especially because its PISA results are below average. 
Furthermore, Greece needs to upgrade vocational education and train-
ing, thereby increasing the level of skills relevant in the labour market. 
Currently, the organisational rationalisation of primary and secondary 
education has been accomplished, and the increase in the number of stu-
dents per classroom and in teaching hours has brought Greece closer to 
the OECD average. In higher education, there have been organisational 
mergers to eliminate duplications, and an external Quality Assurance 
Authority has been established, which is an opportunity to improve qual-
ity (EC SWD  2014r ). Th e Greek society carried a huge burden in the 
last half-decade. According to the calculations performed by Antzoulatos 
( 2011 ), a wage decrease of at least 30 per cent is necessary to achieve the 
REER present at the end of the 1990s and to restore Greece’s competi-
tiveness. However, it was obvious as early as 2011 that this decrease would 
not be enough in itself. Total investment plummeted by 16.8 per cent in 
2011 and 28.7 per cent in 2012, and it was expected to be positive only 
in 2014 (European Commission  2015 : 154). Labour productivity per 
working hour dipped below 75 per cent of the EU-27 average. Th e stock 
of FDI peaked at only 16 per cent of GDP, but in 2012 it shrank to 9.7 
per cent. It currently seems that the series of new austerity measures will 
never end, and the offi  cial estimates related to the rescue packages always 
tend to overestimate the GDP and the expected privatisation revenue. 
In 2013, the European Commission and the IMF forecast that the debt-
to-GDP ratio would be reduced to 124 per cent in 2020. Experts in the 
OECD estimated 157 per cent, and in view of preliminary events, this 
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latter fi gure seems to be more realistic (OECD  2013e : 23). In January 
2015, the parliamentary elections in Greece were won by the radical left-
wing political party, Syriza, which was against the austerity measures. 
Later, the party formed a coalition government with the Independent 
Greeks, a national right-wing party. After very confl ict- ridden negotia-
tions in the summer of 2015—despite the earlier promises and the result 
of a referendum that refused the conditions of the new rescue package—
the Greek government accepted the strict conditions of a third adjust-
ment programme with further austerity measures in the framework of the 
European Stability Mechanism. 
7.2  The Two New Mediterranean Member 
States: Cyprus and Malta 
 Th e two small Mediterranean countries and new EU member states, 
Cyprus (with a population of 1.2 million) and Malta (with a population 
of 420 thousand) were not involved in the cluster analysis due to a lack 
of data. Th e crisis has shown that if a country has a large banking sector 
compared to its economy, in spite of its small territory, the adequate or—
on the contrary—poorly regulated mechanism of the fi nancial system 
may have an impact on the entire EU. Th erefore, it is worth taking a look 
at the performance of Cyprus and Malta during the crisis (Table  7.2 ). 
 After 300 years of Ottoman Rule, Cyprus was part of the British 
Empire between 1878 and 1960. After Cyprus gained independence, 
in 1974, a group of Cypriot military offi  cers supported by the Greek 
junta sought a union with Greece and staged a coup against Archbishop 
Makarios III, fi rst President of Cyprus. In response to the coup, to “pro-
tect” Turkish Cypriots, Turkey invaded the northern part of the island, 
which was proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 
1983; it remains a  de facto state—it is recognised only by Turkey. In rela-
tion to the EU accession, the plan to reunite the island was raised, but the 
Greek Cypriots rejected it in the referendum against the Turkish Cypriots 
who were in favour of reunifi cation. Th erefore, in 2004, the Republic of 
Cyprus joined the EU as a  de facto divided island, and the membership 
of the invaded Northern areas was suspended. Cyprus adopted the euro 
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in 2008. Th e question of reunifi cation has come up from time to time in 
the process of negotiations between the parties but without results so far. 
 Th e Knights of Malta protected the small island from the invasion 
of the Ottoman Empire. In 1814,  Malta became a British Dominion 
and was granted independence in 1964. Both islands are part of the 
Mediterranean, and both were under British rule and British administra-
tion for a long time. Th is historical legacy played a role such that, in both 
countries, the globalisation processes of the 1990s were adopted and uti-
lised and EU membership was granted, thereby making these countries 
fi nancial services centres. Tax rules attracting foreign capital, accountancy 
rules and banking provisions according to the British standards, profes-
sionals with knowledge in the fi elds of legal and accounting matters and 
mastery of the English language are all features that have their roots in 
the colonial period. According to the ECB database, in 2008, total bank 
assets were approximately seven times the GDP in both countries. 
 Pegasiou ( 2013 ) introduces the institutional system of  Cyprus within 
the framework of the VoC literature. Th us, Cyprus is categorised under 
the Mediterranean model of capitalism with unique features deriving 
from the country’s historical background. Th e government played a very 
important role in the economy as both owner and regulator. Th e num-
ber of employees in the public sector doubled between 1980 and 2010. 
Th e country’s performance in terms of public administration, which was 
a British legacy, has gradually deteriorated and lost its effi  ciency. Th e 
electricity supply, harbours, and the leading telecommunications ser-
vice provider are entirely owned by the state; in addition, the state has a 
majority shareholder status in the national fl ag carrier. Political patronage 
and clientelistic practices—similar to other Mediterranean countries—
are both inherent features of extensive state infl uence. Labour relations, 
on the other hand, have been peaceful and cooperative—the traumatic 
events of 1974 strengthened solidarity among the Cypriots. Nevertheless, 
the infl uence of trade unions has decreased here as well; the negotia-
tions between employees and employers are often performed at the indi-
vidual and company levels. Th e split between outsiders and insiders in 
the labour market appeared in Cyprus as well, especially after the EU 
accession, when the number of immigrants began to increase. Th e fea-
tures of the Mediterranean model—a fragmented and politicised system 
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and the importance of the family and the church—can also be found in 
the Cypriot welfare system. At the same time, the level of expenditure on 
social protection benefi ts is lower than in the large Mediterranean coun-
tries (approximately 20 per cent) (EC SWD  2014m : 21), but the indi-
cators for inequality are more favourable (Table A.8). In education, the 
PISA results of the Cypriot students are below average (OECD  2013j : 5). 
Th e tertiary attainment rate is high—which is not characteristic of the 
Mediterranean countries—and traditionally, many obtain their diploma 
abroad. Th e labour market demand for employees with higher educa-
tion degrees was triggered by the development of the banking sector. 
Th e fi nancial system is bank-based; in this respect, Cyprus is similar to 
the other Mediterranean countries. More than two-thirds of the bank-
ing system was in Cypriot ownership when the crisis began, and three of 
these banks dominated the market. Th e banks were operating within an 
oligopolistic and loosely regulated environment; the banking system was 
politically infl uenced, where writing-off  debts and granting favourable 
loans depended on political considerations. Intertwining the Cypriot 
and Greek economies was characteristic of the banking sector, and it had 
serious consequences during the crisis. Not only Greek companies and 
households but also the Greek state—through its bonds—was among the 
clients of the Cypriot banks. After the Greek debt haircut in 2012, up to 
75 per cent of the value of the bonds was lost; for Cyprus, this equated to 
nearly 25 per cent of the country’s GDP (EC SWD  2014m : 19; Pegasiou 
 2013 : 344). 
 Th e crisis in 2008 put an end to a period of impressive progress that 
lasted for more than a decade in Cyprus. Although the current account 
defi cit had increased before the crisis, competitiveness declined, which 
was indicated by the appreciation of REER. Automatic wage indexation 
deteriorated cost competitiveness. Th e increase in real estate prices and 
the stock of mortgages also took place in Cyprus; the former was driven 
primarily by external demand for housing. Nevertheless, events took 
a dramatic turn when fi nancing problems of the banking system and 
public fi nances arose. Greek and Cypriot government bonds were down-
graded by the credit rating agencies, which adversely aff ected the banks 
that owned such bonds. Confi dence was shaken in terms of the fi nan-
cial sustainability of Cyprus due to the diffi  culties of public fi nances and 
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because Cyprus was severely aff ected by fi nancial contagion from Greece. 
An additional concern was the relatively large size of the banking sys-
tem. Cypriot government bonds could be sold only with outstandingly 
high yields in 2011. Cyprus needed international support. Regarding 
the strongly aff ected Russian clients of the banking system, in December 
2011, Russia signed a bilateral loan agreement with the Cypriot govern-
ment, providing a loan of EUR 2.5 billion. Th is amount was not enough 
to cover the country’s fi nancing needs in 2013 or the recapitalisation of 
the banks. In 2013, Cyprus concluded an agreement with the “troika” for 
a three-year loan of EUR ten billion (ECFIN DG  2012b : 28; European 
Commission  2013e : 7). 
 Since then, the Cypriot government has begun the adjustment pro-
gramme with the usual austerity measures in the social welfare system 
with pension reform (European Commission  2013e ), but the end of the 
economic recession was expected in 2015. In 2013, the downturn was 
5.4 per cent. Unemployment increased—in line with this decline—for 
at least two years, reaching 16 per cent in 2014. Th e current account 
defi cit is decreasing. Th e banking system is on the path of slow stabilisa-
tion; in 2013, the total assets of the banking sector amounted to only 
fi ve times the GDP. Th e costs of recapitalisation and asset relief interven-
tions accounted for 10.1 per cent of 2012 GDP. Restructuring resulted 
in the 99 per cent state ownership of the Cooperative Central Bank in 
2014. Regulation and fi nancial supervision have been tightened, and an 
anti-money-laundering action plan has been implemented (EC SWD 
 2014m : 8–9; 19 European Commission  2014g ). Consolidated debt in 
the private sector was 3.4 times the GDP in 2013, and growth has not 
taken a turn yet. A detailed plan was prepared about the privatisation of 
the state-owned companies, and a privatisation law was enacted at the 
beginning of 2014, creating the necessary institutional framework. In the 
fi eld of certain specifi c services (construction and travel), amendments to 
the legislation were adopted to enhance competition. Th e wage index-
ation mechanism was reformed on the basis of a tripartite agreement in 
order to make the labour market more fl exible. In 2012, even this was 
suspended (EC SWD  2014m ). 
 In the case of  Malta , no VoC analysis of its institutional system—
similar to that of Cyprus—has been available. Taking the indicators of 
354 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
the WEF into account, it can be seen that the institutional and regu-
latory features of the Maltese economy are generally in line with the 
Mediterranean countries. Th e values of the indicators are very close to 
the averages of Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (ECFIN DG 
 2014l : 31). Nevertheless, the structure of the Maltese fi nancial system 
and its regulatory environment caused the Maltese economy to take 
another path. Th e banking sector consists of three components. First, 
there are fi ve domestic core banks servicing the domestic economy, with 
total assets amounting to 2.2 times the GDP. Second, the activities of 
the other, non-core domestic banks, representing 0.8 times the GDP, are 
focused largely abroad. Th ird, although total assets of the foreign banks 
amount to fi ve times the GDP, these banks—among which the Turkish 
and German groups of banks play an outstanding role—do not relate 
to the Maltese economy. Th e activities of the insurance and investment 
funds are signifi cant as well. Th e crisis could not shake the banking sys-
tem: due to the conservative business model of the core banks, the high 
savings rate of households, and the marginal role of wholesale funding, 
banks were not in need of government subsidies or any refi nancing of 
the ECB. International banks were recapitalised by their parent banks to 
such an extent that their tier 1 capital adequacy ratio was 131.5 in June 
2013. Malta did not have to spend to restructure banks (ECFIN DG 
 2014l : 21; European Commission  2014g ). Th e size of the banking sector 
even increased during the crisis, and in 2013, its size was the same as it 
had been at the beginning of the crisis—seven times the GDP (EC SWD 
 2014w : 36). Favourable taxation (a simplifi ed system of paying taxes), 
the stability of the regulatory environment and banking supervision—
equally covering domestic and foreign banks, with the same procedures 
for both—all contribute to Malta’s attractiveness. 
 Naturally, the crisis also aff ected the Maltese economy; deleveraging 
cannot be avoided due to the increased amount of private sector debt, 
but altogether, it weighs less heavily on the economy than in many other 
EU member states. Public debt remains approximately 70 per cent in 
the medium term, and now, it seems that it is manageable with domestic 
savings. Nevertheless, it poses a risk in the long run because of the age-
ing of the population. Unlike Cyprus—where services dominate exports 
and where 27.2 per cent of its export market share was lost between 
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2008 and 2013—Malta has achieved improvement in services (tour-
ism, remote gaming, and fi nancial services) and in certain segments of 
the export of goods since the outbreak of the crisis. Th erefore, between 
2008 and 2013, Malta did not lose export market shares. Goods exports 
include the traditional semiconductors industry and the emerging tran-
shipment of oil. Malta has benefi tted from its favourable geographical 
position and has become a centre for transhipment and logistics in the 
area. Although its cost competitiveness has declined since the beginning 
of the 2000s, wage increases have converged with the modest rate of 
productivity growth since the beginning of the crisis. Th e mechanism of 
automatic wage indexation exists in Malta, but its impact is counterbal-
anced—at least in the private sector—in such a way that there is a possi-
bility of fl exible wage bargaining at the company level. At the same time, 
the ineffi  ciency of public administration deteriorates the economy’s com-
petitiveness (ECFIN DG  2014l ). Trade union density is high (approxi-
mately 60 per cent), but collective agreements are concluded only at the 
company level in the private sector. Th ere were some strikes in relation to 
the market liberalisation, mainly in the public sector, but social partners 
are committed to cooperation (Eurofound  2014 ). As far as education is 
concerned, Malta compares well with the other Mediterranean countries, 
the rate of enrolment is among the lowest in both vocational and tertiary 
education (ECFIN DG  2014j : 39, 41). Th e results of the 2009+ PISA test 
were rather poor (EC SWD  2014w ). Th e indicators for social inequalities 
and poverty are below the EU average and the euro area average, but they 
increased during the crisis. Public expenditure on social protection did 
not reach 20 per cent of GDP; the high proportion of means-tested ben-
efi ts indicates the presence of the Anglo-Saxon system, and the large pro-
portion of cash benefi ts is characteristic of the Mediterranean countries 
(National Statistics Offi  ce Malta  2014 : 24–27). For fi scal consolidation, 
Malta did not curtail the low expenditure on social benefi ts; moreover, 
even minimal growth was planned for the coming year. Instead, taxes 
were increased. Although the level of taxation is not high in Malta, the 
pension system, which was reformed in 2006, must be addressed in the 
future. Th e introduction of the private third pillar does not reduce the 
burden on public pension spending (EC SWD  2014w ). 
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 Th e economies of Cyprus and Malta indicate that, although they share 
similar historical backgrounds (a British colonial past), certain elements 
of the Mediterranean model (bureaucratic public administration, a bank- 
based fi nancial system, and a weak innovation system), the globalisation 
and the exploitation of the opportunities off ered by the EU (off shore 
fi nancial services centre of a relatively similar size), only one diff erence—
the diff erent institutional and regulatory solution—was enough in a 
single sector, the banking sector, and an external shock could direct the 
two countries onto diverse pathways. At the same time, it is interesting 
that Cyprus is showing signs of development when the development of 
the innovation system is taken into consideration, which is traditionally 
considered in economics the most conclusive factor in terms of long- 
term growth. Cyprus has been given a favourable assessment by the 
Innovation Union Scoreboards since 2008, usually ranking fi rst among 
the Mediterranean countries, overtaking Italy, while Malta has always 
been a moderate innovator, taking its place among the post-socialist 
countries. In terms of labour force qualifi cations, Cyprus again has a 
more favourable position. Nevertheless, in Cyprus, the crisis of the bank-
ing system dragged the whole economy down; thus, its growth potential 
has declined in the long run. Malta maintained its stable fi nancial sys-
tem and remained on a path of sustainable growth by exploiting market 
niches—although at a lower level than before the crisis. 
7.3  The Risk of Persistent Divergence 
 Th e diffi  culties suff ered by the Mediterranean countries during the crisis 
caused all of them (with the exception of Malta) to lose their positions in 
the per capita GDP ranking relative to the EU-28 average, and even Italy 
has sunk below the average (Fig.  7.1 ). One way of measuring the success 
of their crisis management is to determine whether these countries are 
able to reverse this process and whether they are able to avoid persistent 
divergence.
 Before the global economic changes and the neoliberal shift of the 
1980s, the Mediterranean model was similar to the continental one: the 
product market was relatively regulated, the fi nancial system was bank 
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based, the EPL was considerably strong, the wage agreements between 
employers and employees were institutionalised and more or less central-
ised, social protection aimed at status preservation and was covered by 
social insurance contribution, and, more or less, extended public educa-
tion was provided. Th ese results are not surprising if we take into account 
the geographical proximity, the similar historical roots, and the “catch-
ing up”, “following” type of their modernisation. At the same time, in 
addition to these similarities, in the diff erent institutional areas, certain 
specifi c features developed that made it possible to describe a charac-
teristically Mediterranean model. Th ese features, however, were mainly 
unfavourable in terms of effi  ciency and economic competitiveness. State 
intervention in the product market was larger, the size of the public sec-
tor was larger, the burden of regulation was more signifi cant, the opera-
tion of the labour market was less fl exible, the welfare state could not 
lessen the inequalities in income relative to social expenditure, the will-
ingness to cooperate was weaker in the relationship between employers 
and employees, and the educational system was less successful than those 
in the continental countries. Th e reforms of the 1990s—as introduced 
in Part II—began to head towards market liberalisation similar to the 
continental countries, but instead of layering, bricolage (see 1.6 of Part 
I) expresses rather well what occurred. No effi  cient hybrid solutions were 
 Fig. 7.1  GDP per capita at PPP in Mediterranean countries (% of the EU-28 
average), EU-28 = 100.  Source : Eurostat 
 
358 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
created such as those in some of the continental countries. Th e reasons for 
this are to be found in the worse performance of the state and the public 
administration, in the lack of or the low level of cooperation between 
social groups, especially between employers and employees and between 
the political parties representing them, and in the lack of social support 
of economic reforms, which was a consequence of the latter. 3 
 Th e Mediterranean countries did not embark on a diff erent develop-
ment path during the crisis than in the preceding two decades. Th ose 
changes and reforms that were implemented as part of their crisis man-
agement were realised under the supervision of the EU and the IMF as 
criteria of a rescue package in four of six countries. Th erefore, it is not 
surprising that the reforms again pointed to the direction of liberalisa-
tion. Nevertheless, neither Italy nor Malta showed diff erent economic 
policy objectives, either. Obviously, half a decade is a very short time for 
profound changes; it takes time for reform measures to unfold, and in 
the middle of the recession, they cannot achieve their goal (for example, 
measures aiming at decreasing the duality of the labour market). Th e 
individual analyses of countries and Table  7.3 (which summarises and 
compares the changes) clearly indicate that—as expected—there was no 
breakthrough in the institutional system during the crisis.
 Th e problem is that the Mediterranean countries became trapped in 
a situation that is extremely diffi  cult to solve. Th e programs negotiated 
with the international organisations focused on the stabilisation of the 
budget and the guarantee of safe repayment of loans. In comparison, 
supporting economic growth had only a subordinate role. 4 Th e mem-
bers of the society could not identify themselves with the reforms—
which became obvious after the numerous demonstrations held in the 
countries that received the rescue packages—and the Italian techno-
cratic government of Monti (2011–2012) was given the cold shoulder, 
refl ecting the same attitude. As time passes, the situation is becom-
ing even worse because the austerity measures were forcibly taken by 
the government, but the results of such measures are either non-exis-
tent or hardly perceivable by the citizens. By 2013, the public debt of 
all countries, with the exception of Malta, exceeded 90 per cent, and 
overcoming this debt and the debt of the private sector will reduce 
economic growth for a long time, inducing further austerity measures. 
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Strengthening and reinforcing the sources of growth, including but not 
limited to the innovation system and human capital, require investment. 
Public spending on education was above the EU average only in Malta, 
Cyprus, and Portugal before the crisis; the other three Mediterranean 
countries were well below average, which did not change during the crisis 
(EACEA  2013 : 7). Th erefore, it emerges from time to time that, in order 
to be able to spur economic growth, sources should be created at the 
EU level (by issuing bonds, restructuring the EU budget, and so on). At 
the same time, it is extremely diffi  cult to elaborate guarantees and mak-
ing sure that what happened during the decade before the crisis, when 
the abundantly available capital fl owed into the non-tradable sectors and 
the development of competitive structures did not take place, will not 
occur again. For decades, the European Commission has been trying to 
force the effi  cient utilisation of the assistance provided under EU cohe-
sion policy by applying increasingly cunning and strict measures, but the 
results have been ambivalent so far. 
 Th e analyses of the individual countries have indicated clearly that 
the sectoral composition and the corporate structure of the economies 
should change. Greater emphasis must be placed on tradable sectors, spe-
cifi cally industry; the increase in productivity would revert, presumably, 
if corporate size were larger. Th erefore, these sectors’ integration into the 
global value chain should be deeper. At present, in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain—the latter with the exception of its automotive industry—special-
ised export orientation is not visible, according to data on revealed com-
parative advantage (Jens  2012 ). Moreover, the administrative constraints 
and the tax rules all compel companies to remain small in size (Gill and 
Raiser  2012 ). 
 Capital allocation between tradable and non-tradable sectors in favour 
of the latter is usually explained by the fact that they operate as protected 
sectors and, due to weak competition, companies receive rent. Does this 
mean that strengthening the competition  per se would solve the problem? 
Dellepiane et al. ( 2013 ) make reference to Eichengreen and bring us face 
to face with the experience that it is easier to assign the new factors of 
production—regardless of whether they are human or fi nancial factors—
to the expansion of production than to the boost in productivity, which 
implies that the problem is far more complicated. Th e Spanish example 
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has shown that behind the occurrence of the hosing bubble, in addition 
to high profi t, there were, in fact, several other socioeconomic factors and 
institutional conditions. Th e problems of the Italian and Spanish bank-
ing systems have made it clear that the diff erence between an economy 
embedded in international relations and the domestic economy can be 
found not only in the intensity of competition—such as in Denmark or 
Finland—but also in the institutional environment of their operation. 
In the Mediterranean countries, direct political infl uence, building the 
regime’s own clientele and not professional management subsist more 
easily in the non-tradable sectors. 
 Th e complexity of this problem is expressively illustrated by Calvo 
( 2014 ), who explains that institutional factors were the reasons why 
banking and telecommunication services came to the fore within trad-
able sectors in Spain and why industry has lost ground. Th e government 
did not have a planning-organising capacity or fi nancial means by which 
development controlled from above would have been implemented in 
order to hold out in competition within European integration. Until 
the reform of the single market at the beginning of 1990s, banks and 
companies were fairly protected, but due to Franco’s deliberately divisive 
politics, the structure of the elite was fragmented, and there were not 
strong social, professional intermediary organisations, either. Th erefore, a 
neo-corporatist cooperation, such as that in Germany, could not evolve. 
Companies operating in the knowledge-intensive and capital-intensive 
industries had rather limited fi nancial and organisational capacity for 
product development. Given these specifi c features, the banking and the 
telecommunication sectors were the sectors in which such concentration 
could come about that made the cooperation between the state and a 
few large corporations possible, without intermediary agents and where 
both parties are mutually dependent on each other. Th is non-hierarchical 
cooperation is named “peer coordination” by Calvo ( 2014 ). As the coop-
eration between the complex service sectors and the state gained strength, 
resources were drawn away from the knowledge-intensive and capital- 
intensive industries. 
 Rangone and Solari ( 2012 ) demonstrate why, through the series of 
Italian reforms, the liberal reforms based on “family capitalism”—due 
partly to disguised interests and the lack of cooperation between the social 
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actors and partly to unexpected or disregarded consequences—could not 
improve economic performance. 
 More than a half decade has passed since the crisis began, and the fol-
lowing question remains unanswered: which Mediterranean country will 
be able to reverse the process of moving away from the economic average 
of the EU over the long-term? Th e obstacles that impeded the creation 
of more effi  cient hybrid solutions before the crisis and those referred to 
above (weaker performance of the state and public administration, the 
lack of social support in backing reforms, and the low level of cooperative 
attitude between the social and economic actors) have not disappeared. 
Th ese countries currently face the task of fi nding effi  cient institutional 
solutions that match their own circumstances and facilities. In the last 
part, we return to those consequences that arise from this insight and 
that have relevance for European integration and economic governance. 
 Notes 
 1.  Th e ECB and the national central banks together constitute the Eurosystem, 
the central banking system of the euro area. 
 2.  Banyuls and Recio ( 2012 ) do not give an estimation of the size of the shadow 
economy; nevertheless, a signifi cant size of the shadow economy may be 
assumed if we take account of the fact that the contradiction between the lax 
immigration policy and the strict labour laws has been bridged by immi-
grants’ illegal employment. 
 3.  Th e size of shadow economy indicates how poorly managed the relationship 
between the state and its citizens is. As far as shadow economy is concerned, 
not only Greece has a higher value (24 per cent) than the continental coun-
tries, but the estimates for Italy, Spain, and Portugal (21 per cent, 19 per cent 
and 19 per cent of GDP, respectively) also exceed the value characteristic of 
the continental countries (10–15 per cent) (Schneider and Kearney  2013 : 4). 
 4.  A detailed critical review of the programs related to the rescue packages is 
provided by Aiginger ( 2013 ). 
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8.1  The Fall and Quick Rise of the Baltic 
States 
 Th e situation of the Baltic countries during the crisis is unique in two 
respects: fi rst, these countries suff ered the deepest decline in 2009, and 
second, these countries accomplished the most rapid and most radical 
adjustment (Table  8.1 ). All Baltic countries had an overheated economy 
before the crisis began. Th eir spectacular economic growth was built 
primarily on internal demand, and imbalance manifested in the current 
account defi cit, while fi scal policy was stable, though pro-cyclical. When 
the crisis began, capital infl ow stopped, the real economy began to shrink 
rapidly, and tax revenues decreased. Such circumstances shook even those 
budgets that were otherwise stable. Austerity measures were needed.
 Estonia , with a pre-crisis growth rate of 5 to 6 per cent, was at 70 per 
cent of the EU-27 average in terms of GDP per capita at PPP in 2007 
(while the corresponding rate was only 36 per cent in 1995), and only 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic overtook Estonia among the EU-10 
(Table  4.2). Investments were fi nanced by FDI, domestic currency 
pegged to the euro, and loans enjoyed the low interest rates characteristic 
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of the euro area. Nevertheless, the composition of the FDI changed over 
the course of nearly a decade. While in 2000, the share of manufacturing 
was 21.6 per cent, fi nancial intermediation was 24.3 per cent, and real 
estate development was 7.8 per cent, in 2007, the share of manufactur-
ing decreased to 14.6 per cent, fi nancial intermediation increased to 33.2 
per cent, and real estate development soared to 26.8 per cent (OECD 
 2009b : 26). Th e increase in the share of non-tradable sectors caused the 
elevation of the current account defi cit, which was already 15.9 per cent 
in 2007. Th e Estonian government withdrew its promises concerning 
the increase in wages and welfare provision; thus, the deepest point for 
the government defi cit was in 2008, at 3 per cent, which was reduced 
to 2 per cent in 2009. Because automatic stabilisers were functioning 
(for example, unemployment benefi ts), the government took a defi cit- 
reducing measure accounting for 7 per cent of GDP in 2009. In 2009, 
wages in the public sector were reduced nominally and gradually in sev-
eral steps, by 4.3 per cent on an annual basis. Here, it must be noted 
that in each year between 2004 and 2009, nominal wages increased by 
10–20 per cent. In addition to reducing pension benefi ts and sickness 
benefi ts, the regulation of the various welfare provisions changed as well, 
and in 2010, the retirement age was raised (Purfi eld and Rosenberg  2010 : 
19, 25). Otherwise, moderate fi ne-tuning was accomplished in the social 
protection system in relation to family benefi ts. Expenditures on social 
protection benefi ts remained as low as they had been before the crisis; as 
the GDP (the reference value) has been increasing, it is heading towards 
12 per cent again (EC SWD  2014n : 16–17, 42). 
 For Estonia, currency devaluation could not be an option—not with 
the remaining currency board—only internal depreciation. Provided that 
the country had given up its exchange rate regime, the adoption of the 
euro would have been delayed, and its economic gain would not have 
been substantial, either. First, confi dence in the Estonian economy would 
have been shaken, and as a consequence, the country’s macroeconomic 
stability would have been aff ected. Approximately 90 per cent of cor-
porate and private loans were denominated in euros (Levasseur  2012 : 
125); therefore, the proportion of NPL would have leaped as a result 
of currency devaluation. Its potential to increase competitiveness would 
have been limited, as the import content of exports is high. Th e govern-
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ments of all three Baltic countries assessed the situation similarly, and in 
all three, the government decided to maintain the current exchange rate 
regime. However, by doing so, the Baltic countries had to bear shocks; 
the societies of the other crisis-hit EU countries could not bear them and 
were not willing to bear them. 
 Th e current account defi cit soon disappeared, and the country ran 
a surplus of 2.7 per cent in 2009. In 2012, there was again a current 
account defi cit of approximately 1 to 2 per cent. Th e disappearance of 
the current account defi cit took place after the infl ow of FDI through the 
banks had stopped; lending activity declined, resulting in a contraction 
of the real economy and corporate investments and an increase in house-
hold savings. Th e above process was the same in all three Baltic states. 
 Th e Estonian banking system is almost entirely in the ownership of 
the Northern bank groups; when the crisis began, the four major banks 
(Swedbank, SEB, Sampo, and Nordea) had a market share of 95 per cent 
(OECD  2009b : 79). Th e banking system remained stable, thanks to the 
parent banks, as the Estonian subsidiary banks were supported directly 
by the parent banks in order to maintain liquidity. Th e real estate bubble 
burst: Eurostat considers the real estate price index in 2010 to be the ref-
erence value (100), and relative to this reference value, the annual index 
in 2007 was 186.5, while the index in 2009 was 98. Nevertheless, the 
share of NPL did not reach 6 per cent in any of the years mentioned (EC 
SWD  2014n : 39). Th e Bank of Estonia and the Financial Supervisory 
Authority had several macroprudential regulations to make the lending 
standards and the related risk management more strict—which also con-
tributed to maintaining the stability of the banking system. Th ey could 
not manage limiting credit growth, but they were highly successful in 
maintaining a liquid and well-capitalised system (Sutt et al.  2011 ). 
 Before the crisis, wages increased by 16 per cent annually between 2004 
and 2008, leading to the steep elevation of ULC and the appreciation of 
REER.  In 2009, there was a nominal wage adjustment, in which the 
private sector took the lead. Together, the private and the public sectors 
performed a decrease of about 4 per cent each (Purfi eld and Rosenberg 
 2010 : 22, 25). Th e decrease in wages immediately improved cost com-
petitiveness and helped spur the growth of exports. Price and Wörgötter 
( 2011 ) demonstrate with the help of pre-crisis data that Estonian inward 
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FDI was driven mainly by the aim to exploit cost advantages and obtain 
market shares, and value added of Estonian exports remained low. Th e 
neighbouring Nordic, Baltic states and the CIS remained Estonia’s main 
trading partners; Estonia was less successful in increasing its market share 
within the EU than the Visegrád countries. Th e Estonian companies are 
predominantly small and the contribution of large corporations to value 
added is well below the EU average. Th e Estonian SME sector is very 
active in the international relations, but their revealed comparative advan-
tage was primarily the export of low-tech and medium-low-tech products 
in 2009 (OECD  2012a ). Th e share of FDI in per cent of GDP did not 
decrease during the crisis, either; moreover, it steadily increased to over 
80 per cent, and per capita FDI rose uninterruptedly (except for the year 
of 2009). Th ere were some changes in its structure, though, the share of 
the fi nancial and insurance sector decreased signifi cantly (to 24.4 per cent 
in 2012), the share of the manufacturing sector exceeded 16 per cent. 
Within the manufacturing industry, the share of the sectors with lower 
technological levels decreased (Hunya  2013 : 41, 63). Its impact can be 
seen in the export of high-tech products as a percentage of total exports: 
since the pre-crisis level of around 7 per cent, it has risen to 14–15 per 
cent. Th e Estonian economy was able to increase its global market share 
during the crisis by 14 per cent (2013) compared to 2008. Estonia main-
tained its place among the innovation followers, but cooperation is weak 
between the public and the private sectors (EC SWD  2014n ). 
 Estonian companies tried to keep their workforce via wage decreases 
and working hour reductions. Th e unemployment rate increased from 
the pre-crisis level of below 5.5 per cent to 16.7 per cent in 2010; then, 
it decreased again to 8.6 per cent in 2013. In 2009, the reaction of the 
government to the rapid increase in unemployment was the further liber-
alisation of the labour market (relaxing the conditions for dismissals and 
tightening the entitlement rules on unemployment benefi t). Estonian 
society accepted these austerity measures (similar to the others), and 
because trade unions were weak (trade union density is quite low com-
pared to other parts of Europe), there were no demonstrations or strikes. 
One part of the unemployed, especially the unskilled men who had been 
dismissed from the construction industry, went abroad to work,  primarily 
to Finland. Depopulation has been 7 per cent in the last one and a 
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half decades, partly due to the low number of births and partly due to 
emigration. Kaska ( 2013 : 31) makes reference to the 2011 census, which 
reveals that 2.4 per cent of the total population has left Estonia and moved 
abroad since 2000. Th is value is not high at all, especially given that we 
know that during the crisis, the number of those who returned to Estonia 
increased. At the same time, one must admit that the data seem a bit 
uncertain because in the same volume, Hazans ( 2013 : 69) calculates a 5.9 
per cent net migration rate in the case of Estonia between 2000 and 2010. 
Th e analysis of the European Commission (EC SWD  2014n ) expressly 
lists emigration among the reasons for the shrinking labour force. 
 According to the 2012 PISA report, Estonia’s performance is the second 
best among the EU member states, after the Netherlands (OECD  2013j : 5). 
Th e government considers and handles education as a sector of strategic 
importance, regardless of the crisis and according to the OECD ( 2014b : 
258), public expenditure on education (as percentage of GDP) exceeds 5 
per cent, and, according to the EACEA ( 2013 :7), 6 per cent. Nevertheless, 
a signifi cant skills mismatch has evolved between the qualifi cations and 
the working places because a great proportion of jobs that terminated in 
the non-tradable sectors—especially in the construction industry—do not 
regenerate. Th ere is a risk that the lack of skilled labour force will hinder 
economic growth and may generate a wage rise that again exceeds pro-
ductivity growth. Th e government launched ambitious reforms to tackle 
the problems in the fi elds of tertiary education-with the aim of attracting 
more students to science, technology, engineering and mathematics-, as 
well as vocational education and training (EC SWD  2014n ). 
 Social inequalities—which were considerable to start with—have 
grown since the crisis, no matter the means of measurement: the Gini 
indicator or the income quintile share ratio (Table A.8). Th e ratio of the 
severely materially deprived was 7.6 per cent, which is below the 2013 
EU average (9.6 per cent), but it has risen compared to the 4.9 per cent 
in 2008. 
 Th e driving factors of the crisis in Latvia and Lithuania were very simi-
lar to the ones in Estonia. Th erefore, I wish to underline those  phenomena 
and processes that were diff erent. When the eff ects of the Russian cri-
sis in 1998–1999 wore off , the 2000s saw an economic boom, at the 
end of which  Latvia entered the crisis with an even more overheated 
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economy than Estonia, as indicated by the outstandingly large defi cit of 
the current account (22.4 per cent) in 2007. Th e wages increased more 
rapidly than in Estonia, after 2005, by 20–30 per cent in nominal terms. 
Th e housing bubble swelled even more, and the price index in 2007 was 
187.3 (compared to 2010 = 100). Defi cit was kept under control by the 
government in Latvia (during pre-crisis years, under 1 per cent), but fi s-
cal policy was pro-cyclical here as well. Th e dramatic extent of the impact 
of the crisis is demonstrated well by the fact that the defi cit could have 
reached 16–18 per cent of GDP in 2009 without the measures taken. 
Th e government accomplished an unprecedented level of adjustment 
amounting to 11 per cent of GDP, in the public sector, nominal wages 
were reduced by 11 per cent annually, in the last quarter of the year by 
almost 24 per cent (Purfi eld and Rosenberg  2010 : 18, 25). Even so, the 
defi cit was still 8.9 per cent in 2009, but by 2013, it was only 0.9 per 
cent. According to expectations, by 2016, Estonia will succeed in elevat-
ing growth over 3 per cent. 
 From the three Baltic countries, Latvia’s reaction to cooling down the 
economy by economic policies or stricter regulation was the slowest. Th e 
most severe consequence of this slowness could be felt in the banking 
sector, where foreign ownership was 70 per cent, and there were some 
domestic banks. Half of the depositors were not residents of Latvia; they 
were mainly Russian and other citizens of the CIS.  It has been men-
tioned in Part II that off shore activity played an important role in the 
Latvian economy. When the crisis hit the country, the confi dence of the 
depositors was shaken, and those who did not reside in Latvia began to 
withdraw their money from the Latvian banks. Parex Banka—a domestic- 
owned bank with a 20 per cent market share—was the fi rst bank to fall 
victim to this process. In order to maintain fi nancial stability, the Latvian 
government took a 51 per cent stake in the bank (later extended to 85 per 
cent) in October 2008. Consequently, capital markets lost confi dence in 
the Latvian government itself, and the government sought support from 
the IMF, the EU and Nordic countries (Purfi eld and Rosenberg  2010 : 
7–8). Latvia used EUR 4.5 billion out of the EUR 7.5 billion package 
between 2009 and 2011. Th e three-year long programme was closed on 
20th January 2012. Within the framework of the programme, the state- 
owned Mortgage and Land Bank of Latvia ( Latvijas Hipotēku un zemes 
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banka ) had to be recapitalised. Th e share of NPL was approximately 16 
per cent at most, and in 2012, it sank below 10 per cent. Th e regulation 
and supervision of the fi nancial sector have been tightened, especially in 
the case of banks owned by non-EU entities and with high exposure to 
non-EU customers. State-owned banks have been restructured, their pri-
vatisation is on its way, only one branch of the Mortgage and Land Bank 
of Latvia has been kept, which will function—according to the plans—as 
a Single Development Institution. Bank restructuring costs amounted to 
4.3 per cent of the 2012 GDP (EC SWD  2013d : 15–16, 36; European 
Commission  2011a : 11; European Commission  2014g ). 
 Latvia runs current account defi cits of approximately 2 per cent, which 
is a sustainable level. Th e stock of FDI does not reach the average of the 
post-socialist EU member states, regardless of whether it is examined per 
capita or as a percentage of GDP, and its value at 45 per cent of GDP is 
far behind Estonia’s value at 80 per cent of GDP. Within FDI, fi nancial 
and insurance activities have decreased by 7 percentage points since 2009 
(to 27.4 per cent in 2012), but nevertheless, the share of the non-tradable 
sectors (wholesale and retail, real estate development, and construction) 
is dominant, while the share of manufacturing is 11–12 per cent. Within 
the latter, processing primary products (rubber, plastics, other non-metal 
mineral products) is dominant (Hunya  2013 : 40–41, 71). Th e structure 
of the economy is in line with the fact that Latvia has the penultimate 
place in the ranking of the EU 2014 innovation scoreboard. Th e expen-
diture of the business sector is outstandingly low, 0.15 per cent of GDP, 
but public expenditure is also only 0.51 per cent (European Commission 
 2014c : 82). Th e Latvian economy was able to increase its global market 
share, even with low-tech products during the crisis, by 8.4 per cent dur-
ing fi ve years until 2013. 
 Th e radical adjustment had dramatic consequences on the labour mar-
ket as well; the unemployment rate tripled by 2010 and almost reached 
20 per cent. Latvian employers chose dismissals instead of wage reduc-
tion, contrary to the other two Baltic countries. As a result, many Latvian 
people went abroad to fi nd employment. Latvian emigration exceeded 
the Estonian emigration by a great margin, even before the crisis, and as 
a consequence, between 2000 and 2011, Latvia lost almost 13 per cent 
of its population, 63 per cent of which was due to emigration. As a reac-
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tion to the crisis, the number of Latvian people working in other EU 
countries increased to an unprecedented extent, by 47 per cent between 
2008 and 2011. Th e outmigration fl ow since EU membership, especially 
during the crisis, has jeopardised the reproduction of the Latvian popula-
tion. Th e proportion of migrants with tertiary education was between 24 
and 32 per cent in the last decade. Slight deceleration has been observed 
in outmigration since 2011 (Hazans  2013 : 66, 84; OECD  2013h : 270). 
Th e fl exible labour market was able to adapt quickly to the changes in 
economic performance, which may slow down outmigration as well. In 
2013, the unemployment rate was 11.9 per cent, and a further decrease 
can be expected. 
 Latvian trade union density is only slightly higher (12 per cent) than 
that in Estonia, but its importance is greater. Th e main level of collective 
agreements is that of the company, but there are national level agree-
ments. Naturally, the draconian austerity measures were on the agenda of 
the tripartite negotiations between 2009 and 2011. Th e number strikes is 
minimal, there were some demonstrations organised by the trade unions 
due to the declining wages and social circumstances in 2010–2011 
(Eurofound  2014 ). Th e commotion ensued was a modest one compared 
to the deterioration that took place in the social situation. 
 In Latvia, public expenditures on social protection were very low even 
before the crisis, accounting for 11–12 per cent of GDP. Due to the pre- 
crisis boom, the rate of the severely materially deprived sank from 40 
per cent to 20 per cent in 2008. In 2011, it again reached 31 per cent 
because of the wage reduction, soaring unemployment and cost-cutting 
in social spending, and due to the economic growth, it decreased to 24 
per cent in 2013. Unlike Estonia, indicators of social inequality did not 
rise from the level that was high originally here (Table A.8). In the system 
of social assistance, the means-tested principle had only a minor role, but 
transformations during the crisis made a move towards this principle: 
means-tested benefi ts increased from 0.2 of GDP in 2008 to 0.7 per cent 
of GDP in 2011. In the pension system, the pillar of the compulsory 
private pension fund was introduced, the retirement age was increased to 
65 years, and early retirement was limited (EC SWD  2014u : 7–9, 40). 
 Latvia spends quite a lot on education, public spending on education 
exceeded the EU average even during the crisis, accounting for 5.7 per 
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cent of GDP in 2011, although its amount shows a decreasing trend 
compared to the GDP, as well as relative to government expenditures 
(EACEA  2013 : 6–7). In the 2012 PISA test, Latvian students did not 
produce as outstandingly good results as Estonian students; Latvian 
students’ performance was average (OECD  2013j : 5). Within the edu-
cation system, vocational education and training are in great need of 
development in order to meet labour market needs, which are fi nanced 
by the Latvian government from EU funds. An ambitious programme 
was launched to improve quality in higher education in 2012, but this 
accomplishment came to a halt in 2014 (EC SWD  2014u ). 
 Th e contraction of the  Lithuanian economy was somewhere between 
the Estonian and the Latvian economies. With the −14.8 per cent growth 
rate in 2009, it is more similar to the Estonian economy. Imbalances 
in the economy are similar to those seen in the other two Baltic coun-
tries; the current account defi cit hit its deepest point in 2007 at 14.4 per 
cent. Th ere was also a real estate bubble, and the real estate index was 
165.8 per cent in 2007 (2010 = 100 per cent). Th e fi scal defi cit, which 
had been kept below the Maastricht ceiling prior to the crisis, would 
have skyrocketed in 2009  in Lithuania (similar to Latvia) as well. Th e 
adjustments accounting for 7 per cent of GDP were suffi  cient to keep 
the defi cit at a 9.3 per cent level. By 2013, the government could bring 
defi cits well below the Maastricht fi scal limit of 3 per cent of GDP (2.6 
per cent). Wage reduction, later wage freeze, and social benefi t reduction 
were among the applied actions, but they were intended to be tempo-
rary measures for the period of the crisis only, similar to Latvia (Purfi eld 
and Rosenberg  2010 : 19–20). Expenditure on social protection as a per-
centage of GDP is decreasing due to the increasing GDP and moving 
towards the pre-crisis level of 14 per cent. Th e share of means-tested ben-
efi ts within social protection is very small here as well; nevertheless, it 
increased from the pre-crisis 0.2 per cent of GDP to 1 per cent of GDP 
in 2011. A partial reform of the pension system was accomplished, the 
second pillar was restructured in a way that includes a monetary incentive 
designed to encourage savings for old age. Th e issue of the rapidly ageing 
population raises questions regarding the sustainability and adequacy of 
pensions (EC SWD  2014f : 15, 38). 
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 Foreign banks, more precisely, Scandinavian banks, dominated the 
fi nancial sector, with a market share of above 80 per cent, although 
this share decreased somewhat during the crisis. Th e parent banks pro-
vided support to their Lithuanian subsidiary banks, which helped them 
weather the crisis. Two domestic banks were closed, along with several 
credit unions. Lending conditions were strict, and fi nancial supervision 
was tightened. Th e Lithuanian fi nancial sector remained stable, although 
the share of NPL was still 13.7 per cent in 2013 (EC SWD  2014f : 11, 
35). 
 In spite of these similarities, there were substantial diff erences between 
Lithuania and the other two Baltic countries regarding the starting posi-
tion of their real economies. Th e Lithuanian economy was heavily hit 
by the Russian economic crisis in 1998–1999, and it began a structural 
transformation resulting in a productivity growth. Lithuania’s tradable 
sector was bigger than that of the other two countries, and the increase 
in wages remained in line with the increase in productivity. Th e increase 
in ULC was rather due to the exchange rate eff ect; Lithuania fi rst pegged 
its currency to the USD, which appreciated against the euro. On the 
other hand, REER defl ated by ULC did not appreciate as much as it did 
in Estonia or in Latvia. During the adjustment to the crisis, in 2009, a 
wage decline of the same magnitude as in the other two Baltic countries 
took place in the Lithuanian economy, in which the private sector took 
the lead (IMF  2010 ). 1 One part of the reforms during the crisis aimed at 
improving the management of state-owned enterprises, similar to Latvia 
(EC SWD  2014f  ). 
 Th e inward FDI stock in the case of Lithuania is behind Estonia and 
Latvia, and it has been fl uctuating approximately 35 per cent of GDP 
since 2005. Th e share of manufacturing is modest, though it increased 
during the crisis; it was 27 per cent in 2012. Th e share of wholesale and 
retail trade decreased, and the share of fi nancial intermediation and real 
estate development remained stable. Within manufacturing, the share of 
processing agricultural and mineral products is high, and a favourable 
tendency can be seen in case of products with higher value added, such 
as pharmaceuticals (Hunya  2013 : 41, 75). Th e Lithuanian economy’s 
global market share increased by 22 per cent by 2013. In 2013, Lithuania 
qualifi ed as a moderate innovator (although took last place among them), 
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and in 2014, it overtook Poland. Lithuania’s innovation performance has 
improved signifi cantly since 2010, reaching 52 per cent of the EU aver-
age in 2013, but the business sector’s expenditures on R&D are still anae-
mic (0.24 per cent of GDP) (European Commission  2014c : 5, 57, 82). 
 Due to the crisis, the unemployment rate almost tripled in Lithuania: 
it was 17.8 per cent in 2010, and in 2013, it reached as high as 11.8 
per cent. In 2009, the labour code was strongly liberalised, the restric-
tions on fl exible forms of employment were abolished, and the costs of 
dismissals decreased. Several measures were introduced only temporar-
ily, and the comprehensive reform was delayed. What makes managing 
unemployment, especially youth unemployment, even more diffi  cult is 
that the education system fails to adequately meet labour market needs. 
Lithuanian students performed under the average in the PISA tests, but 
tertiary education attainment is above the EU average. Nevertheless, the 
structure of the education system is not adequate; therefore, the govern-
ment provides increased funding for maths, science and technology stud-
ies, besides other measures targeting quality improvement. Vocational 
education and training is relatively unpopular, and its quality is poor 
in Lithuania. Th e reforms could make only limited progress so far (EC 
SWD  2014f  ). In Lithuania, public spending on education decreased at 
constant prices, but due to the decrease in the GDP, their relative magni-
tude was 5.8 per cent in 2008 and in 2011, which actually exceeded the 
EU average (EACEA  2013 : 4, 7). 
 Twenty per cent of the Lithuanian population emigrated from Lithuania 
between 1990 and 2011 (12.9 per cent out of them after 2000), resulting 
in the highest net migration rate within the EU in the last decade. Th e 
crisis generated a new wave, including especially the young, for which the 
unemployment rate was above 30 per cent in 2010–2011. If this rate of 
emigration among the young Lithuanians persists, it will lead to speeding 
up the natural shrinkage of population as well. Th e declining economic 
position of the destination countries was not enough to accelerate return 
migration; the fi rst increase was registered in 2011. Emigrants who lose 
their jobs in the destination country very often opt for migrating to a 
third country. Th e amount of remittances exceeded 4 per cent of GDP in 
2010–2011 (Sipavičiené and Stankūniené  2013 : 46, 51, 60). 
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 It seems that people in Lithuania choose emigration as a way of cop-
ing and fi nding a solution rather than joining any organisations in which 
interests are represented. Trade union density is around 10 per cent, 
which is between the Estonian and the Latvian fi gures. Th e social impor-
tance of the unions is meagre. In 2012 there were some strikes in the 
sphere of education, not elsewhere. In 2013, the trade unions held a rally 
in front of the Parliament building, with the aim of raising the minimum 
wage. Collective agreements are concluded at the company level. In the 
framework of tripartite concertation, the negotiations have all focused on 
the liberalisation of the labour code since 2009 (Eurofound  2014 ). 
 During the crisis, the greatest worsening could be observed in the EU 
2020 poverty indicator—the majority of the pre-crisis results were lost. 
Th e worst was 34 per cent in 2010, and then, due to the economic growth, 
there has been some improvement. Th e ratio of the severely materially 
deprived was 12.3 in 2008, and the worsening during the crisis was fol-
lowed by a recovery in 2013, when it reverted to 16 per cent from nearly 
20 per cent. Th e social inequality indicators did not decline—similar to 
Latvia—but remained high (Table A.8).
 Not even the crisis could deviate the Baltic countries from the path they 
have been following since they became independent  (Table  8.2 ). Th ese 
countries are prepared to make all sacrifi ces to integrate as deeply and 
irrevocably as possible into the European market economies. Th ey did not 
give up their free-market economic policy; moreover, their reaction to the 
sudden increase in unemployment was further liberalisation. Th ey adhered 
to the exchange rate regime pegged to the euro; following Estonia, Latvia 
introduced the euro in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015. After the events in 
Ukraine in 2014, when Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation, 
the Baltic countries must have felt vindicated that their eff orts were right. 
At the same time, the fact that the population endured measures aiming at 
restoring the fi scal and market balance without protest did not mean that 
individuals had not sought a way out, and their solution was emigration. 
Currently, it cannot yet be assessed whether their employment abroad will 
be temporary. It is certain that having low fertility in view, replacement 
will not happen via the natural growth of the population. 
 As seen in Part II, Estonia had a pioneering role in the region and 
applied the provisions of liberal economic policy the most consistently. 
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Th ese factors were not changed by the crisis, either; thus, Estonia, suf-
fered least of the three Baltic countries. According to the AMECO data-
base, Estonia reached the volume of the 2008 GDP as soon as 2012, 
while Latvia and Lithuania could not do the same, not as late as 2013. 
Th e ratio for the severely materially deprived is 2–3 times higher in Latvia 
and Lithuania than in Estonia. Emigration is not insignifi cant in Estonia, 
either; but it is not a national issue of crucial importance, as it is in case 
of Latvia and Lithuania. 
 An exciting mission would be for comparative research on institutions 
to fi nd an explanation why Estonia is relatively more successful than the 
other two Baltic countries—given that after the Soviet era, their position 
was similar. Norkus ( 2012 ), a Lithuanian sociologist, provides a critical 
overview of the explanations found in the literature, and his answer is 
quite complex. Estonia’s geographical and linguistic proximity to Finland 
is a signifi cant factor and an advantage, but it was exactly when the politi-
cal system changed that Finland faced great diffi  culties. In Estonia, after 
the change of the political system, the political elite and the leaders of 
public administration who were related to the Soviet regime were radi-
cally removed. However, this explanation is not enough in itself, because 
the same happened in Latvia (but not in Lithuania). Looking at the cul-
tural and religious background, Estonia and Latvia have Protestant and 
Lithuania has Catholic roots—meaning that, again, this division is not 
the same as that existing in their economic performance. Norkus ( 2012 ) 
explores deeper layers, which may off er an explanation. In Estonia, the 
persistent infl uence of the Protestant denominations on the indigenous 
population in the eighteenth–nineteenth centuries can be traced; these 
denominations were carriers of Max Weber’s capitalist spirit, and their 
cultural impact could be felt in the twentieth century as well. In Latvia, 
these impacts were overridden by the fact that during the Soviet era, the 
leading economic position was taken by Russians, and after winning 
independence, this tendency was even stronger. For the Russians who 
did not obtain citizenship and who were barred from the public sphere, 
the only opportunity for emergence was the economy. During privatisa-
tion, Russians were not crowded out, as it happened in Estonia because 
the Latvian economy—as described above—strongly relied on the fi nan-
cial services provided to Russia. In Lithuania, the Jewish minority was 
8 Crisis Management 389
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
the engine of urbanisation and industrialisation, and an overwhelming 
majority was killed in WWII. Th erefore, at the end of the Soviet era, 
the majority of townspeople had a rural background; these families did 
not have any memories of or experience with the operation of a market 
economy—contrary to the other two Baltic countries. 
 Th ese explanations seem plausible, and naturally, no outside observer 
is able to confi rm or reject them. Obviously, it would be possible to add 
more details to this picture. Th e existing institutional system provides 
a relatively better source of measurement. In the WEF, competitiveness 
reports between 2011–2012 and 2013–2014, Estonia ranked 32nd–
34th, Latvia 52nd–64th, and Lithuania 44th–48th (Schwab  2013 : 15), 
which confi rms that Estonia has the best business environment. As shown 
above in relation to crisis management, Estonia’s government had the 
best performance and was the quickest to react. A diff erence in terms of 
quality between the institutional systems can be seen in the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index in 2013, in which Estonia 
takes the 28th (fi rst among the post-socialist countries), Lithuania the 
43rd and Latvia 49th. Th e size of the shadow economy is between 26 
and 28 per cent in all three countries (Schneider and Kearney  2013 : 4). 
Th e most striking diff erence can be detected in public trust in politicians 
and in the political system. In the WEF competitiveness report—as far 
as public trust in politicians is concerned—Estonia ranks 42nd, Latvia 
89th, and Lithuania 95th (Schwab  2013 : 181, 247, 257). On the basis 
of Eurobarometer data, Kuokštis ( 2011 ) reveals a huge gap between the 
political legitimacy of the Estonian (on the one hand) and the Latvian and 
Lithuanian (on the other hand) legislations and governments. Th is result 
is very much in line with the present situation, where the population 
of all three countries, which identify themselves as small, economically 
and geopolitically vulnerable countries, endures the economic austerity 
measures, but one part of the Latvian and Lithuanian people emigrate to 
fi nd a solution. At the same time, greater trust in Estonia provides greater 
room for manoeuvring for the government; there is a greater chance to 
fi nd more effi  cient solutions in economic and social policies, and thereby, 
they can prevent emigration—which is accomplished under duress, not 
to gain experience and often becoming permanent—reaches a massive 
scale. Whatever the deeper historical, cultural, social, and psychological 
390 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
reasons are, stronger public trust and a better-performing institutional 
system provide a substantial competitive advantage to Estonia. 
8.2  The Visegrád Countries and Hungary’s 
Separate Path 
 Th e crisis aff ected the Visegrád countries diff erently. Unlike the other 
members of the EU, Poland did not plunge into recession during the 
global fi nancial crisis in 2008. It is hardly surprising that Hungary suf-
fered the greatest decline due to the imbalances accumulated before the 
crisis. It is surprising, however, that the Czech Republic was able to keep 
its current account and its public debt on a sustainable path of balance, 
but its growth was not as marked as that of the Polish economy or the 
Slovakian economy (Table  8.3 ).
 As described in Part II, economic transition began in  Poland after 
the political and economic crises of the 1980s. At the beginning of the 
transition, the situation was even more unfavourable than in the other 
Visegrád countries. Nevertheless, the fi rst two decades of convergence 
brought success and economic progress. In 1992, the GDP per capita 
at PPP was 33 per cent of the EU-15 average, and in 2010, this ratio 
increased to 56 per cent (63 per cent of the EU-28 average) (Orłowski 
 2011 : 8). Th e growth rate increased considerably in 2004 and moved 
above 5 per cent. Exports and investment were the main engines of 
growth. Although the Polish economy had already been integrated into 
the European market well before the country formally became an EU 
member, the accession in 2004 gave new impetus to both exports and to 
the infl ow of FDI. As a result, the current account defi cit did not reach 
7 per cent, even when it was at its deepest level in 2008, and public debt 
remained under 50 per cent. Nevertheless, the Polish economy began to 
show signs of  overheating, with increasing current account defi cit and 
infl ation in 2006, and the crisis put an end to this. 
 In 2009, the infl ow of FDI and exports drastically declined in Poland 
as well. Th e growth of the Polish economy dropped from 3.9 per cent (in 
2008) to 2.6 per cent. In 2009–2010, domestic consumption and the 
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investments in the public sector became engines of growth. Th e favour-
able position of the Polish economy can be attributed to several underly-
ing factors. When the crisis hit the region, it was generally presumed that 
capital would fl ee the Eastern European countries, and as a consequence, 
these economies would collapse. Th e crisis led to the falling exchange 
rate of the fl oating currencies (such as the zloty) in the second half of 
2008, and this decline was greater than that of the Hungarian forint 
or the Czech koruna. Th e verbal intervention from the Polish central 
bank and the government in February 2009 and the opening of a fl exible 
credit line by the IMF in April 2009 were eff ective. Th e exchange rate of 
the zloty stabilised at a lower level, which facilitated Polish exports. Th e 
Polish market is less open compared to the markets of other smaller CEE 
countries, which also helped the Polish economy. 
 Th e fi scal policy did not have much room to manoeuvre, in spite of 
the fact that they managed to reduce the general government defi cit to 
1.9 per cent in 2007. Tax wedge reduction initiated in a good economic 
situation, increasing the wages in the public sector, and the eff ects of 
the measures taken in response to the crisis swung the defi cit and pub-
lic debt. Th erefore, the implemented anti-crisis plan was only 0.7 per 
cent of GDP in 2009 (OECD  2010e : 34). However, government defi cit 
exceeded 7 per cent in 2009 and 2010. With the help of the support 
received from the EU and the investments made for the purpose of the 
European Football Championship in 2012, fi scal policy was able to com-
pensate for the decline in private investments. Taking this slow consolida-
tion into account, it is expected to reach the Maastricht criteria in 2015. 
Public debt did not exceed the 60 per cent ceiling determined both in the 
Maastricht Treaty and in the Polish Constitution. 
 Th e stability of the fi nancial sector had a benefi cial eff ect on the econ-
omy as well. Th e Polish fi nancial supervisory authority intended to curb 
foreign currency lending by issuing a recommendation in 2006. Due to 
the prudent regulatory policy and the conservative business models of 
the banks, the amount of foreign currency debts remained moderate. 
Th e Polish fi nancial supervisory authority made the conditions of such 
lending stricter (Kowalewski and Rybiński  2011 ). Nevertheless, the risk 
was still considerable, because in 2012, more than 30 per cent of the 
outstanding loan portfolio still comprised foreign currency loans (mainly 
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housing loans in Swiss francs). Th e negative consequences began to mani-
fest as of January 2015 when the Swiss National Bank announced that 
it would no longer hold the Swiss franc at a fi xed exchange rate with the 
euro. Th e Swiss franc began to soar. Th e proportion of NPL is not insig-
nifi cant: according to the Polish defi nition, it was 8.8 per cent in 2012, 
and it was on the rise. Th e capital adequacy ratio for the banking sector 
is above the level required under the Basel III agreement. Th e foreign 
ownership of the banking system as a percentage of total assets remained 
approximately 65 per cent during the crisis years (EC SWD  2013e : 14, 
 2014g : 43). Property prices increased markedly before the crisis, but their 
starting point was low, and during the crisis, there was only a moderate 
decrease in housing prices. Th e internal and external indebtedness of the 
private sector was low, and there was no considerable change during the 
years of the crisis. 
 Poland has been able to continuously improve its external competitive-
ness. During the crisis, Poland’s global market share remained stable, and 
in 2013, it exceeded the average of the previous fi ve years by 2.1 per cent. 
REER defl ated by ULC depreciated by nearly 9 per cent in 2012–2013, 
which ensured that cost competitiveness was enhanced. Th ere was a posi-
tive change in the composition of Polish exports in terms of technological 
intensity, but its extent was below that of the other Visegrád countries 
(OECD  2010e ). Geographical specialisation is very favourable because 
there has been a huge demand for Polish imports since the beginning of 
the 2000s in the Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Slovakian and Lithuanian 
markets. During the crisis, Polish exports grew more rapidly—in the 
case of several product categories—than global imports. Experts in the 
European Commission note that Poland sustained its comparative advan-
tage in low- and medium-low-technology goods, and at the same time, 
it lacked comparative advantage in medium-high and high-technology 
goods (EC SWD  2014g : 21). 
 Th ese results obviously refl ect the weaknesses of the innovation sys-
tem. According to the innovation scoreboard of 2014, Poland is the last 
country among the moderate innovators, and the country could not use 
its favourable economic position during the crisis to improve its sta-
tus. Expenditures of the private sector accounted for 0.33 per cent of 
GDP, and those of the public sector amounted to 0.56 per cent of GDP 
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(European Commission  2014c :83). Th e inadequate performance can be 
attributed not only to the low amount of expenditure but to the lack of 
a comprehensive strategy, which would be independent from the succes-
sive parliamentary terms, to the lack of coordination between the relevant 
ministries, to the fact that cooperation is fragile between the actors of the 
R&D realm and the business sector and to the lack of capital-intensive 
domestic enterprises (Kasperkiewicz  2012 ). 
 Presumably, competitiveness would be enhanced if the privatisation 
plan initiated in 2008 were accomplished. Th e economic role of the 
Polish government remained greater than its competitors’ because its 
ownership is present in the network industries; moreover, in 2008, in 
the competitive sectors of the economy, there were indeed over 200 fi rms 
in manufacturing, and more than 100 mining companies were publicly 
owned. Th e planned privatisation has not been accomplished yet, and 
the government classifi ed 50 fi rms as strategically important, intending 
to keep these under majority state ownership and to maintain control 
(Égert and Goujard  2014 ). 
 Due to the favourable results of growth, the unemployment rate is 
lower than in the pre-crisis period, but it is still approximately 10 per 
cent. Data concerning employment are biased by the shadow economy 
in Poland as well, the size of which is estimated to be 24 per cent of GDP 
(Schneider and Kearney  2013 : 4). Th e most serious problem is labour 
market segmentation. Th e use of fi xed-term employment contracts is 
rather widespread, and the transition from these contracts to permanent 
employment is rare. In addition, almost one-third of them are concluded 
in the form of a civil law contract, which provides less protection. Th is 
situation is particularly disadvantageous for the young: in 2013, 68.6 per 
cent of the young were employed with fi xed-term contracts. According 
to the PISA surveys, public education in Poland has developed consider-
ably, with students achieving above-average results in all areas. However, 
labour market data show that there is still a mismatch between skills 
and labour market needs; therefore, reforms aiming at higher education 
and vocational training are currently being developed (EC SWD  2014g : 
17–19). Due to the economic growth, public spending on education in 
real terms was higher in 2011 compared to 2008, and as a proportion of 
GDP, it decreased from 5.7 per cent to 5.6 per cent (EACEA  2013 : 4, 7). 
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 As far as labour relations are concerned, the crisis did not bring about 
changes, and trade union density continued to decrease, reaching 10 per 
cent in 2013. In Part II, it was discussed that although Solidarity had 
historical signifi cance, the strength of the trade unions declined in the 
same way as in the other CEE countries. Solidarity was organised at a 
corporate level in the state socialist system, which made the decentralisa-
tion of concluding the collective agreements easier after the change in 
the political system. During the crisis there were few strikes, 50–80 on a 
yearly basis, mainly in the public sector, which were due partly to the pri-
vatisation plans. In 2009, the social partners managed to make an agree-
ment on crisis management. Th e number of negotiations has decreased 
since, and the government made a decision on minimum pay without 
negotiating (Krzywdzinski  2012 ; Eurofound  2014 ). 
 Th e phenomenon of working abroad also contributed to the decrease 
in unemployment. Th e number of temporary migrants reached its peak 
at 2.27 million in 2007; then, their number decreased and stagnated at 
2–2.1 million. Th ere are 1.2 million Polish people with migratory experi-
ence who returned to their country of origin. Th e majority of them are 
pre-accession migrants (Kaczmarczyk  2013 : 113–115). In Poland, there 
has always been a tradition of international emigration. Kaczmarczyk 
( 2013 ) is not concerned about the return of temporary migrants and 
considers post-accession migration as a solution that drained the excess 
labour force of young, skilled workers from the underdeveloped regions. 
He also points out that the problem rather lies in the fact that these 
young people leave Poland after completing their education, without 
gaining any experience in the domestic labour market, but their labour 
market position abroad is not good, either, because they are overqualifi ed 
for the jobs they take. Th us, their reintegration into Poland upon their 
return can be very diffi  cult, which would require well-tailored migration 
policies. 
 Not even Poland can be indiff erent about keeping the younger genera-
tions in the country because the increasing costs of ageing are placing 
a burden on the Polish economy. It is diffi  cult to phase out the special 
pensions schemes for miners and farmers because of the potential politi-
cal confl icts that accompany such measures. In 2013, the government 
enacted the partial reversal of the systemic pension reform that started 
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earlier in order to consolidate budgetary expenditures. In 2014, there was 
a one-off  asset transfer worth approximately 9 per cent of GDP from the 
second pension pillar, that is, from private pension funds to the fi rst pen-
sion pillar, and the possibility for further transfers from the second pillar 
is given (EC SWD  2014g : 7). 
 Th e indicators for social inequality slightly decreased during the crisis 
due to the growth of the Polish economy, but the rate of the severely 
materially deprived was 11.9 (above the EU average) in 2013 (Table A.8). 
Social expenditures have been approximately 18–19 of GDP since the 
outbreak of the crisis, which shows no change compared to the previous 
years. 
 Th e  Czech Republic also had its share of pre-crisis prosperity; between 
2004 and 2008, its economy grew at a pace of 5.5 per cent on aver-
age, similar to Poland. Its peak was reached in 2006 at 6.9 per cent; 
then, in 2008, it slowed down to 2.7 per cent, meaning that the crisis hit 
the country in a descending branch of a cycle. Th e extent of the reces-
sion, −4.8 per cent, was more favourable than in the Slovakian or the 
Hungarian cases, but since then, 2012 and 2013 also saw a recession 
(−0.8 per cent and −0.7 per cent, respectively), which—apart from the 
Mediterranean countries—was characteristic only of Slovenia, Croatia, 
Finland, and the Netherlands. 
 Adaptation to the crisis was supported by both monetary and fi scal 
policies. Th e central bank reduced the interest rate on several occasions. 
Th e depreciation of the Czech koruna facilitated exports, even if not as 
persistently as that of the Polish currency did. In 2009–2010, an incentive 
package was approved in the amount of 2.2 per cent of GDP. Because the 
government took into consideration the openness of the country, not the 
demand side was its target—because it would have stimulated imports—
but rather the supply side. Because no reserve was accumulated before the 
crisis, there was no room for manoeuvring for a greater package (OECD 
 2010a : 40). Due to the decrease in revenue and the operation of the 
automatic stabilisers, the defi cit leaped to 5.5 per cent in 2009; therefore, 
consolidation began in 2010. Th e government managed to force back the 
government defi cit to 1.3 per cent by 2013. A slight increase is expected 
in the coming years, but the defi cit likely remains approximately 1.5–2 
per cent, and the public debt is fl uctuating around 45 per cent. 
398 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
 Th e Czech banking system did well during the crisis. Since the begin-
ning of the 2000s, prudent regulation, the creation of reserves and 
supervision—fortunately—has developed gradually in steps. As early as 
January 2008, fi nancial supervision was already functioning within the 
Czech National Bank; that is, the same regulation was applied for the 
entire fi nancial system, which was able to manage the mutual interdepen-
dence of the various elements (banks, insurance companies, and savings 
cooperatives) during the crisis. Because interest rates were low, house-
holds were not tempted to borrow in foreign currency loans; the 20 per 
cent proportion of loans denominated in foreign currency taken out by 
companies was the lowest in the region. No housing bubble developed, 
either. Th e banks (almost 90 per cent were foreign-owned) pursued con-
servative business policy, and the majority of companies were connected 
with one bank only, which made risk management considerably easier 
(OECD  2010a : 33–34). Th e proportion of NPL is stably around 5 per 
cent, the capital adequacy ratio of the banks is approximately 15–16 per 
cent, and their profi tability is high; in spite of the recession in the real 
economy, it was the second highest in the EU in 2013 (EC SWD  2014c : 
16, 41). 
 Products of machinery and transport equipment products account for 
almost half of the Czech exports, exerting a highly benefi cial eff ect on the 
competitiveness of the economy; nearly one-third of Czech exports are 
directed to Germany. Although the proportion of non-EU countries has 
grown within Czech exports in recent years, the proportion of the EU 
countries is still above 80 per cent. After the external shock in 2009, the 
recession that occurred in 2012–2013 was due mainly to the decline in 
internal demand, and the boosting of export performance is expected to 
bring recovery. Th e assessment of the performance of the Czech economy 
is controversial. On the one hand, after 2009 exports continuously grew 
in terms of volume and value, but the pace of growth slowed down by 
2013. Th e Czech Republic suff ered a 7.7 per cent loss in its share in total 
global exports during the 5 years before 2013. Th is is not an outstanding 
value compared to the other OMS, but it can be seen that only the perfor-
mance of Hungary is worse (−19.2 per cent) among the Visegrád coun-
tries, which are the peer competitors of the Czech economy; Slovakia’s 
loss is only 2.2 per cent, and Poland’s share increased by 2.1 per cent. Th e 
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REER defl ated by ULC increased in the Czech Republic after the 1990s 
due to the convergence process similar to Slovakia, Hungary, and later 
Poland from 2004. However, after the currency depreciation in 2009, 
a more signifi cant and more persistent decrease in REER followed in 
Poland and Hungary. Although during the crisis, the Czech economy’s 
reaction was less fl exible in applying cost reduction than its competitors’, 
this is not the cause of the real problem. 
 In Part II, it was mentioned that catching up with the EU average had 
modest results in terms of per capita GDP, and it practically did not take 
place between 1995 and 2007 in terms of individual fi nal consumption, 
which expresses the material well-being of a person (Table 4.2). It seems 
that during the crisis, a persistent recession was needed to stir up the 
interest of the European Commission, and in February 2014, ECFIN 
DG as part of its series of conferences held on the individual countries 
fi nally put the investigation of the growth in the Czech Republic on the 
agenda. 2 What struck me as odd was that apart from this conference, 
I could not fi nd a study in literature that undertook investigating the 
“mystery” of the Czech economy. I have used the word “mystery” delib-
erately because, if we compare the potentiality of the Czech economy 
and its actual growth, I believe it is not far-fetched to speak about a 
mystery. Based on the average rate of growth in the period between 1993 
and 2012, it would take 428 years for the Czech Republic to catch up 
with Austria in terms of per capita GNI. What is amazing, though, is 
that all conditions necessary for rapid economic growth according to the 
economic literature are at their disposal: per capita FDI is the second 
highest in the region; the savings rate is the fi rst; the macroeconomic 
environment and the fi nancial system are stable; all key internal and 
external macroindicators show a long-term balance; the labour force is 
qualifi ed; its geographical location, that is, the proximity of Germany, is 
favourable; and social stability is also present (Švejnar and Uvalic  2013 ; 
Švejnar and Semerak  2014 ). Th e position of the Czech Republic in the 
various rankings of competitiveness is diff erent. Although its ranking 
in the WEF decreased during the years of the crisis, according to the 
GCI, in 2014–2015, again, only Estonia ranked better among the post- 
communist countries (Schwab  2014 :13). In the World Bank’s “Doing 
Business” ranking, the Czech Republic took the 75th place in 2014, over-
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taking only Croatia, but in 2015, it was in 44th place (World Bank  2013 , 
 2014 ). Th e IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook ranked 60 countries, 
and in 2014, the Czech Republic took 33rd place; it was second, follow-
ing Estonia, among the post-socialist countries. 3 Th us, unfortunately, the 
international rankings cannot help us solve this mystery. Th e presenta-
tions of the participants of the above-referenced conference that were 
available on the internet do not reveal anything convincing, either. Th ose 
factors that are usually brought forward (weaknesses of institutions, pri-
marily those of public administration, corruption, unfavourable demo-
graphical processes, and the problems of the educational system)—as we 
can see later—show neither individually, nor jointly, those attributes that 
would explain why the performance in terms of convergence is lagging 
behind the CEE competitors. 
 OECD experts have pointed out that, on the one hand, the Czech 
economy is deeply integrated into the German supply chain and, on the 
other hand, that Czech companies exporting fi nal products use mainly 
import intermediate products and few products of Czech origin. Th e 
Czech Republic is among those OECD countries in which the service 
content of gross exports is low—similar to all other Visegrád countries; in 
particular, it is also among those countries that have the lowest domestic 
content, similar to Slovakia and Hungary. A skill upgrade of the labour 
force and increasing the services content of the end products would ensure 
the production of higher added value. A more competition-friendly busi-
ness environment would be necessary in order to support the domestic 
drivers of growth (OECD  2014a : 27). It can also be said in the case 
of the Czech Republic that besides the network industries—where the 
insuffi  ciency of competition is generally characteristic of Europe—the 
state owns a considerably large number of companies that operate in the 
competitive sector. What is even more problematic is that in selecting the 
members of the companies’ management, political considerations  prevail 
over professional ones, and the effi  cient and transparent supervision of 
companies’ operation is not duly ensured. Nevertheless, the product 
market regulation and the state’s role do not implicate larger diffi  culties, 
according to the OECD indicators, than in Poland (see OECD  2014a : 
49–81; Égert and Goujard  2014 ). Regarding corruption, in the ranking 
of Transparency International, the Czech Republic took the 53rd place 
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in 2014; Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, and the three Baltic countries gained 
more favourable places. 
 With respect to research and development, the Czech Republic is a 
moderate innovator; of the post-socialist countries only Slovenia and 
Estonia have better places and are listed as innovation followers in the 
innovation scoreboard of the EU. In the Czech Republic, during the cri-
sis the expenditures on R&D increased; in 2012, the public sector spent 
0.87 per cent of GDP and the business sector spent 1.01 per cent of 
GDP on R&D, which approximate to the 2.07 per cent average of the 
EU. Within the business sector, 60 per cent of the funding comes from 
a few large foreign companies. A shortcoming of the innovation system 
can be found in the low level of cooperation between scientifi c research 
and the business sector. Projects were launched by the government in 
the framework of its innovation policy in order to facilitate cooperation, 
but these projects have not delivered the expected results. Th e effi  ciency 
of the innovation policy is impeded by the fragmented institutional sys-
tem and the very broad scope of the support actions (EC SWD  2014c : 
23–24). 
 Th e employment rate in the Czech Republic is 70 per cent, which is 
outstanding in the region, and it was maintained during the crisis. In 
order to be able to maintain employment, in 2009, partial employment 
was made possible, with reduced wages, for a maximum of one year. In 
2011, with the amendment of the labour code, further liberalisation of 
the labour market took place. Th e unemployment rate was approximately 
7 per cent and, as expected, it will return to the average 6.6 per cent that it 
was before the crisis. From the viewpoint of employment, the situation of 
the Roma population is critical, whose unemployment rate is estimated 
to be above 50 per cent (EC SWD  2013c : 24). 4 Schneider and Kearney 
( 2013 : 4) indicate a signifi cantly lower level of the shadow economy—16 
per cent of GDP in the Czech Republic—than in the other post-socialist 
countries, which is conceivable if we take the high employment rate into 
account. Czech authors estimate a 20 per cent level on the basis of data 
from 2008 (Lichard et al.  2012 : 11). 
 Th e effi  ciency of the labour market has been impaired by the fact that 
the evolution of the wages did not follow the structural change in the 
economy. With the exception of the managers, the proportion and dis-
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persion of wages among occupations and within occupations did not 
change much, except for the high private return on tertiary education 
degrees. Th erefore, the proportion of wages does not indicate what kinds 
of qualifi cation would be needed from those who enter the labour mar-
ket. Minimum wages are determined in the collective agreements above 
the legal minimum (OECD  2014a ). 
 During the crisis, the low level of income disparities increased only 
minimally (Table A.8), and the data tables of Eurostat show that indica-
tors began to return to where they had been before the crisis changed 
them. Th e situation of the Roma population is critical, however; one- 
third of them are considered socially excluded (EC SWD  2014c : 21). 
Th e number of severely materially deprived people was 6.6 per cent in 
2013, which remains under the EU average (9.6 per cent). Th e low level 
of disparities is explained partly by small and stable wage diff erences (as 
mentioned above) because the expenses of social protection remained 
low, that is, below 20 per cent, even during the crisis. 
 Th is evolution of wages is especially interesting because wage bargain-
ing is decentralised, covering approximately one-third of employees. 
Trade union density is continuously on the decline; in 2013, it was esti-
mated to be 13.5 per cent. Strikes on the level of the companies are very 
rare; between 2011 and 2012, there were demonstrations with the sup-
port of the trade unions against the government reforms concerning the 
pension and healthcare system and against other measures curbing other 
welfare benefi ts. Since 1990, there has been a forum for tripartite nego-
tiations under the name of Council of Economic and Social Agreement 
( Rada hospodářské a sociální dohody ), but this is strictly for consultation 
purposes, without a legally binding force (Eurofound  2014 ). Cooperative 
labour relations could not develop, not even through foreign compa-
nies. According to the surveys, the majority of the leaders of the large 
German and Austrian corporations did not strive to implant those direct 
and indirect participation models into the Czech circumstances, which 
were highly appreciated at home. Th is happened only then and there, 
where the German trade unions or workers’ councils fought it out. In 
the fi nancial sector, Anglo-Saxon corporate managements applied direct 
participation methods, but their purpose was precisely the crowding-out 
of the trade unions (Meardi et al.  2013 ). 
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 During the crisis, in the Czech Republic, it became inevitable to inter-
fere with the welfare system, but curtailing welfare benefi ts was not of sig-
nifi cant size. Nevertheless, independent from budgetary consolidation, 
ageing itself would explain why the conditions of retirement had to be 
changed. By 2020, the compulsory retirement age will be 65 or higher, 
with the exception of a few countries; however, in the Czech Republic, 
the retirement age is currently 63 years and eight months. Measures taken 
during the crisis inhibited the increase in pensions in the fi rst pillar only 
between 2013 and 2015 and improved the operation of the voluntary 
third pillar, and a new, funded second pillar was introduced. Only few 
have entered the latter because the missing social consensus makes its 
future uncertain. In 2013, a new type of early retirement was introduced 
as well, which does not help curb the expenses related to ageing (EC 
SWD  2013c : 15–16). 
 Th e situation of the Czech education system is quite complex. 
According to the PISA report of 2012, the results of the Czech students 
are average in mathematics and reading, slightly above average in science, 
and only Estonia, Poland and Slovenia are better from among the post- 
socialist countries within the EU. Th is result was achieved with relatively 
low expenses, the public spending on education (4.9 per cent of GDP) 
lagged behind the EU average by 0.4 percentage points in 2011 as well, 
although the diff erence decreased compared to 2008 (EACEA  2013 :7). 
At the same time, in higher education, there was a huge increase: the 
number of students enrolled in state universities has risen by 32 per cent 
since the mid-2000s, and the number of students has dynamically grown 
in private educational institutions as well. Between 2006 and 2012, the 
ratio of people with higher education qualifi cations in the age group 
between 30 and 34 grew from 13.1 per cent to 25.6 per cent. Higher 
wages related to the degree show that there is a demand for people with 
higher education, but the fact that the budget of the state universities 
grew by only 6 per cent during the same period gives rise to quality con-
cerns. Th e other problem to be solved is the improvement of vocational 
training, which has been chosen by an extremely high proportion (70 per 
cent) of the students in upper secondary education. Th e training pro-
grammes for those who do not continue their studies in higher education 
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are increasingly less suitable for meeting the requirements of the labour 
market (OECD  2014a : 35–37). 
 After this review of the institutions with infl uence on economic 
growth, let me return to the mystery of Czech economic growth. Half a 
decade has passed since the beginning of the crisis, and this period seems 
to confi rm what has already been prognosticated by the characteristics of 
the CEE model in Part II. Convergence built on FDI at a certain level 
of development can be continued only if the domestic economy is also 
competitive at international level, but in order to achieve this, it is impor-
tant to improve the quality of the institutional system (including public 
administration, the innovation system and the educational system). Th e 
Czech Republic did not show worse performance in these areas than its 
competitors, but because it began from a higher level of development 
than its competitors, its performance was not enough to achieve more 
dynamic economic growth. 
 In  Slovakia the dynamic growth of the 2000s reached its peak at 10.7 
per cent in 2007. During the global economic crisis, its economy shrunk 
only in 2009, by 5.3 per cent. However, in the other years, there was 
no recession, and even modest growth could be detected. Th e Slovak 
government—similar to those of other countries—intended to mitigate 
the eff ects of the crisis using fi scal measures. When the accepted fi scal 
stimulus package was actually implemented, its impact on the govern-
ment budget amounted altogether only to 1.0 per cent of GDP in 2009 
and 2010 (OECD  2010g : 33). Before the crisis, Slovakia, which was pre-
paring for the adoption of the euro, curbed public spending. However, 
it did not accumulate reserves, similar to other countries; thus, there was 
no room for manoeuvring in terms of discretionary revenue measures. 
Automatic stabilisers were more dominant, and together with the decreas-
ing revenues, they led to a 7.9 per cent defi cit. As a result of the consoli-
dation measures, the general government defi cit was brought below the 
Maastricht defi cit level in 2013. Since the outbreak of the crisis, public 
debt has almost doubled, reaching 54.6 per cent in 2013. In the coming 
years it is expected to be between 54–55 per cent. In 2011, fi scal disci-
pline was strengthened by a new regulation, and the Fiscal Responsibility 
Board was established. 
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 Th e Slovak fi nancial system is very similar to the Czech system—it 
proved to be stable during the years of the crisis. Th e proportion of for-
eign ownership exceeded 90 per cent, and deposits were high compared to 
loans; therefore, the banks were not in need of foreign funding and pur-
sued a conservative lending policy. Capital adequacy ratios of the Slovak 
banks were already over 16 per cent in 2013, and their profi tability has 
been steadily on the increase since 2011. Foreign currency loans taken for 
the purchase of housing were almost non-existent. Th e ratio of NPL was 
around 5 per cent. (EC SWD  2014y : 44). Property prices soared rapidly 
before the crisis, mainly because interest rates decreased before entering 
the euro area; the disposable income of households, however, increased. 
Th e supply side, that is, the construction industry, did not grow at the 
same rate as it did in Estonia or in Slovenia. Overall, it can be said that 
the property market in Slovakia was not as overheated as it was in many 
other EU member states, but there was a signifi cant correction in the 
prices during the crisis. Th e debt of the private sector was relatively low 
before and during the crisis, similar to the Czech Republic and Poland. 
 In terms of per capita FDI, Slovakia is the fourth—following Estonia, 
Czech Republic, and Hungary—among the post-socialist EU member 
states, and this did not change during the crisis (Hunya  2013 : 40). Th e 
infl ow of FDI was considerable; consequently, it did not cause any prob-
lems in which the current account defi cit was around 7 per cent during 
the years before the crisis. After the shock in 2009, the internal demand 
declined, but exports began to increase rapidly, the current account ran 
a surplus of around 2 per cent in 2012, and the European Commission’s 
forecast calculates a surplus of approximately 1 per cent annually in 
the coming years. Among the Visegrád countries, it is Slovakia whose 
transport equipment and machinery represent the greatest proportion of 
exports. Although Slovak exports to non-EU countries have increased, 
EU countries account for approximately 85 per cent of exports for 
Slovakia (ECFIN DG  2014h : 21). Slovakia has tight trade linkages with 
Germany, but Slovak export shares to Germany are only approximately 
20 per cent compared to the Czech export shares of above 30 per cent 
(Fidrmuc et  al.  2013 : 16). By 2013, Slovakia’s fi ve-year global market 
share in terms of exports has decreased only by 2.2 per cent, which dem-
onstrates the competitiveness of Slovak exports quite well. Th e competi-
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tiveness of Slovak exports has not changed, although REER appreciated 
steadily before the crisis, and during the crisis, depreciation was more 
moderate than in Hungary or in Poland. Increasing productivity and the 
slowing rate of wage growth helped maintain cost competitiveness. Th e 
fact that productivity was increasing during the crisis was partly because 
the less skilled and less productive employees were dismissed fi rst. What 
made Slovakia’s situation even more diffi  cult was that the adoption of 
the euro took place exactly in 2009, which meant—on the one hand—
protection for the open and small Slovak economy, but on the other, the 
country did not have the opportunity to make use of the currency depre-
ciation during this critical period. According to Fidrmuc et al. ( 2013 ), 
Slovakia entered the euro area with a probably overvalued exchange rate. 
 Regarding the sustainability of competitiveness, three factors deserve 
attention. Since the crisis, FDI infl ow has declined, although FDI 
was considered the source of technological convergence in the Slovak 
economy. Pavličková ( 2013 ) provides a detailed analysis of the product 
structure of Slovak exports between 1999 and 2011. She notes that the 
Slovak economy has gained strength—in terms of price competitiveness 
and quality competition—in manufacturing road vehicles (mainly auto-
mobiles) and other transport equipment, but this concerns mainly the 
assembling activity of components, the added value of which is rather 
low. Slovakia’s competitiveness has improved in manufacturing telecom-
munications equipment as well. At the same time, there has been no 
improvement in the exports of technology-driven products with higher 
added value; the structure of exports remained as it had developed in the 
second half of 1990s. According to Pavličková ( 2013 ), the problems pre-
sented partly by the innovation system and partly by the labour market 
and the educational system should be blamed for the unchanged export 
structure, and she also refers to certain factors related to the government. 
Th ese problems altogether explain why Slovakia moved downward and 
dropped 6–15 places in the international rankings measuring the busi-
ness environment in 2014. Th ese problems are also cited by the analysis 
prepared by the European Commission on the assessment of the national 
reform programme: the poor quality of legal regulation and weak law 
enforcement, frequently changing legislation, corruption and clientele, 
particularly in public procurement (EC SWD  2014y ). In Transparency 
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International’s Corruption Perception Index, Slovakia took the 54th 
place following the Czech Republic in 2014. 
 In light of the above, it can be said that the issues of critical impor-
tance are the improvement of legislation, the quality of public adminis-
tration and the development of the innovation system. According to the 
Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014, Slovakia—as a moderate innova-
tor—performs poorly in terms of the indicators for expenditures, R&D 
results, economic applications and eff ects. Total R&D expenditures 
account for 0.82 per cent of GDP—although there was an increase in 
2012—and R&D expenditure in the business sector is 0.34 per cent 
(European Commission  2014c : 67, 83). 
 Th e education system still does not receive enough attention; 4 per 
cent of GDP was spent on government education expenditures in 2011 
(the EU average is 5.3 per cent). However, it can be said that it increased 
in comparison to the 3.5 per cent in 2008 (EACEA  2013 : 7). In the 
PISA surveys in 2012, the Slovak students performed below average; 
their results were worse than earlier results. Th e proportion of those aged 
30–34 with tertiary education has increased by more than 10 percentage 
points since 2008, reaching 26.9 per cent in 2013. Th e youth unemploy-
ment rate has been persistently high (33 per cent in 2013), which means 
that there is a mismatch between qualifi cations and labour market needs. 
Th e problems of vocational training are expected to be solved in Slovakia 
by the introduction of the dual system (similar to other countries), the 
preparation of which is under way (EC SWD  2014y : 19–21). 
 Th e unemployment rate continuously declined during the fi ve years 
preceding the crisis, and it reached its lowest point in 2008 at 9.6 per 
cent. In 2009, fi rms received compensation from the government for 
reducing the working hours, but the unemployment rate exceeded 12 
per cent in 2009 and 14 per cent in 2010, and it has not changed much 
since. Seventy per cent of the unemployed are long-term unemployed. 
Th e Slovak employment rate has never exceeded 70 per cent; it has always 
been approximately 65 per cent. Tackling the underlying factors that 
explain the unfavourable labour market situation can be even more dif-
fi cult due to the eff ects of the crisis. Th ere are great regional diff erences 
within the country, with the central and eastern parts lagging behind in 
particular (reference to these diff erences has already been made in Part 
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II), and these diff erences are refl ected in the unemployment rates of the 
various regions. Th e regional inequalities are closely associated with the 
problem of integrating the Roma population. Th eir employment rate is 
particularly low, as 80 per cent of adult Roma are outside work. Th e 
Roma employment gap is the highest in Slovakia in CEE, while the 
Roma account for a substantial part, more than 9 per cent of the popula-
tion (EC SWD  2012c : 19). 
 Additionally, the unemployment rate is decreasing more slowly than 
the GDP has increased because the Slovak economy specialises very 
strongly in capital-intensive, cyclically sensitive sectors. Th ere is a risk 
here: if the economy does not begin to grow dynamically, unemployment 
may become structural. Th e centre-right government of Iveta Radičová 
intended to make the labour market more fl exible, thereby improving 
employment; thus, the government modifi ed the labour code accordingly 
in 2011. After the election in 2012, the centre-left government of Robert 
Fico enacted provisions that strengthened the rights of the trade unions 
and the protection of the employees, furthermore approximated the dif-
ferent types of taxes related to the various employment forms (EC SWD 
 2012c ; Sikulová and Frank  2013 ). 
 Th e shadow economy has an infl uence on the Slovak labour market as 
well. Estimations regarding the extent of the shadow economy are very 
diff erent from each other. Schneider and Kearney ( 2013 : 4) estimate that 
the size of the shadow economy is only 15 per cent of GDP, while accord-
ing to Lichard et al. ( 2012 : 11), it is 28.6 per cent, based on data from 
2008. Although a year passed between the publication dates of the two 
studies, the signifi cant diff erence cannot be explained. In any case, the 
low level of employment suggests that the shadow economy is extensive. 
 Trade union density in Slovakia decreased further during the crisis, 
from 20 per cent in 2007 to approximately 15 per cent in 2012. Th ere 
were few strikes: there were three genuine strikes between 2005 and 
2010 and one symbolic warning strike in 2011. Collective agreements 
are concluded mainly at the company level, but there are multi-employer 
 agreements as well, which can be extended to other employers according 
to certain rules. Th ere are frequent changes in the regulations on whether 
the employer’s consent is needed for the extension (Eurofound  2014 ). 
Maintaining a certain level of fl exibility is also important because uni-
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form collective agreements would not make it possible to set wages that 
refl ect the diff erences in regional development. 
 Expenditures on social protection benefi ts were only 16 per cent of 
GDP before the crisis and 18 per cent in recent years. Due to the eff ects of 
the crisis, the austerity measures aff ected rather the public sector’s wages 
and the expenditures of the central government. Th e at-risk-of-poverty 
rate and the indicators for inequality increased slightly, but the EU 2020 
poverty indicator did not (Table A.8). Th e rate of the severely materially 
deprived is approximately 10 per cent. In the social fi eld, major changes 
to the pension system were adopted in 2012 due to the ageing of the 
population and the resulting problems of sustainability. Th e defi cit of 
the fi rst, pay-as-you-go pillar was compensated by temporarily reducing 
the contribution rate of the second pillar from 9 per cent to 4 per cent, 
and the funding diff erence was rerouted towards the fi rst pillar. Pension 
savers were allowed to opt out of the second pillar, and voluntary partici-
pation was reintroduced for new labour market entrants, who can decide 
whether to participate. Calculation of the pensions from the fi rst pillar 
was made stricter, and the pension regimes for special categories such as 
the armed forces and police were also curbed (EC SWD  2013j : 13–14). 
 Th e reforms implemented in the healthcare system in 2004 could not 
solve the problems of the sector. Expenditures soared at a large rate, even 
compared to the international fi gures, but the same rate could not be 
detected in the improvement of the health of the population. Th e budget 
constraint of state-owned hospitals is soft, the competition between the 
health insurance funds is modest, and the increase in medicine prices 
cannot be controlled. Th e amount of out-of-pocket payments has tripled 
since 2002, increasing the inequality in the access to healthcare services 
(OECD  2010g : 57–59). In 2013, the government adopted a new reform 
programme aiming to tackle these problems (EC SWD  2014y ). 
 In  Hungary , the 2010 parliamentary election brought a change of 
government. Th e right-wing government began to move along a path—
evoking many confl icts—that was diff erent from the one usually taken by 
the governments of CEE after the change in the political system. Th us, 
processes of the last one and a half decades are detailed in this section. 
Hungary is the only post-socialist EU member that did not gain anything 
from the pre-crisis prosperity, and in 2007, economic growth was as low 
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as 0.5 per cent. Th e public debt had been increasing since 2002 (it was 
51.9 per cent in 2001 and 65.9 per cent in 2007), which was in line 
with the government defi cit moving between 6.4 per cent and 9.4 per 
cent between 2002 and 2006. Th e eff ects of the austerity measures began 
after the 2006 parliamentary elections and were felt fi rst in 2007, when 
the defi cit decreased to 5.1 per cent. High public debt was coupled with 
high external indebtedness, increasing from 66 per cent of GDP in 2004 
to 120 per cent of GDP at the end of 2008, and the majority of this was 
private debt. Th e public debt accounted for 40 per cent. For this reason, 
investors’ confi dence was shaken in the Hungarian securities in spite of 
the results of fi scal consolidation after the outbreak of the global fi nancial 
crisis, and it became increasingly diffi  cult to sell Hungarian government 
bonds. Th e Hungarian forint depreciated by 25 per cent in October 2008. 
At this point, Hungary required an international loan; thus, a combined 
credit package of EUR 20 billion was granted by the IMF, the World 
Bank and the EU in November 2008 (OECD  2010d : 20–22). Th e gov-
ernment had to continue fi scal consolidation; thus, it could not mitigate 
the eff ects of the crisis. Th e Hungarian economy shrunk by 6.6 per cent 
in 2009, which was considerably greater than the decline suff ered by the 
Czech or the Slovak economies. Th e year 2014 was the fi rst in which the 
rate of growth exceeded 3 per cent; it would then move between 2.5 and 
3 per cent. In spite of the fact that the government defi cit is kept under 3 
per cent, public debt will decrease slowly remaining between 73 and 76 
per cent in the years to come. 
 Th e Hungarian people became disillusioned with the policy pursued 
by the Socialist-Liberal governments during the two terms between 2002 
and 2010, and Fidesz was elected by a two-thirds majority. Eight years 
passed, and Viktor Orbán again formed a government. 5 Notwithstanding 
domestic backup, the new government soon experienced that the EU 
did not accept that the government would try to stimulate the econ-
omy by temporarily loosening the budget. When the government was 
in opposition, Fidesz viciously attacked those austerity measures of the 
centre-left government that aff ected the households. If the government 
had continued such measures, it would have rapidly led to their losing 
face. Th erefore, the government imposed special taxes on those sectors 
of the economy that were mainly in foreign ownership. Th e government 
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did not want to give up its intention to introduce the 16 per cent fl at 
personal income tax. Th e earlier mandatory private pension pillar served 
the purpose of making up for the loss in revenue and paying back the 
IMF loan. Th is second pension pillar was de facto eliminated in 2011, 
which meant a one-off  revenue in the amount of 9.7 per cent of GDP 
(EC SWD  2012a : 12). 
 Th e Hungarian banking sector—similar to the CEE countries—was 
not exposed to toxic assets, and the banks (the majority of them foreign 
owned) could rely on the help of the parent banks when the interna-
tional markets showed signs of drying up. After privatisation, there was a 
decade of considerable growth in profi ts in the banking sector, but profi t-
ability has been declining since 2007. Events took a dramatic turn when 
the Hungarian forint depreciated drastically against the Swiss franc, and 
the greatest part of residential housing loans was denominated in Swiss 
francs. Foreign currency borrowing became widespread after 2003, when 
home loan subsidies for loans in forints were tightened (because it was 
no longer sustainable for the government budget), and there were over- 
optimistic expectations that Hungary would soon enter the euro area. 
Interest rates were high on forint loans, so it seemed a good idea to obtain 
foreign currency loans: households borrowed mainly in Swiss francs. 
Foreign-owned banks were ready to off er foreign currency loans, and 
later, domestic banks followed suit. At fi rst sight, the Hungarian banking 
market does not appear to be concentrated, but competition intensity is 
much lower in retail markets, as observed in case of the loan contracts: 
households took risks dominantly (OECD  2010d ). 
 Th e central bank and the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 
sounded a note of caution, but they could not do much because they 
did not have any opportunities for action due to legal regulations. Th e 
government ignored such warnings and did not want to limit the fi nan-
cial possibilities of the households in this fi eld, especially given the fi scal 
austerity measures in 2006. After the outbreak of the crisis, the succes-
sive governments began active regulation. After 2011, the conditions for 
obtaining foreign currency loans were as strict as if they had been prohib-
ited. It could not be helped, however, that at the end of 2011, 65 per cent 
of residential loans were denominated in foreign currency, accounting for 
20 per cent of GDP. Its amount was double the Polish or the Romanian 
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volume of loans (and in the case of Romania, loans were at least denomi-
nated in euro) (Hudecz  2013 :273). 
 During the crisis, payment amounts soared and the general economic 
environment of the fi rms was unfavourable; therefore, the portfolio qual-
ity of the banks deteriorated, and the proportion of non-performing 
credits or shorter maturity delinquencies elevated. As of 2010, the centre- 
right government put a huge burden on the banking sector in its fi scal 
consolidation activity and in solving the problems of foreign currency 
borrowers, partly in the form of extra taxes, partly in the form of the 
controversial scheme in 2011 allowing for an early repayment of house-
holds’ foreign currency mortgages at a fi xed exchange rate well below 
the relevant market rate. Th e eff ect of such measures is estimated to be 
approximately 1¼–1½ per cent of GDP.  In mid-2010, the aggregated 
balance sheet of the commercial banking sector was decreasing, and it 
came to a halt in 2013. Th e banking sector made a loss in 2011–2012, 
but this loss has been borne disproportionately by the banks. Th e banks 
that were the most active in providing household loans suff ered the great-
est loss (ECFIN DG  2014h : 38–40). Foreign-owned banks reduced their 
Hungarian exposure; in 2012, foreign ownership of the banking system 
decreased to exactly 50 per cent of total assets of the Hungarian bank-
ing sector (EC SWD  2014e : 54). In 2013, the Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority was integrated into the central bank in order to 
avoid, in the future, those macroprudential regulatory problems that 
occurred in the mid-2000s. Th e review of the foreign currency loan con-
tracts was performed in 2014, enabled by a Hungarian court decision 
following the preliminary ruling procedure of the European Court of 
Justice. Th e court decided that it is unfair for the bank to apply dif-
ferent exchange rates (buying and selling rates) to take out and repay 
loans (commonly referred to as the exchange rate margin); moreover, as 
a result of the decision, the unilateral amendment of the agreements can 
be proved unfair. Th ese consequences are expected to have yet another 
huge impact on the banking system. Foreign currency loan conversion 
into forints is expected to take place in 2015, using the central bank's 
offi  cial exchange rate on 7 November 2014. Th e commercial banks were 
allowed to obtain the currency necessary for performing the conversion 
scheme, and the National Bank of Hungary provided the amount from 
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its reserves. In view of the surge of the Swiss franc in January 2015, it can 
be said that for all actors, this conversion has been an option by which 
an even worse situation can be avoided. Th e conversion scheme included 
only housing loans, and it excluded all other loans (for example, loans 
for the purchase of road vehicles or corporate loans). Th e conversion of 
consumer and car foreign currency loans will continue in 2016. 
 Th e diffi  culties and problems the Hungarian economy must tackle 
are not restricted exclusively to the fi nancial system. Hungary suff ered 
a 19.2 per cent decline in terms of export market share during the fi ve 
years leading up to 2013. Among the post-socialist EU members, higher 
value was registered only in Croatia. Pre-crisis current account defi cit was 
quite considerable—around 7 per cent—and was eliminated as of 2009 
as imports decreased at a greater extent than exports. Since 2013, the 
accelerating increase of the surplus can be detected. Although since their 
decline in 2009, exports have been increasing, the data on export market 
share indicate that there are problems with the Hungarian economy’s 
competitiveness. Th e reason for this cannot be found in price competi-
tiveness because REER defl ated by ULC depreciated steadily during the 
crisis. Th e Hungarian export structure is favourable: the share of high- 
tech products is one of the highest in the EU. Th e key drivers of exports 
are machinery and manufacturing transport equipment, and their unit 
value has been the highest among the Visegrád countries since the begin-
ning of the 2000s; as for the other sectors, Hungary is on a par with the 
other Visegrád countries. However, the decline in competitiveness can 
be felt in these sectors as well. Th e productivity of the Czech and Slovak 
manufacturing sector exceeded that of Hungary as early as the mid-2000s. 
As far as product upgrades are concerned, the Hungarian economy lags 
behind its peers. FDI stock in manufacturing was lower in 2011 than it 
had been in 2000. In 2011–2012, signifi cant improvements were made 
in the automobile subsector, and in 2013, the negative trend of losing 
export market shares reversed. Nevertheless, these improvements could 
not change the fact that the investment rate is the lowest in Hungary 
among the Visegrád countries. Hungary is highly integrated into the 
world economy, with three-quarters of exports going to the EU member 
states, but the domestic value added content of exports is relatively low. 
Approximately 75 per cent of exports are produced by foreign-owned 
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companies, but the Hungarian SME sector remains to be connected only 
to some extent, spillover eff ects are low, and the dual structure of the 
economy survived. Th e innovation system should be enhanced in order 
to increase domestic value added (ECFIN DG  2014h : 20–26). 
 Hungary is among the moderate innovators in the Innovation Union 
Scoreboard 2014, taking fourth place—following Slovenia, Estonia, and 
the Czech Republic—among the post-socialist EU member states and 
occupying the 20th position among all member states. R&D expendi-
tures increased from the pre-crisis 1 per cent of GDP to 1.3 per cent of 
GDP in 2012. Th is increase can be attributed to the business sector; in 
2012, 0.85 per cent of expenditures were provided by the business sector 
(European Commission  2014c : 5, 82). Innovation activity is very much 
concentrated in terms of space and actors alike; innovation is concen-
trated around mainly Budapest and some foreign-owned fi rms (ECFIN 
DG  2014h ). 
 Th e problems of the Hungarian economy’s competitiveness and dual-
ity have been known to successive governments. Th e centre-right gov-
ernment that came to power in 2010 drew the conclusion that recipes 
aiming at building a traditional, more perfect market (for example, Pina 
 2014 ) will not solve these problems and that a more powerful interven-
tion of the government is needed. Although special sectoral taxes were 
introduced due to the obligation of fi scal consolidation—and were 
extended to and imposed on the fi nancial, energy, telecommunication, 
and retail sectors—the government interfered to a greater extent in the 
economy. Th e Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, is convinced 
that the energy prices necessary for competitiveness cannot be reached by 
strengthening competition but by government-driven price regulation. 
Obviously, these measures are inseparably intertwined with the intention 
of holding on to political power. In 2013, residential energy prices were 
reduced by 20 per cent, which was a trump card for Fidesz: in 2014, 
Fidesz’s party won the parliamentary elections again almost by a two- 
thirds majority. Th e government handles FDI in a selective manner and 
concludes “strategic agreements” with those industrial companies that it 
considers economically desirable. Not only does the government interfere 
with and intervene in the economy as a regulator to an extent and in a 
manner that are unusual in the EU member states, but it also intends 
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to increase state ownership in those fi elds considered to be of strategic 
importance (primarily the energy sector, public utilities, and the bank-
ing sector). In order to achieve this aim, the government would go any 
lengths, and it does not hesitate to make fi nancial sacrifi ces or to come 
into confl ict with foreign owners. Between 2010 and 2013, the value of 
state shareholdings doubled (Voszka  2013 : 1292). Th is economic policy 
has made the Hungarian economy’s renown even worse internationally, as 
detected in the positions obtained in the various rankings of competitive-
ness (for example, Schwab  2014 : 13, World Bank  2014 : 4), but for many 
Hungarians, having disappointed in the capitalist transformation, this 
economic policy meant certain security and justice against the banks that 
made huge profi t before the crisis, against the energy companies, which 
were in a monopolistic position, and against the commercial chains, 
which used their dominant positions against their domestic suppliers. 
 In the fi rst years of economic transition, the size of the working popu-
lation decreased by 30 per cent, and the majority of the elderly, Roma 
and/or low-skilled workers who became unemployed could not enter the 
labour market again and thereby were in need of the social protection 
system. Low levels of unemployment became persistent. Th e crisis fur-
ther deteriorated the situation, and the unemployment rate, which had 
hovered around 7 per cent, increased above 10 per cent in 2009. Th e 
new role taken by the government can be traced to how it handled the 
problem of unemployment. According to the centre-right government, 
the welfare states typical of Western Europe cannot be sustained; there-
fore, the welfare system must be replaced by the work-based economy 
known as the workfare system. Th e activity rate began to rise due to 
strict measures addressing early retirement, disability pension and cer-
tain parts of the social assistance system and to further liberalisation of 
the labour code in 2012. Th e government’s public work scheme is sup-
posed to make up for the missing jobs in the private sector (EC SWD 
 2014e : 23). In 2015, the average number of employed in the scheme was 
approximately 200 thousand. 6 Th is was the fi rst time since the change in 
the political system that the government managed to push the employ-
ment rate above 63 per cent—with the help of this scheme—which is 
still well below the EU average (68.4 per cent). Th e unemployment rate 
decreased to 10.2 per cent in 2013, and it is expected to go below 8 per 
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cent in 2015. Th e indicators for employment are improved by the fact 
that during the crisis—with the opening of the German and Austrian 
labour markets—temporary migration sped up. A study found that, at 
the beginning of 2013, there were 335,000 Hungarian citizens (aged 
18–49) who had permanent residence in Hungary but who were staying 
abroad. Th ose who move abroad are younger and more qualifi ed than the 
residents in Hungary (Gödri et al.  2013 : 43–44). When the question of 
employment arises, the size of the shadow economy must be taken into 
account. According to Schneider and Kearney ( 2013 : 4), this size is not 
insignifi cant—22 per cent of GDP—in Hungary. According to Bublik 
and Tóth ( 2013 : 25), the informal income of the Hungarian population 
amounts to 17–18 per cent of GDP. 
 Although the government considers public works a temporary solu-
tion due to the structural problems, it is not likely that the market will be 
able to replace them soon. Th e employment of the low skilled is invari-
ably a challenge because the newer generations of the young leave school 
without appropriate qualifi cations. In the Roma population (approxi-
mately 6 per cent of the total), the employment rate has not reached 30 
per cent (OECD  2010d : 135). Th e government wishes to centralise the 
structure of public education with the intention of elevating the stan-
dard of education (in a uniform manner) to a higher level. However, 
for the time being, the 2012 PISA survey gave an account of the perfor-
mance of the Hungarian students as below average (EC SWD  2014e ). 
According to EACEA ( 2013 : 7), public spending on education was 5.3 
per cent of GDP in 2008, and data for the years after 2008 are provided 
on a provisional basis: for 2011, it is 5.2 per cent of GDP. According to 
data provided by Eurostat, the 5.1 per cent in 2008 decreased to 4.7 in 
2011. It remains to be seen whether the dual training introduced in 2013 
proves to be successful. Th e reforms concerning higher education came 
to a standstill before the 2014 parliamentary elections. Although the 
government remained in power, the already elaborated conception was 
 abandoned and at the end of 2014, and a new proposal was put forward 
for discussion and accepted in 2015. 
 Th e trade unions did not play an important role in the profound 
changes implemented by the Orbán cabinet in terms of economic and 
social policies, although there were a few strikes and demonstrations. 
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Trade union density is only 11 per cent. Collective agreements have 
shifted to the company level. Th e forum for tripartite conciliations, the 
National Interest Reconciliation Council, where negotiations were held 
on the general increase in the gross wage, was reorganised and converted 
into the National Economic and Social Council as of 2011. Th e mem-
bers of this council included representatives of not only the employer and 
employee organisations but also other civil organisations (associations for 
large families, disabled people, and so on) and Churches, and it became 
a professional advisory board (Eurofound  2014 ). 
 In the social assistance system, the austerity measures mentioned ear-
lier have not represented the only important change since 2010. Th e pop-
ulation of Hungary began to decrease earlier than in the neighbouring 
countries. In this rapidly ageing country, family policy is at the centre of 
attention, but the most important means applied are the tax advantages, 
from which only those with high incomes can benefi t. In CEE, only 
Hungary (and Slovenia) spend a few percentage points more than 20 per 
cent of GDP on social protection, but this has decreased, reaching 21.8 
per cent in 2012. As a result of persistently modest growth, the low level 
of employment and the fl at personal income tax introduced in 2011, the 
social inequalities increased and the indicators of poverty deteriorated. In 
2013, almost one-third of the Hungarian population was below the EU 
2020 poverty criteria, and the proportion of severely materially deprived 
people was 26.8 per cent, which means that the situation in Hungary is 
far more serious than that in the other Visegrád countries. 
 Based on Hungary’s economic performance, it can be said that the 
country drifted away from the path the other Visegrád countries took in 
the second half of the 2000s. 7 As a result of the changes that have been 
implemented since 2010, the role of the government has come to the 
forefront to such an extent and centralisation has been performed at such 
a level in the spheres of public administration, the economy, education, 
healthcare, and so on that, currently, Hungary’s institutional system is 
also diff erent from that of the other Visegrád countries (Table  8.4 ). Only 
time will tell whether the government has been right in hoping that, with 
the help of the changed institutional system, the country will reach the 
level of economic performance of the Visegrád countries once again.
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8.3  The South-Eastern Countries: 
Enlargement with Croatia 
 Th e crisis hit the South-Eastern countries more seriously than the Visegrád 
countries (with the exception of Hungary) but less seriously than the 
Baltic states. However, after 2011, growth could not gather considerable 
momentum, contrary to the Baltic states. Croatia had been sustaining a 
continuously shrinking economy (since 2009) when it joined the EU on 
1st July 2013 (Table  8.5 ).
 Slovenia reached the post-transformation peak of growth at 6.9 per 
cent in 2007, which dropped to 3.3 per cent in 2008. Th is rate was 
followed by 7.8 per cent downturn in 2009. Before the crisis, Slovenia 
pursued disciplined fi scal policy; public debt was only 21.6 per 21cent 
in 2008. Th erefore, at the beginning of the crisis, a fi scal stimulus 
package was launched in the amount of 2.1 per cent of GDP (OECD 
 2009e : 56). Nevertheless, due to the decreasing revenue related to the 
economic recession and the automatic stabilisers, defi cit was increasing 
rapidly, reaching 6.1 per cent in 2009. Consequently, in 2010, consolida-
tion measures were taken, including but not limited to the delay in the 
previously decided wage increases. Indexation of the social benefi ts and 
pensions fi rst decreased, and then was suspended. General government 
defi cit remained between 4 and 6 per cent until 2012. A dramatic change 
took place in 2013 due to the restructuring costs of the banks, increasing 
the defi cit to 14.6 per cent. At the same time, public debt reached 70.4 
per cent, and it is expected to exceed 80 per cent in the coming years, 
although the defi cit may sink below 3 per cent by 2015. Th e extended 
state ownership in the banking sector and in fi rms with low profi tability 
(especially in the transport sector) presents further risks in decreasing 
defi cit. Slovenia fulfi lled its commitment to the EU when it included the 
basic principles of balanced fi scal policy in its Constitution. However, 
according to the assessment performed by the Commission, the adoption 
of the legal regulation suff ers a delay, and the effi  ciency of the fi scal coun-
cil, which was established in 2009, is limited (EC SWD  2014z ). 
 Pre-crisis credit expansion was covered by the banking sector with for-
eign funding in the overheated economy, which increased from 9.3 per 
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cent of GDP in 2002 to 46.7 per cent in 2008, accounting for one-third 
of the aggregate balance sheet of the banks (ECFIN DG  2012c : 2, 6). 
Slovenian banks were hit hard when international lending came to a halt, 
and they became dependent on the long-term refi nancing operations of 
the Eurosystem, although they did not have toxic assets. Th e consoli-
dated debt of the non-fi nancial private sector and households was not 
large—110–120 per cent of GDP compared to the reference value of 
the EU (133 per cent). However, the level of NPL was high, and this 
increasing tendency did not stop in 2013, when it was 18 per cent (EC 
SWD  2014z : 46), and the capital adequacy ratio of the banks was low 
before the crisis as well. Th e total assets of the Slovenian banking sector 
decreased during the crisis from 146 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 116 per 
cent of GDP in 2013. 8 Th e government decided in 2013 to intervene 
and take policy action addressing the stability risks of the banking sector, 
but already between 2008 and 2012, it spent quite a large amount (2.1 
per cent of the 2012 GDP) on restructuring the banks. Th e Slovenian 
situation is unique in that the major shares of the banks are state-owned, 
and there are two domestic privately owned and three foreign-owned 
subsidiary banks. For the recapitalisation of the state-owned banks, the 
government spent EUR 3.214 billion, which was followed by EUR 243 
million in 2014. In 2013 and 2014, NPL with a gross value of EUR 3.3 
billion and, later, EUR 1.087 billion were transferred to the Bank Asset 
Management Company, which was fi nanced by the issuance of state- 
guaranteed new bonds. Th e government intended to reduce its participat-
ing interest in the largest bank (NLB) to no more than 25 per cent plus 
one share. Th e government was planning to privatise two other banks 
(NKBM, Abanka) in 2014, but this privatisation must be fi nalised only 
in 2015. However, if no capital increase takes place in the two privately 
owned domestic banks, they may become state-owned banks (ECFIN 
DG  2014m : 22–23,  2014r : 9–11; European Commission  2014g ). 
 Th e debts of households did not make the situation worse for the 
banks; their share in the increase of the credit was modest. Lending by 
the banks was more prudent towards households than towards compa-
nies. Although housing prices had doubled during the pre-crisis years, 
correction was continuous, and the decrease in real terms was 29 per 
cent between 2008 and 2013. Presumably, this tendency will continue 
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(ECFIN DG  2014m : 16). Although the building of houses contributed 
to the boom of the construction industry, the main drivers were rather 
infrastructural investments and road construction. 
 Slovenia’s competitiveness was also hit hard by the crisis: REER 
appreciated in the euro area, and ULC increased more than it did in the 
Visegrád countries. Th e adjustment of the wages began in 2012. Th e 
declining sales markets of the main destinations of exports (Italy and the 
former Yugoslav republics) and the composition of exports (dominantly 
low-tech and medium-tech products with fl exible demand) contributed 
to the fact that Slovenia’s global market share decreased. While in the fi rst 
half of the 2000s, its global market share was expanding, as of 2008, there 
was a decline, and by 2012, the fi ve-year loss was 20.4 per cent, which 
could not be compensated by the 3.3 per cent growth in 2013. Slovenian 
experts have drawn our attention to the deeper processes that are in the 
background of the facts and fi gures in Eurostat. Ponikvar et al. ( 2013 : 
160) warn that “in the 2001–2008 period Slovenian economic growth 
was largely a consequence of the growth of low value-added sectors and 
that this period was not characterised by any notable technological break-
through”. Th e share of high-tech products in terms of added value lags 
behind the same share of the Czech, Slovak, or Hungarian economies, 
although Slovenia joined the suppliers of the German automobile indus-
try. Th e export-oriented companies of the textile, footwear and wood-
working industries were sustained in international competition by setting 
up “survival coalitions”, which meant that the employees accepted lower 
wages and undertook more work. Th e more developed companies, for 
example, in the metallurgical and pharmaceutical industries, worked in 
a fl exible work organisation, and in cooperation with the trade unions, 
they elaborated the microsystem of competitive solidarity. In order to be 
able to hold their own in international competition, work intensity had 
to be increased, which did not really allow for the co-existence of formal 
and informal work. In Slovenia, after the change in the political system, it 
remained the common practice that the modest wage of formal work was 
complemented by the payment received for informal work (Stanojevic 
 2012 ). Th e size of the shadow economy is estimated by Slovenian statis-
tics to be 10 per cent of GDP (EC SWD  2014z : 14), while in the inter-
national survey performed by Schneider and Kearney ( 2013 : 4), it is 23 
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per cent of GDP. Both pieces of data concern the non-observed economy, 
but the methodology-related reason for this diff erence cannot be detected 
from these studies. 
 Work intensity and the debt of corporations increased before the crisis, 
and it does not matter whether we compare the latter to the equity of 
companies (in 2011, 141 per cent) or to their income (OECD  2013g : 
14). Th erefore, corporations did not have reserves; consequently, many 
of them suff ered a long-term crisis. Th e ratio for NPL of non-fi nancial 
corporations increased from 16 per cent to 28 per cent between 2012 
and the end of 2013, and the construction and property development 
corporations were especially aff ected. However, no industry emerged 
unscathed. Among the corporations, fi nancial holdings are typically the 
result of the Slovenian conditions, and they participated in a number of 
debt-driven management buy out transactions between 2005 and 2007, 
in the second wave of privatisations. During the crisis, some became insol-
vent, while others went through debt-restructuring processes. Th e level 
of inward FDI stock in Slovenia was the lowest among the post-socialist 
countries during the crisis: it was only 34 per cent of GDP in 2012. By 
contrast, 29 per cent of total assets and 27 per cent of total debt were held 
by state-owned and state-controlled enterprises. Th eir productivity and 
profi tability are lower than those of privately owned enterprises due to 
inadequate company management, ineffi  cient state support, and political 
intervention. In view of this, it is hardly surprising that between 2007 
and 2012, state aid granted to the real economy tripled—it was 1.27 
per cent of GDP in 2012. Th e government intended to reduce the level 
of state involvement, but the privatisation of the previously identifi ed 
15 companies is sluggish, partly because it is necessary to perform fi scal 
consolidation fi rst and partly because of the defi ciencies in the legal regu-
lation concerning bankruptcy proceedings (ECFIN DG  2014m : 37–40). 
 Th e system of R&D&I depicts a more favourable picture of the pos-
sibilities of the Slovenian economy. Slovenia’s relative performance to the 
EU improved from 85 per cent (2007) to 93 per cent (2013), and in 
2008, the country moved from the category of “moderate innovators” to 
the category of “innovation followers”. Slovenia is—without doubt—the 
leading country among the post-socialist countries. A thorough survey 
of the indicators reveals that Slovenia’s results in terms of expenditures 
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on R&D&I are far better than in the output indicators (European 
Commission  2014c : 66). Th is explains why no improvement—expected 
on the basis of innovation capacity—could be seen in the growth rate of 
productivity in the pre-crisis years, either. 
 During the years before the crisis, the unemployment indicators for 
Slovenia were favourable (below 6 per cent), and the employment rate 
was over 70 per cent. Th e labour market performed well, although in the 
pre-crisis decade, the labour market reforms were erratic. Th e employ-
ment protection of the workers with open-ended contracts remained 
well over the OECD average, while that of the workers with fi xed-term 
contracts was at the level of the OECD average (OECD  2009e : 112). In 
the course of the crisis, the unemployment rate was continuously increas-
ing; in 2013, it already reached 10 per cent, and youth unemployment 
exceeded 20 per cent in 2012. New reforms were introduced in 2013 in 
order to reduce labour market segmentation and increase fl exibility. Th e 
fi rst results of these reforms are promising. Th e Slovenian education sys-
tem performed fairly well; according to the PISA report, the mathematics 
and science scores are above the OECD average, but reading skills are 
below the OECD average. Vocational education and training are in need 
of further developments, the problem of which is expected to be solved 
by the introduction of the dual system (EC SWD  2014z : 27–30). Public 
spending on education was above the EU average, even during the crisis, 
amounting to 6.7 per cent of GDP in 2011 (EACEA  2013 : 7). 
 Public spending on social protection was the highest in Slovenia 
among the post-socialist countries, even during the crisis, and indica-
tors for income disparities remained well below the EU average, but they 
are slowly increasing (Table A.8). In Slovenia, the costs of the ageing 
society would lay an unsustainable burden on public fi nances. In 2011, 
a referendum refused the pension reform and the labour market reform. 
Nevertheless, at the end of 2012, the parliament adopted a new pension 
reform. Increasing the retirement age and changing the indexation of the 
pensions stabilised the costs expectedly until 2020 (EC SWD  2014z ). 
 It seems that the Slovenian society was not prepared for the fact 
that the separate path, as described in Part II, may reach its end. Th e 
Conservative coalition elected in 2004 and led by Janez Janša introduced 
neoliberal reforms without conciliation with the trade unions, includ-
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ing the fl at rate taxation, and started privatisation. Th is disregard for the 
trade unions has not occurred since the 1990s. Th e confl ict ended in 
demonstrations, and as a result, both parties suff ered considerable losses: 
the government did not win the parliamentary elections in 2008, and 
the trade unions lost one-fourth of their membership. During the cri-
sis, the centre-left government did not have other alternative but intro-
duced austerity measures and, thus, found itself in confl ict with the trade 
unions. In December 2011, Janša returned to power after an early gen-
eral election was held. Janša’s government was not popular due to fur-
ther austerity measures; moreover, Janša received a vote of no confi dence 
and was taken to court, charged with corruption. Janša was followed by 
Alenka Bratušek. Her government could not win the early general elec-
tion, and Bratušek, who appointed herself as a nominee for EU commis-
sioner in 2014, was rejected because she was found incompetent. Th e 
right wing could not win the approval of the trade unions for the lib-
eralisation and privatisation of the economy; furthermore, it wished to 
replace the political infl uence exercised by the post-socialist elite through 
state-owned properties with its own infl uence exercised through its own 
clientele (Stanojevic  2014 ). Naturally, it will come as no surprise that in 
the WEF competitiveness report, Slovenia is ranked number 133 out of 
144 countries as far as “public trust in politicians” is concerned (Schwab 
 2014 : 339). Dissatisfaction of the voters with the whole political elite was 
demonstrated rather well when a six-week-old party won 35 per cent of 
the vote in the 2014 election and when a centre-left coalition was formed 
as a result. 9 Nevertheless, it is not likely to be enough to stop the deterio-
ration of the Slovenian model, which has been based on neo-corporatist 
agreements and strong state involvement. Th e government is not able 
to give up privatisation, and trade union density is gradually shrinking: 
in 2013, it was estimated to be 20 per cent. Collective bargaining is still 
performed at the sectoral level, but the aff ected sphere is narrowing, and 
there is a tendency towards decentralisation (Eurofound  2014 ). If the 
political division of society does not hinder the change in the economy, 
Slovenia’s institutional system will presumably be similar to that of the 
Visegrád countries. However, due to the legacy of the previous decades, it 
is likely that social protection and social partnership will have a relatively 
greater role in Slovenia than in the Visegrád countries. 
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 Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013. Similar to the case of the non-
 EU member states of the Western Balkans, not much attention has been 
devoted to Croatia’s institutional system in the VoC literature. Croatia’s 
historical legacy is similar to that of Slovenia: Croatia was also part of 
Yugoslavia and had earlier belonged to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes, to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy until its collapse in 
1918, and to the Habsburg Empire beginning in the sixteenth century. 
Its culture is also similar to Slovenia’s culture in that it adheres to Roman 
Catholicism, in contrast to the other Western Balkan countries, where 
the principal religions are Orthodox Catholicism and Islam. At the same 
time, economically, Croatia was less developed than Slovenia; signifi cant 
industrialisation took place only after the WWII. During the Yugoslav 
period, per capita GDP decreased from 66.7 per cent of Slovenian GDP 
in 1952 to 64.1 per cent of Slovenian GDP in 1989 (Gligorov  2004 : 
27). Similar to Slovenia, Croatia, as the second-richest republic of the 
socialist Yugoslavia, also had an interest in breaking free from the declin-
ing economy, the presence of which has been described in relation to 
Slovenia in Part II. Croatia declared its independence from the Socialist 
Federal Republic Yugoslavia on the very same day as Slovenia, on 25 
June 1991. However, the war that followed was not a ten-day-long war, 
as it was in Slovenia. Th e Croatian War of Independence was fought for 
four years partly in its own territory (which was claimed by the Serbian 
minority, which established the Republic of Serbian Krajina), partly in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which became independent and was populated by 
Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats. At the end of 1995, the war ended after an 
agreement was signed in Dayton (Ohio, USA). In addition to its human 
and fi nancial losses, the war distorted the entire Croatian economic and 
political transformation. Th e war destroyed one-third of Croatia’s indus-
trial capacity and 10 per cent of housing, and the Yugoslavian market as 
such ceased to exist (Bartlett  2003 : 88–89). In 1997, Croatian per capita 
GDP was only 47 per cent of the per capita Slovenian GDP (Gligorov 
 2004 : 27); in 1998 the estimated level of real GDP was 78 per cent of the 
1989 GDP (EBRD  1999 : 73). 
 In 1990, the fi rst multi-party election was won by the Croatian 
Democratic Union ( Hrvatska  demokratska  zajednica ) led by Franjo 
Tuđman, who was re-elected President twice and who remained in power 
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until his death in 1999. Tuđman took part in the political movement 
known as the “Croatian spring” in 1971, which called for more rights 
for Croatia within Yugoslavia. Th e communist President, Josip Broz Tito 
(born to a Croat father and Slovene mother) repressed the movement 
out of fear that nationalism would gain strength and that Yugoslavia 
might fall apart. Tuđman remains a controversial fi gure because, after 
the independence of Croatia, Tuđman used the economic transforma-
tion to build his political clientele. He refused to cooperate with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which led to 
the international isolation of Croatia (Bartlett  2003 ). Th e issue of the war 
crimes cast a shadow on the accession of Croatia to the EU. Negotiations 
stopped until the accused persons were surrendered (that is why the less 
developed Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU earlier than Croatia); 
however, the majority of the Croatian population considered the accused 
national heroes rather than war criminals. Croatia was made an offi  cial 
candidate in 2004, and the accession negotiations began in 2005, after 
the last accused person was delivered. 
 After the 1990 election, the right-wing government adopted an act 
on mandatory privatisation as early as 1991 and rapidly accomplished it 
accordingly in the midst of the war. Its primary form was management 
buy out; voucher privatisation was only secondary. Contrary to Slovenia, 
Croatia did not want to build on the tradition of relatively autonomous 
self-management, preferring to impede the cooperation between the post- 
communist managers and workers (Bohle and Greskovits  2012 ). Th e lit-
erature is entirely unambiguous in revealing that during the privatisation 
process, the obtained properties had political connections and supported 
the government (for example, Bartlett  2003 ; Bohle and Greskovits  2012 ; 
Cvijanović and Redžepagić  2011 ). 10 Th e same methodology can also be 
seen in other post-socialist countries. State-owned banks provided loans 
for the buyout, and these were paid back from the profi ts of companies, 
or the assets of companies served as coverage for these mortgages. In most 
cases, the new owners strived to maximise short-term profi ts, and instead 
of implementing long-term management, they depleted the gained prop-
erty and went bankrupt; as a result, in 1998, the whole banking system 
experienced a crisis. Within a few years, the greatest part of the banking 
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sector was owned by Italian and Austrian banks (Bartlett  2007 ). Similar 
to the other post-socialist EU member states, Croatia’s fi nancial system 
is bank based. FDI played an important role in the transformation of 
Croatia as well (similar to the other post-socialist EU member states), 
but its dynamic infl ow began only after the accession negotiations had 
commenced. Since then, the FDI stock has exceeded 50 per cent of GDP, 
which is on par with the average of the other ten post-socialist countries. 
However, the composition of FDI is not really favourable because the 
majority of FDI fl owed into the non-tradable sectors (fi nancial interme-
diation, property development, and construction) and, within industry, 
into processing raw materials rather than into more technology-intensive 
sectors (Hunya  2013 : 41, 99). In line with the above, Croatia is among 
the moderate innovators. After Croatia joined the EU, the country was 
included, for the fi rst time, in the innovation scoreboard, taking the 23rd 
place (European Commission  2014c : 5). 
 After the change in the political system, the unemployment rate began 
to decrease in the mid-1990s, but due to the failure of the fi rst wave 
of privatisation—as described above—unemployment increased again. 
Better growth performance in the 2000s somewhat improved the situa-
tion in the labour market, but the rate of unemployment dipped below 
10 per cent only in 2008, when the crisis began. Th e Croatian labour 
market was among the most rigid at that time in terms of EPL; only the 
Mediterranean countries showed higher values. Croatia’s EPL was higher 
than those of the post-socialist countries, even Slovenia. Croatian EPL 
was strict in the case of open-ended contracts and in the case of fi xed- 
term contracts (World Bank  2011 : 17–18). 
 Th e evolvement of labour relations was similar to that of the Romanian 
and Bulgarian situation rather than the Slovenian situation. Th e Croatian 
government considered the traditions of self-managed companies a threat 
rather than an opportunity, and no corporatist cooperation developed. 
Th e tripartite social dialogue was established legally in 1994, and the 
Economic and Social Council was set up. In 2000, the centre-left gov-
ernment came to power, and it tried to conclude a comprehensive agree-
ment with the social partners, but this attempt failed because certain 
trade unions had withdrawn. Trade union density remained considerable 
(35 per cent) compared to the other EU members, but currently, this 
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fi gure exists only because density in the public sector was 70 per cent. 
Coordination between the highly fragmented trade unions is low, wage 
bargaining is decentralised, and agreements are concluded at the com-
pany level (Eurofound  2014 ). 
 Th e welfare system was quite developed in Yugoslavia, and its adminis-
tration was performed in a decentralised way. Th is facilitated the launch of 
the social protection system in the post-Yugoslavian independent states. 
Croatia, like its peers, had to face the same social challenges brought 
about by the economic transition, but in addition, it had to cope with the 
consequences of war, including the resettlement of refugees and displaced 
persons, the integration of territories that returned as the result of the 
Dayton Accords and the reintegration of war veterans into civil society. 
In 1998, public expenditure on social protection increased to as much 
as 28.1 per cent of GDP (Bejaković and McAuley  1999 : 7). Th e opera-
tion of the welfare system and the structure of social expenditures were 
politicised as well, characterised by prevailing political considerations, 
the building of clientele and selective support for political adherents. 
Expenditure on pensions accounts for an outstandingly high amount of 
social spending. Croatia introduced the three-pillar pension system at the 
beginning of the 2000s in order to decrease its fi scal burden. Before the 
crisis, public expenditures on social protection decreased to 18.7 per cent 
of GDP. In the last decade, public spending on education was approxi-
mately 4 per cent of GDP, 1 percentage point lower than the EU average, 
and Croatia is planning to implement cost-cutting measures in the com-
ing years. In the PISA tests, Croatian students performed below average, 
but showing no signifi cant diff erence from the performance of Slovakian, 
Lithuanian, Latvian, and—more recently—Hungarian students. In the 
last fi ve years, the proportion of those participating in higher education 
has rapidly increased, but the proportion of young people aged 30–34 
with higher education degrees is still 11 percentage points lower than the 
EU average (in 2013, it was 25.7 per cent). Th e composition of higher 
education is not favourable; the proportion of those holding a degree 
in engineering or in medicine is decreasing. In the case of those with 
degrees and in the case of skilled workers, one-third and, in some fi elds, 
half of those who enter the labour market are not employed in a job that 
matches their fi eld of study. Th e implementation of the reforms covering 
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several sectors of the education system and hopefully tackling the prob-
lems has been delayed (Bartlett  2007 : 213–214; EC SWD  2014b :26–27, 
50; OECD  2013j : 5). 
 Th e crisis drew attention to the structural weaknesses of the Croatian 
economy, which suff ered considerable loss in 2009; moreover, since then, 
through fi ve successive years, the economy has shrunk by a total of 12 
per cent. Recovery was expected to begin only in 2015. During the cri-
sis, fi scal policy was loosened, and government defi cit shifted approxi-
mately 6 per cent between 2009 and 2013, decreasing to 5.2 per cent 
in 2013. Public debt was 36 per cent in 2008; after that, it began to 
increase rapidly, and in 2013, it reached 75.7 per cent. Th e dynamism of 
this growth has slowed down, but it did not stop; by 2016, it may reach 
90 per cent of GDP. Th ere is a risk in decreasing public debt, namely, 
that the share of foreign currency debt in public debt is high (in 2013, it 
was approximately 75 per cent, ECFIN DG  2014c : 43), and the losses 
of the state-owned companies and the state guarantees granted to them 
(mainly in the fi elds of highway construction, railway infrastructure and 
shipbuilding) mean contingent fi scal liabilities. Th e assessment of bud-
getary development is complicated because the Croatian statistical sys-
tem is currently, that is, after the accession, in the process of adopting 
the European System of Accounts. Budgetary planning as such has been 
strengthened by several acts since 2009; in 2011, a fi scal council was 
established, but the eff ects of these measures have not been felt strongly 
yet. In planning, the government tends to be overoptimistic, which leads 
to frequent budgetary revisions (EC SWD  2014b ). 
 Total assets of the banking sector were 130 per cent of GDP in 2013, 
which means that Croatia has the fourth-largest banking sector (after 
Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia) in Central and South-Eastern Europe. State 
ownership is limited, representing only approximately 5 per cent of total 
banking assets. Th e banking sector remained stable during the crisis, and 
capital levels are among the highest in the region. Th e Croatian National 
Bank adopted a conservative approach during the years of pre-crisis pros-
perity, and using macroprudential measures, it aimed to slow down the 
pace of credit growth and the expansion of the ratio of foreign-currency- 
denominated loans. Th ese measures strengthened the resilience of the 
banks during the crisis. Th e degree of fi nancial euroisation in Croatia 
434 Models of Capitalism in the European Union
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
is among the highest in the world; thus, maintaining a broadly stable 
exchange rate of the kuna against the euro has been a key element of 
Croatia’s economic policy strategy. Th is exchange rate regime was like 
a tightly managed fl oat, which could sustain even in the most critical 
years of the crisis. Nevertheless, indebtedness of the private sector could 
not be avoided. However, this indebtedness was characterised mainly by 
external borrowing, which was performed directly from the foreign par-
ent banks of Croatian subsidiaries; thus, the parent banks took the risk. 
Due to the crisis of the real economy, the ratio of NPL increased from 5 
per cent in 2008 to 15.3 per cent in 2013 and, in the corporate sector, 
to 27.4 per cent. Deleveraging began in the private sector. Due to the 
reduced demand for credit from the private sector, banks have compen-
sated by increasing lending to public entities and state-owned enterprises. 
Obviously, the above-demonstrated situation of public fi nances presents 
further risks (ECFIN DG  2014c : 45–53). 
 Household debt peaked at 42 per cent of GDP in 2010. Compared 
to those of the Western-European countries, this rate is not high, but in 
2012, it was still 6 percentage points higher than in the ten CEE coun-
tries. Households were not in an easy situation considering that prop-
erty prices had decreased by 30 per cent between 2008 and 2013 and 
that Swiss franc-indexed housing loans accounted for 40 per cent of all 
loans. When the Swiss franc surged in January 2015, the related risks 
became reality. During pre-crisis prosperity, the debt-to-GDP ratio of 
the corporate sector more than doubled, which—after the narrowing of 
the export markets and the decline in domestic demand—further surged 
by 30 percentage points, reaching the peak at 95 per cent in 2010; its 
decline is slow. Corporate debt of Croatia also exceeds—by 7 percentage 
points—that of the ten competitor CEE countries (ECFIN DG  2014c : 
34, 36, 39). 
 Th e problems related to the competitiveness of the Croatian economy 
can be found in the background of the protracted crisis. Croatia’s pre- 
crisis economic growth was already accompanied by imbalances, and the 
current account ran a 6 per cent defi cit. It originated from the defi cit 
of the export of goods, and services, including the country’s consider-
able tourism, could not compensate. Th e loss of its export market share 
began in 2004, and between 2008 and 2013, it reached 20.9 per cent. 
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Th e process took a turn in 2013, when a growth of 3.4 per cent was 
registered. Th ere are several factors in the background of market share 
loss and weak competitiveness. Croatia’s main export markets (Italy, 
Bosnia- Herzegovina, and Slovenia) were also hit hard by the crisis. When 
Croatia joined the EU, the country exited the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement, which means that they have limited access to some 
regional markets. Its exports were concentrated on goods for which the 
demand declined considerably. As mentioned, Croatia has not accom-
plished the industrial restructuring the Visegrád countries did with the 
help of the FDI; therefore, Croatia could not integrate into the global 
value chain. Croatian experts agree that one of the main problems of 
the Croatian economy is the drastic decline in the manufacturing indus-
try (Cvijanović and Redžepagić  2011 ). ULC increased more slowly than 
in the competitor countries, but this began from a high level and was 
more intensive than that of productivity. REER demonstrates the disad-
vantageous position of cost competitiveness compared to the ten post-
socialist countries, especially in the industrial sector. Th e regulation of 
the product market is more rigid than that of regional competitors, but 
it does not show considerable diff erences compared to pre-accession data 
on its regional competitors (De Rosa et al.  2009 ). Th e state maintained 
ownership to a considerable extent; at the end of 2013, there were 59 
state-owned companies of strategic interest and 561 companies await-
ing privatisation. Privatisation is proceeding slowly, but certain advances 
have been made, especially in selling tourism-related facilities, former 
military properties and shipyards. Th e privatisation contracts of the lat-
ter properties include restructuring aid as well. Competitiveness rankings 
assessing the business and institutional environment (made by the World 
Bank, the Heritage Foundation and the WEF) demonstrated clearly that 
the Croatian  economy underperformed the CEE-10 (EC SWD  2014b : 
31–32; ECFIN DG  2014c : 31). 
 As a result of the crisis, the unemployment rate increased substantially; 
since 2012, it has exceeded 15 per cent (as it did at the end of the 1990s), 
and it is approaching 18 per cent. Youth unemployment was 50 per cent 
in 2013. Since 2010, the employment rate has been the lowest in Croatia 
(besides Greece) within the EU. Most jobs were lost in the construction 
industry and manufacturing. Th e decline in employment is exceeding 
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the economic decline, in which the rigid labour market and the regula-
tion of social assistance play a role, as it creates disincentives to work 
(even a low income means that eligibility for social benefi ts is lost). Rigid 
labour market regulation and high dismissal costs led to the increase in 
fi xed-term contracts, the segmentation of the labour market and informal 
employment. Estimations of international organisations concerning the 
size of the informal economy move between 25 and 40 per cent; accord-
ing to Schneider and Kearney ( 2013 :4), it is 28 per cent. Since 2013, the 
government has been trying to make the labour market more fl exible and 
to decrease its segmentation through a series of reforms. It is diffi  cult to 
gauge the eff ects of the changes so far; the content of the reform measures 
of the second phase launched in 2014 have not been elaborated yet (EC 
SWD  2013a : 17–19,  2014b ). 
 Th e crisis increased social inequalities; in 2013, 29.9 per cent of the 
Croatian population was below the EU 2020 poverty criteria, even 
though it had been 2.7 percentage points higher in the previous year. 
Th e rate of the severely materially deprived was 14.7 per cent in 2013, 
which means some improvement to the 15.9 per cent of 2012. It is not 
certain how persistent this improvement will be because further austerity 
measures are planned for the coming years in terms of social protection- 
related costs, which accounted for 20–21 per cent of GDP during the 
years of the crisis. Th e three-pillar pension system is undergoing changes 
in order to conduct fi scal consolidation. In 2014–2015, funds in the total 
amount of 1.4 per cent of GDP are rerouted from the second to the fi rst 
(state) pillar, and social security contributions transferred to the second 
pillar will be decreased. In 2016, transfers from the state to the third—
voluntary—pillar will be eliminated. After 2011, some structural reforms 
were also made because social transfers and the system of pensions were 
fragmented. Th ere were more than 70 types of legal entitlement upon 
which it was possible to receive welfare provision. Th is was restructured 
by an act in 2013, and the investigation of means-testing was given 
greater emphasis. Th e introduction of the guaranteed minimum benefi t 
has been delayed. Th e integration of the pension system is made more 
diffi  cult by the fact that special pensions for veterans, former political 
prisoners, military personnel, and other benefi ciaries account for 20 per 
cent of overall pension expenditure. For this reason, the government is 
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attempting to apply incentives to keep people working and to extend the 
actual date of retirement (EC SWD  2013a : 15,  2014b : 9–10, 24–26). 
 Until this day, Croatia has not recovered entirely from the damages 
caused by the war in the fi rst few years of the economic and social transi-
tion. Its economic performance and its institutional system rank some-
where between Slovenia and the other two South-Eastern European 
countries: Romania and Bulgaria. It remains to be seen whether Croatia 
will be able to fi nd its way back to its historical roots, which would once 
again make the country more similar to the Central-European region. 
 Romania was in a prosperous period of growth when the global fi nan-
cial crisis occurred—the average rate of growth was above 6 per cent after 
2001. Nevertheless, large imbalances accumulated in the background of 
the spectacular results, exactly as it happened in other countries as well. 
Growth was based mainly on private consumption, which was fi nanced 
by the infl ow of foreign capital. Moreover, this growth was enhanced by 
a pro-cyclical fi scal policy. As a result, current account defi cit reached an 
average 10 per cent between 2004 and 2008, and the government defi cit 
increased to 5.6 per cent by 2008. Investments of the private sector were 
fi nanced mainly from foreign currency loans. Euroisation was high in 
Romania; more than 50 per cent of transactions were euro-denominated, 
which meant that exchange rate devaluation—as a tool applied by eco-
nomic policy—could be used only to a limited extent during the crisis 
(Dăianu and Murgescu  2013 : 14). When the crisis hit the country in 
2008, the infl ow of FDI decreased dramatically. Th is led to such a signifi -
cant external funding gap that Romania had to apply for international 
assistance. In May 2009, an agreement was concluded on the joint fi nan-
cial assistance programme provided by the EU, the World Bank, the EIB 
and the EBRD, amounting to a total EUR 20 billion. In return, Romania 
had to implement an adjustment programme. Romania requested that 
the EU and the IMF launch a precautionary fi nancial assistance pro-
gramme (with a fi nancial framework of approximately EUR fi ve billion 
altogether) as a follow-up to the previous two-year-long programme. In 
2013, it was decided that due to the remaining risks, a third precau-
tionary fi nancial assistance programme was needed until 2015, which 
meant a fi nancial package in the amount of EUR four billion (European 
Commission  2013c : 13,  2013d : 1). 
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 Signifi cant adjustment took place in the Romanian economy, the cur-
rent account defi cit sank below 2 per cent by 2013, and it is expected to 
remain at this level in the coming years. Government defi cit decreased 
to 2.2 per cent, but public debt increased by 25 percentage points 
between 2008 and 2013; however, this debt was still only 37.9 per cent 
of GDP. Due to the depreciation of the lei and the moderate increase in 
wages costs, between 2008 and 2013, REER weakened by 15 per cent, 
enhancing the price competitiveness of the Romanian economy and 
compensating for the pre-crisis appreciation. Between 2008 and 2013, 
the global export market share of Romania increased by 16.4 per cent. 
Romanian exports account for 40 per cent of GDP, which is the low-
est ratio compared to the country’s CEE competitors, and Romania was 
less integrated into the international business network. Th e stock of per 
capita FDI had been increasing dynamically before the crisis, but it was 
only half of the average of the ten CEE NMS in 2012. In the composi-
tion of FDI, there are favourable processes, however. Nearly one-third 
of FDI fl owed into the manufacturing sector—which is the main export 
sector—similar to the Visegrád countries. Fifty per cent of total exports 
are knowledge intensive, which is slightly below the EU weighted average 
(55 per cent); however, it exceeds by far the level of the Baltic countries, 
Bulgaria and Croatia (European Commission  2013d : 10, 29–30; Hunya 
 2013 : 40, 83). Th is ratio is due to the presence of FDI. Th e Romanian 
innovation system is invariably among the most moderate innovators in 
the scoreboard of the EU, and R&D intensity weakened in the midst of 
the crisis-evoked austerity measures. In 2008, R&D spending was 0.58 
per cent, and the input of the business sector was 0.17. In 2012, accord-
ing to the innovation scoreboard of the EU, Romanian R&D expendi-
tures in the public sector were 0.3 per cent, and the comparable fi gure in 
the business sector is 0.12 per cent. Duality of the domestic and foreign 
corporate sector is demonstrated rather well by the fact that the latter 
provides more than 70 per cent of exports. At the same time, micro-
enterprises account for 90 per cent of all companies, and the majority 
of the SME sector is concentrated in low-value-added areas with spe-
cialisation in labour-intensive industries. Productivity in the Romanian 
economy as a whole remains at 60 per cent of the EU average (EC SWD 
 2013f :26–27; European Commission  2013c : 20,  2014c : 83). 
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 Th e competitiveness of the Romanian economy is weakened by the 
problems of the business environment, those of public administration 
and the economic management of state-owned companies. More than 
900 state-owned companies account for 9 per cent of output and 10 per 
cent of employment; their role is considerable in the energy and trans-
port sectors. Among the EU member states and even compared to the 
OECD average, the size of the public enterprise sector is the largest in 
Romania—besides Slovenia (De Rosa et  al.  2009 : 22). Th e diffi  culties 
Romania’s economy must face are well demonstrated by the following 
fi gure: the arrears of state-owned enterprises have been halved due to the 
reform programmes; however, they still accounted for 2 per cent of GDP 
in 2013 (European Commission  2013c :6). Attempts have been made 
towards the appointment of professional management, but the results are 
limited because political considerations often prevail over professional 
ones. Privatisation has been proceeding slowly—often due to the lack 
of interested applicants—and the authorities do not seem very resolute 
in this matter, either. According to the international competitiveness 
rankings, ineffi  cient bureaucracy is one of the major shortcomings in 
the Romanian business environment, and in the period between 2013 
and 2015, improving public administration is still in the centre of the 
structural reforms, which are the pre-conditions of the fi nancial support 
provided by the EU-IMF (European Commission  2013d ,  2014f  ). Th e 
need to improve public administration is also underlined by the fact that 
Romania’s absorption rate was 20.2 per cent at the end of 2012, which 
means that during the seven-year budget period, Romania could absorb 
only one-fi fth of all EU funds (EC SWD  2013f : 3). 
 Th e Romanian banking system was also adversely aff ected by the crisis 
of the wholesale funding and the double-digit loan growth, followed by 
deteriorating asset quality. Th e housing bubble burst in 2009, and the 
annual decrease in housing prices was between 20 and 10 per cent for 
four years. Th e ratio of NPL increased from 2.8 per cent in 2008 to 21.6 
per cent in 2013 (EC SWD  2013f : 39,  2014h : 46). Nevertheless, neither 
the ratio of NPL nor the capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector 
underperforms Romania’s competitors in the region. Within the frame-
work of the fi nancial assistance programmes, measures were elaborated 
to ensure the stability of the banking system (strengthening the Deposit 
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Guarantee Fund and the regulations concerning bank resolution, lim-
iting household and SME loans denominated in foreign currency, and 
regulating the non-banking sector). Eighty per cent of the Romanian 
banking sector was foreign owned, and among these, there are nine core 
banks, the parent banks of which belong to the euro area. In the con-
text of the European Bank Coordination Initiative—also known as the 
“Vienna Initiative”—these parent institutions committed to providing 
capital support and to maintaining their overall exposure to Romania 
in the fi rst phase of the programme. As a result, deleveraging has been 
orderly. However, in the medium term, the Romanian exposure of the 
nine banks has been limited by the parent banks; their exposure shrank 
to 86 per cent in 2013 (if 2009 is taken as the benchmark level), and 
funding provided by the parent banks has decreased as well. Foreign own-
ership of the banking system accounted for almost 90 per cent of total 
assets before the crisis, but by 2012, it sank below 70 per cent (European 
Commission  2013d : 12; EC SWD  2014h : 46). 
 Th e unemployment rate remained around 7 per cent even during the 
crisis, which is a favourable piece of data in itself. However, the employ-
ment rate among those aged 20–64 years was below 64 per cent, which 
is quite low within the EU. Worse performance (by 5 to 10 percentage 
points) was registered only in the case of the Mediterranean economies. 
Young people are in a diffi  cult situation in Romania; youth unemploy-
ment was 23.6 per cent in 2013. Th e lack of integration among the Roma 
population is demonstrated by a very highrate of unemployment (48.6 
per cent). Romania had the highest share of employment in agriculture 
in the EU before the crisis. Th is ratio increased further, reaching 28.6 per 
cent in 2011, which has an unfavourable eff ect on the labour productiv-
ity level of the economy (EC SWD  2013f : 16). In 2011, the Romanian 
government intended to make the labour market more fl exible by modi-
fying the labour code. Nevertheless, only suppressing the shadow econ-
omy would achieve a major breakthrough. Romania has one of the lowest 
ratios of budget revenues relative to GDP in the EU; however, a relatively 
high tax burden is laid on the low- and medium-level incomes. Th is also 
explains why employment statistics represent 9.4 million people, while 
according to the data, 4.3 million people contributed to the social insur-
ance funds in 2012, and 1.2 million of them were employed in the public 
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sector. Th e rapidly ageing population is another especially severe prob-
lem. Romanian experts estimate that the size of the shadow economy 
is approximately 25–30 per cent of GDP (Dăianu and Murgescu  2013 : 
18–19), which is entirely in line with the estimations (28 per cent) made 
by Schneider and Kearney ( 2013 : 4). 
 Th e limited employment possibilities, the huge diff erence in wages 
and free movement within the EU all motivated mainly the younger gen-
eration to go abroad for work. It is not easy to determine the extent of 
the Romanian labour migration, 11 and it is especially diffi  cult to deter-
mine how many of those who took temporary jobs abroad will return. 
According to the national censuses, the population decreased from 21.68 
million to 19.04 million between 2002 and 2012, and emigration plays 
an important role in this reduction. Highly skilled emigrants tend to 
head to the Northern countries, while those with or without vocational 
education usually go to Spain or Italy, where the national languages are 
related to Romanian. Emigration played an important role in the pre- 
crisis wage increase and the consumption-driven growth through the 
decrease of labour supply and remittances. Remittances have decreased 
since the crisis, but their amount still reached 3 per cent of GDP in 2009 
(Mereuta  2013 : 130–133). 
 Budgetary consolidation was accompanied by tough austerity mea-
sures in 2010, such as a 25 per cent reduction in wages in the public sec-
tor, a 15 per cent reduction in all social benefi ts and a freeze in pensions. 
Th e Romanian pension system was already a three-pillar system before 
the crisis; in 2010, the retirement age was elevated to 65 years in the 
case of men and 63 years in the case of women. Th e unpopular measures 
evoked demonstrations, which led to the resignation of the centre-right 
government in 2012. In spite of the series of government crises, in 2011, 
the government pushed through the above-mentioned amendment of the 
labour code and the reform of social dialogue, although the trade unions 
protested. Th e national-level collective agreements were abolished, and 
collective agreements were made primarily on the company level and sec-
ond on the sectoral level. Weakening of the corporatist institutions is 
shown by the fact that although dissatisfaction manifested in political 
protests, the number of strikes and the number of participants in them 
have been declining continuously since 2008; trade union density weak-
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ened to approximately 35 per cent in 2013 (Eurofound  2014 ; European 
Commission  2013c ). 
 Th e performance of the Romanian students improved compared to 
their earlier results, according to the 2012 PISA survey; nevertheless, 
Romania is among the lowest-ranked EU member states (OECD  2013j : 
5). In 2011, an act on education was passed, aiming to improve the qual-
ity of education in the long term on all levels. In order to align the train-
ings with the needs of the labour market, vocational training must be 
developed considerably, and, again, the dual training system is expected 
to solve this problem. Unfortunately, the realisation of the reform mea-
sures is proceeding very slowly (EC SWD  2014h ). Public spending on 
education (4.5 per cent of GDP in 2008) decreased to 4.1 per cent in 
2011, which obviously does not support the accomplishment of the 
reforms (EACEA  2013 : 7). 12 
 Th e poverty-related indicators have not yet reached the level of 2007, 
but due to the austerity measures in 2010, some of the improvement 
achieved after the EU accession has been lost. Romania still has enor-
mous tasks in eradicating poverty; in 2013, 40.4 per cent of the popu-
lation was below the EU 2020 poverty criteria, and 28.5 per cent of 
the population was considered severely materially deprived. If Romania 
succeeds in achieving the expected growth, the modest but continuous 
decrease in the latter category can be maintained. 
 Growth in  Bulgaria was approximately 6 per cent in each year between 
2004 and 2008, which was followed by a 5 per cent decline in 2009—
the lowest among the four South-Eastern European EU member states. 
Since then, the growth rate has been positive in each year, but it shifted 
between 0.7 and 2.0 per cent and is expected to remain in this range in 
the coming years. Impressive growth was accompanied by high current 
account defi cits, which exceeded 25 and 23 per cent in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. In 2009, the defi cit decreased rapidly; between 2014 and 
2016, it is expected to run a surplus of approximately 2 per cent. During 
pre-crisis prosperity, the unemployment rate continuously decreased; it 
was 5.6 per cent in 2008. However, in 2013, it reached 13 per cent. In 
the coming years, an improvement of 1 to 2 percentage points may be 
expected. 
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 As described in Part II, Bulgaria was in a deep crisis in the mid-1990s, 
when the currency board was set up; using the strict monetary policy 
as an anchor for stability, the currency of the lev was fi rst pegged to the 
German mark and then to the euro. 13 Th is monetary system also enforced 
a disciplined fi scal policy. At the deepest point of the crisis, government 
defi cit was 4.2 per cent, decreasing to 1.2 per cent by 2013. In 1997, 
public debt was 97.3 per cent and began to decrease steadily as the result 
of strict fi scal policy and a dynamic increase in GDP, reaching the low-
est value in 2008 at 13.3 per cent. When it elevated again, it increased 
only to 18.3 per cent in 2013 due to the disciplined fi scal policy and 
the fact that the currency board was maintained. Th e currency board 
and the related strict monetary and fi scal policy are considered—by the 
otherwise divided political class—achievements that are worth keeping. 
For this reason, Bulgaria did not have to seek international assistance—as 
Romania did—although there were severe external imbalances. 
 Th e regulation of the banking system was in line with the monetary 
policy. Th e Bulgarian National Bank imposed measures to strengthen 
banking supervision, to create reserves and to decelerate credit growth 
in the decade preceding the crisis. Th ese were also parts of the stand-by 
agreement concluded with the IMF ending in 2007. As the result of the 
crisis, it was not possible in Bulgaria to avoid the deterioration of bank 
assets: the share of NPL was approximately 17 per cent; however, the 
stability of the banking system was not at risk. Foreign-owned banks 
continued their deleveraging process, which resulted in a decline in 
their market share, and at the same time, the share of Bulgarian banks 
increased from 15.7 per cent in 2008 to 27.3 per cent in 2013 (ECFIN 
DG  2014b : 17). In June 2014, confi dence in Bulgaria’s fourth-largest 
domestic bank was suddenly shaken, resulting in a panic and its closure 
by the national bank. Depositors could not withdraw funds from the 
bank for months, and the crisis began to spread to other banks as well. 
Th e stabilisation costs of the banking system also contributed to the 
fact that government defi cit and public debt are expected to increase—
albeit from a low level—in the coming years (European Commission 
 2014a ). 
 Th e pre-crisis economic boom was based on low internal savings and 
the indebtedness of the private sector, which was concentrated in the 
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non-fi nancial corporate sector. Corporate debt increased to a high level 
(124 per cent of GDP in 2010) compared to Bulgaria’s EU peers. At the 
same time, the debt level of the household sector was only 28 per cent 
(ECFIN DG  2012a : 10). Th e newly introduced measures concerning the 
banking system could not prevent the boost of corporate loans because 
most of loans were in the form of cross-border intra-company lending. 
Corporate deleveraging is in process, and housing prices have fallen by 40 
per cent since 2008 (ECFIN DG  2014b : 15). 
 In Bulgaria, state-owned companies do not play as important a role as 
they do in Romania; they remain mainly in the energy and transport sec-
tors. During the crisis, the centre-right government performed large-scale 
privatisation; however, the centre-left government that came to power in 
2013 practically re-nationalised three companies (a chemical company, a 
weapons producer, and an energy company) after buying stakes in them 
(Djankov  2014 ). Public administration has more or less the same weak-
nesses as in Romania, but the country presents a slightly better absorp-
tion capacity: in January 2013 the overall absorption of the seven-year 
EU funds stood at 26.7 per cent (EC SWD  2013b :3). According to 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, both Bulgaria 
and Romania ranked 69th among 177 countries in 2014. 
 Th e current account defi cit was driven fully by the trade balance of 
goods, which was fi nanced largely by exceptionally strong FDI infl ows 
before the crisis. A quick correction of earlier defi cits took place during 
the crisis, and the adjustment came on account of reduced imports and 
the continued growth in exports. Bulgaria’s trade activity (in terms of 
goods and services) relative to GDP is more open than that in Romania 
or in Croatia but more closed than that in Slovenia and in the smaller 
Visegrád countries. FDI also plays a crucial role in modernising Bulgaria’s 
economy, but its composition and amounts have been found greatly vola-
tile over time. At the beginning of the 2000s, a notable portion of FDI was 
absorbed by the manufacturing, transport and communication sectors, 
mainly by the low value-added, resource-intensive segments within the 
manufacturing sector (food industry, textile industry, metals, and chemi-
cals). Before the crisis, the fl ow of FDI shifted towards the real estate and 
fi nancial intermediation sectors, that is, towards the non-tradable sectors, 
and the share of the manufacturing sector decreased to approximately 
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17 per cent. Per capita FDI stock is slightly below the average of the 
post-socialist EU member states. However, due to Bulgaria’s low level of 
GDP, the total inward FDI stock is approximately 95 per cent of GDP—
almost double the average of the above-mentioned countries (ECFIN 
DG  2012a : 7–8; Hunya  2013 : 41, 56). 
 In spite of the unfavourable composition of FDI, the growth rate of 
Bulgarian exports is one of the highest among its regional peers (after the 
decline in 2009), and the global market share of exports increased by 5.7 
per cent in the fi ve years leading up to 2013. Th is process was not hin-
dered by the fact that wage growth before the crisis exceeded the growth 
of productivity, which manifested in the rise of REER and ULC. Wage 
growth did not stop after the crisis, but its rate slowed. Wage growth 
was not fuelled by the wage increase in the public sector, but rather by 
that in the private sector, which was generated by market processes. 
However, the baseline level was so low that the non-cost competitive-
ness factors compensated for the deterioration of cost competitiveness 
and the increase in ULC was more moderate in the tradable sectors. At 
the same time, the growth of exports and the growth of Bulgaria’s export 
market share were facilitated by the fact that raw material (basic met-
als, plastics, rubber, fuels and cereals) prices increased in the 2000s, and 
after the decline in 2009, prices began to increase again in 2010, which 
is an uncertain, cyclical component (ECFIN DG  2013b : 19–21). Th e 
structural problem is expressed rather well by the fact that while high- 
tech and medium-level technological products account for almost half 
of exports in the EU on the average, they account for only one-fourth of 
the exports in case of Bulgaria. Recently, FDI infl ow has tended towards 
the energy sector, including the renewable energy sources, and there are 
recent examples of increased investment activity in the automotive, phar-
maceutical and metal manufacturing industries (ECFIN DG  2014b : 24), 
although it would be premature to say that the tide has turned. It is not 
easy to make changes, and the performance of the Bulgarian innovation 
system is repeatedly ranked last in the EU scoreboards. During the crisis, 
expenditures relative to GDP did not decrease, but slightly increased, 
reaching 0.6 per cent in 2012 (European Commission  2014c : 5, 83). 
 In Bulgaria, the crisis was most painfully manifested in high levels of 
unemployment. Th e unemployment rate increased from 6 per cent to 13 
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per cent, and the employment rate was 64 per cent—exactly the same 
as in Romania. In the background of these fi gures, there are cyclical as 
well as structural processes. As a result of the decline of the construction 
sector, the economy signifi cantly shed low-skilled labour, in which it was 
especially diffi  cult to fi nd employment. Th e unemployment rate of low- 
skilled and young workers was equally above 28 per cent in 2012. In 
spite of national integration programmes, more than half of the Roma 
people are unemployed as a result of their lower education. Th e share of 
the Roma population in the country is estimated at approximately 10 
per cent. Bulgarian labour market data are infl uenced by the presence 
of the shadow economy, the share of which is similar to the Romanian 
fi gure (exceeding it slightly) at approximately 30 per cent of GDP. Th e 
government attempted to combat the shadow economy by introducing 
minimum thresholds for wage and social security contributions, but in 
doing so, it may limit the employment of unskilled or low-skilled peo-
ple (Dzhekova and Williams  2014 : 15; EC SWD  2013b : 8, 16,  2014a ; 
ECFIN DG  2014b : 32). 
 Although the labour market position is more favourable for those who 
are highly qualifi ed, the employment data of graduates show that higher 
education still cannot respond adequately to labour market demands. 
Th e performance of the Bulgarian education system during the crisis is 
indicated by the fact that Bulgaria was found the worst performer of the 
EU member states according to the 2012 PISA survey. Th ere were some 
reform measures aiming to improve quality, especially in higher educa-
tion and teacher training, but no substantive progress has been made. Th e 
quality of vocational education and training also needs to be improved 
(EC SWD  2014a ). Austerity measures during the crisis severely restricted 
the modernisation possibilities of the education system. Public spending 
on education was approximately 4 per cent of GDP before the crisis, but 
even this modest amount decreased to 3.6 per cent in 2011 (EACEA 
 2013 : 7). 
 Finding a job abroad was a way of channelling labour market tension 
in the case of Bulgaria. Employees’ remittances accounted for approxi-
mately 5 per cent of GDP during the years before the crisis—similar to 
Romania. 14 Bulgaria, with its current population of 7.3 million, lost half 
a million of its population during a decade, one-third of which (175,000 
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people) is attributed to international emigration. According to the sta-
tistics of the destination countries, the number of short-term or seasonal 
Bulgarian employees is approximately 300,000–400,000. Return migra-
tion has accelerated since the crisis. According to the 2011 national cen-
sus, almost 200,000 Bulgarians have returned after more than one year 
abroad since 1980. Most emigration therefore appears to be temporary 
(OECD  2013h : 238). Unfortunately, this is not enough to save Bulgaria 
from being one of the most rapidly ageing societies in the EU; moreover, 
according to the estimations of the United Nations, the population will 
shrink at one of the highest rates in the world within the next fi ve decades 
(Onder et al.  2014 ). Bulgaria’s pension system is a three-pillar one, simi-
lar to Romania and Croatia. In 2011, the defi cit of the pension fund 
belonging to the fi rst pillar forced the government to gradually elevate 
the retirement age (65 years for men and 63 years for women) and to 
abolish certain other allowances (EC SWD  2013b ). 
 Th e austerity measures that accompanied the crisis aff ected the pen-
sion system and included freezing the wages in the welfare and the public 
sectors in 2010. Trade unions played a more active part than in Romania 
in the protests against these austerity measures, although trade union 
density was low (approximately 20 per cent). Negotiations had been 
on-going for a long time when, in 2010, an agreement was reached on 
the very slow, prolonged increase of the retirement age. However, due to 
the deteriorating budgetary situation, the government brought forward 
the date of introduction. As a result, two trade unions withdrew from 
the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation and began organising 
national demonstrations. Although in 2012, the criteria for social partner 
organisation representativeness were made more rigorous, the tripartite 
system remained. Th e relationship between the trade unions and the gov-
ernment is still heavy with confl icts. Wage negotiations are performed 
typically at the company level, but the sectoral level remained as well. 
Collective agreements cover 30 per cent of employees (Eurofound  2014 ). 
 In view of the fact that poverty in Bulgaria is even more severe than 
in Romania, the violent social reactions are more easily understandable. 
Social inequalities did not increase during the crisis (Table A.8), but the 
ratio of those who are below the EU’s poverty indicator increased from the 
pre-crisis 44.8 per cent to 48 per cent, and it is even more dramatic that 
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the ratio for the severely materially deprived accounted for 43 per cent 
of the population in 2013. Social expenditures and pensions increased 
slightly in 2013–2014, but the bold growth in public debt questions how 
sustainable these measures are (EC SWD  2014a ). Public trust in politi-
cians is very low—similar to the other CEE countries. In autumn 2014, 
the national election was won by the conservative Boyko Borisov, whose 
previous government was toppled by anti-poverty and anti-corruption 
protests in February 2013, 15 showing that voters cannot fi nd an alterna-
tive that provides stability (Table  8.6 ).
8.4  The Opportunity to Change the Model 
 Part II highlighted the conclusion that the CEE countries represent a 
distinct model of capitalism, even though the diff erences among the 
countries are signifi cant, which also means that they cannot be identi-
fi ed with the Western European models. As seen, Nölke and Vliegenhart 
( 2009 ) and Bohle and Greskovits ( 2012 ) depict the Visegrád countries 
as a distinct model. Th ose who have classifi ed the Baltic countries—or 
within the Baltic countries, Estonia—(for example, Bohle and Greskovits 
 2012 ; Feldmann  2007 ) often describe them as liberal market economies. 
However, my empirical analysis makes it clear that the Baltic institutional 
system does not fi t into the model defi ned as a liberal market economy in 
the VoC literature. A very important element of the liberal market econ-
omy is that capital allocation is performed via the stock market, and its 
innovation system not only is developed but also downright encourages 
radical innovations; none of these is present in case of the Baltic states. 
Furthermore, maintaining general social insurance is not an element of 
the US-based liberal model, either. In the Baltic countries, within the 
expenditures of social protection, means-tested benefi ts account for less 
than 1 per cent of GDP, which is infi nitesimal even if we take the low 
level of total expenditure into account (EC SWD  2014n : 42,  2014u : 
40,  2014f : 38). Among the post-socialist countries, only Slovenia can be 
considered a borderline case because its institutional system was relatively 
close to the North-Western model, specifi cally, to the continental model, 
before the crisis. According to the classifi cation applied by Schweickert 
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et al. ( 2013 ), the CEE member states are handled separately, and they 
constitute two subgroups based on whether the liberal or coordinated 
market economy is characteristic. It expresses rather well that these coun-
tries can be put into a separate group, and within the group, subgroups 
can be created. However, the terms “liberal” and “coordinated” market 
economies are misleading. Th ey are the characteristic features not only of 
the liberal model—see the reference above—but also of the continental 
model. For example, with the exception of Slovenia, in the other coun-
tries, there is no corporative cooperation between employers and employ-
ees, which is an essential feature of the model. 
 Th e common features shared by all CEE member states are important, 
especially when the relationship between the self-regulating market and 
the social forces opposing subordination to market forces is not under 
investigation—as Bohle and Greskovits do ( 2012 ) using a theoretical 
framework built on Polányi—but rather competitiveness and economic 
performance. In this case, an important and common feature of the 
CEE model is the signifi cant role FDI plays in modernisation (the com-
mon features of the individual institutional areas have been discussed 
in 4.6 of Part II). However, it is rather an oversimplifi cation to derive 
the whole institutional system from only one feature, as in Nölke and 
Vliegenhart ( 2009 ). Th e lack of capital and management knowledge, 
adopted European law and weak civil society—all of which are charac-
teristic of the region in question—have had an eff ect on the evolution of 
the group of institutions. Th e important role of FDI was a consequence 
itself, although its presence undoubtedly aff ects the formation of institu-
tions to a certain extent. If, however, these countries were not member 
states of the EU, if civil society were stronger, and if there were more 
knowledge relevant from the aspect of market economy, the eff ect of for-
eign capital on the institutional system would be diff erent, for example, 
in labour relations or in the innovation system. Furthermore, one of the 
most serious issues the countries of this region have to face in terms of 
competitiveness is that foreign corporations have an insular position in 
the economic environment; thus, their presence cannot explain the insti-
tutional system of indigenous economy. 
 Following the crisis in 2008, the question arises of how the processes 
of the crisis infl uenced the CEE model. After the crisis hit the region, 
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the stability of three Visegrád countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia), the dramatic decline in the Baltic states, the serious problems 
of Hungary and the South-Eastern countries all made the impression that 
the CEE countries took a diff erent path to development. However, the 
fast adjustment accomplished by the Baltic countries and the problems 
of growth in the Czech Republic have indicated that we must be careful 
and avoid jumping to conclusions too quickly. 
 Th e detailed survey of the institutional systems in the individual coun-
tries above has shown that the fundamental characteristics of the model 
remained; in fact, in certain areas (labour market, labour relations, and 
social protection), convergence occurred among the countries. 
 It became universally recognised how important the composition of 
FDI and the preference given to tradable sectors were to those small 
open economies that (with the exception of Poland) are considered small 
not only globally but also within the EU. No considerable shift has yet 
occurred among the individual subgroups; the Visegrád countries and 
Slovenia are still characterised by the fact that FDI is centred on the trad-
able sectors, especially in the manufacturing sector (and Romania also 
shows favourable data). Owing to the crisis, it has become necessary to 
initiate privatisation in all those countries in which there are still state- 
owned companies to notable degree and where the budget is in need of 
revenue. Th is process is advancing very slowly and reluctantly in Poland, 
Slovenia and Romania because these governments are rather unwilling 
to give up their remaining state-owned companies. Only Hungary has 
chosen a diff erent path: the government is expanding the sphere of state- 
owned corporations. 
 No breakthrough has occurred in any of the countries in the institu-
tional system of R&D&I, and according to the scoreboard of the EU, 
there have not been signifi cant changes in their position in comparison 
to either the OMS or to each other. Among the countries less aff ected 
by the austerity measures, in the Czech Republic the increasing input 
has not yet had a tangible eff ect on the performance of the innovation 
system, and Poland, which escaped the recession, could not make use of 
its advantageous position. 
 Th e fi nancial system remained bank based, 16 and foreign owners 
retained stability. In Latvia and Slovenia, the restructuring of domestic- 
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owned banks weighed heavily on the budget. As for the future, there 
is an on-going rearrangement within the region, in line with economic 
prospects; in the riskier countries, parent banks are decreasing their expo-
sure. Hungary is again moving along on a diff erent path. In Hungary, 
foreign banks are struck heavily by surtaxes and the cost of foreign cur-
rency mortgage relief schemes; at the same time, the state is strengthening 
the positions of state-owned fi nancial institutions by purchasing foreign 
banks and reorganising savings cooperatives. 
 All countries continued to carry out liberalisation or preserved the 
already strongly liberalised regulation in the labour market as a reaction 
to the problems of employment. As far as labour relations are concerned, 
the role of the trade unions continued to weaken, or in certain cases, it 
remained unchanged. In light of their historical background, it is hardly 
surprising that none of the countries considered sharing the burden of 
the crisis between employers and employees on the basis of the agree-
ment among the social partners. Th e protests, if there were any, were 
directed against the governments in question because the austerity mea-
sures reached the people primarily through the budget: either as public 
servants or via curtailing social services. 
 Social protection has become weaker not only because of the tempo-
rary measures of budgetary consolidation but also because pension sys-
tems were changed due to the increasing costs caused by ageing. Th e 
second pillar of the pension system was either cut off  in many countries 
or nationalised entirely in order to fi ll the holes in the budget. Th e diff er-
ence in social protection among the countries is showing a decreasing ten-
dency. According to the most recent data available (2012), expenditures 
as a percentage of GDP were 14–16.5 per cent in the Baltic countries and 
Romania, 17–19 per cent in Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovakia, 20–22 per 
cent in the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Hungary, and 25.4 per cent in 
Slovenia. (In the meantime, the EU average was 29.5 per cent.) 
 Overall, it can be said that the characteristic features of the model 
remained: modernisation is built on FDI, the innovation system is weak, 
sustaining competitiveness is possible only by a liberalised labour mar-
ket and low social expenditures, and employees are vulnerable. 17 In the 
unfavourable global economic situation, the pace of growth is slower, 
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but in this region—unlike in the Mediterranean countries—convergence 
continues in the majority of the countries. 
 Th e positive eff ect of EU membership on the functionality of the 
model can be observed clearly if we compare Romania and Bulgaria 
(both have a defi nitely more unfavourable historical legacy than that of 
the Visegrád countries) with countries whose attributes were similar at 
the beginning of the socio-economic transformation: the former with 
Moldova and the latter with Macedonia. In the institutional change, the 
non-EU countries gradually fell behind the EU member states, and these 
processes show that the EU conditionality acts as an anchor (Ahrens and 
Zweynert  2012 ). Th e diff erences between the EU member states, the 
acceding countries and the other post-socialist countries concerning the 
institutional system of the market economy appear even more spectacu-
larly in EBRD’s Transition Report of 2013 (EBRD  2013 : 109). 
 Nevertheless, with time, the limitations of the model become increas-
ingly visible. Th e diffi  culties of growth in the case of the Czech Republic 
have been discussed in detail above. In Hungary, the economic transition 
was not accompanied by such a political success as the birth of the sov-
ereign nation state; as it happened in several countries, at the same time, 
the “Goulash communism” of Kádár’s regime focused attention on the 
material well-being to a greater extent than any other country. Because 
the new system was not similar to, for instance, the most coveted social 
market economy of the neighbouring Austria, the resulting disappoint-
ment and discontentedness led to the questioning of the model, and the 
system change is generally regarded as a failure. Th e Orbán government 
has been experimenting with the introduction of a new model since 
2010, in which the state and indigenous capital have a major role. In the 
Baltic countries, emigration acts as a safety valve and canalises discontent 
instead of creating internal political confl icts. 
 During the crisis, a change of approach took place in the EU and 
OECD analyses, contrary to the views described in 2.7 of Part II. Recently, 
the authors of these analyses considered that the convergence potential of 
the model is limited if the export capacity of the companies in the CEE 
countries is closer to the lower end of the value chain. Th e criteria for 
persistent convergence are to move upwards in the global value chain, to 
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strengthen the indigenous growth drivers, to improve the quality of the 
institutions and to develop education and the innovation system. 
 Nevertheless, the restructuring of the institutional system has brought 
up serious dilemmas, as in the Mediterranean countries. Th e duality of 
the FDI impact has already been discussed in 4.7 of Part II, that is, it 
undoubtedly had a modernisation eff ect on these economies, but the 
spillover eff ect has been more limited than expected at the time of the 
transition or compared to the impact hypothesised on the basis of eco-
nomic theory. 18 By the turn of the century, the state’s endeavour to attract 
FDI through targeted economic policy had become widely accepted in 
the CEE countries (Drahokoupil  2009 ). First, it was characteristic of the 
Visegrád countries and Slovenia to apply various incentives to direct for-
eign investments towards the tradable sectors, especially manufacturing; 
currently, the FDI policy of, for example, Estonia, Romania, or Croatia 
also strives to fi nd investments in the sectors with high technological 
levels (Kostevc et al.  2011 ). In Hungary, as early as 2000, the govern-
ment consciously tried to connect the multinational companies and the 
domestic SME sector and to eliminate the dual structure of the economy 
by launching the “Széchenyi plan”. Th e subsidies granted to companies 
not for the purpose of crisis management have considerably exceeded the 
EU average relative to GDP (between 2004 and 2011, it was 2.7 times 
the EU average) ever since, regardless of the political composition of the 
government in power. However, both the performance of the economy 
and the survival of the dual structure show that the subsidies did not 
achieve their objectives. Th e unstable regulatory environment, the high 
market share of the enterprises under the control of the central and local 
governments and the disincentive eff ect of the allowances granted to 
the smaller companies—among others—are all responsible for this fail-
ure (Kállay  2014 : 284, 291–296). Slovakia, which did not apply active 
industrial policy as Hungary did (Duman and Kureková  2012 ), shows 
far better results in economic growth and in catching up with the EU 
average (Table 4.2). Again, we may come to the same conclusion as we 
did in relation to the Mediterranean countries: it is not enough to recog-
nise the problem and to select a device that, in itself, seems relevant and 
appropriate to tackle the problem because, without creating a suitable 
institutional environment, the device in question remains ineff ective. 
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Th e consistently applied Slovakian neoliberal economic policy has been 
more successful than the Hungarian economic policy, which employed 
an ineffi  cient development policy. 
 As a result of the crisis, it has become clear that Slovenia cannot con-
tinue the separate path it had taken. It shows that, for the other countries, 
there is no alternative to combining modernisation built on FDI with the 
development of the indigenous economy and to the related Sisyphean 
institution building. It is exactly this recognition that prevents us from 
entertaining the hope that the Hungarian attempt will succeed, that aims 
to accelerate economic growth by increasing state ownership and creating 
regulations that intervene deeply in market processes. 
 Th e “fi rm-centred” approach of Hall and Soskice ( 2001 )—as elabo-
rated in detail in 2.4 of Part I—has been criticised from the start because 
it did not take the role of the state into consideration when creating the 
model; soon after, it was corrected in VoC literature. Th e analyses of both 
the Mediterranean and the CEE countries have shown that the state has 
a fundamental role not only in running the social services system and 
the educational system but also directly in the performance of the eco-
nomic system. Th erefore, the corrections made so far are not suffi  cient. 19 
Th e operation method of the state must be integrated more organically 
into the models because the professionalism of regulation, the level of 
corruption and other elements of good governance fundamentally aff ect 
and infl uence the operation and the competitiveness of the institutional 
system of economy. 
 Th eoretically, there is a way to produce a gradual and systematic 
transformation of the CEE model into an institutional system in which 
the value-producing ability of domestic economy increases. Th is would 
make it possible to converge to a (more) social market economy, but it 
would be diffi  cult to predict its relatedness to Western European institu-
tional systems due to its lack of corporatist traditions. In the case of the 
three countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) that pulled 
through the crisis relatively well, their success was due to their favourable 
composition of FDI and their geographic position (these countries are 
integrated into the German supply chain), and stable public fi nance 20 
prevented them from accumulating a substantial imbalance prior to the 
crisis and made them more resistant to external shocks. However, as far as 
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the critical issue of the CEE model is concerned (that is, that indigenous 
companies should ascend in the global value chain), these countries could 
not reach a turning point. Th e question remains open: which country is 
able to establish a group of institutions that will achieve a breakthrough? 
 Notes 
  1.  It is diffi  cult to obtain a clear picture of the debt of the private sector 
because, according to Eurostat data (accessed on 14 August 2014), consoli-
dated debt decreased from approximately 80 per cent in 2009 to 60 per 
cent in 2012. According to Eurostat data (accessed on 9 January 2015), it 
decreased from 287 per cent to approximately 207 per cent. 
  2.  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi nance/events/2014/20140221- drivers_of_
growth/index_en.htm , date accessed 05 January 2015. 
  3.  http://www.imd.org/news/2014-World-Competitiveness.cfm , date 
accessed 05 January 2015. 
  4.  No precise data can be obtained about the exact size of the Roma popula-
tion. Th e self-declaration of the national censuses shows only a fragment of 
the actual population. Th e number of this population is estimated to be 
between 150,000 and 300,000, which means 2–3 per cent of the 
population. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/fi les/roma_coun-
try_factsheets_2013/czech_republic_en.pdf ,  http://www.visegrad.info/
minorities-social-exclusion-roma-minority/factsheet/roma-minority-in-
visegrad-countries.html , date accessed 05 January 2015. 
  5.  Directly after the Socialist-Liberal coalition won in 2006, in autumn, at a 
meeting with the Socialist parliamentary fraction Prime Minister, Ferenc 
Gyurcsány, admitted that he had lied during the  campaign, failed to govern 
adequately, and manipulated the statistical data in order to win re-election. 
His speech was recorded, and the tape was leaked, which was followed by a 
series of protests (Tóth et al.  2012 ). Gyurcsány clung to offi  ce until 2009, a 
year after an opposition-called “social referendum” was held in which a 
large majority voted to repeal fees for university tuition and doctor and 
hospital visits in 2008. 
  6.  http://kozfoglalkoztatas.kormany.hu/a-kozfoglalkoztatas-fobb- statisztikai-
adatainak-idosora-2013-tol-havonta , date accessed 10 June 2015. 
  7.  See Csaba ( 2013 ) about the controversial results of the Hungarian transi-
tion and the “derailment” after the EU accession. 
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  8.  As opposed to data indicated by ECFIN DG ( 2014m : 22), EC SWD 
( 2014z : 46) data from 2009 and 2013 are 150.8 and 131.4 per cent, 
respectively. 
  9.  http://www.euractiv.com/sections/elections/political-novice-wins- slovenia-
election-303448 , date accessed 05 January 2015. 
  10.  In connection with Croatia, the referenced literature has never failed to 
emphasise the development of “crony capitalism” in relation to privatisa-
tion. It must be noted that before the crisis, according to the fi ndings of the 
WEF competitiveness report in 2008–2009 (Schwab and Porter  2008 :369), 
in the case of the “Favouritism in decisions of government offi  cials” indica-
tor, Slovenia took the 62nd, Croatia the 86th, Poland the 105th, Czech 
Republic the 110th, Bulgaria the 111th, Hungary the 112th, Romania the 
113th, and Slovakia the 116th ranks. In the report for 2013–2014 (Schwab 
 2013 : 416), Poland took the 65th, Croatia the 112th, Slovenia the 114th, 
Hungary the 116th, Bulgaria the 117th, Czech Republic the 123rd, 
Romania the 137th, and Slovakia the 144th ranks. Because these data origi-
nate from interviews with company managers, which are considered soft 
data, we must interpret them with caution. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
Croatia’s position in building clientele is not as blatant if we compare it 
with the Visegrád countries. 
  11.  According to the 2012 census, the number of people who were abroad for 
more than a year was 727,540, but the Romanian statistics offi  ce itself fi nds 
this fi gure an underestimation. In 2011, 800,000 Romanian people were 
registered in Spain and almost one million in Italy (Mereuta  2013 : 
129–130). According to the Migration Outlook published by the OECD, 
the number of Romanians working abroad was 3.5 million, in contrast to 
the estimation (2.5–2.7 million) made in 2010 (OECD  2010j : 236,  2013h : 
288). 
  12.  Data for 2008 are missing from the European Commission’s series (EC 
SWD  2013f : 42); EC SWD ( 2014h : 50) indicates that public spending on 
education was 3.1 per cent in 2011. 
  13.  Bulgaria followed the same path it had taken in the inter-war period, when 
huge reparations (imposed after WWI) were added to high public debt and 
Bulgaria, in order to be able to handle the situation, insisted on returning 
to pre-war gold standard rules, pursuing strict fi scal policy, and meeting the 
external payment obligations; as a result, it never went bankrupt. Romania 
was on the winning side in the war, received reparations, pursued a protec-
tionist policy and was active in using monetary and fi scal policy—neverthe-
less, it defaulted in 1933 (Nenovsky et al.  2011 ). 
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  14.  Source of data:  http://www.unece.org/fi leadmin/DAM/oes/disc_papers/
ECE_DP_2008-5.pdf , date accessed 12 December 2014. 
  15.  http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/10/bulgarias- 
election , date accessed 12 December 2014. 
  16.  For details on the operation of the fi nancial markets during the crisis in 
Central-East Europe, see the analysis by Kiss and Kosztopulosz ( 2013 ). 
  17.  An analysis of the inequalities of the post-socialist and the old Central 
European member states in terms of competitiveness on the regional level 
is provided by Lengyel and Rechnitzer ( 2013 ). 
  18.  For more recent Eastern European or Hungarian examples, see Sass ( 2011 ), 
Franco and Kozovska ( 2011 ), Antalóczy et al. ( 2011 ). 
  19.  Th is statement also confi rms Szanyi’s ( 2013 ) remark made in connection 
with the “crony capitalism” often mentioned in relation to the CEE 
countries. 
  20.  For details on the development of institutions pursuing disciplined fi scal 
policy in response to the CEE crisis, see Kovács ( 2014 ). 
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 Part IV 
 European Integration of the 
Varieties of Capitalism 
 With the help of the in-depth analyses in Part III, the driving factors of 
the crisis in the 28 EU member states, how the various countries reacted 
to the crisis in terms of institutional changes and the extent to which it 
has altered the models of capitalism have been described. In this Part, 
I attempt to identify, by applying quantitative means, the groups of 
countries showing similar features on the basis of the characteristics that 
proved to be fundamental from the perspective of the driving factors of 
the crisis. Th en, all conclusions drawn from the analyses so far are sum-
marised. Finally, an overview of the consequences these fi ndings entail 
with regard to the European integration is provided. 
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 Th e severity of the crisis in the various countries is most frequently 
measured in the GDP growth rate or as the evolution of per capita 
GDP.  However, the cumulative impact of the crisis is expressed most 
graphically by how the cumulative value of GDP volume changed dur-
ing the fi ve-year period after the beginning of the crisis, compared to the 
GDP for 2008. Th e impact on households is more expressively shown by 
private fi nal consumption data, which are worth measuring in the same 
way. Th e latter have also been infl uenced by the speed of adaptation to 
the eff ects of the crisis (Table  9.1 ).
 I attempted to estimate the relationship between the cumulative losses 
or gains of GDP and the driving factors of the crisis using a regression 
analysis. As described in detail in Part III, the driving factors of the crisis 
appeared in various combinations in the individual countries; thus, it is 
hardly surprising that the regression analysis did not lead to useful results. 
Th erefore, I apply a cluster analysis, which provides interpretable results. 
From the aspect of the driving factors of the crisis—on the basis of what 
has been described in the previous Part—besides GDP losses, the fol-
lowing issues were very signifi cant: the size of the current account defi cit 
when the crisis started, the level of indebtedness in the private and the 
 Classifi cation Based on the Driving 
Factors of the Crisis and the Models 
of Capitalism 
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public sectors, the size and vulnerability of the banking sector, whether 
there was a housing bubble, the openness of the economy in the export 
and import of goods and services, the size of inward FDI stocks as a 
percentage of GDP, the percentage of the gross value added of industry 
and fi nancial services, what productivity was like, and how the REER 
evolved (Table A.10). Th rough a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s 
 Table 9.1  Cumulative losses/gains of GDP and private fi nal consumption between 
2009 and 2013 as a share of 2008 GDP 
 Cumulative losses/gains of GDP 
(2009–2013) compared to 2008, at 
constant prices, as a share of 2008 
GDP 
 Cumulative losses/gains of private fi nal 
consumption (2009–2013) compared to 
2008, at constant prices, as a share of 
2008 private fi nal consumption 
 1  Poland  0.44  1  Poland  0.35 
 2  Sweden  0.12  2  Sweden  0.25 
 3  Malta  0.10  3  Austria  0.16 
 4  Slovakia  0.06  4  Belgium  0.15 
 5  Germany  0.01  5  Germany  0.15 
 6  Belgium  0.00  6  Luxembourg  0.14 
 7  Austria  −0.02  7  Malta  0.10 
 8  France  −0.03  8  France  0.09 
 9  Luxembourg  −0.09  9  Finland  0.06 
 10  Czech Republic  −0.11  10  Czech Republic  0.02 
 11  Cyprus  −0.13  11  Slovakia  −0.04 
 12  Netherlands  −0.13  12  Slovenia  −0.05 
 13  UK  −0.14  13  UK  −0.10 
 14  Portugal  −0.18  14  Italy  −0.13 
 15  Bulgaria  −0.19  15  Denmark  −0.15 
 16  Denmark  −0.20  16  Netherlands  −0.17 
 17  Spain  −0.24  17  Portugal  −0.24 
 18  Finland  −0.26  18  Bulgaria  −0.28 
 19  Italy  −0.26  19  Spain  −0.29 
 20  Romania  −0.26  20  Ireland  −0.31 
 21  Hungary  −0.28  21  Cyprus  −0.37 
 22  Estonia  −0.28  22  Romania  −0.44 
 23  Ireland  −0.30  23  Hungary  −0.46 
 24  Slovenia  −0.39  24  Croatia  −0.47 
 25  Lithuania  −0.43  25  Estonia  −0.61 
 26  Croatia  −0.48  26  Greece  −0.74 
 27  Latvia  −0.67  27  Lithuania  −0.79 
 28  Greece  −0.69  28  Latvia  −0.80 
 Source : Author’s own calculation based on the AMECO database 
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 variance method, the relationships among the countries and the groups 
of countries can be plastically represented in a dendrogram (Fig.  9.1 ). 1 
 I have chosen the division into six from among the potential clusters 
because of its economic explanatory power. Two countries—Luxembourg 
and Ireland—constitute individual, “single-member” clusters on their 
own due to their outlier values, and besides these clusters, the CEE mem-
ber states and the others separate themselves in the fi rst step. Leaving 
the analysis like this would provide us with a very superfi cial picture. 
 Fig. 9.1  Classifi cation of the EU member states according to the driving fac-
tors of the crisis in 2008, using hierarchical cluster analysis.  Source : Author’s 
own calculations 
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However, including more than six clusters would split the groups exces-
sively because of the small number of elements. 
 Th e fi rst cluster can be named “ Stable North-Western Europe ”, and 
Malta joins this cluster from the Mediterranean countries as a result of 
its stable fi nancial system and small GDP losses. It is characteristic of this 
cluster that GDP losses are slightly below average, and with the exception 
of Denmark and Finland, the countries had a positive current account 
and their amount of private debt was above average (except for Germany) 
when the crisis hit them. Th e value added of industry as a percentage of 
GDP is slightly above average, while that of business and fi nancial ser-
vices is average. Th eir labour productivity—with the exception of the two 
outstanding clusters—is the highest. Th eir banking system was extended 
relative to the GDP when the crisis started, but during the crisis, the 
banking system remained stable, the restructuring costs were below aver-
age, there was no housing bubble, and if there was price adjustment, it 
was continuous and balanced. 
 Th e second cluster has been described as “ Unstable Mediterranean ”, 
with France and the UK wedged in as well. Th ese countries had above- 
average GDP losses and current account defi cit and the largest amount 
of debt in the private sector—with the exception of the two outstanding 
clusters—when the crisis began. Between 2008 and 2011, the decline in 
the real estate market was not as dramatic as in case of the cluster of the 
Estern and South-Eastern countries. However, this was attributable to 
the fact that in the Mediterranean countries, the crisis escalated later than 
in the previously mentioned cluster. Public debt in 2008 was the highest 
in this cluster, but the standard deviation exceeded that of the EU-28. 
In this cluster, the inward FDI as a percentage of GDP is the lowest, the 
added value of industry is the lowest, but the added value of services is 
above average, while productivity is slightly above average. Th e relatively 
large banking sector carried above-average restructuring costs. Although 
France had below-average GDP losses and low bank restructuring costs, 
it is not in the fi rst cluster because its economy is less open and because 
the industry’s share in GDP is small. Th e GDP losses of the UK are about 
average, but its cost of bank restructuring is above average and—similar 
to France—the industry’s share in the GDP is small; therefore, the UK 
cannot be placed in the fi rst cluster. 
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 Th e third cluster is related to the OMS and contains only Ireland, 
bearing the name “ Victim of the banking system ”. Th e country’s indicators 
in 2008 show smaller imbalances, but nevertheless, it would fi t into the 
countries of “Stable North-Western Europe”; however, the collapse of the 
real estate market and the crash of the banking sector, not to mention its 
huge restructuring costs, make Ireland an outstanding case. 
 Th e fourth cluster, “ Stable East Central Europe ”, contains the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Poland. Th e cluster average of GDP shows gains, 
and as seen in Table  9.1 , even “the weakest link”, the Czech Republic, 
has below-average losses. Th e diff erence between these countries and the 
other countries in the region can be found in these countries’ better indi-
cators of external and internal balance in 2008 and in their strong indus-
trial performance. In the EU, these countries had the smallest banking 
sectors relative to GDP, and they did not spend money on them. Th eir 
balance could not even be disturbed by the fact that during the three 
years before the crisis, the appreciation of the REER was the greatest 
because it took place on a low level. 
 Th e fi fth cluster, “ Unstable Eastern and South-Eastern Europe ”, con-
tains the remaining countries of the region: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Th is group of coun-
tries suff ered the greatest GDP losses during the crisis and the greatest 
drop in real estate prices—apart from Ireland. Th e presence of FDI is 
approximately the same size as in the previous cluster, but the perfor-
mance of industry is less signifi cant and services have a greater role in 
trade. Labour productivity is the lowest in this cluster. Th e relatively 
small banking system in this cluster caused minimal restructuring costs. 
At the same time, we must note here that the Slovenian restructuring 
costs soared in 2013; however, these data were not included in the most 
recently available EU data source. Although Hungary’s real economic 
features are similar to those of the previous cluster, Hungary is included 
in this cluster because its fi nancial imbalance had already accumulated 
before the crisis. 
 Th e sixth cluster is Luxembourg, the “ Lucky off shore fi nancial haven ”, 
with all its indicators refl ecting that the services are dominant both in 
the structure of economy and in foreign trade. Although the amount of 
private debt was high and the fi nancial sector was huge when the crisis 
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hit the country, it pulled through the fi ve years that followed 2008 with 
below-average GDP losses and with restructuring costs just slightly above 
the average. 
 Th e amount of GDP losses the countries accumulated during the 
crisis did not follow the grouping of the countries according to capi-
talist models. If we take into account the 2008 indicators considered 
relevant in terms of the driving factors of the crisis, the resulting groups 
of countries are more similar to the models of capitalism identifi ed on the 
basis of institutional characteristics. Th e Nordic and the North-Western 
countries are mingled, but the Mediterranean countries remained in one 
cluster—with the above-described inclusion of France and the UK. Th e 
Eastern and Central Eastern countries constitute one group, as seen on 
the dendrogram, and the subgroups are within themselves. Th e diff er-
ences between the two categorisations draw attention to two correlations. 
 On the one hand, it can be seen that the size of the economy mat-
ters because it can determine the country’s vulnerability. Denmark has 
favourable institutional features characteristic of the Nordic countries, 
and only the amount of private debt was high among the crisis param-
eters; nevertheless, it suff ered substantial losses. In the case of Finland—
which experienced a minor decline, but it is invariably on top of the 
international competitiveness ranking—losing the pull factor of Nokia 
and the diffi  culties of the electronics sector were enough to account for 
losses that were similar in size to those of the Spanish and Italian econo-
mies. At the same time, France, which struggled with problems in terms 
of competitiveness, was able to decrease its losses due to its huge internal 
market. Th e fi rst place of Poland in the ranking of gains and losses also 
confi rms the benefi cial eff ect of the greater internal market. In the case 
of the smaller countries—as we have seen, in Luxembourg, Cyprus, and 
Malta—one single factor, the diff erent regulation of the fi nancial sector, 
landed them in very diff erent situations. 
 On the other hand, the economic structure and the size of the tradable 
sectors—especially where, due to its size, a country was more open—had 
a role in determining vulnerability during the crisis. Th e main benefi cia-
ries of the relatively greater tradable sector were those Central European 
countries that were built on the German economy—which was capable 
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of growing outside Europe. Overall, the more balanced distribution of 
the industrial and service activities has alleviated vulnerability. 
 Finally, it is noteworthy that the characteristics of the driving factors 
of the crisis did not determine the long-term development prospects of 
the economies; for example, in “Unstable Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe”, the Baltic countries are showing quick and dynamic adaptation, 
while the improvement of the others is much slower. 
 Note 
 1.  Hair et al. ( 1998 ) provide a detailed description on the methods of cluster 
analysis. 
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 In the previous part, the models of capitalism are constructed in terms 
of the member states of the EU on the basis of empirical analysis, and 
an overview of the institutional changes that occurred during the crisis 
in 2008 is given. Now, it is time to summarise the lessons worth learn-
ing and to draw conclusions that have relevance, on the one hand, to the 
comparative studies on the institutional systems and, on the other hand, 
to the overall European integration. 
 Th e  most important message this study conveys is that all EU member 
states can be analysed within a single theoretical framework. Th ere is no 
theoretically well-grounded reason why the post-socialist member states 
should be treated separately from the others. As it demonstrated by the 
empirical analysis in Part II, on the one hand, these countries constitute 
a new, distinct model, and, on the other hand, this model can be com-
pared to the other models within one classifi cation system. Th is fi nding 
is confi rmed by the above-referenced Transition Report of EBRD ( 2013 ) 
and the study made by the IMF on the 25 years of transition ( 2014 ). Th e 
report made by the EBRD measures the extent to which economic insti-
tutions are able to meet the international standards of an industrialised 
market economy. Th e IMF study ( 2014 ) shows a cluster analysis based on 
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a few indicators on the basis of data from 1998–2000 and on data from 
2011–2013. Both studies have revealed that the member states of the EU 
broke away from the other post-socialist countries and that, on the basis 
of their institutional systems, they belong to the fully functioning mar-
ket economies. Furthermore, from the detailed assessment performed by 
EBRD, it can be seen that the countries with the prospect of EU mem-
bership were also able to enact deeper changes. It is especially important 
to emphasise this because the unsolved theoretical problems of the tra-
ditional, divided VoC literature, which studies the developed and post- 
socialist countries separately, may promote invariable categorisations and 
comparisons of the post-socialist economies. Drahokoupil and Myant 
( 2015 ) make a distinction between the countries of the post-socialist 
region on the basis of the ways they integrated into the global economy. 
Th ey also add that this is not a comprehensive theoretical framework; 
they aim to account for these countries’ diff erent economic performance. 
Whether desired or not, these authors maintain the conception that CEE 
member states still constitute a “separate world” within the EU. 
 Th is separation cannot be sustained because of the diff erentiation of 
the post-socialist region and because, during the crisis, it became evi-
dent that there are at least as deep institutional diff erences between the 
North-Western and the Mediterranean countries as between the North- 
Western and the CEE countries. Th e institutional defi ciencies of the 
Mediterranean countries remained hidden by a favourable period of 
economic growth that coincided with the introduction of the euro. Th e 
category of the “mixed market economy”, which was, according to the 
dual categorisation of Hall and Soskice, considered the category for the 
Mediterranean countries, has never been a subject of thorough scrutiny 
in VoC literature, which also contributed to the fact that this issue has 
not been brought into the limelight yet. 
 In order to be able to interpret the economic performance of the 
various groups of institutions and to assess their long-term prospects in 
terms of competitiveness, the role of the state must be integrated not 
only because of the CEE countries but also because of the Mediterranean 
countries. As seen in Chap.  2 , Soskice ( 2007 ) fi nds it necessary to relate 
the welfare functions of the state to the investigation of the production 
systems. Th e development of both the Mediterranean and CEE countries 
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has shown clearly that this solution is not suffi  cient. Th e regulatory func-
tions of the state and the quality of the business environment—which 
is determined by these functions—contribute to the diff erences among 
the models to an extent that cannot be ignored. 1 I remove those indica-
tors from the WEF GCI that pertain to the professional, eff ective, fair, 
and transparent legislative and regulatory activity of the state or pub-
lic administration. Th ese indicators are all soft data without exception, 2 
but—in spite of this limitation—it can defi nitely be seen that diff erent 
states or public administrations with diff erent quality functioning relate 
to the diff erent models of capitalism (Table  10.1 ). Th e diff erence between 
the Nordic and North-Western groups of countries is small (even if the 
English-speaking countries were treated separately, it would not change 
the picture), and similarly, the average of the rankings of the Southern 
European and the CEE groups of countries is similar. Even the two island 
countries—formerly under British rule—perform signifi cantly better 
than the larger Mediterranean countries. Estonia, with its high rankings, 
has been excluded from the average of the CEE countries because it biases 
the group average.
 Th e divide is striking between the Nordic, North-Western countries 
and the Southern, CEE countries regarding the quality of the state’s eco-
nomic regulation. Th e gap is also markedly evident in how developed the 
innovation systems are (Fig. 3.2). During the crisis, a divergence could 
be observed explicitly in the performance of the innovation systems, and 
it only in 2014 did the innovation report give an account of the halt and 
the reversal of divergence (European Commission  2014c ). Pelle and Végh 
( 2014 ) choose indicators from the WEF GCI that express the R&D&I 
readiness of the innovation system and carry out a cluster analysis con-
fi rming the existence of the divide between the Nordic, North-Western 
countries and the Southern, CEE countries. 3 
 Another common feature of the Southern and the CEE countries is 
that both regions have to rely on foreign capital for modernisation. Th e 
diff erence between the two regions is that, in the CEE countries, the most 
important form of foreign capital was FDI, and foreign capital fl owed in 
the Mediterranean countries in portfolios and other forms, as described 
in Chap.  4 . Both regions have experienced the substantial effi  ciency gap 
between the operations of enterprises taking part in foreign trade and 
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those not taking part in foreign trade, between the multinational com-
panies and the SME sector, which indicates the problem of economic 
duality. Szerb et al. ( 2013 ) formulate the Regional Entrepreneurship and 
Development Index, which assesses the entrepreneurial attitudes and 
their regional and institutional contexts. Th e European Commission 
used this index in their 6th Cohesion Report. Th e separate positions of 
the Nordic and North-Western countries can be observed here as well. 
If only individual attitudes are taken into account, the Mediterranean 
countries show a more favourable picture. 4 
 It follows from the above that the similar features shared by the 
Mediterranean and CEE countries can be observed precisely in those 
areas (innovation system, the quality of the regulation of the business 
environment, the structure of the corporate sector, and the level of devel-
opment of the SME sector) of utmost importance from the viewpoint of 
competitiveness and long-term economic growth. Consequently,  the sec-
ond important lesson to learn from this study is that the comparison of OMS 
and NMS has become out-dated , as deeper institutional diff erences can 
be revealed between the Nordic, North-Western (English-speaking and 
continental) countries and the Southern (Mediterranean), CEE countries 
than in the former division. 
 Further investigation may reveal a number of underlying long-term 
cultural and political factors (the role of corruption, the relationship 
between citizen and state, the strength of public institutions, rule of law, 
social dialogue, and so on) that have an important impact on North- 
Western and South-Eastern division and on the prospects of economic 
convergence, but this investigation goes beyond the scope of this study. 
 Soon after the crises in 1929–1933 and in 1973, economic policy 
changes were accompanied and/or followed by a new economic para-
digm. We have not seen a similar change since the 2008 global crisis; the 
short-lived budgetary incentives in 2009 and monetary easing do not add 
up to a Keynesian renaissance, for example. Th e changes in economic 
policy on the product and labour market—or, at least, their intentions—
all point in the direction of liberalisation. Strengthening competition in 
the network industries is continuously on the agenda throughout the EU 
(therefore, it was not even mentioned when the countries were described 
individually). Only those cases in which there is a conspicuous diff erence 
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in the intensity of competition between the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors (in certain Nordic, continental, and Mediterranean countries) 
have been noted. In countries where there is considerable amount of 
state property to be privatised (some post-socialist countries, Greece, 
and Cyprus), privatisation is occurring, albeit quite reluctantly. Only 
Hungary is trying to reverse this process, increasing state property in the 
banking sector, primarily in the energy sector and in other public utility 
services. 
 Th e problems of the fi nancial system have shown that both extreme 
deregulation and politically infl uenced state ownership are able to under-
mine the stability of banks. Th e crisis in 2008 confi rms that market 
competition and strong state regulation are not incongruous—on the 
contrary, they are interdependent. 
 Labour market liberalisation is another common tendency. Wherever 
changes were implemented during the years of the crisis, the main objec-
tive was to increase the fl exibility of the labour market. Th e segmented 
labour market and the fact that diff erent employment protection was 
applied for employees with open-ended and fi xed-term contracts called 
for reforms, primarily in the Mediterranean, the continental, and some 
of the CEE countries. As a result of the crisis, in response to increas-
ing unemployment, in educational systems across Europe, attention was 
focused on meeting the demands of the labour market and on vocational 
education; the introduction or the strengthening of the dual training was 
generally accepted as the only solution. 
 In the fi eld of labour relations, the reduction of trade union density 
continued during the crisis throughout the EU, and a general tendency 
was the decentralisation of collective wage negotiations towards the cor-
porate level. Nevertheless, social partnership is still invariably strong 
in the Nordic and—with the exception of the UK and France—in the 
North-Western countries. In the Mediterranean countries, cooperation 
between employers and employees remained problematic, burdened 
heavily by confl icts, except in the two small island countries. Because, 
with the exception of Italy, restructuring—as a result of the crisis—took 
place with external help, it was no question that, ultimately, trade unions 
had to give in. Th e programmes of economic and social policy were not 
based on social consensus in any case—if there had been consensus, a new 
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chapter would probably have been opened in social partnership. Th us, it 
seems conceivable that the economic constraints will bring the role of the 
trade unions closer to those of the CEE countries in the long run. In the 
CEE countries, labour relations have remained similar to those before the 
crisis; that is, employees are vulnerable and trade unions are weak, and 
in the South-Eastern European countries, where trade unions previously 
showed greater activity, the reduction of trade union density has made 
them more similar to the Visegrád countries. 
 Common features can also be found in social protection during the cri-
sis; on the one hand, budgetary consolidation led more or less to austerity 
measures in welfare provision, and, on the other hand, due to the ageing 
of society, pension systems were aff ected throughout Europe. Th e position 
of the groups of countries and the models relative to one another has not 
changed much in terms of social protection. In case of the expenditures 
on social protection, GDP—the reference value for comparison—has 
shrunk, increasing in relative proportion in the Mediterranean coun-
tries: between 26–31 per cent of GDP in the four larger Mediterranean 
countries in 2012. Due to the large proportion of pensions, their slow 
changeability and the consequences of unemployment, these expendi-
tures cannot be decreased easily in the short term. It cannot be predicted 
whether, in the long run, the Mediterranean countries will be able to 
preserve their position, which makes them more similar to the Nordic 
and North-Western countries than to the CEE countries in terms of the 
development level of the systems of social protection. As the crisis nears 
its end, the CEE countries have begun to return to the pre-crisis propor-
tions in their social expenditures; that is, they are lagging far behind the 
OMS and constitute two subgroups. One subgroup consists of the Baltic 
countries and Romania, which spend at the level of GDP, that is, half 
of the EU average, while Bulgaria, the Visegrád countries, Croatia, and 
Slovenia constitute the other subgroup, spending a few percentage points 
more. Th is is the only fi eld in which there is a divide between the OMS 
and NMS. 
 Th e individual fi elds of social protection have not been scrutinised in 
detail because it would be well outside the scope of this book, although 
the contribution of the quality of, for example, the health care system to 
competitiveness is hardly disputable. In two cases, the Netherlands and 
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Slovakia, unsuccessful marketisation attempts have already been men-
tioned, providing very important lessons in terms of these institutions. 
On the one hand, the introduction of marketisation can be successful 
only if it takes place in each element of the system in question. On the 
other hand, it would be a mistake to assume that there is a solution that 
does not use the substantial proportion of revenues when we want to 
maintain the relatively (for example, compared to the USA) low level of 
social inequality. 
 During the crisis, the factor that has infl uenced the development of 
the individual countries since the 1990s was given special emphasis. It 
is equally true for France, Italy, Hungary, Greece, and Slovenia that eco-
nomically unrealistic expectations and an unrealistic overview of the situ-
ation widely distributed throughout society (continually strengthened by 
part or the whole of the political elite) stand in the background of their 
poor economic performance (which persistently lags behind their real 
economic background) or of the sudden decline during the crisis. 
 In summing up the changes during the crisis,  we approach the third 
fi nding of this study. Th e changes took place gradually throughout Europe 
by layering ,  but the context of such layering shows signifi cant diff erences in 
the various models . Th e Nordic and continental countries continue the 
wire-dancing they have been performing since the 1990s, trying to fi nd 
a balance between the liberalisation of the product and labour markets, 
holding the fort in global competition and maintaining the protection 
of the welfare system and social partnership; that is, their institutional 
systems are moving along the path of hybridisation. For the English- 
speaking countries, the imperative to regulate their fi nancial sectors has 
meant a retreat from the liberalisation and deregulation concepts of the 
1980s and 1990s. In the case of the Mediterranean countries, it is too 
early to see if the measures introduced as preconditions of the rescue 
packages have persistent eff ects and whether they will be able to formu-
late more effi  cient hybrid solutions than those before the crisis. In the 
CEE countries in which there were changes, these changes occurred by 
deepening the logic and characteristic features of the model (liberalisa-
tion on the product and the labour markets, integration in the global 
value chain through FDI, and maintaining competitiveness through 
keeping the social protection expenditures at a low level); thus, we can-
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not speak about hybridisation, with the exception of the separate path 
taken by Hungary. 
 Th e extent of the GDP losses occurring during the crisis—as we have 
seen—did not fi t into the models of capitalism. Drahokoupil and Myant 
( 2015 ) point out that the VoC approach is criticised because it cannot 
provide an explanation for the diff erent economic performance in the case 
of the post-socialist countries. Th e question may be put more generally: 
what is the institutional analysis suitable for, and what might it add to 
our understanding of the economic phenomena? If we compare the pre- 
crisis and the post-crisis periods,  a fourth lesson can be concluded from this 
study, namely, that an overview of institutions may help us understand 
long-term economic performance and opportunities for development. 
When the macroeconomic processes still yielded very impressive results, 
the institutional analysis of the Mediterranean countries indicated that 
their economic institutions remained weak. When macroeconomic indi-
cators still promised unlimited opportunities for convergence in the CEE 
countries, the scrutiny of the institutional factors drew attention to the 
constraints. Th ese correlations have been expressly revealed by the empir-
ical analysis performed with pre-crisis data in Part II. Undoubtedly, insti-
tutional analysis has its own limitations as well because the scope of the 
examined institutions must be drawn somewhere; thus, simplifi cation is 
inevitable. Economic performance is evidently infl uenced by several non- 
institutional eff ects, for example, the size of the economy, demographical, 
geopolitical, and climatic conditions, and so on. From the driving factors 
of the crisis, it seems that in the short-term, the signifi cance of the indi-
vidual, non-institutional eff ects increases, but sometimes, already in the 
medium term, it can be seen that the infl uence of the institutional system 
on the performance of the economies becomes stronger. Th e Baltic coun-
tries, thanks to their fl exible institutional system, began to grow quickly 
after their deep decline; although France did not slip into massive GDP 
losses, due to the institutional problems described in Chap.  6 , it was not 
able to make its economy more dynamic by 2014. 
 Considering the above, I summarise what can be concluded about the 
development opportunities of the EU models of capitalism. Th e Nordic 
model can be maintained only if the higher level of social protection 
is coupled with intensive competition, an effi  cient innovation system, 
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a fl exible labour market, and the institutionalisation of budgetary dis-
cipline, which has been implemented in Sweden in the most consistent 
way. If the North-Western continental countries want to maintain and/or 
strengthen their competitiveness and/preserve as much as possible from 
the provision of welfare benefi ts, they must also opt for this institutional 
combination. To do so, the institutional structure and the philosophy of 
their welfare system may remain persistently diff erent. Indeed, since the 
1990s, we have seen such institutional changes in the continental coun-
tries, to various depths, with variable consistency and with varied out-
comes. If the North-Western continental countries’ development proves 
to be successful, presumably, it will be accompanied by further institu-
tional convergence. Only the position of France is dubious. If France 
does not introduce reforms on the basis of social consensus, it may drift 
towards the Mediterranean model. 
 Apart from certain regions in Northern Italy or in Spain, it is not 
realistic to assume that Mediterranean countries will follow the group of 
institutions characteristic of the Nordic or North-Western continental 
countries. Mediterranean countries’ educational and innovation system, 
their SME sector and the performance of their public administrations do 
not provide enough basis for this shift. In order to achieve persistent sta-
bility, these countries, similar to the Visegrád countries—with all advan-
tages and disadvantages of this path—need institutional changes through 
which the tradable sectors become stronger through FDI and integrated 
into the global value chain more deeply and disciplined budgetary policy 
becomes institutionalised. In other words, the Mediterranean model may 
converge with the CEE model. It is questionable, though, whether it is 
still reasonable to speak of the Mediterranean model as such after this 
kind of change. 
 For the less developed CEE countries, the current model also provides 
an opportunity for further convergence. Th e Czech Republic reached the 
limits of the model. On the basis of its institutional system, Estonia is 
the fi rst country to be able to change its model, but it seems that the 
unfavourable circumstances (the decline in Finland and the consequences 
of the Russian-Ukrainian confl ict) are holding back the development of 
this small economy. Th e stable Visegrád countries should surpass exactly 
those institutional weaknesses that have been indicated in the previ-
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ous section in connection with the Mediterranean countries. Even if 
this breakthrough succeeded, it would not necessarily mean that these 
countries would be identifi ed with one of the Western European models 
because the tradition of corporatist cooperation between employers and 
employees is missing. 
 Notes 
  1.  It can also be concluded that by ignoring the performance of public 
administration, the theoretical framework of the VoC can be suitable 
for investigating only the Nordic countries and the North-Western 
countries. 
  2.  Th e signifi cance of subjective judgement is shown by the fact that the 
Czech Republic has jumped from 53rd place (2013–2014) to seventh 
place (2014–2015) in terms of out-of-control government spending, 
which expresses hope rather than reality one year after the change of 
government. 
  3.  Pelle ( 2015 ) demonstrates that the current R&D&I policy at the EU 
level does not help decrease the R&D&I diff erences between the 
North-West and the South-East. 
  4.  Th e less entrepreneur-friendly spirit of residents in the Eastern prov-
inces of Germany illuminates why convergence within Germany 
slowed down (EC 2014: 27–28). 
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 Th e diversity of the institutional systems, as revealed in the previous 
chapters, presents a major challenge for European economic integration. 
Th is chapter describes this challenge and its consequences. Obviously, 
this diversity is not the only challenge European integration must face. 
Th ere are several challenges from outside the economy (environmental 
issues, climate change, the energy supply, migratory pressure, demo-
graphic problems, and so on) and from the globalised world economy 
(the non-decreasing backwardness in competitiveness compared to the 
USA and increasingly intense competition with the emerging countries), 
which all jeopardise the maintenance of the welfare model, 1 which model 
is generally known as the European social market economy. Nevertheless, 
the discussion of all these details is well outside the scope of this book. 
Th is chapter is dedicated to those aspects that result from the main topic 
of this book, that is, the study of the various models of European market 
economies and their coexistence. 
 Models of Capitalism and the Future 
of the European Integration 
bfarkas@eco.u-szeged.hu
11.1  Worsening Convergence Prospects 
 Th e issues analysed in the institutional system and the institutional divide 
between the Nordic and North-Western countries and the Southern, CEE 
countries have all indicated the limitations of the income convergence 
among the member states. In the previous Parts, I take into account the 
results of mainstream economics, which will not change. Th e European 
Commission prepares a report every three years about the expected long- 
term economic impacts of ageing societies, published under the title of 
the Ageing Report. In this report, they forecast the evolution of potential 
GDP. Th e working group of the Committee builds the model on the neo-
classic growth model and uses the production function in its econometric 
model. Th e report in 2009 (European Commission  2009a ) did not calcu-
late the eff ects of the crisis; nevertheless, a continuously worsening poten-
tial GDP growth rate has been projected for the entire EU until 2060. In 
post-socialist countries, the reduction of the growth rate seemed greater 
than in the entire EU, as triggered in the model by the expectedly greater 
decrease in the population. Naturally, it must always be added that the 
model does not take the future institutional and political changes into 
account. Th e report for 2012, which was published in 2011, built in only 
partially those eff ects of the crisis that are deteriorating the growth poten-
tial; nevertheless, the data show the further worsening of the prospects for 
convergence. It is remarkable that in the case of the model for 50 years, 
the report for 2012 calculates the convergence in the labour productivity 
growth rate instead of the convergence in productivity levels. In a foot-
note, an explanation is provided, namely, that to achieve the latter, a huge 
growth rate should have been assumed for the short- and medium-terms, 
which was not plausible (European Commission  2011b : 126). Halmai 
and Vásáry ( 2012 : 319) calculate the expected per capita potential output 
at PPP in the various countries based on the model of the Ageing Report; 
the result of this was that 80 per cent of the EU-27 average would be 
achieved or exceeded only by the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia 
in 2060 among the post-socialist countries, and this result is already a 
reality in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Th e Mediterranean countries 
would also sink under the EU average. Th e report made by the EBRD 
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( 2013 : 17) does not depict a more exhilarating picture, either. Th eir fore-
cast until 2035 projects the decreasing growth rate of total factor produc-
tivity. Labour productivity measured in GDP per worker relative to the 
EU-15 will remain between 60–80 per cent in 20 years’ time; only the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia will exceed 80 per cent. Th e report made by 
the IMF ( 2014 ) also draws our attention to the fact that the convergence 
of the post-socialist countries has been decelerating since the crisis. 2 All 
studies and reports have regarded the re-launching and accelerating of 
structural reforms as the potential way out. 
 Th e problem that has arisen within the EU is similar to that coined 
as the middle-income trap in literature, that is, that certain countries 
become stuck at a certain level of development. According to the World 
Bank’s ranking, only Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary do not belong 
to the high-income countries among the EU member states (the latter 
slipped from the high-income countries to the middle-income countries 
in 2009), but processes and tensions within the EU are not determined 
by which global economic income group the countries belong to but 
rather by the income inequalities within the EU or, alternatively, within 
the convergence club. As discussed above, recently the analysts of the EU 
and the OECD have found that in order to continue the convergence 
in the CEE countries, it is inevitable to climb higher in the global value 
chain, as noted by Eichengreen et al. ( 2013 ), who regards this process 
as a remedy for the middle-income trap. Although this remedy in itself 
requires a very complicated adaptation process—as also noted above—an 
increasing number of fi ndings of recent research indicate further diffi  cul-
ties. Based on her empirical survey and other data from the literature, 
Szalavetz ( 2014 ) points out that, on several occasions, the functional 
upgrading of subsidiaries of multinational companies did not result in 
capturing more value. Because it has become general in the emerging 
countries to move higher in the value chain, the increasing number of 
competitors puts pressure on the costs, but the asymmetric power rela-
tionships also make it diffi  cult for the peripheral actors to reap the benefi ts 
of their upgrading results (for example, the suppliers’ margins are often 
determined by the parent company). Sometimes, the parent company 
off shores high-value-added activities, but the newly available resources 
are directed to even more complex and knowledge-intensive activities; 
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thus, the proportion of the relative share of value does not change even if 
the distribution is fair. Functional upgrading usually results in obtaining 
higher added value in the case of an indigenous enterprise rather than in 
the case of a subsidiary of a multinational corporation. Th ese experiences 
are in line with the concept we discuss in Chap. 4, that is, in order to 
continue convergence, it is not possible to give up developing an interna-
tionally competitive domestic economy. 
 Everything we have learned about the development and transition of 
the institutions and the groups of institutions anticipates that, although 
the countries are not pre-determined to fail, to overcome path depen-
dency, it is extremely unlikely that all less developed member states of 
the EU will be able to embark on a development path that enables them 
to avoid getting stuck at a lower level of development. Th erefore, institu-
tional analysts are deeply dissatisfi ed with the generally applied approach 
in which the diffi  culties of convergence are presented, the reforms are 
encouraged and the related tasks are listed. If we think about the sustain-
able future of European integration, we must not forget the question of 
how the European integration can operate in the long term with coun-
tries at various levels of development. Th is issue should be refl ected in the 
economic governance debate at the EU level. 
11.2  The Future of the European Integration 
in Limited Convergence Prospects 
 In order to understand this problem, it is worth investigating fi rst why 
it is so important to maintain convergence in European integration. Th e 
most obvious answer is that this convergence has always been included in 
the main objectives of the European integration from the Treaty of Rome 
to the Treaties currently in force. Article 3 of the consolidated version of 
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) proclaims that “Th e Union 
shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level 
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment … It 
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shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity 
among Member States”. Th e Preamble of the TEU is expressly about 
economic convergence, and Article 121 of the Consolidated version of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU is about “sustained convergence 
of the economic performances of the Member States”. In less developed 
countries, economic convergence is the most attractive opportunity 
off ered by the EU, and it serves as a basis for social acceptance. 
 Convergence is included in the integration not only at the level of 
legal and political objectives. Th eories interpreting the economic eff ects 
of the integration (from the earliest customs union theories to the trade 
and common market theories, including the free movement of factors) 
are equilibrium theories with their roots in neoclassical economic theory, 
and the latter theories assume the international equalisation of factor 
costs and factor prices. In the economics of the European integration, 
the long-term growth eff ects of integration are represented with the help 
of the framework of neoclassical or endogenous growth theories, which 
include the idea of (conditional or absolute) convergence. 3 
 When the monetary union was established, the issue of convergence 
particularly became the focus of attention, and at the same time, it was 
placed into a broader context. Th ere was general agreement that the main-
tenance of the monetary union requires real and nominal convergence. 
Th e discussion was about how this status can be achieved. Th e starting 
point for the negotiations was the report made by the Delors Committee, 
which took the view that the monetary policy, the fi scal policy and the 
structural reforms of the real economy should be closely related and 
that economic and monetary integration should progress concurrently. 
Th e committee’s assumption was that, if a government deviated from 
the commonly agreed budgetary guidelines or wage settlements, market 
forces would exert a disciplinary infl uence, but this infl uence might be 
either too slow or too sudden. Th erefore, the Community would con-
stitute a framework for the coordination of national economic policies. 
Th e Delors Committee clearly recognised the signifi cance of institu-
tional diversity, but it assumed that the risks and adverse eff ects of the 
EMU could be prevented by community-level, pre-designed institutions 
(Delors Committee  1989 ). Th is thinking is clearly represented in one of 
the fi gures in the Committee’s study titled “One market, one money”, 
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which assumes a one-way eff ect between community-level institutions 
and the behaviour of economic actors (Fig.  11.1 ). In the past 20–25 
years, this approach has not changed one iota, and the reforms that came 
into existence during the six-year period of crisis management follow the 
same train of thought. Th e institutions designed at the community level 
are able to change the behaviour of the actors by combining sanctions 
and incentives.
 Th e member states are usually categorised into two groups—the “econ-
omists” and the “monetarists”—on the basis of their arguing during the 
debate leading to the Maastricht Treaty (for example, Kenen  1995 ; Molle 
 2001 ). Th e “economists” (especially German and Dutch experts) were 
of the opinion that monetary integration is possible after achieving real 
convergence, and the monetary union was regarded as the “crowning” of 
the convergence process (in German, this is known as “ Krönungstheorie ”). 
Th e “monetarists” (especially Italian, French and Belgian experts) hoped 
that monetary integration might enforce tight control on infl ation and 
induce changes in economic behaviour that facilitate real convergence. 
Finally, the specifi c content of the Maastricht Treaty was not determined 
by these theoretical debates but on political compromises, exactly the 
same way as in the scope of countries admitted to the euro area in 1998; 
however, by that time, the structural weaknesses of the Mediterranean 
countries was observable after the crisis of the European Monetary 
System in 1992–1993 (see Aglietta  1995 ). 
 Fig. 11.1  Schema of the effects of EMU.  Source : European Commission 
( 1990 : 12) 
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 Th us, in the theories of economic integration and monetary union, 
the convergence of the real and nominal processes is an essential assump-
tion. A diff erent theoretical framework appeared only when the cohe-
sion policy 2014–2020 was formulated. Th e Barca report—which was 
prepared at the request of the EU Commission (Barca  2009 )—argues 
in favour of the place-based paradigm that derives from the fi ndings of 
the new economic geography and new institutional economics. However, 
these approaches do not count on the appearance of equilibrium, that is, 
convergence. Th e report expressly declares that convergence measured 
in per capita GDP is not an objective of cohesion policy because the 
evolution of the productive potential of an area may occur as the result 
of prosperous agglomerations growing more quickly and the disparities 
between the centre and the periphery widening. Th e objective of cohe-
sion policy is to facilitate the realisation of the economic potential of the 
regions and inclusive social development within the regions. Th e Barca 
report makes reference to the most important documents of the 1970s 
and 1980s (Werner, Th omson, and Padoa-Schioppa reports), and the key 
sentences of the old reports are cited, from which it is evident that their 
authors believe that not only the monetary union but also the common 
market would be unsustainable, 4 if the regional and structural inequali-
ties deepened. Th ese old authors view cohesion policy as a solution that is 
able to prevent such a case; this very task justifi es its existence. Th e Barca 
report breaks with this old paradigm of cohesion policy without asking 
what will happen to the functionality of the common market or that of 
the monetary union if the cohesion policy is not able to facilitate conver-
gence (and, according to the new economic geography and new institu-
tional economics, market processes are not heading towards the direction 
of convergence). Although the legal regulation of the cohesion policy 
adopted several elements of the place-based paradigm, the Council of 
the European Union, in its decision to accept the Multiannual Financial 
Framework for 2014–2020, confi rmed the reduction of the regional 
inequalities as an objective of cohesion policy. In the debates around the 
regulation and the budget of the cohesion policy, the deeper theoretical 
questions raised by the Barca report have remained unanswered (Farkas 
 2013 ). 
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 In summary, econometric forecasts confi rm the concerns awoken 
by the institutional studies in relation to the development prospects of 
European integration. In the economics of European integration, we can-
not fi nd a theoretical framework to solve this problem. Th e conception 
of conditional convergence may include the role of the institutions and 
the fact that several structural reforms are needed to restore or strengthen 
convergence. Nevertheless, no answer is given regarding the situation 
that is most likely to occur, namely, how the European integration will 
be able to survive in the long run if the reforms are not or are only partly 
successful in some countries. 
 Neglecting the problem of convergence itself—as the Barca report 
did—cannot be a solution, either. Let us take the example of the United 
Kingdom: politicians and scholars usually blame the monetary union for 
the problems within European integration, however the diffi  culties of the 
UK prove that even the common market and the “four freedoms” cannot 
function without real convergence. Since the crises in 2008, the country 
has experienced such massive immigration that it repeatedly comes up 
with the idea of limiting the free movement of workers. Th e asymmetric 
relationship between countries is well represented by the fact that the fi rst 
fi rm step was not taken by the sender countries, which have been losing 
labour forces, but the country that has gained labour forces. Th e con-
vergence of income levels is necessary to achieve that the free movement 
of workers indeed increases the economic performance of integration. 
Persistent one-way movement deteriorates the potential growth rate of 
the sender country and deranges its social security system, as we are talk-
ing about ageing societies with low fertility. 5 Th e Ukrainian crisis shows 
that in the geographical peripheries, such as the Baltic countries, migra-
tion may infl uence geopolitical stability as well. 
 No infallible remedy exists for the diff erent institutional arrangements 
and the resulting problems of convergence. Nevertheless, as an institu-
tional analyst, I think that the discussions on the reforms invariably begin 
with the second question: what reforms are needed to accelerate conver-
gence and to reverse divergence in some countries. Th e fi rst question is 
never asked: how large are those diff erences that still allow the internal 
market and/or the monetary union to remain functional: If we man-
aged to model this on the economics of integration, we would be able 
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to see the minimum conditions of the functionality of the integration, 
and the related costs could be estimated. When all the above factors are 
taken into account, we may begin talking about how these minimum 
conditions can be achieved, which would also indicate the borders of 
intervention from the EU. Let us take an obvious example: if the per 
capita GDP in the Czech Republic cannot catch up with the EU average 
and becomes stuck at the level of 80 per cent, and this does not gener-
ate any obstacles in the free movement of the production factors and the 
economy creates no imbalances that may spill over to the economy of 
another member state, this will not jeopardise the functionality of the 
integration—although it means a certain loss of performance compared 
to the optimal conditions—and no EU intervention will be needed. 
 It is obvious that the functioning of a type of integration that has 
large institutional and cultural diversities can be managed less eff ectively 
and at higher costs (market transaction costs and redistributions costs 
alike) than a more homogenous integration, such as that of the USA. Th e 
countries have to make an attempt to decrease operational costs, while 
also being aware that institutional features may change very slowly and 
in an unpredictable manner, and the operational cost of integration must 
be compared to the alternative cost of the absence of integration. In this 
train of thought, the dispute about the common budget might be easier 
to handle, the contribution to which is always considered—expressly 
or tacitly—by the net contributors as the case of putting water into an 
empty barrel. 
 Interestingly, in political science, it has been long debated how het-
erogeneity within integration can be handled in formulating policies 
and in the decision-making mechanism; diff erentiated integration is dis-
cussed extensively in the literature, which gathered new impetus after the 
enlargement in the 2000s. Th e inequalities in development within the 
integration and the risk of persistent division between the centre and the 
periphery have come under scrutiny only recently in the theory of dif-
ferentiated integration (Ágh  2014 ; von Ondarza  2013 ). 
 From the very beginning, there have been two main ways of think-
ing about European integration. One expects the realisation of the free 
market at the community level from the integration; the other expects 
community- level common policies and institutionalisation. Th ese 
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approaches are well known as positive and negative integration. Th e 
two approaches could coexist (though with on-going debates and com-
promises) peacefully and even successfully with one another, and they 
relied on one another in the fi rst three decades of integration. After the 
Mediterranean enlargement, heterogeneity increased to such a great 
extent that the eff ect of the community-level institutions on forming 
the behaviour of the actors weakened. Before the Maastricht Treaty, in 
the debate about nominal and real convergence, Italian experts expected 
direct external help from the community constraints against insuffi  cient 
internal reform capacity and indigenous institutional weakness. 6 Th ese 
expectations did not prove to be well-grounded, and in the end, Ludwig 
Erhard’s writings in 1955, which warn against the weakness of commu-
nity institutions in relation to integration if the agreement is missing in 
terms of the objectives, principles, and systems of activities and behav-
iour, became justifi ed. Erhard also notes that we should not make the 
mistake of establishing increasingly newer institutions to obscure the 
tensions that result from a lack of agreement. 7 Political aspects and com-
promises, as well as the exaggerated expectations concerning the infl u-
ence of community institutions, contributed to the fact that the resulting 
euro area has a composition that puts a disproportionate burden on its 
economically weaker members, causing disproportionate losses in their 
growth potential when adapting to external shocks without a deprecia-
tion of currency. 
 In post-socialist countries—as we have seen above—European integra-
tion successfully stimulated transition. Th e application of conditionality, 
however, was truly eff ective only until their intention to join the Western 
bloc impelled these countries and the non-recurrent, productivity- 
increasing eff ect of the transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy in the favourable global economic environment resulted in per-
ceptible convergence. It is well documented that the reforms have slowed 
down or even come to a halt in recent years (see EBRD  2013 ).  Th e eff ec-
tiveness of the conditions and regulations imposed by the external EU level 
decreases ,  and the signifi cance of the commitment of the given state or society 
increases ,  if productivity growth must be ensured from a higher income level 
and with a more complex adaptation process . 
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 In summary, the EU has to manoeuvre between two adverse aspects. 
On the one hand, the EU cannot fail to support convergences at the 
community level that allow for a functioning internal market and a func-
tioning monetary union. On the other hand, it must be reassessed what 
can be realistically expected from community-level institutions and regu-
lations in such heterogeneous integration, and the member states must 
be made aware that their responsibility in making use of the advantages 
off ered by the EU has increased. 
 Th e logic behind both central planning and equilibrium theories with 
neoclassical roots implies that a pre-determined fi nal state can be achieved 
by bureaucracy, by the market or by the joint functioning of the two.  We 
must accept the situation in which we contemplate European integration , 
 which is built on common values and principles :  as an open-ended system , 
 not as a well-defi ned fi nal state ,  implying safety . Diff erentiated integration 
is not a transitory deviation from the ideal situation to be achieved but 
rather a method for handling the diff erences. 
 European integration is invaluable in maintaining European political 
stability and peace; it is the only chance for Europe to remain a factor in 
the global economy among competitors with markets of hundreds of mil-
lions or a billion people. Reviving the European integration is a huge task 
that must be performed with conviction and commitment and without 
entertaining illusions. 
 Notes 
  1.  Swedish experts have pointed out that the traditional advantages (for exam-
ple, in Sweden, the developed infrastructure, knowledge of the English lan-
guage, and cheap energy) are becoming increasingly less relevant because, in 
global competition, increasingly more countries are able to provide such 
benefi ts. Th e key to maintaining a high standard of living is the preservation 
of the competitiveness of the tradable sector, which depends principally on 
the ability to increase productivity (Alsén et al.  2013 ). Th is conclusion 
applies for all regions. 
  2.  Éltető ( 2014 ) provides a comprehensive overview of the integration experi-
ence of the CEE countries and of the convergence measured in per capita 
GDP. 
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 3.  Beckmann et al. ( 2000 ) provide a comprehensive and detailed overview of 
the theoretical conceptions of European economic integration. 
 4.  Th e diff erent needs for convergence within and outside the euro area require 
further analysis. 
 5.  Recently, the problem has arisen rather pointedly in Poland, where the 
decreasing amount of remittances indicates that an increasing proportion of 
foreign workers have decided to settle permanently. Furthermore, migrant 
women tend to have more children than do women who remain in their 
country of origin.  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/12/05/uk-europe-
demographics-poland-idUKKCN0JJ0KT20141205 , date accessed 15 
December 2014. 
 6.  Dyson and Featherstone ( 1999 ) give a very interesting and detailed account 
of the political, politological, economic and social philosophical views that 
infl uenced the debates before the Maastricht Treaty. 
 7.  Jede Integration aber - die politische und die wirtschaftliche - setzt immer 
eine vorherige Übereinstimmung hinsichtlich der Prinzipien, Systeme und 
Ziele des Handelns und Verhaltens voraus. Aus diesem Grunde sagte ich 
einleitend, daß vor jedem Versuch einer Integration der Wille zu einer 
Verständigung stehen muß. Verfallen wir nicht in den Fehler, Schwierigkeiten, 
Spannungen und Störungen sowohl im nationalen wie auch im internation-
alen Raum durch immer neue institutionelle und organisatorische 
Maßnahmen heilen oder—besser gesagt—überdecken zu wollen. Solcherart 
schieben wir die Probleme nur vor uns her, aber wir lösen sie nicht. Die 
Organisation ist immer nur die Form, aber die Funktion allein ist der Inhalt 
all unserer Bemühungen, die Zusammenarbeit der Völker auf eine höhere 
Ebene zu heben, ihr den Charakter einer echten Integration zu verleihen 
(Erhard  1955 : 8). 
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 Appendix 
 Table A.1  Clusters of the product markets 
 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  5  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 11)  ( n = 4)  ( n = 6)  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1) 
 Dimension 1. Market liberalisation 
 Price controls (index) a 
  Mean  4.49  8.85  4.40  6.67  4.40  5.56 
  Std. Deviation  1.12  1.16  0.04  1.15  0.00  1.11 
 Government enterprises and investment index b 
  Mean  1.19  8.80  2.26  1.10  3.33  2.23 
  Std. Deviation  0.08  3.36  2.23  0.00  0.00  2.20 
 Highest marginal tax rate, corporate rate (%) c 
  Mean  26.65  18.85  18.87  32.23  22.28  24.43 
  Std. Deviation  5.54  4.40  4.43  3.36  0.00  6.70 
 Highest marginal tax rate, individual rate (%) c 
  Mean  43.37  32.20  28.80  37.79  38.80  37.73 




 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  5  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 11)  ( n = 4)  ( n = 6)  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1) 
 Paying taxes, total tax rate (% of proft) d 
  Mean  47.77  40.00  47.78  62.27  35.50  47.78 
  Std. Deviation  12.27  4.42  7.76  13.30  0.00  11.15 
 Starting a business, procedures (number) d 
  Mean  5.57  8.80  7.70  11.13  6.60  6.66 
  Std. Deviation  2.20  1.13  2.30  3.32  0.00  2.25 
 Starting a business, time (days) d 
  Mean  12.27  34.45  17.73  32.27  26.60  20.02 
  Std. Deviation  6.68  19.95  6.67  17.72  0.00  13.38 
 Starting a business, cost (% of income per capita) d 
  Mean  2.29  10.00  6.65  19.93  2.20  6.69 
  Std. Deviation  2.27  7.72  6.70  4.41  0.00  6.65 
 Starting a business, minimum capital (% of income per capita) d 
  Mean  25.56  76.60  38.80  42.23  20.00  38.84 
  Std. Deviation  21.13  84.50  15.56  53.35  0.00  41.15 
 Dealing with licenses, procedures (number) d 
  Mean  13.32  21.10  22.27  13.33  13.30  17.70 
  Std. Deviation  4.46  6.68  9.97  2.28  0.00  7.72 
 Dealing with licenses, time (days) d 
  Mean  155.56  222.20  189.93  219.97  217.70  184.46 
  Std. Deviation  79.94  73.34  57.74  45.59  0.00  70.06 
 Dealing with licenses, cost (% of income per capita) d 
  Mean  66.69  224.48  38.85  88.87  19.90  85.60 
  Std. Deviation  29.93  184.47  46.64  43.37  0.00  96.66 
 Registering property, procedures (number) d 
  Mean  4.47  7.75  4.47  8.80  8.80  5.52 
  Std. Deviation  2.21  1.10  1.14  4.40  0.00  2.23 
 Registering property, time (days) d 
  Mean  44.44  189.95  51.13  22.27  29.90  66.64 





 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  5  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 11)  ( n = 4)  ( n = 6)  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1) 
 Registering property, cost (% of property value) d 
  Mean  5.52  1.10  2.28  3.30  10.00  4.43 
  Std. Deviation  3.36  0.09  4.42  3.35  0.00  3.33 
 Paying taxes, payments (number per year) d 
  Mean  12.25  44.40  18.80  14.47  22.20  19.98 
  Std. Deviation  6.67  36.68  9.91  6.61  0.00  18.82 
 Paying taxes, time (hours per year) d 
  Mean  169.91  374.40  346.67  307.73  58.80  257.70 
  Std. Deviation  73.33  185.57  303.37  48.88  0.00  188.85 
 Enforcing contracts, procedures (number) d 
  Mean  29.96  35.50  30.00  39.97  26.60  31.12 
  Std. Deviation  4.42  4.42  3.31  1.16  0.00  5.58 
 Enforcing contracts, time (days) d 
  Mean  432.23  820.05  439.90  848.80  321.10  541.10 
  Std. Deviation  100.05  377.71  223.35  348.81  0.00  278.80 
 Enforcing contracts, cost (% of claim) d 
  Mean  19.93  17.78  20.02  20.00  8.80  20.00 
  Std. Deviation  6.62  5.53  7.75  8.86  0.00  6.67 
 Closing a business, time (years) d 
  Mean  1.14  2.20  3.37  1.10  2.20  2.29 
  Std. Deviation  0.01  0.02  1.14  0.03  0.00  1.10 
 Closing a business, cost (% of estate) d 
  Mean  7.74  12.20  12.23  15.53  15.50  10.00 
  Std. Deviation  4.43  6.68  4.42  6.61  0.00  5.58 
 Closing a business, recovery rate d 
  Mean  76.66  33.33  37.77  61.17  41.10  57.78 
  Std. Deviation  14.40  8.87  9.99  16.66  0.00  22.24 
 Dimension 2. International integration 
 Trade integration of goods e 
  Mean  36.65  43.33  58.86  19.97  44.43  41.15 




 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  5  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 11)  ( n = 4)  ( n = 6)  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1) 
 Trade integration of services e 
  Mean  12.20  8.88  11.10  7.72  87.77  13.38 
  Std. Deviation  7.71  4.42  3.36  3.33  0.00  16.62 
 Balance of international trade in goods (%of GDP) e 
  Mean  2.27  −8.87  −9.92  −7.70  −10.07  −3.36 
  Std. Deviation  7.78  7.79  8.90  6.61  0.00  9.91 
 Balance of international trade in services (% of GDP) e 
  Mean  0. 594  1.16  2.29  3.31  43.33  3.39 
  Std. Deviation  2.23  1.11  2.22  4.46  0.00  8.86 
 Inward FDI stock, % of GDP f 
  Mean  59.97  46.63  56.62  23.37  60.00  52.25 
  Std. Deviation  39.96  31.16  16.64  11.12  0.00  31.10 
 Outward FDI stock, % of GDP f 
  Mean  62.25  5.53  8.88  26.67  191.10  41.15 
  Std. Deviation  32.22  5.59  9.97  17.70  0.00  46.60 
 Distances between cluster centres 
 Cluster  1  2  3  4  5 
 1  6.77  4.44  5.79  8.43 
 2  6.77  5.00  5.85  10.16 
 3  4.44  5.00  5.86  8.86 
 4  5.79  5.85  5.86  10.02 
 5  8.43  10.16  8.86  10.02 
 Source : 
 a Gwartney–Lawson ( 2008 ) Annual report, data 2006 
 b Gwartney–Lawson ( 2008 ) Annual report, average of the data 2004–2006 
 c World Bank ( 2007b ), data 2006 
 d World Bank ( 2007a ) data 2007 
 e Eurostat, average of the data 2004–2006 




 Table A.2  Clusters of research and development and innovation system 
 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1)  ( n = 7)  ( n = 14) 
 Research and development expenditure, % of GDP a 
  Mean  3.23  1.56  1.94  0.84  1.46 
  Std. Deviation  0.64  0.00  0.41  0.35  0.91 
 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) 
by source of funds; Business enterprise sector (%) b 
  Mean  66.88  80.05  52.78  37.81  47.18 
  Std. Deviation  1.20  0.00  6.96  9.67  14.72 
 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) 
by source of funds; Government sector (%) b 
  Mean  26.48  13.90  31.94  50.21  40.79 
  Std. Deviation  3.30  0.00  5.02  9.19  13.54 
 Human resources in science and technology as a share of labour force (%) c 
  Mean  46.82  43.35  43.76  33.41  38.32 
  Std. Deviation  2.96  0.00  4.59  6.54  7.87 
 Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports (%) a 
  Mean  15.99  36.04  17.82  6.78  12.15 
  Std. Deviation  2.91  0.00  7.40  4.84  8.88 
 Employment in high- and medium-high-technology manufacturing sectors, 
share of total employment (%) a 
  Mean  40.60  41.49  38.24  24.86  31.16 
  Std. Deviation  6.90  0.00  4.61  3.77  8.39 
 European high-technology patents (per million inhabitants) b 
  Mean  46.65  10.09  19.85  1.30  12.29 
  Std. Deviation  25.79  0.00  8.75  1.59  17.63 
 Patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Offi ce (USPTO), 
Number of patents per million d 
  Mean  131.85  112.50  61.97  4.67  40.29 
  Std. Deviation  6.82  0.00  13.64  7.59  47.16 
 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) by source of funds; Abroad (%) b 
  Mean  4.84  5.95  12.66  9.51  9.69 




 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1)  ( n = 7)  ( n = 14) 
 Employment in knowledge-intensive service sectors, Share of total 
employment (%) a 
  Mean  8.07  1.28  5.75  5.56  5.74 
  Std. Deviation  2.35  0.00  1.11  2.71  2.50 
 Distances between cluster centres 
 Cluster  1  2  3  4 
 1  4.71  3.29  6.09 
 2  4.71  3.99  6.42 
 3  3.29  3.99  3.61 
 4  6.09  6.42  3.61 
 Source : 
 a Eurostat, average of the data 2004–2006 
 b Eurostat, average of the data 2003–2005 
 c Eurostat, average of the data 2005–2007 




 Table A.3  Clusters of the fi nancial system 
 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  5  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1)  ( n = 10)  ( n = 2)  ( n = 9) 
 Bank capital to assets ratio (%) a 
  Mean  6.04  4.70  8.63  6.35  5.64  6.90 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 3.05  0.00  1.52  3.32  0.84  2.12 
 Bank deposits/GDP b 
  Mean  0.63  3.34  0.39  1.14  0.79  0.74 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.29  0.00  0.12  0.12  0.17  0.61 
 Bank overhead costs/Total assets b 
  Mean  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
 Deposit money bank assets/GDP b 
  Mean  0.98  1.24  0.46  1.64  1.31  0.96 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.21  0.00  0.15  0.12  0.25  0.47 
 Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) a 
  Mean  97.38  108.66  44.82  165.31  130.46  94.15 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 22.13  0.00  14.65  9.41  21.76  47.15 
 Private credit by deposit money banks/GDP b 
  Mean  0.83  1.19  0.37  1.58  1.17  0.84 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.20  0.00  0.12  0.05  0.29  0.47 
 Bank concentration (Share of the 5 largest CIs in total assets) b 
  Mean  0.94  0.29  0.68  0.54  0.68  0.69 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.06  0.00  0.15  0.03  0.16  0.18 
 Herfi ndahl index for CIs (index ranging from 0 to 10,000) c 
  Mean  1855.22  294.00  1357.63  1131.33  676.70  1111.56 
  Std. 
Deviation 




 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  5  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1)  ( n = 10)  ( n = 2)  ( n = 9) 
 Share of the 5 largest CIs in total assets in per cent c 
  Mean  75.07  29.23  65.23  61.47  48.10  58.50 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 14.22  0.00  14.76  33.71  16.52  19.16 
 Total assets under management by insurance corporations/GDP c 
  Mean  0.69  1.66  0.06  1.08  0.43  0.42 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.33  0.00  0.04  0.62  0.23  0.45 
 Total assets under management by investment funds/GDP c 
  Mean  0.41  50.84  0.04  0.25  0.64  2.35 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.21  0.00  0.03  0.08  0.78  10.12 
 Life insurance premium volume/GDP b 
  Mean  0.06  0.30  0.01  0.07  0.04  0.04 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.01  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.06 
 Total assets under management by pension funds/GDP c 
  Mean  0.06  0.00  0.04  1.22  0.08  0.15 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.07  0.00  0.04  0.12  0.09  0.33 
 Non-life insurance premium volume/GDP b 
  Mean  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.03 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 
 Market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) a 
  Mean  109.68  139.53  22.22  119.57  56.28  57.46 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 8.68  0.00  9.48  22.96  19.05  40.55 
 Stock market turnover b 
  Mean  0.87  0.01  0.29  1.18  0.83  0.61 
  Std. 
Deviation 





 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  5  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1)  ( n = 10)  ( n = 2)  ( n = 9) 
 Stock market capitalisation/GDP b 
  Mean  1.01  1.26  0.19  1.11  0.51  0.52 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.08  0.00  0.09  0.22  0.18  0.38 
 Stock market total value traded/GDP b 
  Mean  0.84  0.01  0.06  1.32  0.46  0.40 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.55  0.00  0.07  0.42  0.33  0.47 
 Distances between cluster centres 
 Cluster  1  2  3  4  5 
 1  2.31  1.14  1.27  0.86 
 2  2.31  3.32  1.06  2.29 
 3  1.14  3.32  2.26  1.15 
 4  1.27  1.06  2.26  1.27 
 5  0.86  2.29  1.15  1.27 
 Source : 
 a World Development Indicators, average of the data 2003–2005 
 b Beck et al. ( 2000 ) average of the data 2004–2006 
 c European Central Bank ( 2008 ), data 2007 
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 Table A.4  Clusters of the labour markets and industrial relations 
 Description of the cluster 
 1  2  3  4  5  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 11)  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1)  ( n = 8)  ( n = 2) 
 Employees with a contract of limited duration (annual average) (% of total 
number of employees) a 
  Mean  8.47  11.60  16.73  16.44  5.32  11.47 
  Std. Deviation  7.00  4.62  0.00  8.17  0.73  7.64 
 Persons employed part-time (% of total employment) a 
  Mean  6.98  23.18  46.15  15.73  21.08  14.42 
  Std. Deviation  3.45  1.35  0.00  5.31  6.05  9.80 
 Public expenditure on labour market policies, by type of action; Total LMP 
services (category 1), % of GDP b 
  Mean  0.07  0.19  0.48  0.15  0.30  0.15 
  Std. Deviation  0.04  0.03  0.00  0.08  0.12  0.11 
 Public expenditure on labour market policies, by type of action; Total LMP 
measures (categories 2–7) b 
  Mean  0.21  1.16  0.83  0.53  0.26  0.45 
  Std. Deviation  0.15  0.32  0.00  0.18  0.30  0.36 
 Public expenditure on labour market policies, by type of action; Total LMP 
supports (categories 8–9), % of GDP b 
  Mean  0.37  1.89  1.85  1.36  0.53  0.94 
  Std. Deviation  0.23  0.76  0.00  0.61  0.48  0.75 
 Trade union density (%) c 
  Mean  21.40  66.39  21.53  31.22  32.90  30.86 
  Std. Deviation  7.24  11.51  0.00  20.56  5.52  18.98 
 Bargaining coverage % c 
  Mean  38.50  90.00  82.00  81.25  34.77  59.80 
  Std. Deviation  23.52  7.21  0.00  17.27  0.33  29.49 
 Coordination of wage bargaining (1–5) c 
  Mean  2.27  3.33  4.00  3.25  3.00  2.84 
  Std. Deviation  1.27  0.58  0.00  0.89  2.83  1.25 
 Diffi culty of hiring index d 
  Mean  31.73  9.33  17.00  51.38  11.00  33.08 
  Std. Deviation  21.22  8.62  0.00  24.69  0.00  24.61 
 Rigidity of hours index d 
  Mean  63.64  40.00  40.00  62.50  10.00  55.20 




 Description of the cluster 
 1  2  3  4  5  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 11)  ( n = 3)  ( n = 1)  ( n = 8)  ( n = 2) 
 Diffi culty of fi ring index d 
  Mean  32.73  20.00  70.00  41.25  15.00  34.00 
  Std. Deviation  14.89  17.32  0.00  6.41  7.07  16.07 
 Rigidity of employment index d 
  Mean  42.82  23.00  42.00  51.75  12.00  40.80 
  Std. Deviation  12.42  14.73  0.00  9.05  7.07  16.09 
 Nonwage labour cost (% of salary) d 
  Mean  30.18  29.33  18.00  26.50  11.00  26.88 
  Std. Deviation  5.44  27.10  0.00  10.58  0.00  11.67 
 Firing cost (weeks of salary) d 
  Mean  18.91  14.00  17.00  44.88  23.00  26.88 
  Std. Deviation  11.19  13.11  0.00  28.38  1.41  21.55 
 Employment rate a 
  Mean  60.88  70.48  74.50  66.75  70.02  65.19 
  Std. Deviation  4.09  8.09  0.00  2.39  2.24  5.71 
 Unemployment rate a 
  Mean  8.41  6.37  3.93  7.22  4.83  7.32 
  Std. Deviation  2.76  2.01  0.00  1.96  0.47  2.51 
 Long-term unemployed (12 months and more) as a percentage of the total 
active population a 
  Mean  4.56  2.03  1.63  2.73  1.30  3.29 
  Std. Deviation  2.31  1.82  0.00  1.43  0.19  2.14 
 Unemployment rate, by age group; Less than 25 years, % a 
  Mean  19.27  16.37  6.90  15.60  11.25  16.61 
  Std. Deviation  5.96  7.19  0.00  3.74  3.46  5.80 
 Distances between cluster centres 
 Cluster  1  2  3  4  5 
 1  5.82  8.04  3.63  5.54 
 2  5.82  5.96  4.46  4.92 
 3  8.04  5.96  5.89  6.29 
 4  3.63  4.46  5.89  5.58 
 5  5.54  4.92  6.29  5.58 
 Source : 
 a Eurostat, average of the data 2005–2007 
 b Eurostat, average of the data 2004–2006 
 c Visser ( 2009 ) 
 d World Bank ( 2007a ) 
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 Table A.5  Clusters of the social protection system 
 Description of the cluster 
 1  2  3  4  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 4)  ( n = 1)  ( n = 13)  ( n = 7) 
 Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) a 
  Mean  6.84  5.58  6.39  4.67  5.95 
  Std. Deviation  0.96  0.00  1.27  1.12  1.40 
 Health expenditure, public (% of GDP) a 
  Mean  1.32  1.62  2.42  1.85  2.06 
  Std. Deviation  0.42  0.00  0.65  0.89  0.78 
 Health expenditure, private (% of GDP) a 
  Mean  8.17  7.20  8.81  6.52  8.00 
  Std. Deviation  0.93  0.00  1.26  0.98  1.47 
 Inequality of income distribution b 
  Mean  3.61  4.95  4.87  5.13  4.74 
  Std. Deviation  0.27  0.00  1.10  1.49  1.20 
 Expenditure on pensions Current prices (% of GDP) c 
  Mean  11.18  4.83  12.03  7.09  10.23 
  Std. Deviation  1.11  0.00  1.76  0.93  2.82 
 At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers (%) b 
  Mean  27.50  32.50  25.69  23.07  25.52 
  Std. Deviation  2.68  0.00  2.76  3.51  3.50 
 At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers (%) b 
  Mean  12.13  19.00  15.96  16.36  15.58 
  Std. Deviation  1.25  0.00  3.68  4.22  3.76 
 Total expenditure on social protection, Current prices (% of GDP) c 
  Mean  28.00  18.07  25.71  15.17  22.82 
  Std. Deviation  4.65  0.00  3.70  2.59  6.18 
 Social benefi ts (other than social transfers in kind) paid by general 
government (% of GDP) d 
  Mean  15.30  9.50  15.27  10.14  13.61 
  Std. Deviation  1.11  0.00  2.42  1.85  3.18 
 Social benefi ts by function; Sickness/Health care (% of total benefi ts) c 
  Mean  24.15  40.30  28.14  30.61  28.68 
  Std. Deviation  2.37  0.00  3.30  3.42  4.40 
 Social benefi ts by function; Family/Children (% of total benefi ts) c 
  Mean  12.89  14.86  7.47  9.50  9.20 




 Description of the cluster 
 1  2  3  4  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 4)  ( n = 1)  ( n = 13)  ( n = 7) 
 Social benefi ts by function; Old age (% of total benefi ts) c 
  Mean  33.74  21.87  42.59  43.64  40.64 
  Std. Deviation  5.50  0.00  5.90  3.26  7.15 
 Social benefi ts by function; Disability (% of total benefi ts) c 
  Mean  13.80  5.03  8.31  8.88  9.22 
  Std. Deviation  0.77  0.00  2.04  0.81  2.65 
 Social benefi ts by function; Housing (% of total benefi ts) c 
  Mean  1.49  3.03  1.37  0.26  1.14 
  Std. Deviation  0.74  0.00  1.56  0.27  1.32 
 Social benefi ts by function; Unemployment (% of total benefi ts) c 
  Mean  7.43  7.80  6.00  3.07  5.48 
  Std. Deviation  2.45  0.00  3.45  1.41  3.15 
 Social protection receipts by type; General government contributions (% of 
total receipts) e 
  Mean  50.16  53.17  34.71  27.99  36.04 
  Std. Deviation  8.91  0.00  7.72  9.63  11.32 
 Social protection receipts by type; Employers’ social contribution (% of total 
receipts) e 
  Mean  29.24  26.07  37.38  53.43  40.12 
  Std. Deviation  13.90  0.00  7.44  12.33  13.17 
 Social protection receipts by type; Social contribution paid by the protected 
persons (% of total receipts) e 
  Mean  15.92  15.83  22.65  15.42  19.27 
  Std. Deviation  7.18  0.00  8.19  8.98  8.55 
 Distances between cluster centres 
 Cluster  1  2  3  4 
 1  6.93  4.17  6.02 
 2  6.93  6.86  6.66 
 3  4.17  6.86  4.31 
 4  6.02  6.66  4.31 
 Source : 
 a World Development Indicators, average of the data 2002–2004 
 b Eurostat, average of the data 2005–2006 
 c Eurostat, average of the data 2003–2005 
 d Eurostat, average of the data 2005–2007 
 e Eurostat, average of the data 2004–2006 
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 Table A.6  Clusters of the education system 
 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 7)  ( n = 3)  ( n = 10)  ( n = 5) 
 Percentage of the population aged 25–64 having completed at most lower 
secondary education a 
  Mean  21.48  57.34  25.98  15.37  26.36 
  Std. Deviation  4.40  13.42  10.42  5.91  14.78 
 Early school-leavers—Percentage of the population aged 18–24 with at most 
lower secondary education and not in further education or training a 
  Mean  10.25  29.76  13.73  9.89  13.91 
  Std. Deviation  3.03  8.71  2.79  5.69  7.46 
 Total population having completed at least upper secondary education, 
Population aged 25–64 (%) a 
  Mean  78.52  42.66  74.02  84.63  73.64 
  Std. Deviation  4.40  13.42  10.42  5.91  14.78 
 Youth education attainment level—Percentage of the population aged 20–24 
having completed at least upper secondary education a 
  Mean  82.38  62.43  81.50  85.31  80.22 
  Std. Deviation  6.03  12.26  4.95  9.00  9.55 
 Pupils in upper secondary education enrolled in vocational stream; Males, (%) b 
  Mean  66.10  50.79  48.58  69.89  58.01 
  Std. Deviation  10.19  18.96  16.93  11.50  16.66 
 Pupils in upper secondary education enrolled in vocational stream; Females, 
(%) b 
  Mean  59.72  38.14  38.02  55.41  47.59 
  Std. Deviation  10.62  12.62  18.45  16.50  17.88 
 School enrolment, tertiary (% gross) c 
  Mean  67.81  59.26  54.74  43.99  56.79 
  Std. Deviation  13.08  4.19  18.42  9.89  16.12 
 Life-long learning (adult participation in education and training)—Percentage 
of the population aged 25–64 participating in education and training over 
the four weeks prior to the survey a 
  Mean  22.19  6.90  5.67  4.74  10.26 
  Std. Deviation  7.64  3.19  2.45  2.32  8.76 
 Science and technology graduates (ISCED 5–6) in mathematics, science and 
technology per 1000 of population aged 20–29 b 
  Mean  12.78  10.47  11.59  8.82  11.23 




 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 7)  ( n = 3)  ( n = 10)  ( n = 5) 
 Annual expenditure on public and private educational institutions compared 
to GDP per capita; All levels of education, (%—based on full-time 
equivalents) d 
  Mean  26.54  25.71  22.40  23.59  24.20 
  Std. Deviation  2.55  1.34  2.98  2.20  3.04 
 Annual expenditure on public and private educational institutions compared 
to GDP per capita; Tertiary level of education (ISCED 5–6), (%—based on 
full-time equivalents) d 
  Mean  42.45  32.23  32.24  40.25  36.70 
  Std. Deviation  5.00  3.67  6.13  5.76  7.08 
 Public expenditure on education, % of GDP d 
  Mean  6.24  4.75  4.83  4.58  5.17 
  Std. Deviation  1.16  0.60  0.90  0.49  1.09 
 Private expenditure on education as % of GDP d 
  Mean  0.50  0.40  0.40  0.66  0.48 
  Std. Deviation  0.34  0.18  0.22  0.15  0.25 
 Employment rate, by highest level of education attained; Pre-primary, primary 
and lower secondary education—levels 0–2 (ISCED), % of age group 
25–64 years a 
  Mean  53.27  56.26  39.77  26.89  42.95 
  Std. Deviation  7.63  9.74  9.63  10.99  13.73 
 Employment rate, by highest level of education attained; Upper secondary 
and post-secondary non-tertiary education—levels 3–4 (ISCED), % of age 
group 25–64 years a 
  Mean  76.15  66.30  67.77  67.62  69.91 
  Std. Deviation  3.74  1.88  4.10  5.43  5.57 
 Employment rate, by highest level of education attained; Tertiary education—
levels 5–6 (ISCED), % of age group 25–64 years a 
  Mean  86.39  81.40  83.86  83.29  84.16 
  Std. Deviation  0.97  3.32  2.67  1.19  2.58 
 Unemployment rates of the population aged 25–64 by level of education; 
Pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education—levels 0–2 (ISCED), 
Annual average a 
  Mean  7.16  8.05  10.08  25.68  12.14 




 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  Total 
 Number of the 
countries  ( n = 7)  ( n = 3)  ( n = 10)  ( n = 5) 
 Unemployment rates of the population aged 25–64 by level of education; 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education—levels 3–4 
(ISCED), Annual average a 
  Mean  4.40  6.16  6.00  8.97  6.17 
  Std. Deviation  1.36  1.32  1.64  2.95  2.37 
 Unemployment rates of the population aged 25–64 by level of education; 
Tertiary education—levels 5–6 (ISCED), Annual average a 
  Mean  3.03  5.39  3.56  3.65  3.65 
  Std. Deviation  0.76  0.46  1.34  1.18  1.25 
 Distances between cluster centres 
 Cluster  1  2  3  4 
 1  6.64  4.24  5.20 
 2  6.64  4.86  6.91 
 3  4.24  4.86  3.61 
 4  5.20  6.91  3.61 
 Source : 
 a Eurostat, average of the data 2005–2007 
 b Eurostat, average of the data 2004–2006 
 c World Bank ( 2007b ), average of the data 2002–2004 




 Table A.7  Assessment of the EU member states’ overall Lisbon performance, 








2006  Rank 2005 
 Sweden  1  1  2  2  2 
 Austria  2  4  3  5  3 
 Denmark  3  2  1  1  1 
 The Netherlands  4  3  4  3  5 
 Finland  5  5  5  6  6 
 Germany  6  8  8  9  10 
 Ireland  7  6  6  8  7 
 United Kingdom  8  7  7  4  4 
 France  9  10  9  11  8 
 Czech Republic  10  9  14  10  12 
 Slovenia  11  14  10  12  11 
 Luxembourg  12  12  12  7  9 
 Belgium  13  13  13  13  13 
 Cyprus  14  15  15  14  14 
 Estonia  15  11  11  15  16 
 Lithuania  16  17  18  20  20 
 Latvia  17  16  17  18  19 
 Slovakia  18  18  20  23  22 
 Spain  19  19  16  17  21 
 Portugal  20  21  21  16  18 
 Poland  21  24  26  27  26 
 Greece  22  20  19  22  17 
 Hungary  23  23  22  19  15 
 Italy  24  22  23  21  23 
 Bulgaria  25  25  25  24  24 
 Romania  26  26  24  25  25 
 Malta  27  27  27  26  27 
 Source : Barysch et al. ( 2007 : 12,  2008 : 12), Tilford-Whyte ( 2010 : 11) 
 List of Lisbon indicators: GDP per capita; Labour productivity; Employment rate; 
Employment rate of older workers; Female participation rate; Educational 
attainment; Research and Development expenditure; Business investment; 
Comparative price levels; At risk-of-poverty rate; Long-term unemployment 
rate; Dispersion of regional employment rates; Greenhouse gas emissions; 
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 Table A.10  Clusters based on the driving factors of the crisis 
 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  Total 
 Number of 
the 
countries  n = 8  n = 7  n = 1  n = 3  n = 8  n = 1  n = 28 
 Cumulated losses/gains of GDP 2009–2013 comparing to 2008, at constant 
prices in the share of 2008 GDP a 
  Mean  −0.05  −0.24  −0.30  0.13  −0.37  −0.09  −0.18 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 0.14  0.22  0.00  0.28  0.16  0.00  0.24 
 Current account balance in % of GDP—2008 b 
  Mean  2.98  −8.31  −5.60  −4.97  −11.41  5.40  −5.03 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 4.33  6.38  0.00  2.49  5.43  0.00  7.74 
 House price index (2010 = 100) % change T/T−3, T = 2011 b 
  Mean  1.36  −5.64  −38.70  −10.07  −25.23  8.00  −10.40 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 9.17  7.99  0.00  6.49  12.73  0.00  15.34 
 Private debt in % of GDP—consolidated—2008 b 
  Mean  168.76  173.23  256.50  67.40  114.26  399.00  154.80 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 43.90  50.87  0.00  1.05  28.76  0.00  73.23 
 General government gross debt in % of GDP 2008 b 
  Mean  55.66  71.41  44.20  34.57  23.99  14.40  46.41 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 19.29  28.27  0.00  10.86  21.14  0.00  28.09 
 Inward FDI stocks in % of GDP 2008 b 
  Mean  73.00  36.64  75.10  49.77  50.50  2911.50  156.44 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 48.67  19.63  0.00  10.11  22.11  0.00  540.90 
 Gross value added—Industry, including energy, % of all branches—2008 b 
  Mean  21.23  15.37  23.60  27.63  21.70  9.40  20.25 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 3.19  3.57  0.00  2.90  3.77  0.00  5.29 
 Gross value added—Business activities and fi nancial services, % of all 
branches—2008 b 
  Mean  25.46  26.81  28.80  18.10  21.70  52.20  25.01 
  Std. 
Deviation 




 Description of the clusters 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  Total 
 Number of 
the 
countries  n = 8  n = 7  n = 1  n = 3  n = 8  n = 1  n = 28 
 Average value of imports and exports of goods divided by GDP (%) 2008 b 
  Mean  44.99  22.70  38.40  56.13  49.59  44.90  41.69 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 12.24  3.57  0.00  20.69  14.16  0.00  16.26 
 Average value of imports and exports of services divided by GDP (%) 2008 b 
  Mean  16.59  10.70  39.80  8.20  12.00  97.70  16.63 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 10.13  7.72  0.00  1.80  3.51  0.00  18.16 
 Labour productivity per person employed 2008, EU-27 = 100 b 
  Mean  111.64  100.34  126.90  71.93  62.95  168.20  93.21 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 9.42  14.61  0.00  8.82  14.73  0.00  28.60 
 Real effective exchange rate—42 trading partners—% change T/T−3, T = 2008 b 
  Mean  1.20  0.57  7.30  20.93  10.76  3.40  6.19 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 2.48  5.33  0.00  5.71  6.31  0.00  8.18 
 Total bank assets to GDP (%) 2008 c 
  Mean  387.48  370.05  960.63  91.94  117.27  3403.09  402.43 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 151.31  169.39  0.00  17.01  34.33  0.00  626.74 
 Total recapitalisation and asset relief 2008–2012, as a % of 2012 GDP d 
  Mean  3.49  7.40  39.96  0.00  0.82  5.85  4.72 
  Std. 
Deviation 
 3.64  6.30  0.00  0.00  1.57  0.00  8.26 
 Source : 
 a Author’s own calculation by AMECO 
 b Eurostat 
 c European Central Bank online database 
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